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Abstract
Today’s Internet is full of applications by which users share potentially private infor-
mation with each other. Recently, the privacy concerns of users are rising and users
gradually become more suspicious with respect to the use of their (personal) informa-
tion. In this thesis, we aim at bringing secure multi-party computation closer to com-
mon Internet users. The main goal is to design and implement privacy-preserving
reconciliation-based applications for multiple users which are secure against passive
and active attackers. Additionally, our solutions should be efficient enough to be
practical and usable enough even for non-technical users.
As a main contribution in theory, we present different privacy-preserving multi-party
reconciliation protocols based on an additively homomorphic cryptosystem that are
secure against passive attackers (semi-honest model). We also propose reconciliation
protocols that are secure against active attackers (malicious model) by applying
zero-knowledge proof techniques. The stronger security model comes at the price
of efficiency. As a prerequisite, we develop several novel cryptographic tools in the
areas of privacy-preserving set operations and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
We also analyze to what extent fully homomorphic cryptosystems can be used for
multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols.
As a main contribution in practice, we introduce SMC-MuSe, a framework for Secure
Multi-Party Computation on MultiSets. SMC-MuSe is a carefully designed frame-
work for secure multi-party computation including an implementation of different
cryptographic components, a support infrastructure, multi-party privacy-preserving
reconciliation protocols, and two user-friendly applications for the desktop and mo-
bile environment. We also evaluate the efficiency of the SMC-MuSe framework. In
particular, we measure the computation and communication overhead of all imple-
mented components within the SMC-MuSe framework.
As a third line of work, we propose different application scenarios in the areas of
event scheduling, e-voting, and electronic auctions for reconciliation protocols. We
examine the practicability of one particular user-friendly application of SMC-MuSe
by conducting a user study on our Android application Prefer. The user study shows
that Prefer is a useful and very interesting application for today’s smartphone users.
Finally, we show the potential of reconciliation protocols for common Internet users
by conducting a user study on privacy-preserving reconciliation in the Internet. The
user study shows that our reconciliation protocols are useful in different application
scenarios for common Internet users.
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1 Introduction
Today’s Internet is full of applications by which users share potentially private in-
formation with their friends and business partners (e.g. Doodle, Google Calendar,
Flickr, or Facebook). Typically, this (private) information is shared with an (im-
plicitly) trusted service provider or third party. Usually, the user has no knowledge
about the usage of her data and the data is shared among advertisers, application
developers, or government agencies. The rapid development of the (mobile) Inter-
net makes things even worse, especially the convenient and fast Internet access on
the user’s smartphone. Everyday, without worrying about privacy, millions of users
share (private) information on their smartphones with application developers, Inter-
net providers, and other third parties to use certain features on their smartphone or
to obtain useful applications which are available for free.
One essential problem with privacy is that companies do not develop free applications
for humanitarian reasons but rather to make money, e. g., with selective advertising
based on collected user data. The majority of users may still be willing to trade
in their private data for the free service use offered by the third parties. Recently,
however, privacy concerns of users are rising [36, 61, 80, 163]. Users gradually
become more suspicious with respect to the use of their (private) information by
service providers or third parties. In 2013, Savage et al. analyzed the value of private
information on the Internet based on the Smartphone App Market [176]. The authors
show that users are willing to pay a certain amount of money to conceal private
information relinquished by the privacy permissions of smartphone applications.
Interestingly, users have a very clear understanding of their preferences for privacy
when they are informed about the usage of their (private) data [176]. Possibly,
the increasing demand for privacy and the users’ willingness to pay for privacy
will lead to a rising development of privacy-preserving applications for the general
public.
In this thesis, we develop such privacy-preserving applications for the general pub-
lic. Our approach is based on secure multi-party computation. Secure Multi-Party
Computation (SMC) offers a theoretically well-founded way to enable applications
that preserve their users’ privacy. In many applications, multiple parties need to
jointly compute a function of their individual inputs, while keeping the inputs to
the function private from each other. An example would be to compute general
statistics over individual private input data like the age or the salary of a user. Se-
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cure multi-party computation solves this problem without the use of a trusted third
party. In theory, SMC protocols typically assume that all parties can directly com-
municate with each other, secure channels between each pair of parties exist and any
required keying material is pre-distributed. The practical use of secure multi-party
computation has often been questioned in the past [160]. This is due to the fact that
the assumptions made in theory are hard to meet in practice and that general pur-
pose SMC frameworks have a high computation and communication overhead. In
this thesis, we introduce a practical special purpose SMC framework for multi-party
reconciliation protocols.
Reconciliation protocols are a specific type of secure multi-party computation proto-
cols. A reconciliation protocol allows two or more parties to reconcile their ordered
input sets in a privacy-preserving manner [134]. More concretely, it allows multiple
parties to find common inputs in their individually ordered input sets that maxi-
mize a function based on the intersection of their inputs. In certain applications,
the order of the input set encodes the preferences of each party associated with the
input elements. The pre-order is induced by a so-called composition scheme. In
this thesis, we consider the sum of ranks and the minimum of ranks composition
schemes first introduced in [134]. In case of the former, the sum of the preferences
of all parties is optimized while the latter maximizes the lowest of the preferences
of all parties.
Reconciliation protocols enable a variety of interesting privacy-preserving appli-
cations such as event scheduling, e-voting, electronic auctions, policy reconcili-
ation, and distributed network monitoring [129]. E. g., in a privacy-preserving
event scheduling application several parties agree upon a common meeting time
based on their individual availability and preferences. Each party can assign pref-
erences to each one of its free time slots which are equally taken into account
when the best meeting time is determined. Furthermore all parties keep their in-
puts private from each other and do not even reveal them to any trusted third
party.
The main goal of this thesis is to design and implement multi-party privacy-preserving
reconciliation protocols which are secure against passive and active attackers. A pas-
sive attacker follows the protocol correctly but tries to learn as much as possible from
the protocol run, especially any information about the private inputs of the other
parties. An active attacker can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol in order to
manipulate the computation or to learn more information about the other parties’
private inputs. The efficiency of these protocols is crucial for their practical use
in the different application scenarios. Also, we intend to bring secure multi-party
computation, especially applications of reconciliation protocols, to common Inter-
net users. Thus, our applications are to be usable enough even for non-technical
users.
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As a main contribution in theory, we construct reconciliation protocols secure in the
semi-honest and malicious model, i. e., secure against passive and active attackers.
We analyze the correctness, security, and complexity of our protocol constructions.
As a main contribution in practice, we develop the SMC-MuSe framework. SMC-
MuSe is a carefully designed framework for secure multi-party computation. We eval-
uate the efficiency of all implemented components of the SMC-MuSe framework. We
also present different reconciliation-based application scenarios and show the poten-
tial of reconciliation protocols for common Internet users.
1.1 Contributions
In the following, we detail our main contributions.
Novel Cryptographic Tools: In order to achieve multi-party privacy-preserving
reconciliation protocols secure in the semi-honest and malicious models, we devel-
oped novel cryptographic tools in the context of Privacy-Preserving Set Operations
and Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge.
In the area of privacy-preserving set operations, we present two main contributions.
First, we generalize the multiset intersection operation by Kissner et al. [114] which
is required for our semi-honest model protocol constructions presented in Chapter 4.
Second, we present novel set operations to check the multiset membership of a set
element and the inclusion relation between two multisets. We design the formal pro-
tocols and analyze the correctness, security, and efficiency of our constructions. Both
contributions generalize Kissner’s grammar for privacy-preserving set operations.
The first one generalizes the grammar to input multisets of arbitrary size and the sec-
ond one generalizes it by a multiset difference operation.
In the area of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, based on well-known crypto-
graphic primitives, we construct non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
for complex computations using an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. More
specifically, we propose new non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for the Paillier
cryptosystem and proof constructions for the creation of polynomials and operations
on polynomials based on the Paillier cryptosystem. Our zero-knowledge construc-
tions enable verifiable multiset union, intersection, and reduction operations which
are required for our malicious model protocol constructions presented in Chapter 5.
We also show that our constructions are more efficient than the ones previously
proposed by Kissner et al. [114].
Parts of this work have already been published in [143, 144, 145, 148].
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Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation in the Semi-Honest Model: As a
main contribution, we construct multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation pro-
tocols which are secure against passive attackers (semi-honest model) in Chapter 4.
We propose reconciliation protocols for the minimum of ranks and sum of ranks
composition schemes in the semi-honest model. Our constructions are based on a
threshold version of a semantically secure additively homomorphic cryptosystem.
The core operations used in our protocols are privacy-preserving multiset opera-
tions. We give a formal protocol description, and analyze the correctness, security,
and efficiency of our constructions in terms of computation and communication
overhead.
We show potential improvements of our protocols in case of a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme. Finally, we generalize reconciliation protocols from totally or-
dered input sets to arbitrary pre-ordered input sets. This enables a broader range
of possible applications.
This work has been published in [143, 147, 148, 195].
Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation in the Malicious Model: In Chap-
ter 5, we propose multi-party protocols solving the reconciliation on ordered sets
problem that are provably secure against active attackers. We construct reconcil-
iation protocol variants for the minimum of ranks and sum of ranks composition
schemes which are secure in the malicious model. Our constructions are based on
a threshold version of a semantically secure, additively homomorphic cryptosystem
and our novel non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to provide verifiable multiset
operations.
We give a formal protocol description and analyze the correctness, security, and
complexity of our constructions. In order to prove the security of the protocol, we
give a formal simulation proof in the real-vs.-ideal paradigm. We show that our rec-
onciliation protocols are polynomial-time bound with respect to both the number of
parties and the number of input elements of each party.
This work has been published in [144, 145].
SMC-MuSe: A Framework for Secure Multi-Party Computation: As a main
contribution in practice, in Chapter 7, we introduce SMC-MuSe, a framework for
Secure Multi-Party Computation on MultiSets. SMC-MuSe is a well-designed
framework for secure multi-party computation including an implementation of dif-
ferent cryptographic components, a support infrastructure for secure multi-party
computation, multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols in the semi-
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honest and malicious model, and two user-friendly applications for the desktop and
mobile environment. The framework is targeted at the efficient computation of
arbitrary compositions of privacy-preserving multiset operations. SMC-MuSe sup-
ports the multiset intersection, union, and element reduction operations by Kissner
et al. [114] as well as the novel multiset membership test and the sub-multiset
test developed in the context of this thesis. SMC-MuSe supports several homomor-
phic cryptosystems. Currently, we use a threshold version of the Paillier cryptosys-
tem for our reconciliation protocols. In addition, we implemented several prelimi-
nary and newly-developed zero-knowledge proofs based on the Paillier cryptosystem
which are, e. g., to be used in the reconciliation protocols secure in the malicious
model.
Our SMC-MuSe framework makes secure multi-party computation on multisets
available to application developers and end-users. To the best of our knowledge,
SMC-MuSe is the first practical framework that allows privacy-preserving compu-
tations secure against active attackers. We show how SMC-MuSe allows an appli-
cation developer to easily turn a protocol implementation into a user-friendly SMC
application by the implementation of a scheduling application on top of the reconcil-
iation protocols in the desktop and mobile environment. More generally, SMC-MuSe
enables the implementation of e-Voting schemes, electronic auctions, scheduling ap-
plications, and any other type of application that can be built on top of multiset
operations or reconciliation protocols.
The work on SMC-MuSe has also been published in [146, 149].
Performance and Usability Evaluations: As a second major practical contribu-
tion, we present a comprehensive evaluation of the efficiency of our SMC-MuSe
framework. We show the efficiency in terms of computation and communication
overhead of all implemented components, especially of the reconciliation protocols
secure in the semi-honest and malicious models. We show that all solutions in
the semi-honest and the malicious model are polynomial-time bound with respect
to the number of inputs and the number of parties. We also demonstrate that
SMC-MuSe is competitive with existing SMC frameworks such as the SEPIA frame-
work. Last, we show that reconciliation protocols can also be used in the mobile
environment using our Android application Prefer. We conducted a user study
on Prefer to verify the usability of our mobile application. The user study shows
that Prefer is in fact a useful and well-designed application for today’s smartphone
users.
Further, with respect to usability, we present several reconciliation-based application
scenarios in the areas of event scheduling, e-voting, and electronic auctions. We
conduct a user study on privacy-preserving reconciliation on the Internet. Most
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notably, our evaluation results give a strong evidence that users prefer a privacy-
preserving negotiation in reconciliation-based application scenarios over more open
negotiations or a negotiation by a service provider or a trusted third party. We
also analyze whether users consider the result of the composition schemes minimum
of ranks and sum of ranks fair or not and how the two schemes compare. The
results indicate that users prefer minimum of ranks over sum of ranks with respect
to fairness. So far, our user study shows that reconciliation protocols are very useful
for common Internet users. Overall, SMC-MuSe is a great step towards secure
multi-party computation for the general public with a range of possible application
scenarios.
Part of the work has been published in [129, 143, 144, 145].
1.2 Collaborations
The work of this thesis was done within the scope of a joint research project between
the group of Professor Meyer at RWTH Aachen University in Germany and the
group of Professor Wetzel at the Stevens Institute of Technology. In particular,
there was a close collaboration with D. Mayer, a PhD student at Stevens Institute
of Technology. In general, the members of each group worked on separate aspects
of this project and frequently communicated new results and questions to the other
collaborators. Specifically, the work was divided such that the group at RWTH
Aachen University focused on multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols
and the group at the Stevens Institute of Technology worked on two-party privacy-
preserving reconciliation protocols, see Section 2.6. D. Mayer published his results
on two-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols in his thesis [128], see also
Section 2.6.1.
In part, this joint research project is funded by the German Research Foundation
(DFG) under ME 3704/1-1 and the National Science Foundation (NSF) under award
CCF 1018616.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the cryp-
tographic background used in this thesis and discusses related work in the different
research fields. In Chapter 3, we describe our novel cryptographic tools which we
use to construct multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols. Chapters 4
and 5 present our work on reconciliation protocols secure in the semi-honest and
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malicious models. In Chapter 6, we discuss application scenarios for reconcilia-
tion protocols and describe the results of our user study about privacy-preserving
reconciliation on the Internet. Our framework SMC-MuSe for secure multi-party
computation is presented in Chapter 7 and evaluated in Chapter 8. The thesis
closes with a conclusion and a discussion on future research directions in Chap-
ter 9.
7

2 Related Work and Cryptographic
Background
In this chapter, we introduce preliminary work and discuss important related work in
different research areas within the scope of this thesis. In Section 2.1, we start with
basic definitions. In the Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 we present the research ar-
eas homomorphic cryptography, zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocols, secure
multi-party computation, privacy-preserving set operations, and reconciliation proto-
cols. In each section, we give a short introduction into the topic, discuss related work,
and then present the preliminary work used in this thesis.
2.1 Basic Definitions
In this section, we introduce basic definitions that are used in this thesis.
2.1.1 Set Theory
In the following, we recap required results in set theory. A more formal description
is given in [180].
Definition 2.1.1.1 (Sets and Domain) Let S and D be sets and S ⊆ D. The set S
is described by its characteristic function
ϕS : D → {0, 1}
which, iff s ∈ S, maps an element s ∈ D to 1 and otherwise, iff s 6∈ S, to 0. The
set D is called the domain.
Definition 2.1.1.2 (Pre-Order) Let S denote a set and let ≤ denote a binary rela-
tion on S. Then ≤ is a pre-order, if the following conditions hold:
∀a ∈ S : a ≤ a (Reflexivity),
∀a, b, c ∈ S : if a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ c , then a ≤ c (Transitivity).
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The set S is called pre-ordered set. The set S is a totally pre-ordered set iff
∀a, b ∈ S : a ≤ b or b ≤ a (Totality).
Definition 2.1.1.3 (Total Order) Let S denote a set and ≤ is a binary relation on
S. Then ≤ is a total order, if ≤ is a total pre-order and if it holds that
∀a, b ∈ S : if a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ a , then a = b (Antisymmetry).
The set S is called totally ordered set.
Remark: Let S be a set with k set elements chosen from a common domain D. We
denote (S,≤) as a totally ordered (pre-ordered) set if ≤ is a total order (pre-order)
on S. We also write {x1 ≥ ... ≥ xk} for (S,≤).
Definition 2.1.1.4 (Ranking Function) Let S = {x1, ..., xk} be a set with k set
elements chosen from a common domain D. The function rankS : S → N defined by
∀xi ∈ S : rankS (xi) = k − i+ 1
induces a total order ≤ on S.
Definition 2.1.1.5 (Composition Scheme) Let (S1,≤1) , ..., (Sn,≤n) be totally or-
dered sets. We denote the totally pre-ordered set
(
S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn,≤{S1,..,Sn}
)
as the
combined ordered set of (S1,≤1) , ..., (Sn,≤n) w.r.t. to a function f if ≤{S1,..,Sn} is
the total pre-order induced by the function f : (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn) → N. The function f
is called the composition scheme.
Definition 2.1.1.6 (Minimum of Ranks) The Minimum of ranks (MR) composition
scheme is defined by the function f(x) = min{rankS1(x), ..., rankSn(x)} for x ∈
S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn.
Definition 2.1.1.7 (Sum of Ranks) The Sum of ranks (SR) composition scheme is
defined by the function f(x) = rankS1(x) + ...+ rankSn(x) for x ∈ S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn.
Definition 2.1.1.8 (Multiset) Let D be the domain. A multiset S is then defined
by its generalized characteristic function
ϕS : D → N0
which, iff s ∈ S, includes an element s ∈ D with multiplicity ϕS(s) ∈ N and
otherwise, iff s 6∈ S, the element is not included. The size of S is defined as
|S| =
∑
s∈S
ϕS(s).
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Definition 2.1.1.9 (Multiset Intersection) Let S1, S2 ⊆ D be multisets and let
ϕS1 , ϕS2 be their characteristic functions. The intersection of S1 and S2, denoted by
S1 ∩ S2, is the multiset defined by the characteristic function
ϕS1∩S2(s) := min{ϕS1(s), ϕS2(s)}.
Definition 2.1.1.10 (Multiset Union) Let S1, S2 ⊆ D be multisets and let ϕS1 , ϕS2
be their characteristic functions. The union of S1 and S2, denoted by S1 ∪S2, is the
multiset defined by the characteristic function
ϕS1∪S2(s) := ϕS1(s) + ϕS2(s).
Definition 2.1.1.11 (Multiset Reduction) Let S ⊆ D be a multiset and let ϕS be
the characteristic function. The reduction of S by t for some t ∈ N, denoted by
Rdt(S), is the multiset defined by the characteristic function
ϕRdt(S)(s) := max{0, ϕS(s)− t}.
Definition 2.1.1.12 (Multiset Membership) Let S ⊆ D be a multiset and let z ∈ D.
The membership relation z ∈ S is true iff
ϕS(z) > 0.
Otherwise, z is not a member of S, i. e., z 6∈ S.
Definition 2.1.1.13 (Sub-Multiset) Let S1, S2 ⊆ D be multisets. The sub-multiset
relation S1 ⊆ S2 is true iff
∀s ∈ S1 : ϕS1(s) ≤ ϕS2(s).
Otherwise, S1 is not a sub-multiset of S2, i. e., S1 6⊆ S2.
Definition 2.1.1.14 (Multiset Difference) Let S1, S2 ⊆ D be multisets and let
ϕS1 , ϕS2 be their characteristic functions. The difference of S2 and S1, denoted
by S2 \ S1, is the multiset defined by the characteristic function
ϕS2\S1(s) := max{0, ϕS2(s)− ϕS1(s)}.
.
2.1.2 Number Theory
In the following, we detail results in number theory used in this thesis. More infor-
mation can be found in [197].
Definition 2.1.2.1 (Prime Number) A number p ∈ N+ is a prime number if p > 1
and p has exactly two positive divisors, 1 and itself.
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Definition 2.1.2.2 (Safe Prime Number) A safe prime number p is a prime number
of the form p = 2p′ + 1, where p′ is also a prime number.
Definition 2.1.2.3 (Semigroup) A semigroup is an algebraic structure (G, ∗) where
G is a set and ∗ a binary operation that satisfies the following conditions:
∀a, b ∈ G : a ∗ b ∈ G (Closure),
∀a, b, c ∈ G : (a ∗ b) ∗ c = a ∗ (b ∗ c) (Associativity).
Definition 2.1.2.4 (Abelian Semigroup) An abelian semigroup is a semigroup (G, ∗)
where the binary operation ∗ is commutative:
∀a, b ∈ G : a ∗ b = b ∗ a.
Definition 2.1.2.5 (Monoid) A monoid (G, ∗) is a semigroup with an identity ele-
ment e:
∃ e ∈ G such that ∀a ∈ G : e ∗ a = a ∗ e = a (Identity Element).
Definition 2.1.2.6 (Group) A group (G, ∗) is a monoid with the additional property:
∀a ∈ G, ∃b ∈ G : a ∗ b = b ∗ a = e (Inverse Element).
Definition 2.1.2.7 (Abelian Group) An abelian group is a group (G, ∗) where the
binary operation ∗ is commutative:
∀a, b ∈ G : a ∗ b = b ∗ a.
Definition 2.1.2.8 (Order of a Group) The order of a group G is defined by its
cardinality |G|, i. e., the number of group elements in G.
Definition 2.1.2.9 (Finite Group) A finite group is a group in which the underlying
set G is of finite size.
Definition 2.1.2.10 (Generating Set and Group Generators) Let (G, ∗) be a finite
group then S ⊆ G generates G iff all elements a ∈ G can be expressed as a combina-
tion (under the binary operation ∗) of elements in S. All elements a ∈ S are called
group generators.
Definition 2.1.2.11 (Cyclic Group) A cyclic group is a group that is generated by
a group generator.
Definition 2.1.2.12 (Ring) A ring (R,+, ∗) with identity is an algebraic structure
where R is a set and +, ∗ are binary operations. R is an abelian group under addition
(+) and a monoid under multiplication (∗). In addition the following conditions
hold:
∀a, b, c ∈ G : a ∗ (b+ c) = (a ∗ b) + (a ∗ c) (Left Distributivity),
∀a, b, c ∈ G : (b+ c) ∗ a = (b ∗ a) + (c ∗ a) (Right Distributivity).
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Definition 2.1.2.13 (Units and Group of Units) Let (R,+, ∗) be a ring. The set
R∗ contains all multiplicatively invertible elements and is called group of units:
R∗ = {a ∈ R | ∃ b ∈ R : a ∗ b = b ∗ a = 1}.
Each invertible element is called a unit of the ring R.
Definition 2.1.2.14 (Zero Divisor) Let (R,+, ∗) be a commutative ring. An element
a ∈ R is a zero divisor if it holds that:
∃x ∈ R : a · x = 0 ∧ x 6= 0.
Definition 2.1.2.15 (Field) A field (GF,+, ∗) is an algebraic structure where GF
is a set and +, ∗ are binary operations. GF is an abelian group under addition (+)
and multiplication (∗). In addition the following condition holds:
∀a, b, c ∈ G : a ∗ (b+ c) = (a ∗ b) + (a ∗ c) (Distributivity).
Definition 2.1.2.16 (Finite Field) A finite field is a field in which the underlying
set GF is of finite size.
Definition 2.1.2.17 (Primitive Element) A primitive element of a finite field GF (p)
is a group generator of the multiplicative group of the field.
Definition 2.1.2.18 (n-th Residue) Let n = p · q be the product of two large primes
p, q. A number v is called an n-th residue modulo N2 if the following equation holds:
∃x ∈ Z∗N2 such that v = xn mod N2.
If n = 2, we denote the number v as a quadratic residue or square modulo N2.
Definition 2.1.2.19 (Polynomial Long Division) Let (R,+, ∗) be a commutative
ring. For two polynomials f ∈ R[X] (dividend) and g ∈ R∗[X] (divisor), the poly-
nomial long division results in a polynomial q ∈ R[X] (quotient) and a remainder
polynomial r ∈ R[X] such that
f = gq + r,
and either r = 0 or the degree of r is lower than the degree of g. These conditions
define q and r uniquely.
Algorithm [8]: Let f = adXd + ad−1Xd−1 + ... + a1X1 + a0 be a polynomial of
degree d and g = ceXe + ce−1Xe−1 + ... + c1X1 + c0 a polynomial of degree e. The
coefficients of q and r can then be computed in the following way:
1. If d < e, return q = 0 and r = f
2. For i = d− e, ..., 0, compute q by
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a) q[bi] = f [ai+e]×h g[ce]−1
b) For j = e, ..., 0, compute
i) f [ai+j ] =1 f [ai+j ] + (−g[cj ] ∗ q[bi])
3. For j = e− 1, ..., 0, compute r by
a) r[hj ] = f [aj ]
If d ≥ e holds, then the quotient q is a polynomial q = bd−eXd−e + ...+ b0 of degree
d− e and the remainder r is a polynomial r = he−1Xe−1 + ...+ h0 of degree e− 1.
Algorithm using the Horner scheme [8]: Let g be a linear divisor of the form
(X − z). The coefficients of q and the remainder r can then be computed as follows:
1. q[bd−1] = f [ad]
2. q[bi] = f [ai+1] + q[bi+1] ∗ z , ∀i = d− 2, ..., 0
3. r = f [a0] + q[b0] ∗ z
2.1.3 Computational Complexity Theory
In the following, we recap required results in complexity theory. A more formal
description is given in [193].
Definition 2.1.3.1 (O-Notation) Let f, g : N→ R be two functions. We will write
f = O(g)
iff in general the function g(x) grows asymptotically faster than f(x) for all x ≥ x0:
∃ c, x0 > 0 such that ∀x : f(x)
g(x) ≤ c.
The O-Notation places an upper bound on the complexity of a function f .
Definition 2.1.3.2 (Probabilistic Polynomial Time Algorithm) A probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm f : N → R can use randomness and for all inputs x ∈ N its
running time is upper bounded by some polynomial in the input length:
∀x ∈ N : f = O(xa) for some constant a ∈ N.
1Note that this is an assignment operator and f [ai+j ] is iteratively overwritten with the new value
f [ai+j ] + (−g[cj ] ∗ q[bi)]).
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A probabilistic polynomial time bounded attacker is called computationally bounded.
Definition 2.1.3.3 (Negligible Function) A function  : N → R is called negligible
if for every positive polynomial poly(·) there exists an Npoly ∈ N such that
∀x ∈ N with x > Npoly : |(x)| < 1
poly(x) .
2.1.4 Basic Cryptography
In the following, we describe basic cryptographic primitives used in this thesis. More
information can be found in [113].
Definition 2.1.4.1 (Cryptographic Hash Function) A hash function h maps an
input x of arbitrary finite bit length to an output h(x) of fixed bit length l. Given
h and an input x, it is easy to compute h(x). A cryptographic hash function has
the following additional properties for every probabilistic polynomial time bounded
attacker Adv:
• Preimage resistant: Given only y = h(x) it is computationally infeasible to
find any preimage x′ with h(x′) = y.
• Second preimage resistant: Given x, h(x) it is computationally infeasible to
find a second preimage x′ 6= x with h(x′) = h(x).
• Collision resistant: It is computationally infeasible to find any x, x′ with x 6= x′
such that h(x) = h(x′).
Definition 2.1.4.2 (Commitment Scheme) Let m be a message chosen from a com-
mon domain D. In the commitment phase, a commitment c is computed from the
message m and published. In the opening phase, additional information is released
such that anyone can verify that c was a commitment on m. In addition, the fol-
lowing properties hold [42, 81]:
• Hiding: No information about m is revealed by c.
• Binding: Given a commitment c corresponding to a message m it is hard to
open c to another message m′ 6= m.
Definition 2.1.4.3 (Interactive Proof System) An interactive proof system for a set
S is a two-party protocol between a verifier V and a prover P . P proves a statement
to V in an interactive protocol between P and V . An execution of such a protocol is
called transcript. The following two conditions are satisfied [82, 164]:
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• Completeness: For every x ∈ S the verifier V rejects the proof only with
negligible probability.
• Soundness: For every x 6∈ S the verifier V accepts a proof from any transcript
with P only with negligible probability.
Definition 2.1.4.4 (Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge [164]) An interactive proof
system is zero-knowledge if for all x ∈ S and corresponding transcripts with output
A(x) = (AP , AV ∗)(x) between a prover A with interaction AP and every feasible
interaction AV ∗ by a verifier, there exists a feasible computation B∗(x) by a simulator
SIM such that (AP , AV ∗)(x) and B∗(x) are indistinguishable.
I. e., every information which can be extracted from a transcript between P and V
on input x ∈ S, can also be extracted by a simulator on x itself. This means that
the verifier gains no additional information about x besides the correctness of the
assertion x ∈ S.
Definition 2.1.4.5 (Secret Sharing Scheme) Let s be a secret value. A (t, l)-
threshold secret sharing scheme is defined by an algorithm A that computes A(s) =
[s1, ..., sl] such that the following conditions hold [182]:
• Correctness: The secret value s is uniquely determined by any t shares from
[s1, ..., sl]. A reconstruction algorithm computes the secret value s from any t
shares.
• Security: Any t − 1 shares from [s1, ..., sl] reveal no information about the
secret value s. More formally, the probability distribution of t − 1 shares is
independent of s. The scheme is even secure against adversaries with unlimited
computing power and is called information-theoretically secure [14].
Definition 2.1.4.6 (Shamir Secret Sharing [182]) Let GF be a finite field and
s ∈ GF a secret value. The Shamir Secret Sharing scheme is a (t, l)-threshold
secret sharing scheme over GF where the share generation and reconstruction are
defined as follows:
• Share Generation: Generate a polynomial f(x) = a0 +a1x+ ...+at−1xt−1 with
a0 = s and uniformly chosen coefficients a1, ..., at−1 ∈ GF . The output are l
points on the polynomial where
(xi, yi) = (i, si) ∧ si = f(i) , i = 1, ..., l.
• Share Reconstruction: The secret s = f(0) is reconstructed using Lagrange
interpolation [182]. Given t shares sv1 , ..., svt ∈ GF with distinct indices
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vj ∈ 1, ..., l, compute
s = f(0) = sv1γv1 + ...+ svtγvt with γvi =
t∏
j=1,i 6=j
−xvj
xvi − xvj
.
Let [a] = [a1, ..., al] and [b] = [b1, ..., bl] be shared values a, b. It is possible to perform
share addition in the following way:
• Share Addition: Compute the shared value [d] = [d1, ..., dl] with d = a+ b by
di = ai + bi , i = 1, ..., l.
Definition 2.1.4.7 (Public-Key Cryptosystem) Let M and C be sets denoted as
the plaintext and ciphertext space. A tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithms (G,E,D) is called a public-key cryptosystem or asymmetric cryptosystem if
the following two properties hold:
• Given a security parameter b ∈ N, the key generation algorithm K outputs a
key pair (pk, sk). We call pk the public key and sk the secret key.
• For every key pair (pk, sk) generated by K(b), and for every plaintext m ∈
M , the encryption algorithm E and the decryption algorithm D satisfy the
following condition:
Pr[Dsk(Epk(m)) = m] = 1.
Remark: In a symmetric cryptosystem, in contrast to a public-key cryptosys-
tem, there exists a secret shared key which is used for encryption and decryp-
tion.
Definition 2.1.4.8 (Homomorphic Public-Key Cryptosystem) Let (G,E,D) be a
public-key cryptosystem where (M, ∗M ) and (C, ∗C) are abelian semigroups. (G,E,D)
is homomorphic if for any plaintexts m1,m2 ∈ M and ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ C with
m1 = Dsk(c1) and m2 = Dsk(c2), it holds that:
Dsk(c1 ∗C c2) = m1 ∗M m2.
Definition 2.1.4.9 (IND-CPA Security / Semantic Security [85]) A public-key cryp-
tosystem (G,E,D) provides semantic security if given two ciphertexts, it is compu-
tationally infeasible for a probabilistic polynomial time bounded attacker to find any
meaningful relationship between the plaintexts based only on the ciphertexts.
More formally, the public-key cryptosystem (G,E,D) is called IND-CPA (indistin-
guishable encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack) secure if every probabilistic
polynomial time bounded attacker Adv wins the following IND-CPA game with prob-
ability less than or equal to 12 + (b) where  is a negligible function:
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• Generate a key pair (pk, sk) using G(b).
• The attacker Adv has access to the encryption algorithm Epk using the public
key pk. The attacker Adv outputs two messages m1,m2 ∈M of equal length.
• As a challenge, choose a random bit x ∈ {0, 1}, compute the encryption
c = Epk(mx), and send the ciphertext c to the attacker Adv.
• The attacker may perform polynomially time bounded computations, especially
call Epk on inputs m ∈M . Then, the attacker Adv outputs a bit x′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The attacker Adv wins the game iff x = x′.
2.1.4.1 Cryptographic Hardness Assumptions
In the following, we recap required results about cryptographic hardness assump-
tions. A more formal description is given in [113].
Definition 2.1.4.10 (Integer Factorization Problem) Let N = p · q be the product
of two large prime numbers p, q. The integer factorization problem is defined as
follows. Given the composite number N , find the non-trivial factors of N .
Remark: In general, for all probabilistic polynomial time bounded attackers it is
computationally infeasible to solve the integer factorization problem for two large
prime numbers with a non-negligible probability.
Definition 2.1.4.11 (Discrete Logarithm Problem) Let (G, ∗) be a group and a, b ∈ G.
Any integer c that solves ac = b is called discrete logarithm of b to the base a. We
write c = logab.
Remark: In general, for all probabilistic polynomial time bounded attackers it is
computationally infeasible to solve the discrete logarithm problem in large prime
order groups with a non-negligible probability.
Definition 2.1.4.12 (Decisional Composite Residuosity Problem (DCRP)) For a
given c, g, m and for all probabilistic polynomial time bounded attackers it is com-
putationally infeasible to decide with non-negligible probability if there is a r ∈ Z∗N
such that c = gmrN mod N2.
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2.2 Homomorphic Cryptosystems
In this thesis, we focus on public-key homomorphic cryptosystems which provide se-
mantic security, see Definition 2.1.4.9. Public-key cryptosystems were first proposed
by Diffie et al. [54]. In a homomorphic cryptosystem, we have a structure-preserving
homomorphism between the plaintext space and the ciphertext space of the cryp-
tosystem, see Definition 2.1.4.8. We distinguish between additively, multiplicatively,
and fully homomorphic cryptosystems. In an additively (multiplicatively) homo-
morphic cryptosystem, we have an operation in the ciphertext space to compute the
encrypted sum (product) of two plaintexts given only the corresponding ciphertexts.
A fully homomorphic cryptosystem is additively and multiplicatively homomorphic.
Not before 2009, the first efficient fully homomorphic cryptosystem was proposed
by Craig Gentry [75].
In the following, we review related work in Section 2.2.1, discuss additively homo-
morphic cryptosystems in Section 2.2.2 and fully homomorphic cryptosystems in
Section 2.2.4.
2.2.1 Related Work
The first semantically secure homomorphic cryptosystem was proposed by Gold-
wasser et al. [85]. The Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem is additively homomorphic
and provides semantic security. The homomorphic addition corresponds to a mul-
tiplication in the ciphertext domain and the security of the scheme is based on
the so-called Quadratic Residuosity problem [85]. In 1985, the first multiplica-
tively homomorphic cryptosystem was proposed by El Gamal [60]. The security of
the ElGamal cryptosystem is based on the discrete logarithm problem (see Defini-
tion 2.1.4.11) and the homomorphic multiplication is a multiplication in the cipher-
text domain.
In 1994, Benaloh [15] proposed a generalization of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosys-
tem. The scheme is semantically secure and additively homomorphic. The security
is based on the m-Residuosity problem [15]. In 1999, P. Paillier proposed a further
additively homomorphic cryptosystem. The security is based on the Decisional Com-
posite Residuosity Problem (see Definition 2.1.4.12) and the homomorphic addition
is again a multiplication in the ciphertext domain. Our protocol constructions pre-
sented in Chapters 4 and 5 are based on the Paillier cryptosystem which we present
in Section 2.2.3.1.
Further additively homomorphic cryptosystems are given in [47, 140, 154]. A fur-
ther multiplicatively homomorphic scheme is the RSA cryptosystem [170]. Note
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that the plain RSA cryptosystem is not semantically secure. On the other hand, a
semantically secure variant of RSA using the OAEP padding [12] is not homomor-
phic.
There are also cryptosystems that are additively homomorphic and allow a limited
number of homomorphic multiplications. In 2005, such a semantically secure scheme
was proposed by Boneh et al. [23]. The Boneh–Goh–Nissim cryptosystem allows an
arbitrary number of homomorphic additions but only one homomorphic multiplica-
tion using the bilinear map [23]. In 2008, Armknecht et al. developed a symmetric
semantically secure additively homomorphic cryptosystem based on a coding theory
problem which also allows an arbitrary fixed number of multiplications [3]. However,
the ciphertexts grow exponentially in the number of multiplications which limits the
possible applications of the cryptosystem. Interestingly, Rothblum showed that one
can transform any asymmetric homomorphic cryptosystem into a symmetric homo-
morphic cryptosystem and vice versa [171].
In 1994, a first approach to fully homomorphic cryptosystems was proposed by Fel-
lows et al. [64]. The Polly Cracker cryptosystem is provable secure based on difficult
combinatorial problems, especially on circuit satisfiability. The scheme is additively
as well as multiplicatively homomorphic. Unfortunately, the ciphertext grows expo-
nential with respect to the computed circuit. In 2009, the first fully homomorphic
cryptosystem was proposed by Craig Gentry [75, 76, 77]. The scheme and its se-
curity is based on ideal lattices and allows unlimited homomorphic additions and a
limited number of homomorphic multiplications. Then, the ciphertext needs to be
refreshed. This is done by a re-encryption of the ciphertext followed by a homo-
morphic evaluation of the decryption circuit. This allows for an arbitrary number
of homomorphic multiplications.
An implementation of the scheme is described in [78]. However, the refreshing op-
eration is relative expensive which currently makes the scheme impractical. E. g.,
refreshing a single ciphertext takes up to 30 minutes. Also, the public key is in the
range of several GB for reasonable security parameters. In 2010, a second approach
which uses only integer arithmetic was proposed by Dijk et al. [188]. Here, the
security is based on finding an approximate integer common divisor [104]. As a
summary, a lot of research is still needed to make fully homomorphic cryptosystems
comparably efficient to cryptosystems solely additively or multiplicatively homomor-
phic.
2.2.2 Additively Homomorphic Cryptosystems
Our protocols require a threshold version of a semantically secure, additively ho-
momorphic, asymmetric cryptosystem where the plaintext space and the ciphertext
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space are abelian semigroups.
A cryptographic system which has additively homomorphic properties, provides an
operation in the ciphertext domain to compute the encrypted sum of two plain-
texts given only the corresponding ciphertexts. More formally, let Epk(·) be the
encryption function with public key pk. In an additively homomorphic cryptosys-
tem, there is an operation +h such that Epk(a + b) = Epk(a) +h Epk(b) which
can be computed efficiently given only Epk(a), Epk(b), and pk. Here, the plain-
text space (M,+) has the structure of an additive abelian semigroup, see Defini-
tion 2.1.2.4.
It is also possible to perform efficient scalar multiplication ×h with a scalar value
s by repetitive application of the +h operation. Given a ciphertext c = E(m)
and a scalar value s ∈ N, the encryption of the product m · s can be determined by
applying the operation +h s times in the ciphertext domain using only the ciphertext
c as
E(m · s) = c×h s = c+h . . .+h c︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
.
Furthermore, we denote the iterative homomorphic sum by ∑˜, i. e., all additions
are homomorphic additions +h. In addition, we require the cryptosystem to provide
semantic security as defined in Definition 2.1.4.9. That is, given two ciphertexts, it is
infeasible for an attacker to find any meaningful relationship between the plaintexts
based only on the ciphertexts.
2.2.3 Threshold Additively Homomomorphic Cryptosystems
In a (t, l)-threshold version of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem, the private
key sk is shared among the l parties with each party Pi holding a private share
ski (1 ≤ i ≤ l). Using the private key share ski, a party Pi can compute a
partial decryption of a ciphertext. To successfully decrypt a given ciphertext, t of
the l key shares are required. To compute the plaintext, t partial decryptions of the
ciphertext need to be computed.
The key generation and distribution can be done in two ways. Either a dedicated
trusted party generates the key shares and distributes them to the l parties in a
secure way. The pre-distribution of the keying material is the usual assumption
for a secure multi-party computation protocol, see also Section 2.4. The second
more expensive solution, in terms of computation and communication overhead, is a
distributed key generation and distribution protocol between the n parties, see e. g.
[97, 152]. In this thesis, we focus on the first approach where the keying material is
pre-distributed.
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2.2.3.1 Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem
We make use of the probabilistic public-key cryptosystem proposed by Paillier [161].
The cryptosystem is additively homomorphic and semantically secure based on the
Decisional Composite Residuosity Problem (see Definition 2.1.4.12).
There are several threshold variants [46, 47, 67, 68] of the Paillier cryptosystem
which make it a very popular choice in secure multi-party computation protocols.
In our complexity considerations as well as in our implementation we use the variant
proposed in [68] which is a (t, l)-threshold scheme, provides semantic security and
is additively homomorphic. The plaintext space is the commutative ring ZN where
N = p · q is a b-bit modulus and p, q are two large safe prime numbers. We denote
b as the key size of the cryptosystem, i. e., b = log2(N). The ciphertext domain is
Z∗N2 . The homomorphic addition +h is a multiplication and the scalar operation
×h a modular exponentiation in the ciphertext domain Z∗N2 . Next, we describe the
cryptographic operations in detail.
Key generation. Generate two large safe prime numbers p, q (see Definition 2.1.2.2)
of equal bit length b2 such that
p = 2p′ + 1 ∧ q = q′ + 1 ∧ N = p · q ∧ gcd(N,φ(N)) = 1.
The public key pk is (N, g), where g is a generator of Z∗N2 . Set m = p′q′
and β is randomly chosen in Z∗N . The private key sk = β ·m is shared using
the Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme (see Definition 2.1.4.6), which provides the
private key shares (sk1, ..., skn) for parties P1, ..., Pn.
Encryption. The encryption function is given by Epk (m)
def= gmrN mod N2 for any
plaintext m ∈ ZN , where r ∈ Z∗N is selected uniformly at random.
Homomorphic addition. For two ciphertexts α, β ∈ ZN2 , the homomorphic opera-
tion +h is given by α+h β
def= α · β mod N2.
Homomorphic scalar multiplication. For a ciphertext α ∈ Z∗N2 and a scalar s ∈ N,
the scalar multiplication is defined by s×h α def= αs mod N2.
Threshold decryption. To perform a threshold decryption, each party Pi computes
the partial decryption ci = c2∆ski mod N2 where ∆ = l! and ski is the 2b-bit
private key share of party Pi [67]. Given t partial decryptions, one can recover
the plaintext by computing the Lagrange interpolation on the exponents, see
[67] for more details on this recovery algorithm.
Re-randomization. To mask a given ciphertext α with a new random value, we
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multiply it with an additional random factor Rd ∈ Z∗N . Formally, the re-
randomization operation [·]Rd is defined as [α]Rd def= α ·RdN mod N2.
Complexity of Homomorphic Operations: In our protocols discussed in Chapters 4
and 5, we extensively use homomorphic operations of the Paillier cryptosystem.
Recap that b is the bit size of the public key, i.e., b = log2(N) where N2 is the
modulo. The complexity of the homomorphic operations can be determined as
follows:
1. Homomorphic addition +h: This requires a multiplication of two 2b-bit inte-
gers. Using the Karatsuba method [112] the complexity of this multiplication
is O
(
b1.585
)
.
2. Homomorphic scalar multiplication ×h: This requires an exponentiation of a
2b-bit integer with a b-bit integer2. Using exponentiation by squaring with
Montgomery reduction [137] leads to a complexity of O
(
b2.585
)
.
2.2.3.2 Sequential Execution of Homomorphic Operations
In practice, homomorphic operations (in the Paillier cryptosystem) are used such
that the result of a single homomorphic operation is a freshly randomized value. This
holds for any additively homomorphic cryptosystem which is semantically secure.
In the following, we use the Paillier cryptosystem to discuss the sequential execution
of homomorphic operations.
As an example, a scalar multiplication is computed as c ×h α = [αc]Rd = αc · Rdn,
where Rd denotes a new random blinding factor. Therefore, with overwhelming
probability computing the ×h operation twice on the same inputs will not re-
sult in the same output. The re-randomization is required to preserve the se-
mantic security of the cryptosystem such that, after computing a homomorphic
operation, the resulting ciphertext is uniformly distributed in the ciphertext do-
main.
This leads to multiple randomizations for a sequence of operations. However, we
only need to randomize ciphertexts which are sent to one of the other parties. Thus,
we can drop all randomizations but one of them before we sent the ciphertext to
the other party. More in detail, when a sequence of operations is performed by
one party, we can apply the re-randomization once after the sequence is completed
2We assume that the scalar value is an element of the plaintext space ZN .
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rather than re-randomizing each operation. For example, assume one party com-
putes
a×h E(b) +h c×h E(d) = E(ab+ cd).
Each homomorphic operation in this equation introduces a new randomization fac-
tor. Let r∗1, r∗2, r+ be the randomization factors and rb, rd be the random components
of the encryptions E(b) and E(d). We can rewrite the equation in the following
form:
a×h E(b) +h c×h E(d) = gab+cd
(
r∗1 · r∗2 · r+ · rb · rd
)N
mod N2
In our protocols, all parties use the additively homomorphic cryptosystem to com-
pute sequences of homomorphic operations on ciphertexts and exchange those cipher-
texts. If only the result of these computations is sent to other parties, we can replace
the triple re-randomization r∗1 · r∗2 · r+ with a single randomization factor Rd, while
maintaining the semantic security of the cryptosystem.
In our protocols, we make this explicit by writing ×h,+h for the not randomized
variants of the operations, and [·]Rd for the randomization using an uniformly ran-
dom value from Rd ∈ Z∗N . The above sequence of operations thus writes in the
following way:
[a×h E(b) +h c×h E(d)]Rd = gab+cd (Rd · rb · rd)N mod N2.
2.2.4 Fully Homomorphic Cryptosystems
We make use of an asymmetric fully homomorphic encryption scheme which op-
erates on the binary plaintext space M = F2 = {0, 1} and generates ciphertexts
from some set C via a probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm Epk using
a public key pk. There is a (deterministic) polynomial-time decryption algorithm
Dsk using a secret key sk such that Dsk(Epk(m)) = m for all m ∈ M . Further-
more, we have algorithms pk and pk which perform homomorphic operations,
i.e., Dsk(Epk(m1) pk E(m2)) = m1 + m2 and Dsk(Epk(m1) pk E(m2)) = m1 ·m2,
where + and · denote addition and multiplication in F2, i.e., binary XOR and AND.
We use the notations E,D, and  on tuples to denote component-wise application.
As a shorthand, we write E,D, and  without the explicit notation of the used
keys pk, sk.
Furthermore, we use several common basic algorithms that will be used in con-
struction of more complex ones. Those algorithms operate on Boolean inputs and
only use XOR and AND operations and can therefore be adapted to operate on
encrypted data by using a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Their imple-
mentation is straightforward and mimics the common circuit implementations of
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those algorithms, see, e.g., [192]. In particular, for inputs c, d ∈ C` with plain-
text bit-length `, we use the following algorithms where the details are described
in [194]:
• Negation: Not(c) for ` = 1 flips a bit, i.e., D(Not(c)) = D(c) + 1. The com-
plexity is O(1).
• Equality: Equal(c, d) returns an encryption of 1 if D(c) = D(d) and an encryp-
tion of 0 otherwise. This can be generalized to k ≥ 2 inputs. The complexity
is O(k`).
• Greater than: GT(c, d) returns an encryption of 1 if D(c) > D(d) and an
encryption of 0 otherwise. Here, > denotes the order on D`, interpreted as
binary representations of natural numbers. The complexity is O(`).
• If-Then-Else: IFE(b, c, d) for b ∈ C returns an encryption of D(c) if D(b) = 1
and an encryption of D(d) otherwise. The complexity is O(`).
• Maximum and Minimum: Max(c, d) and Min(c, d) which return encryptions of
max(D(c),D(d)) and min(D(c),D(d)). This can be generalized to k ≥ 2 inputs.
The complexity is O(k`).
• Addition: Add(c, d) returns an encryption of D(c) + D(d), where + denotes
addition of binary numbers with carry. The output ciphertext tuple has length
dlog2(k)e+ `. The complexity is O(k(log(k) + `)).
2.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
In this section, we present the area of Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK).
We discuss interactive and non-interactive ZKPK protocols. Suppose a prover P has
knowledge of an x such that (y, x) ∈ R for some relation R and some public value
y. The prover wants to convince a verifier V of this knowledge without revealing
anything about x except that the prover knows the value of x. A protocol that
realizes this functionality is called a ZKPK protocol. Any ZKPK protocol must
satisfy three properties: First, it must be correct, i.e., if the prover knows x, then
the prover can convince the verifier that he knows x. Second, it must be sound, i.e.,
without knowledge of x, a prover cannot convince the verifier. Third, it must satisfy
the property of zero-knowledgeness, i.e., the verifier learns nothing but the fact that
P knows an x such that (y, x) ∈ R. For a more formal definition of these properties,
see Definitions 2.1.4.3 and 2.1.4.4.
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Usually, ZKPK protocols are constructed based on hard problems in the area of
cryptography, graph theory, and especially computational complexity theory [193].
An example in cryptography is given as follows. Consider a ZKPK protocol for
proving the knowledge of a discrete logarithm. P wants to prove the knowledge
of the discrete logarithm x of some public value y = gx (mod p) where g is a gen-
erator of a group Z∗p of order p. In a ZKPK protocol, the goal is to convince
V that P knows the discrete logarithm of x, without V learning the actual value
of x.
The general approach of an interactive ZKPK protocol is as follows. The prover
commits to the value y = gx (mod p) for which it proves the knowledge of the secret
value x. The goal of the commitment is that the prover binds itself to the value
y (and x). The prover is not able to prove the knowledge of x using a different
value except x. Then, the verifier computes a challenge which is not known or
guessable by the prover. The challenge is a random value and depends on the secret
value x. In a non-interactive ZKPK protocol, the challenge generated by the verifier
is replaced by the result of an unpredictable hash function based on the secret
value x computed by the prover. Thus, the prover challenges itself, e. g., using a
cryptographic hash function. The prover then computes a response which is only
accepted with high probability by the verifier if the prover knows the secret value
x. Otherwise, the prover cannot answer the challenge correctly and the verification
fails.
In this thesis, we focus on non-interactive Σ-Protocols which are a well-known form
of ZKPK protocols. We discuss Σ-Protocols in Section 2.3.2, and present the used
ZKPK protocols in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Related Work
The idea of interactive zero-knowledge proof systems was first introduced in [86].
Feige et. al [62] proposed zero-knowledge proofs based on the security of integer
factoring and showed in [63] that the notion of indistinguishable witnesses is similar
to the notion of zero-knowledge proofs. Here, the verifier cannot distinguish the
witnesses between several protocol runs where the prover uses one of several wit-
nesses to an NP assertion [63]. In [87], Goldwasser et al. further refined the notion
of zero-knowledge proofs and presented ZKPK protocols based on the languages of
quadratic residuosity and quadratic nonresiduosity [87]. A first formal definition
was given in [10].
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are a variant of interactive ZKPK, where the
prover convinces the verifier without a challenge computed by the verifier. In [20],
Blum et al. proposed non-interactive ZKPK protocols based on the problem of de-
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ciding quadratic residuosity. Here, the prover and the verifier beforehand share
a short random string. Damgard et al. further refined this property and pre-
sented formal definitions for ZKPK protocols under the auxiliary string assump-
tion [43]. In this thesis, we use the so-called Fiat-Shamir heuristic [66] which
enables non-interactive ZKPK protocols by replacing the challenge generated by
the verifier by the result of an unpredictable hash function applied to the input
of the prover. Note that those ZKPK protocols using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic
are secure in the random oracle model instead of the standard model [11], see also
Section 2.4.3.2.
An important result in the area of zero-knowledge proofs is that the sequential
composition of ZKPK protocols is again a ZKPK protocol. This is not true for
the parallel composition of zero-knowledge proofs. Dwork et al. discussed this
problem by introducing the notion of concurrent zero-knowledge [57, 58]. In this
thesis, we use ZKPK protocols only in sequential composition in our reconciliation
protocols.
The universally composable security framework [31] allows sequential and parallel
composition of arbitrary many protocol instances. The security of the reconciliation
protocols in this thesis is given for a single protocol instance. It is still future
work to analyze the security of our reconciliation protocols under arbitrary protocol
composition, see Chapter 9.
Camenisch and Stadler proposed the first framework for the general construction
of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [28]. Their framework is based on discrete
logarithms and provides constructions for proving the knowledge of discrete loga-
rithms and complex representations, as well as linear constraints among the log-
arithms and composition of such proofs using And- and Or-Composition. In this
thesis, we use a similar proof representation based on a tree-structured composi-
tion of the proof specifications, see also Section 7.3.3.1. Our concrete proofs are
based on the Paillier cryptosystem instead of discrete logarithms and use only And-
Compositions.
Based on the proof framework by Camenisch et al. [28], two practical proof compil-
ers have been proposed, namely ZKPDL [133] and CACE [6]. Both compilers specify
domain specific languages for defining the arithmetic setting and the proof goals of
zero-knowledge proofs and can compile these specifications to executable code. Sim-
ilar to our solution, both approaches are based on Σ-Protocols and the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic. However, ZKPDL and CACE are not general enough to be used in our
setting. ZKPDL only supports exponentiation homomorphisms such as given in the
ElGamal cryptosystem [60]. Thus, there is no support for the Paillier cryptosys-
tem [161]. Furthermore, neither system supports verifiable shuffle protocols which
we use in our constructions, see also Section 2.3.4.3.
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2.3.2 Σ-Protocols
A well known form of ZKPK protocols are Σ-Protocols, which are interactive two-
party protocols in which the verifier generates a random challenge. The so-called
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [66] removes the need for interaction and operates by replacing
the challenge generated by the verifier by the result of a hash function. This heuristic
is an efficient generalization of ZKPK protocols to the multi-party setting. These
protocols are known as non-interactive ZKPK protocols.
Each Σ-Protocol consists of three messages and four computation steps, which is
called a 3-move form. In the first step, prover P commits to one or multiple values
and sends these commitments as the first message. Then, the verifier V generates
a random challenge and sends it to P . The final message is sent from P to V and
contains the response, which depends on both the commitment and the challenge.
The response can be used by V to verify the property claimed by P . The idea of
this structure is that in the commitment step, P does not know the challenge yet
and can therefore not adapt the value of the commitment to the challenge. The
security of the proofs is then based on the assumption, that it is hard to generate
a valid response for independently chosen commitments and challenges without the
claimed knowledge.
More formally, we can define Σ-Protocols as follows.
Definition 2.3.2.1 A protocol Π is said to be a Σ-Protocol for relation R if Π is of
the above 3-move form and has the following properties:
• Completeness: If P, V follow the protocol on input y and private input x where
(y, x) ∈ R, the verifier always accepts.
• Special Soundness: From any y and any pair of accepting conversations on
input y with different challenges, one can efficiently compute x such that
(y, x) ∈ R.
• Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: There exists a polynomial-time sim-
ulator SIM , which on input y and a random c outputs an accepting conver-
sation of the form (a, c, s) which is (computationally) indistinguishable from
conversations between the honest P, V on input y.
Special soundness states that if we can extract the private value x from two protocol
transcripts with the same commitment but different challenges, then it follows that
x must have been used to generate the two responses, and thus, the prover must
know x.
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Special honest-verifier zero-knowledge uses the simulation paradigm for SMC pro-
tocols: If the verifier can generate indistinguishable protocol transcripts using a
simulator, he does not learn anything new during the protocol. Note that the def-
inition is weak in the sense that it only requires simulation of transcripts with a
honest verifier, thus not taking into account that a verifier might cheat to gain more
knowledge in the protocol.
It was shown that all Σ-Protocols satisfy the standard definition of an honest-verifier
ZKPK protocol and that they retain their properties when several protocols are
composed in parallel [37]. These properties make Σ-Protocols effective tools when
constructing larger systems of zero-knowledge proofs. All ZKPK protocols in this
thesis are Σ-Protocols.
2.3.3 Fiat-Shamir Heuristic
Bellare and Rogaway [11] first formalized the so-called weak Fiat-Shamir transfor-
mation where the hash takes only the prover’s first message as input. The so-called
strong Fiat-Shamir transformation includes the statement to be proven in the hash
input [16]. We use the strong Fiat-Shamir transformation in our zero-knowledge
proof constructions presented in Section 3.2. Fiat-Shamir-based proof protocols are
secure in the random oracle model [11], see also Section 2.4.3.2.
2.3.4 Specific ZKPK Protocols
In the following, we present ZKPK protocols which will be used in our protocols
presented in Chapter 5. We also describe the concrete zero-knowledge proof for the
Paillier cryptosystem since we use it as the additively homomorphic cryptosystem
in our implementation presented in Chapter 7.
2.3.4.1 Interactive Proof of Plaintext Knowledge
In a proof of plaintext knowledge, a prover proves the knowledge of the plaintext for a
known ciphertext. In a proof of plaintext knowledge for the Paillier cryptosystem, a
prover tries to prove to the verifier that he knows m, r such that y = gm ·rN mod N2
for a known ciphertext y. Interactive variants of the plaintext knowledge proof for
the Paillier cryptosystem were proposed in [38, 39].
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2.3.4.2 Interactive Proof of Correct Multiplication
Suppose two parties know the three ciphertexts α, β, γ. In a proof of correct multi-
plication, a prover proves the plaintext knowledge of γ = E(m) and, using the scalar
multiplication ×h, the correct multiplication of the plaintext m with the ciphertext
α for the known ciphertext β:
m×h α = β.
Interactive variants of the correct multiplication proof for the Paillier cryptosystem
were proposed in [38, 39].
2.3.4.3 Non-Interactive Proof of a Subset Relation
We want to prove that parties select a certain number of elements from a publicly
known set, without revealing the identity or the order of the selected elements.
Consider a set of plaintext values D. In our setting, the prover selects a subset S
of k elements from D in an unknown order and sends encryptions in a verifiable
manner to the other parties. Therefore, the prover proves the plaintext knowledge
of those encryptions and the subset relation S ⊆ D.
Our ZKPK protocol is based on the idea, that the prover simply computes a shuffle
(random permutation) of all elements in D and sends encryptions of the shuffled
domain, without revealing his permutation. Then, he can tell other parties which
subset of the permuted set corresponds to his subset. What remains is for the
prover to show that the encryptions sent by him are in fact the encryptions of a
valid permutation of D. More formally, we need a verifiable shuffle protocol [92, 91,
93, 141, 150]. In our setting, we use a protocol proposed by Nguyen et al. [150],
since it can be applied directly in the Paillier cryptosystem, can be turned into a
non-interactive scheme using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic and runs in linear time in
the size of domain D.
Assume that we have a publicly known set of encryptions δ1, ..., δz of all elements
in the set D = {d1, .., dz}. For simplicity, we assume δi = gdi mod N2. The prover
re-randomizes the encryptions, i.e., computes δ′1, ..., δ′z with δ′i =
(
δi · rN
)
mod N2
for some random values ri ∈ Z∗N and privately chooses a random permutation ma-
trix A ∈ {0, 1}z×z. He sends the re-randomized encryptions in permuted order to
the verifier together with a non-interactive ZKPK that he knows {r1, ..., rz} and
A, such that A is a valid permutation matrix and δ′1, ..., δ′z are the result of a re-
randomization with {r1, ..., rz} and permutation according to A. Finally, the prover
tells the other parties which subset of the permuted set corresponds to his sub-
set S.
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2.3.4.4 Proof of Correct Threshold Decryption
In a proof of correct threshold decryption, the prover proves the correct partial
decryption of a known ciphertext. In order to prove that a party correctly computed
the partial decryption in a threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem, we use the
techniques by Fouque et al. [67].
Recall that, using the Paillier cryptosystem, the threshold decryption of a ciphertext
c is given by ci = c2∆ski mod N2 where ∆ is public and ski is the private key share
of party Pi. Each party has to convince the other parties, that c was raised to the
correct exponent to generate ci. The idea is to generate so-called verification keys
vk1, ..., vkn for all parties, which can be used to verify the exponentiation in the
computation of the partial decryption.
Let v be a square number that generates the cyclic group of squares in Z∗N2 with
overwhelming probability. A verification key vki is given by the term v∆ski mod N2.
When a party computes a partial decryption, it also provides a proof that v∆
and c4∆, when raised to the same secret exponent ski, give vki =
(
v∆
)ski and
c2i =
(
c4∆
)ski respectively. Since v∆ was raised to the correct ski during key
generation, and the proof shows that c4∆ was raised to the same exponent, the
other parties can be convinced, that ci is in fact the correct partial decryption of
c.
2.4 Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) is a large field of research within modern
cryptography. In general, it allows multiple parties to compute a function on their
individual private inputs in a distributed fashion without revealing anything but the
output of the function to each other or any server. SMC protocols have been widely
studied in theory in the past. More concrete, in a SMC protocol n parties jointly
compute a function f based on their private inputs. Each party Pi holds a private
input xi and the result of the computation is (y1, ..., yn) = f(x1, .., xn) such that
party Pi learns yi and anything that can be learnt from yi and xi but nothing else.
A more formal definition is given in Section 2.4.2.
In theory, an SMC protocol typically assumes that all parties can directly commu-
nicate with each other, secure communication channels between each pair of par-
ties exist and any other keying material required for the SMC protocol in question
is pre-distributed. In an SMC protocol, a secure communication channel guaran-
tees that an adversary cannot read, modify or generate messages in the established
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channels but the adversary may tap all messages exchanged between each pair of
parties [164].
In addition, the practical use of SMC has often been questioned due to the large
communication and computation overhead it puts on the clients. As a result, there
exist two main directions in SMC. The first direction aims at the computation of
arbitrary functions even if this may lead to some functions not being computable
within a reasonable time frame. The second direction aims at developing proto-
cols to more efficiently compute some specific interesting functions. One example
for such functions are privacy-preserving set operations which we discuss in Sec-
tion 2.5.
Typically, the security of SMC protocols is shown in two different adversary models:
the semi-honest and the malicious model. In the semi-honest model, all parties follow
the protocol correctly but try to learn as much as possible from the protocol run.
In the malicious model, parties can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol in order to
manipulate the computation or to learn more information about the other parties’
private inputs. Typically, ZKPK protocols are used in the construction of secure
multi-party computation protocols [83] to achieve security in the malicious model.
In such a malicious model protocol each party proves all computations within each
step of the protocol and the other parties verify the proofs in each protocol step.
This effectively forces all parties to execute the protocol as given in the protocol
description.
We discuss the two adversary models in Section 2.4.4. Aumann et al. introduced the
covert adversary model [5]. Interestingly, covert adversaries may deviate arbitrarily
from the protocol but the SMC protocol guarantees that if the adversary deviates
from the protocol, then the honest parties detect this malicious behavior with a
high probability. In this thesis, we concentrate on the semi-honest and the malicious
adversary model.
In the following, we review important related work in Section 2.4.1. We give a formal
definition of SMC protocols in Section 2.4.2, discuss security models in Section 2.4.3,
and present different adversary models in Section 2.4.4.
2.4.1 Related Work
Secure multi-party computation was first introduced by A. Yao [198]. Today, SMC
has many applications, including electronic voting, electronic auctions, private infor-
mation retrieval, and secure algebra [56, 153, 166]. Seminal work on SMC [14, 198]
shows that any functionality that can be modeled as a Boolean or arithmetic circuit
can be computed in private. As these early generic solutions exhibit a high com-
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plexity for the computation of some functionality, a second line of research focuses
on developing protocols that can compute only specific functionality but in a very
efficient way. Today, both approaches coexist and results arguing in favor of devel-
oping special purpose protocols [52, 51] as well as such arguing in favor of generic
approaches have been published recently [48, 105].
In 1982, Yao proposed a generic secure two-party computation protocol which is
secure in the semi-honest and the malicious model [122, 198]. In 1987, the approach
was generalized to the multi-party case by Goldreich et al. [84]. The SMC protocols
are based on Boolean circuits. There exist a number of SMC protocols based on
Circuit theory, e. g., [13, 14, 126, 198, 168]. Circuits are labeled finite directed
acyclic graphs with input and output vertices. The function f to be computed is
modeled by so-called gates. A formal definition of circuits is given in [191]. A
circuit is determined by the size and the depth of the graph. In a Boolean circuit,
the function f to be computed is a Boolean function [192]. However, the generic
constructions based on Boolean circuits are sometimes not very efficient such that
it is preferable to design specific solutions for a concrete problem. For those specific
solutions, two approaches are well-known in the SMC research area: Secret Sharing
and Homomorphic Cryptography.
There are a number of SMC protocols proposed in the literature that are based
on secret sharing, e. g. [21, 26, 74]. Here, all parties perform privacy-preserving
computations on shares. E. g., the Shamir Secret Sharing scheme is an additive
secret sharing scheme (see Definition 2.1.4.6). I. e., it allows the private addition
of two secret input values by an addition of the corresponding shared values. The
result is a share for the sum of the two input values. A prominent secret sharing
based framework for SMC is the SEPIA framework [25].
There are also a number of SMC protocols based on homomorphic encryption
schemes, e. g., [71, 44, 153]. Here, privacy-preserving computation is possible due to
the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. E. g., there is an operation in
the ciphertext domain to compute the encrypted sum of two plaintexts using only the
corresponding ciphertexts. For a detailed description of homomorphic encryption
schemes, see Section 2.2.
The challenges of implementing SMC in practice were recently discussed by Halevi
et al. in [94]. As we do in this thesis, they argue that the theoretical model for
SMC is not suitable for today’s Internet users. In particular they question the
assumption that all clients are directly connected and interact simultaneously during
the computation of the desired output.
It is also ongoing research whether one should prefer either generic SMC construc-
tions or specialized SMC solutions. In 2012, Huang et al. proposed solutions for
two-party set intersection based on Circuit theory [105]. Their solutions is based on
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Yao’s generic garbled-circuit method [198] and is secure in the semi-honest model.
They implement their solution and compare the efficiency to Cristofaro et al. [50]
by an own implementation of Cristofaro’s protocols. The results indicate that their
generic solutions is competitive to the specialized solution by Cristofaro et al. [50].
As a response, Cristofaro et al. published a paper dedicated to the comparison of
their approach with the generic construction by Huang et al. [105]. Their opti-
mized implementation of the specific solution clearly outperforms the generic con-
struction by Huang et al. The authors also argue that Huang et al. probably
made several unfavorably decisions in their implementation of Cristofaro’s proto-
cols.
These research results clearly show that practical evaluation results are highly de-
pendent on the concrete implementation. Thus, it is difficult to compare different
approaches for the same problem based on their evaluation results without con-
sidering their implementations. In this thesis, we also compare the efficiency of
several components of our SMC-MuSe framework with the SEPIA framework by
Burkhart et al. [26, 27]. We evaluate both frameworks and present our evalua-
tion results in Sections 8.3 and 8.4.3. In Chapter 7, we present our SMC-MuSe
framework which enables secure multi-party computation on multisets for end-
users and is based on an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. In the following,
we focus on frameworks that also enable secure multi-party computation in prac-
tice.
2.4.1.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation Frameworks
In this section, we briefly review existing frameworks for secure multi-party compu-
tation. There exists a lot of work on practical secure multi-party computation frame-
works [13, 21, 25, 26, 27, 44, 99, 102, 106, 107, 116, 125, 126, 127, 138, 151, 168, 181].
In the following, we discuss the most prominent approaches. In Section 2.4.1.2, we
provide a more detailed comparison of our SMC-MuSe framework against the closely
related SMC frameworks.
In 2004, Malkhi et al. introduced Fairplay [126]. Fairplay is a two-party computa-
tion framework based on generic secure function evaluation as proposed by Yao [198].
The authors also propose a high-level procedural definition language called SFDL
to specify functions. All computable functions are compiled into a Boolean cir-
cuit. In 2008, Ben-David et al. proposed the FairplayMP framework [13] which
is an extension of Fairplay to the multi-party setting. The authors extended the
specification language and use for computation the BMR protocol [9] which is an
extension of Yao’s circuit technique [198]. They also provide practical results for
a simple auction example. Both frameworks provide security in the semi-honest
model.
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In 2008, Bogdanov et al. proposed Sharemind [21]. Sharemind is a secure multi-
party computation framework based on an additive secret sharing scheme. Their
solution provides security in the semi-honest model and all share operations are
universally composable [31]. Each party shares its input with three computing
nodes. The specified algorithms are then computed on those nodes and the re-
sult is published to all parties. Sharemind allows the specification of algorithms in
an assembly-like language. As the performance results indicate, the aim of Share-
mind is a very efficient implementation based on exactly three trusted computing
nodes.
In 2009, Damgard et al. proposed the Virtual Ideal Functionality Framework
(VIFF) which is the first asynchronous implementation of secure multi-party com-
putation [44]. VIFF is the successor of SMCL which is no longer supported [151].
VIFF is based on arithmetic circuits and Shamir secret sharing but also allows com-
putations based on homomorphic encryption. The most interesting property is the
asynchronous protocol implementation which allows for parallelization of primitive
operations such as secure multiplications. The security of the framework is again
given against passive adversaries.
In 2010, Henecka et al. introduced the TASTY framework [99]. TASTY is a two-
party SMC framework which combines computations based on homomorphic en-
cryption and secret sharing similar to the VIFF framework. The proposed compiler
allows the user to define the function to be computed using both theoretical SMC ap-
proaches. The authors suggest that homomorphic encryption is better for large inte-
ger arithmetic whereas secret sharing and circuits are better for non-linear function-
alities. The framework is secure in the semi-honest model.
In 2011, Burkhart presented the SEPIA framework [25]. SEPIA uses Shamir’s secret
sharing for secure multi-party computation. The input is shared between an arbi-
trary number of computing nodes which perform the function evaluation. The result
of the computation is published to all parties. In general, SEPIA allows the com-
putation of arbitrary functions over a prime field Zp. The authors proposed several
protocols based on the primitive share operations, e. g., (multi)set intersection and
(multi)set union [127]. The framework is secure in the semi-honest model. In [26],
the authors show that SEPIA outperforms VIFF and FairplayMP and is competitive
with the Sharemind framework. As stated by the authors, SEPIA is currently one
of the fastest available SMC frameworks. However, the results in [26, 27] also show
that the communication overhead is very high. In this thesis, we provide a detailed
performance comparison of our SMC-MuSe framework with the SEPIA framework,
see Sections 8.3 and 8.4.3.
Recently, Iacovazzi et al. [107] propose an extension of the SEPIA framework by
implementing the Globally-Constrained Randomization (GCR) method [169]. GCR
is a simplified additive secret sharing scheme based on simple blinding [169]. The
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benefit of GCR is performance and the drawback is the computation options, i. e.,
only simple computations are possible [169]. E. g., GCR can not handle intermediate
secret results but only allows computation of a public output based on a number of
private inputs. The authors compare and practically evaluate the efficiency of the
GCR scheme with SEPIA’s Shamir secret sharing operations and show that GCR is
faster than Shamir for secure private additions.
In 2013, Kreuter et al. proposed PCF [116] which is a two-party framework for
SMC. Their approach is based on optimized Boolean circuit. In general, the secu-
rity is given in the semi-honest model. In addition, the authors argue that circuit
implementations secure in the malicious model are feasible based on the KSS com-
piler proposed by Kreuter et al. [117]. The KSS compiler generates highly-optimized
circuits [117] such that the evaluation of these circuits is efficient enough even in the
malicious model.
At the time of writing, in 2014, Rastogi et al. propose the Wysteria framework [168]
in the multi-party setting. Similar to the Fairplay and FairplayMP frameworks,
Wysteria has a high-level programming language to define functions and those spec-
ifications are compiled into Boolean circuits based on the GMW protocol [84]. The
security is given in the semi-honest model. As a new feature, Wysteria supports
mixed-mode programs. The authors call programs mixed-mode where local and
secure multi-party computations are interleaved. The authors provide an implemen-
tation of their framework and their evaluation shows that Wysteria is competitive
against previous SMC frameworks.
2.4.1.2 Comparison against closely related SMC Frameworks
As discussed before there are different frameworks for secure multi-party compu-
tation proposed in related work. In this section, we compare SMC-MuSe against
these related frameworks. We focus on discussing frameworks with an available
implementation which try to make SMC available to application developers and
end-users.
In the following, we present the comparison of SMC-MuSe against the VIFF, SEPIA,
Sharemind, and FairplayMP frameworks by analyzing certain properties of the
frameworks. We focus on the cryptographic primitives, the computable functions,
the adversary model, and the communication model. An analysis of the newly pro-
posed frameworks PCF and Wysteria is part of future work.
VIFF is a framework for secure multi-party computation which is based on Shamir’s
secret sharing and additively homomorphic encryption [44, 190]. The framework is
integrated into the Python language and supports arbitrary function computation
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specified over Zp or GF (28). Each party shares its input among all other parties.
Then, they jointly compute the chosen function and recover the output of the com-
putation. VIFF provides security against semi-honest adversaries and allows up to
c < n2 colluding attackers. The framework supports asynchronous communication
utilizing the Twisted framework [199].
Clients need to be setup manually to install required dependencies and configure
the clients. All required keying material for the secure channels as well as the
secret sharing scheme needs to be manually setup. SSL channels between the clients
are established with the help of the pre-configured keys. Note that no automated
solution is proposed to authenticate those SSL connections. VIFF proposes a manual
solution to the key distribution problem as parameters for secret sharing have to be
configured beforehand. Thus, the overall setup phase is more complicated than the
setup of SMC-MuSe.
The most well-known practical application of VIFF is the implementation of a dou-
ble auction in Denmark where the price for sugar beets was reconciled between
merchants and farmers [22]. However, the authors conducted the SMC computa-
tions with trusted computing nodes. The double auction was executed on three
servers trusted in computation after the danish farmers and merchants submitted
their encrypted bids to a database. The result was published to all farmers and
merchants.
SEPIA is a framework for secure multi-party computation which is based on Shamir’s
secret sharing [26, 27]. SEPIA is written in Java and enables to compute functions
over a prime field Zp. The authors implemented and tested their framework for a
62 bit prime p. This allows arithmetic operations on shares to be executed directly
by CPU instructions resulting in very fast computations. However, it also limits the
possible input domain and the range of computable functions since modular reduc-
tions of intermediate results have to be avoided [27].
SEPIA introduces input and privacy peers. The input peers share their input
among the privacy peers. The privacy peers are responsible for the SMC com-
putations. SEPIA supports SSL between any pair of privacy and input peers. Key
generation and certification is out of scope assuming that a PKI exists. Keying
parameters required for secret sharing are manually configured. SEPIA is secure
in the semi-honest model with up to c < n2 colluding privacy peers. Note that in
SEPIA, the privacy peers also learn the result. The authors suggest to run the
computation with a high number of input peers such that the output of the chosen
function results in no or at least little information about the inputs of the input
peers [27].
SEPIA uses a synchronous communication approach such that all privacy peers have
to be online during computation. The practical potential of SEPIA was illustrated
37
2 Related Work and Cryptographic Background
in the context of distributed network monitoring [26]. SEPIA targets scenarios
where it is realistic to assume the existence of trusted components for computation.
SEPIA provides interfaces to several basic secure multi-party computation protocols
based on secret sharing in Zp. Also, several more sophisticated protocol examples,
e. g., set intersection or multiset union, are given that use the basic protocols in a
modular fashion. Finally, SEPIA provides good documentation and tutorials that
help the developer to create its own protocol building on the basic protocols already
implemented.
Sharemind is a framework similar to SEPIA but it uses only three computation
nodes. Sharemind is based on additive secret sharing and is written in C++ [21].
Sharemind targets high-performance computing and is especially suitable for func-
tions which allow for a large amount of parallel computations.
FairplayMP is a framework for secure multi-party computation which is based on
boolean circuit evaluation and is written in Java [13]. It allows for the evaluation of
arbitrary functions specified in the framework-specific function definition language
SFDL. Boolean circuits for functions specified in SFDL are automatically generated
in FairplayMP. The authors tested the performance of their framework in the context
of auctions with 8-bit integers as input and output.
In FairplayMP, secure channels are established via SSL. Currently, only a man-
ual setup with configuration files is supported. The same holds for the exchange
of keying material. The framework is secure against semi-honest adversaries with
c < n2 . Each input player adds his blinded input to the input wires. The circuit
is jointly evaluated by the computation nodes, which communicate synchronously.
Note that as opposed to SEPIA the computation nodes do not learn the result
of the computation due to an initial blinding of the inputs by the input par-
ties.
SMC-MuSe is our framework for secure multi-party computation presented in this
thesis, see also Chapter 7. SMC-MuSe is based on an additively homomorphic cryp-
tosystem and is written in Java. Secure channels are established via SSL and the
setup phase is fully automated. The communication is asynchronous between all par-
ties and the SMC computations are executed by the parties themselves. Any SMC-
protocol that can be implemented in SMC-MuSe is a composition of multiset opera-
tions, see Table 3.1.1. SMC-MuSe enables the implementation of SMC-protocols in a
modular state-based fashion. The framework supports security against semi-honest
and malicious adversaries with up to c ≤ n − 1 colluding attackers. SMC-MuSe
also includes a desktop application and an Android application which makes secure
multi-party computation available to end-users.
Summary: Table 2.4.1 summarizes our comparison of SMC frameworks. Apart
form the big differences with respect to the functions that can be computed by
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Property VIFF SEPIA Sharemind FMP SMC-MuSe
Crypto. Primitive SSS/AHE SSS ASS BCE AHE
Comp. Functions Zp, GF (28) Zp Z232 Arbitrary Table 3.1.1
Setup phase Manual Manual Manual Semi-auto Auto
Practical yes yes no no yes
Adversary Model SHM SHM SHM SHM SHM, MM
Attackers c < n2 c <
n
2 c <
n
2 c <
n
2 c ≤ n− 1
Comm. model async. sync. sync. sync. async.
End-user no no no no yes
Table 2.4.1: Comparison of the SMC frameworks.
the different frameworks, the main differences of SMC-MuSe compared to the other
frameworks are the adversary models, the automation of the setup phase, and the
end-user applications. SMC-MuSe targets end-users and application developers.
This is also reflected in the implementation of a fully automated setup phase which
saves the potentially non-technical end-user any hassle related to key generation and
distribution. SMC-MuSe is also the only SMC framework that provides two usable
end-user applications for the desktop and mobile environment.
As opposed to SEPIA and Sharemind, all computations in SMC-MuSe are done
locally by the parties themselves. As in VIFF, the communication between the
clients in SMC-MuSe is asynchronous. In SEPIA and Sharemind, the computing
nodes also learn the result of the computation, while in VIFF, FairplayMP and
SMC-MuSe only the input parties learn the results. In SMC-MuSe, protocols secure
in the malicious model as well as protocols secure in the semi-honest model are
implemented. Also, opposed to the other frameworks, it allows up to c ≤ n − 1
colluding attackers rather than c < n2 . Thus, SMC-MuSe is secure against more
powerful adversary types.
With respect to performance, a fair comparison between the frameworks currently
seems to be very difficult due to the very significant differences with respect to the
input domain,the communication model, and the range of computable functions. In
addition, the test environment used to evaluate the performance of the frameworks
varies from desktop computers to cluster-based setups. Nevertheless, we have made
the effort to integrate the SEPIA framework in our test environment and evaluated
our framework SMC-MuSe against the SEPIA framework with respect to multi-
set intersection, union, and the reconciliation protocol MR-opt, see Sections 8.3.1
and 8.4.3.
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2.4.2 Formal Definition
We give a formal definition of a secure multi-party computation protocol:
Definition 2.4.2.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocol [123]. In a secure
multi-party computation protocol, n parties P1, ..., Pn jointly compute a function f
which takes n inputs and generates n outputs. Each party has one private input
xi and at the end of the protocol run, party Pi should learn the yi component of
the output (y1, ..., yn) = f(x1, ..., xn). The protocol should be privacy-preserving and
correct. Privacy-preserving in the sense that no party should learn anything other
than its own output and what can be deduced from its result yi and its input xi.
Correctness states that the protocol indeed computes f , i. e., party Pi really learns
the correct value yi.
In this thesis, we are mainly concerned with protocols for n parties P1, ..., Pn, each
of which has a private input multiset Si with k set elements si1, ..., sik. The set
elements are chosen from a common domain D and can be represented as a bit-
string of length l. The parties P1, ..., Pn jointly compute a function f (S1, .., Sn) = y
such that each party Pi learns the same y and everything deducible from Si and
y.
2.4.3 Security Models
In the following, we describe two security models, namely the Standard Model and
the Random Oracle Model, which are often used to prove the security of crypto-
graphic protocols. We use the standard model to prove the security of our pro-
tocol constructions presented in Chapter 4 with a semi-honest adversary (see Sec-
tion 2.4.4.1) and the random oracle model to prove the security of our protocol con-
structions presented in Chapter 5 with a malicious adversary (see Section 2.4.4.2).
In [45], Damgard et al. propose a general way to convert a protocol secure in the
semi-honest model to a protocol with security against covert adversaries [5]. Covert
adversaries may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol but the deviation is detected
with high probability. It is still future work to examine how the constructions in [45]
can be used for our protocols.
2.4.3.1 Standard Model
In the standard model, we consider a probabilistic polynomial time bounded adver-
sary with limited computation power as defined in Definition 2.1.3.2. There exist
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problems which cannot be solved in polynomial time, e. g., the factorization prob-
lem. Secure protocol constructions are only based on such complexity assumptions.
Thus, the protocol is secure as long as the complexity assumptions hold, e. g., as long
as we assume that factorization cannot be solved in polynomial time. Depending on
the chosen cryptographic primitives in a protocol, it is hard to prove the security of
the protocol in the standard model.
2.4.3.2 Random Oracle Model
There are protocols that cannot be proven secure in the standard model. Here, the
cryptographic primitives are replaced by idealized functions. E. g., protocols that
use the so-called Fiat-Shamir heuristic to construct non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs use a hash function to compute random values. However, no realistic hash
function returns truly random values. Thus, the security of such protocols is evalu-
ated in a different model, in which the hash function is replaced by a random oracle,.
This was first formalized by Bellare and Rogaway [11].
A random oracle is a theoretical black box machine that returns a truly random
response for every query it receives. If the exact same query is performed twice, the
same value will be returned. In a multi-party setting, there is one random oracle for
all parties and it therefore can be used in the same way as a hash function. Other
than realistic hash functions, which are only believed to be hard to invert or predict,
a random oracle has exactly the properties that are often optimistically expected
from hash functions.
To formally prove the security of a protocol in the random oracle model, we allow
the simulator to control the output of the random oracle. Therefore the simulator
can choose the output of the random oracle when generating the corresponding
transcript, as long as it is indistinguishable from the uniformly random output of
the actual random oracle.
2.4.4 Adversary Models
In secure multi-party computation two adversary models are commonly used: the
semi-honest and the malicious model. Both models assume the existence of pairwise
secure communication channels between all parties, such that external attackers do
not have to be considered. A semi-honest adversary is an insider attacker, e. g., a
party that participates in the protocol and tries to infer as much (secret) informa-
tion as possible from its view of a protocol run, but strictly follows the prescribed
actions of the protocol. An insider attacker is a stronger form of an adversary than
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the external attacker. A malicious adversary is an insider attacker that can almost
arbitrarily deviate from the protocol except for refusing to participate in the proto-
col, manipulating its own input, and aborting the protocol. In our SMC protocols,
we assume that at least one party in the protocol is honest. Thus, we consider
protocols with c < n colluding attackers.
2.4.4.1 Semi-Honest Model
The Semi-honest model (SHM), which is also referred to as the honest-but-curious
adversary model, was first introduced in [84]. In the semi-honest model all parties
act according to the prescribed actions in the protocols. They may, however, try to
infer as much information as possible from all results and also intermediate messages
obtained during the execution of the protocol. Consequently, a protocol is said to be
privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model, if no party gains any information about
the other party’s private input other than what can be deduced from the output of
the protocol and the party’s own private input.
While not the strongest model possible, the semi-honest model is suitable for all
applications in which none of the parties is more ill-intended than just being curious.
For example, in a scheduling application where the parties are simply interested in
finding a common time for a meeting, it is reasonable to assume that none of the
parties has any malicious intent.
2.4.4.2 Malicious Model
In the Malicious model (MM), an attacker can behave almost arbitrarily, that is, we
do not assume that all parties follow the steps of the protocol correctly. However,
the following vicious behaviors cannot be prevented in an SMC protocol secure in
the malicious model:
Participation/Aborting: It is not possible to force all parties to participate in the
protocol and we can not inhibit that the malicious party aborts the protocol
before completion.
Input Substitution: A malicious party can always replace its private input before
execution of the protocol without being detected.
We briefly describe the formal definition of security in the malicious model. For a
thorough formal definition see [30, 82, 123]. The definition is based on the idea to
compare what an adversary can do in a real execution of the protocol to what it
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can do in an ideal world, in which our security goals are satisfied. This is called the
real-vs.-ideal paradigm.
Execution in the Ideal World: In the ideal world, the functionality is computed
with the help of a Trusted third party (TTP), that receives the private inputs
S = (S1, ..., Sn) of all parties, computes the function f (S1, .., Sn) = y and returns
the result y to all parties. In this case, the security goals are satisfied, as no in-
formation other than the result of the function is provided by the TTP. We now
sketch a protocol execution in the ideal world. For a more formal definition, see
[82].
The adversary is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, which con-
trols c < n corrupted parties. All honest parties Pi send Si to the TTP. All corrupted
parties either send Si or some arbitrary values S′i (input substitution), which is de-
cided by the adversary based on the input values of the honest parties. The TTP
computes y = f(S) and sends y to the adversary. The adversary may abort the
protocol by sending a special abort symbol ⊥ to the TTP. The TTP sends ⊥ to the
honest parties if the adversary aborted the protocol or y if it did not. All honest
parties output the result y of the TTP, the corrupted parties output nothing. The
output is denoted as IDEAL(S).
Execution in the Real World: In the real world, the actual protocol, denoted as
Π, is executed between the parties. Again, we consider a probabilistic polynomial
time bounded adversary, which controls c < n corrupted parties. The adversary can
follow an arbitrary strategy and can abort the protocol at any time. The output of
the protocol is denoted by REALΠ(S).
Indistinguishability & Simulation Paradigm: To prove that a protocol is privacy-
preserving in the malicious model the simulation paradigm is used, which com-
pares the real-world execution of the protocol to an ideal-world execution. In
other words, a protocol is privacy-preserving if we can simulate every probabilistic
polynomial time bounded adversary from the real world by a probabilistic polyno-
mial time bounded algorithm in the ideal world. If this property is satisfied, we
can be certain that our protocol is as privacy-preserving as the ideal world proto-
col.
In more details, in the ideal world, all parties provide their inputs to a trusted
third party, which computes the correct output and provides the results to each
party. In the real world, in addition to the protocol’s correct output, the adversary
learns all messages exchanged between the parties and all randomness generated
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during the execution of the protocol. To prove the real-world protocol secure, one
shows that it is possible to construct a simulator which, given the ideal output,
can generate a transcript that is identical to the real protocol execution. If such
a transcript can be generated using only the knowledge of the ideal execution, the
protocol is privacy-preserving in the malicious model. In Section 5, we use the simu-
lation paradigm to prove the security of our protocol constructions in the malicious
model.
2.5 Privacy-Preserving Set Operations
Privacy-preserving set operations are an interesting application of secure multi-party
computation. In this thesis, we are especially interested in privacy-preserving mul-
tiset operations. Here, each party only learns the result of the multiset opera-
tion and anything what can be deduced from the result and its input multiset.
Privacy-preserving multiset operations were first introduced by Kissner et al. [114].
Our reconciliation protocols are based on privacy-preserving multiset intersection,
union, and element reduction operations. We give an in-depth overview of those
multiset operations in Section 2.5.2. In the following, we discuss related work
in Section 2.5.1 and present the preliminary work on multiset operations in Sec-
tion 2.5.2.
2.5.1 Related Work
Privacy-preserving set operations were first introduced by Freedman et al. [70]. The
approach is based on oblivious polynomial evaluation using an additively homomor-
phic asymmetric cryptosystem and is secure in the semi-honest model. Privacy-
preserving protocols for multi-party (multi)set operations secure in the semi-honest
model, especially set intersection and set union, were first introduced by Kissner et
al. [114]. Their work is based on the initial work about two-party and multi-party set
intersection by Freedman et al. [70]. The essential idea of the operations proposed
by Kissner et al. is to encode the elements of multisets as the roots of an encrypted
polynomial and compute the result of the set operations using an additively homo-
morphic cryptosystem. The authors also sketch protocols for set intersection and
set union secure in the malicious model [114]. In this thesis, we use the multiset
intersection, union, and element reduction operations of Kissner et al. [114] in the
construction of our reconciliation protocols. We therefore describe these operations
in more detail in Section 2.5.2.
In the area of privacy-preserving set operations, there exists a lot of work about
secure set intersection protocols [4, 29, 50, 51, 70, 95, 96, 98, 101, 105, 108, 109,
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114, 121, 162, 175] which provide security in the semi-honest or the malicious
model. Also, a lot of research focuses on secure set union protocols [18, 26, 71,
98, 103, 114]. In the following, we discuss all protocols in the multi-party set-
ting.
In 2006, Sang et al. [174] proposed a similar multi intersection protocol as Kissner’s
protocol [114]. The authors use lower degree random polynomials and reduce the
quadratic complexity in the number of inputs but increase the linear complexity in
the number of parties. In 2008, Sang et al. [172] also improved the set intersec-
tion protocol secure in the malicious model by reducing the complexity regarding
the number of parties. In 2009 [173], the authors propose malicious model proto-
cols for multi intersection, over-threshold union, and element reduction based on
the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [23]. The protocols are secure in the random
oracle model and have universal composability [31]. The authors do not provide
any practical results on the efficiency in terms of computation and communication
overhead. In this thesis, we based our protocol constructions on the Paillier cryp-
tosystem. It is future work to analyze how the proposed solutions based on the
Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem can be used to construct privacy-preserving recon-
ciliation protocols.
The protocols by Dachman-Soled et al. [41] generalize Kissner’s ideas to multivariate
polynomials, which allows them to slightly improve the performance of Kissner’s
multiset intersection protocol. An interesting direction for future work can be to
realize multiset element reduction and multiset union, the two other operations
required by our protocols, using their approach.
Cheon et al. [34] also propose similar protocols to Kissner et al. [114] for set
intersection which have quasi-linear complexity in the number of inputs. The authors
do not provide solutions for multisets. As a main difference, the authors use the
point-representation of an encrypted polynomial to represent sets. Their speed-up
results in the use of the Fast Fourier Transform to efficiently compute interpolation
and evaluation of polynomials.
Frikken et al. [71] propose protocols for multi-party multiset union secure in the
semi-honest model and the malicious model. The solution is similar to Kissner et
al. [114] with linear communication complexity regarding the number of parties but
quadratic communication complexity with respect to the number of inputs. As a
main difference, the authors propose the use of a bulletin board where each party
posts their computation results. Thereby, the communication amount to the other
parties is decreased. This is especially useful in the malicious model where zero-
knowledge proofs are exchanged between all parties. We use a similar broadcast
approach to reduce the communication overhead.
Burkhart et al. [26, 27] also propose (multi)set intersection and union operations
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based on secret sharing. The authors represent (multi)set by Bloom Filters to re-
alize (multi)set intersection and union [127]. Their framework SEPIA includes an
implementation of multi-party (multi)set intersection and union operations. The
authors describe their results in [127] and conduct a detailed practical evaluation
of the performance of their solution. They state that their solution is the currently
fastest practical solution to (multi)set intersection and union. The authors compare
SEPIA against several two-party set intersection protocols [50, 73, 105] and one so-
lution for privacy-preserving network aggregation [165] which includes a multi-party
(multi)set union operation.
The authors [127] clearly show that SEPIA outperforms the existing solutions re-
garding the computation time. However, the authors do not compare SEPIA against
the existing solutions with respect to the communication overhead. They only
provide information about transmitted data which is in general very high. De-
pending on the size of the Bloom filter, the transmitted data is in the range of
several hundred MBs up to Gigabytes. In Section 8.3, we evaluate the (multi)set
intersection and union implementation of the SEPIA framework in comparison to
our implementation of Kissner’s multiset operations within the SMC-MuSe frame-
work.
Recently, in 2012, Blanton et al. [18] also propose efficient solutions for (multi)set
intersection, union, and element reduction. Their solution is also based on a linear
secret sharing scheme similar to Burkhart et al. [26, 27]. Each party shares all set
elements in the input set and keeps an array-based list of shares as the input to a
protocol run. The protocols have quasi-linear complexity in the number of inputs and
quadratic overhead in the number of parties. However, the authors do not provide
a practical implementation of set operations and do not report on results about the
runtime and communication overhead of their solution as in the case of SEPIA. In
this thesis, we used multiset operations based on homomorphic cryptography. It is
future work to analyze how we can construct reconciliation protocols using Blanton’s
multiset operations based on secret sharing.
At the start of our project, the multiset operations by Kissner et al. [114] seemed
to be the most promising approach to construct privacy-preserving reconciliation
protocols. Today, the multiset operations by Sang et al. [173] and Blanton et
al. [18] are interesting alternatives. However, both alternatives would require a
substitution of the cryptographic primitive, i. e., exchanging the Paillier cryptosys-
tem by the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem respectively a linear secret sharing
scheme. In the following, we describe Kissner’s multiset operations in more de-
tail.
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2.5.2 Multiset Operations by Kissner et al.
Kissner et. al [114] specify algorithms for privacy-preserving operations not only
for the intersection of multisets but also for the union of multisets and for element
reduction. They show that based on these operations, any function over multisets
of size k that can be expressed by the grammar
Υ ::= Si | Rdt(Υ) | Υ ∩Υ|Si ∪Υ|Υ ∪ Si (2.1)
can be computed in a privacy-preserving manner. Here, Si is a multiset of a partic-
ipating party Pi and t ≥ 1. Note that the union operation can only be computed if
one of the two operands is known to some party Pi.
2.5.2.1 Representing Multisets as Polynomials
The essential idea of the operations proposed by Kissner et al. is to encode the
elements of multisets as the roots of an encrypted polynomial and compute the result
of the set operations using an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. A private
input multiset Si = {si1, ..., sik} of party Pi is encoded by defining a polynomial
fi(x) =
∏k
j=1 (x− sij) and then encrypting the coefficients of f . I.e., an element
appearing y times in the multiset Si is a y-fold root of the corresponding polynomial
f . The result of multiset operations can now be computed solely by manipulating
encrypted polynomials.
2.5.2.2 Encrypted Polynomials
Let E denote an encryption function. Let f denote a polynomial of degree d repre-
sented by its coefficients f [0], . . . , f [d], and let E(f) denote the encrypted polynomial
with encrypted coefficients E(f [0]), ..., E(f [d]). As a shorthand, we denote the en-
crypted polynomial E(f) by φ and the encrypted coefficients by φ[0], ..., φ[d].
2.5.2.3 Operations on Encrypted Polynomials
As shown by Kissner and Song, in Section 4.2.2 of [114], assuming a semantically
secure additively homomorphic encryption function E, it is possible to compute
the sum of two encrypted polynomials, the derivative of an encrypted polyno-
mial, and the product of an unencrypted polynomial with an encrypted polyno-
mial without knowledge of the plaintext coefficients of the encrypted polynomi-
als.
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Sum of Encrypted Polynomials: Given encryptions E(f1), E(f2) of two polyno-
mials f1, f2 of degree d1, d2, the encryption of the polynomial g = f1 + f2 can be
computed as
E(g[i]) = E(f1[i]) +h E(f2[i]) where 0 ≤ i ≤ max {d1, d2}. (2.2)
I.e., computing the encryption of the sum requires (min {d1, d2}+1) +h-operations.
Derivative of an Encrypted Polynomial: Given the encryption E(f) of a poly-
nomial f of degree d, the encryption of polynomial g = ddxf can be determined
as
E(g[i]) = (i+ 1)×h E(f [i+ 1]) where 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1. (2.3)
I.e., computing the encryption of the derivative requires d×h-operations.
Product of an Unencrypted Polynomial with an Encrypted Polynomial: Given
the encryption E(f1) of a polynomial f1 of degree d1 and a polynomial f2 of degree
d2, the encryption of g = f1 ∗ f2 can be determined as
E(g[i]) = (f2[0]×h E(f1[i])) +h (f2[1]×h E(f1[i− 1])) +h
...+h (f2[i]×h E(f1[0])) where 0 ≤ i ≤ d1 + d2.
Note that E(f1) = E(f [0]), ..., E(f [d1]), f2 = f [0], . . . , f [d2] and any undefined
array positions are treated as zero, e. g., E(f1[d1 + d2]) = 0 or f2[d1 + d2] = 0. An
upper bound on the number of operations necessary to compute the product g is as
follows:
+h :
d1+d2∑
i=0
i = (d1 + d2) · (d1 + d2 + 1)2 (2.4)
×h :
d1+d2∑
i=0
i+ 1 =
d1+d2+1∑
i=1
i = (d1 + d2 + 1) · (d1 + d2 + 2)2 (2.5)
2.5.2.4 Multiset Union, Intersection, and Element Reduction
Given the operations on encrypted polynomials introduced above, it is possible to
compute the multiset operations union, intersection, and element reduction. The
multisets are represented as polynomials as described in Section 2.5.2.1.
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Union. The union S1 ∪S2 of two multisets S1 and S2 (represented by polynomials
f1 and f2 respectively) can be expressed by the multiplication of the polynomials
as
f1 ∗ f2.
Each element a appearing y1 times in S1 and y2 times in S2 with y1, y2 ≥ 0 occurs
y1 + y2 times in the multiset represented by f1 ∗ f2. Kissner et al. have proven
the Theorem 1 [114] which states that an attacker obtains the same amount of
information from f1 ∗ f2 as from S1 ∪ S2.
Intersection. The intersection S1 ∩ S2 of two multisets S1 and S2 (represented
by the polynomials f1 and f2 of degree d respectively) can be expressed by the
polynomial
f1 ∗ r + f2 ∗ s,
where r, s are random polynomials of degree d. Each element a appearing y1 times
in S1 and y2 times in S2 with y1, y2 > 0 occurs min{y1, y2} times in the result-
ing multiset. Kissner et al. have proven the Theorem 3 [114] which states that
an attacker obtains the same amount of information from f1 ∗ r + f2 ∗ s as from
S1 ∩ S2. Theorem 3 is based on Lemma 2 which is a proposition about two
polynomials:
Lemma 2.5.1 (Kissner’s Lemma 2, page 26-27 of [114]) Let f, g be polynomials
in R[x] where R is a ring such that no polynomial-time-bounded adversary can
find the size of its subfields with non-negligible probability, deg(f) = deg(g) =
α , β ≥ α , gcd(f, g) = 1 , and f [deg(f)] ∈ R∗ ∧ g[deg(g)] ∈ R∗. Let
r = ∑βi=0 r[i]xi and s = ∑βi=0 s[i]xi, where ∀0≤i≤β r[i]← R, ∀0≤i≤β s[i]← R (inde-
pendently). Let u = f ∗ r + g ∗ s = ∑α+βi=0 u[i]xi. Then ∀0≤i≤α+β u[i] are distributed
uniformly and independently over R.
Thus, Theorem 3 is restricted to multisets of the same size. In Section 3.1.1, we
generalize this Lemma to polynomials of arbitrary degree such that Theorem 3 holds
for multisets of arbitrary sizes.
Element Reduction. The reduction Rdt(S) (by t) of a multiset S represented by
polynomial f can be expressed by the polynomial
t∑
j=0
f (j) ∗ Fj ∗ rj ,
where f (j) is the j-th derivative of f and rj , Fj are random polynomials of degree
deg(f (j)). Fj is chosen such that no roots of Fj are elements of the overall domain
49
2 Related Work and Cryptographic Background
Size of different encodings where the multiset S is of cardinality k
Type Symbol Result Degree Example
Simple S k {A,B}→ f (x) = (x−A) (x−B)
Rank renc((S,≤)) k(k+1)2
renc ({A > B})
→ f (x) = (x−A)2 (x−B)
Multiplicity menc(n, S) n · k2 menc (2, {A,B})→ f (x) = (x−A)4 (x−B)4
Effect of set operations on the degree of polynomials f, f1, ..., fn
Type Symbol Result Degree
Element Reduction Rdt(f) deg(f) + t
Set Intersection f1 ∩ ... ∩ fn 2 ·max{deg(f1), ..., deg(fn)}
Set Union f1 ∪ ... ∪ fn ∑ni=1 deg(fi)
Table 2.5.1: Encodings and operations and their effect on the polynomial degree.
D. Each element a occurring y times in S with y ≥ 0 occurs max{y− t, 0} times in
the resulting multiset. Kissner et al. have proven the Theorem 5 [114] which states
that an attacker obtains the same amount of information from ∑tj=0 f (j) ∗Fj ∗ rj as
from Rdt(S).
2.5.2.5 Effect of Encodings and Multiset Operations on Polynomials
In our reconciliation protocols for MPROSMR and MPROSSR (see Chapters 4 and 5)
we use different encodings of the inputs of each party into multisets. In the follow-
ing, S is a multiset with k distinct elements. Table 2.5.1 lists different encodings
and multiset operations, and their effect on the degree of the resulting polynomials.
In the Simple encoding, each set element occurs once. The Rank encoding includes
the rank (order) in the multiset. Using the Multiplicity encoding, each set element
occurs n · k times where n denotes the number of parties and k the cardinality of
the set S. Table 2.5.1 also shows the effect of the different multiset operations ele-
ment reduction, multiset intersection, and multiset union on the degree of the result
polynomial. Each multiset operation increases the degree of the result polynomial.
2.5.2.6 Privacy-Preserving Multiset Intersection Protocol
We describe the multiset intersection protocol secure in the semi-honest model by
Kissner et al. (Figure 1, [114]) which is used as a building block in Sections 4.2.1
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and 4.3.1. The protocol is given for n parties P1, ..., Pn with input multisets Si of
size k. All parties learn the intersection S1 ∩ ...∩ Sn of all input multisets S1, ..., Sn
without gaining any other information about the other parties’ input multisets. The
protocol works as follows.
First, each party Pi determines the polynomial representation fi of its multiset Si
using the Simple encoding. The encryption E(fi) is sent to c other parties. Then,
all parties compute the encrypted polynomial E(S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn) of the multiset in-
tersection on the input multisets S1, ..., Sn. Note that in the result polynomial,
each input polynomial fi is blinded by c+ 1 random polynomials. Thus, the result
polynomial is uniformly distributed and up to c colluding attackers cannot deduce
any information from it. Finally, all parties participate in the threshold decryp-
tion of the result polynomial. Each party calculates the result of the protocol, i. e.,
the multiset intersection S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn of the input multisets S1, ..., Sn, by check-
ing the roots of the result polynomial. We use the multiset intersection protocol
in the construction of our reconciliation protocols in the semi-honest model, see
Chapter 4.
2.5.2.7 Verifiable Multiset Operations
Kissner et al. [114] proposed protocols to securely compute the multiset intersec-
tion, union, and reduction operation in the malicious model. As described in Section
2.5.2, all set operations are composed of several polynomial multiplications of an
encrypted polynomial with an unencrypted polynomial. In case of multiset intersec-
tion and reduction, we also need homomorphic addition to add up the intermediate
multiplication results.
The authors of [114] show that one can achieve verifiable multiset operations by
proving the correct multiplication of all intermediate results using a ZKPK protocol
for correct multiplication. A correct polynomial multiplication of two polynomial
f1, f2 is shown by proving the multiplication of each coefficient of polynomial f1
with each coefficient of polynomial f2. Therefore, the prover sends all intermediate
multiplication results together with a corresponding zero-knowledge proof to the
verifier. Note that the verifier has to add up the intermediate multiplication results
for each coefficient of the result polynomial.
If both input multisets contain k inputs, adding the ZKPKs increases the proto-
col complexity by O(k2). Unfortunately, the authors do not provide a detailed
complexity analysis of their malicious model constructions and do not show how
many challenges, commitments, and responses are needed in order to proof a correct
polynomial multiplication. We proposed a more efficient variant for proving a poly-
nomial multiplication in Section 3.3. In Section 3.3.1.1, we compare the complexity
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of our new approach presented in Section 3.3.1 with the approach presented in this
section.
2.5.2.8 Multiset Operations within the SEPIA Framework
We describe SEPIA’s multiset intersection and union protocols which are used in
the performance comparison against SMC-MuSe’s multiset intersection and union
operations, see also Section 8.3.1.
Set / Multiset Intersection Protocol: SEPIA uses the Bloom filter data struc-
ture [19] to represent sets. Bloom filter are a space-efficient bit-array-based data
structure to represent sets. Bloom filters are best suited for insertions and set
membership tests. Counting Bloom Filters are a generalization of Bloom filters
based on integer-arrays which allow the representation of multisets. In the SEPIA
framework, each array position of the bloom filter is shared among the other par-
ties. This leads to a high communication overhead if the Bloom filter becomes very
large.
In the following, we denote a (counting) Bloom filter of party Pi by BFi (CFi), the
position u of a Bloom filter by BFi(u), and s denotes the size of the Bloom filter.
Set intersection is realized by computation on the binary Bloom filters BF1, ..., BFn
using the logical AND at each position u, 1 ≤ u ≤ s:
[BF∩(u)] = [BF1(u)] ∧ ... ∧ [BFn(u)]
where [Bit1 ∧Bit2] = [Bit1] ∗ [Bit2].
So, SEPIA needs the private share multiplication to compute the set intersection
operation. In case of multisets, SEPIA computes
[CF∩(u)] = min(min([CF1(u)], [CF2(u)]), ..., [CFn(u)]).
The min operation can by realized by the use of SEPIA’s lessThan operation [127].
Here, SEPIA needs private additions as well as multiplications to realize multiset
intersection.
Set / Multiset Union Protocol: The computation is similar to the set intersection
protocol using the logicalOR operation at each position u, 1 ≤ u ≤ s:
[BF∪(u)] = [BF1(u)] ∨ ... ∨ [BFn(u)]
where [Bit1 ∨Bit2] = [Bit1] + [Bit2]− [Bit1] ∗ [Bit2].
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So, SEPIA needs private additions and multiplications for the set union operation.
In case of multisets, SEPIA computes
[CF∪(u)] = [CF1(u)] + ...+ [CFn(u)].
Thus, SEPIA only needs the addition operation for multiset union.
2.6 Two-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation Protocols
Two-party privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets (PROS) is a specific type
of secure multi-party computation protocols. A reconciliation protocol allows two
parties to reconcile their ordered input sets in a privacy-preserving manner [134].
The output of the reconciliation protocol is the common element in the two or-
dered input sets which maximizes the combined orders of both parties according to
an agreed upon order composition scheme (see Definition 2.1.1.5). Applications
of PROS are e. g. privacy-preserving policy reconciliation or privacy-preserving
scheduling. In both applications, the order of the input set encodes the preferences
of each party associated with the input elements.
The maximizing of the parties’ individual preferences is achieved by carrying out
privacy-preserving set intersection protocols on specifically chosen input sets in a
particular order. This order directly corresponds to the combined order induced by
the chosen composition scheme. We discuss two different composition schemes in
Section 2.6.2. In the two-party setting, reconciliation protocols have been proposed
which are secure in the semi-honest [134, 135] and the malicious model [132]. We
briefly review the semi-honest protocols in Section 2.6.3.
2.6.1 Related Work
Meyer et al. first introduced two-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols
secure in the semi-honest model in [134]. The protocol constructions are based on
an additively homomorphic cryptosystem and use the set intersection protocol by
Freedman et al. [70]. In [135], the authors further develop these protocols and show
that it is possible to construct two-party protocols that are privacy-preserving in
the semi-honest model from any privacy-preserving set intersection protocol such as
[29, 50, 95, 96, 101, 108, 70, 173]. In [132], Mayer et al. have developed two-party
reconciliation protocols secure in the malicious model.
As first described in [134], PROS enables the process of fair and privacy-preserving
policy reconciliation. Policy reconciliation enables the negotiation of agreements
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between two parties even when the parties do not necessarily trust one another. In
order to allow for an unbiased negotiation, it is a must that the choices each party
is willing to accept remain private at all times. Yet, the goal of the reconciliation
process is to yield an agreement that is unbiased with respect to the choices of both
parties involved. The protocol assumes two parties with their individual set of rules
which define parameters for collaboration or information exchange with the other
party. Reconciliation is used to enable collaboration by determining a common set
of parameters. The application scope was later extended to the realm of privacy
policies in social networks by D. Ferrest [65].
Kursawe et al. also propose a solution for private policy negotiation [119]. The
solution is based on a threshold version of a semantically secure additively homo-
morphic cryptosystem. The function to be computed is modeled as a boolean circuit
which is evaluated in a privacy-preserving manner using the homomorphic cryptosys-
tem.
A scheduling application solves the problem of finding common (best-matching)
timeslots among multiple parties with certain availabilities, potentially taking indi-
vidual preferences into account. In the context of SMC, this problem was first used as
a motivating example in [134, 135] in the two-party setting and later on implemented
as a two-party iPhone application Appoint based on direct Bluetooth connections
[131]. In Section 7.6.2, we present our Android app Prefer which also enables multi-
party privacy-preserving scheduling where each party holds an ordered set of input
elements based on their individual preferences.
In [17], the authors also propose a scheduling application for mobile devices. As
opposed to Appoint, the output in [17] is the set of all common inputs and user
preferences are not taken into account. Another privacy-preserving scheduling ap-
plication for mobile devices was proposed in [49]. Here, each party assigns costs
to the timeslots (similar to preferences). The output contains all timeslots where
the sum of the individual costs are below a threshold. This is the opposite of
the highest sum in reconciliation protocols using the sum of ranks composition
scheme.
In 2011, Jo´nsson et al. propose a multi-party weighted set intersection proto-
col in [110]. As in the reconciliation protocols for the sum of ranks composition
scheme, the inputs are associated with weights and the protocol computes the sum
of the weights. However, in [110] the output is the set of all values with a sum
of weights above a threshold t and not only the value(s) with the highest sum of
weights.
In 2012, D. Mayer published his thesis about the design and implementation of
two-party reconciliation protocols in [128]. We shortly summarize the main con-
tributions of his work. In theory, D. Mayer extended the security guarantees of
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PROS protocols to the malicious model [132]. Also, the author proposed privacy-
preserving interval operations which extend the possibilities in the comparison of
input elements. In practice, D. Mayer has shown that it is possible to implement
PROS protocols in both adversary models in a very efficient way. Therefore, the
author created a library for privacy-preserving tools and protocols that implements
all proposed two-party protocols and the required cryptographic building blocks.
Furthermore, D. Mayer proposed a carefully designed test and evaluation frame-
work [130] and tested the performance of all implemented components. In practice,
the author has shown the portability and practical usability of the implemented
library by proof-of-concept applications for the Android and iOS platform. Finally,
based on general usability studies and guidelines, the author has shown that the
performance of the PROS protocols is acceptable for users in certain application
scenarios.
The focus of the research of D. Mayer are two-party reconciliation protocols. In this
thesis, we concentrate on multi-party reconciliation protocols.
2.6.2 Composition Schemes
In a PROS protocol, each party totally orders the elements in its input set Si accord-
ing to its preferences. The rank of an element sij is determined by rankSi , see Defi-
nition 2.1.1.4. The most preferred element has the highest rank. The goal of the par-
ties is to not only determine the elements they have in common but determine those
shared elements which maximize their combined preferences.
Here, we consider two composition schemes first described in [134], that are reason-
able choices, in the sense that they are unbiased with respect to the orders of any of
the parties. The first composition scheme is called the minimum of ranks scheme and
determines the rank of an element in the intersection of all sets based on the mini-
mal rank assigned to it by any party, see Definition 2.1.1.6. The second composition
scheme is called SR and determines the rank of an element based on the sum of the
ranks assigned to it by all parties, see Definition 2.1.1.7.
2.6.3 Two-Party Reconciliation Protocols in the Semi-Honest Model
In the following, we review the PROS protocols secure in the semi-honest model
proposed by Meyer et al. [134, 135]. We generalize PROS protocols to the multi-
party setting in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1.
The input of both parties P1, P2 is an ordered set Si of k input elements. Each
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party associates a rank with each of its inputs such that his most preferred input
is si1 and is associated with a rank of k, his second most preferred input is si2
and is associated with a rank of k − 1, and so on until his k-th input element sik
which is associated with a rank of 1. The PROS protocol enables the two parties
to determine the input element that they have in common and that maximizes the
combined order induced by the chosen composition scheme (see Section 2.6.2). If
no solution exists, the output is the empty set. The protocol is privacy-preserving
with up to c < n colluding parties in the semi-honest model. The complete protocol
works as follows.
The protocol consists of multiple rounds. In each round, all pairs of set elements
are compared according to the combined order. For the sum of ranks (minimum
of ranks) composition scheme, there are up to 2k − 1 (respectively k) rounds. The
order in which the set elements are compared guarantees that if a match is found, it
is the maximum according to the chosen composition scheme. Each round consists
of one or more private set intersections on sets of size 1.
In the first round, party Pi’s input set contains its most preferred element si1. In each
of the following rounds, the parties participate in several private set intersections.
The order in which the parties select their inputs in each round is fixed and deter-
mined such that the first time when the set intersection yields a non-empty set, this
set contains the common input that maximizes the sum of ranks (minimum of ranks)
assigned to it by both parties. The schedule exactly determines the input combina-
tion used in each round. Therefore, both parties also learn the individual ranks of
the common input that maximizes the combined order. The computation and com-
munication complexity of a PROS protocol is O(k2).
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented basics and discussed important related work
in the research areas homomorphic cryptography, zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
protocols, secure multi-party computation, privacy-preserving set operations, and rec-
onciliation protocols. We use the threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem as the
cryptographic primitive within our reconciliation protocol constructions presented
in Chapters 4 and 5. In order to secure our protocols against malicious adversaries,
we utilize the introduced zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocols. Our multi-
party reconciliation protocols are based on the presented privacy-preserving multiset
operations.
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As motivated in Chapter 1, a primary goal of this thesis is to construct privacy-
preserving reconciliation protocols which are secure in the semi-honest and the ma-
licious models. In this chapter, we propose our novel cryptographic building blocks
which we use in our protocol constructions presented in Chapters 4 and 5 for the
semi-honest and the malicious model (see Section 2.4.4). Our reconciliation protocols
are based on privacy-preserving set operations (see Section 2.5.2) and use an addi-
tively homomorphic cryptosystem (see Section 2.2.2) to perform computations on
encrypted data. In the malicious model, we have to verify those computations in or-
der to prove the security of our reconciliation protocols.
We present our contributions in the area of privacy-preserving set operations in
Section 3.1. In order to achieve security in the malicious model, we describe novel
zero-knowledge proofs for the Paillier cryptosystem in Section 3.2. The privacy-
preserving set operations are realized by operations on polynomials. The goal of the
ZKPK protocols presented in Section 3.2 is to verify the construction of encrypted
polynomials and the operations on encrypted polynomials. We present our results
on verifiable polynomial construction and operations in Section 3.3. In the following,
we describe our contributions in more detail.
In Section 3.1, we present novel privacy-preserving set operations. First, we gener-
alize the multiset intersection operation presented in Section 2.5.2 for input polyno-
mials of arbitrary degree. This generalizes Kissner’s grammar for privacy-preserving
set operations to allow the input of multisets of arbitrary size. This is an integral
component of our semi-honest protocol constructions presented in Chapter 4. Next,
we present novel set operations to check the multiset membership of a set element
and the inclusion relation between two multisets. These two operations enable the
elimination of multiset elements which is used in an application scenario presented
in Chapter 6. Just as our reconciliation protocols presented in Chapters 4 and 5,
the protocols are based on a threshold version of an additively homomorphic cryp-
tosystem. We specify these protocols for set membership (∈) and subset relation
(⊆) in detail. In addition, we provide an analysis of both the communication and
the computation overhead of our new protocols and show that they are correct and
privacy-preserving.
In Section 3.2, we provide novel non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for the Paillier
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cryptosystem that allow us to specify new protocols for verifiable multiset union, in-
tersection, and reduction operations. In particular, we convert the interactive proof
for plaintext knowledge and correct multiplication (see Sections 2.3.4.1 and 2.3.4.2)
into non-interactive ZKPK protocols. In addition, we present a new ZKPK proto-
col for homomorphic linear equations and show how this can be used to construct
ZKPK protocols for verifiable set operations. We show that these new ZKPK pro-
tocols are more efficient than the ones previously proposed by Kissner et al. (see
Section 2.5.2.7). In part, this work is based on parts of the master thesis of L.
Brutschy [24]. Compared to [24], we present a revised version of the algorithms,
their descriptions and their complexity analysis. We also added a detailed proof of
special soundness for the linear equation proof and a comparison of our approach
with the existing approach presented in [114].
In Section 3.3, we describe how to verify the construction of polynomials and oper-
ations on polynomials. Our constructions for verifiable polynomial construction
and operations are generic in the sense that we can use non-interactive plain-
text knowledge, correct multiplication, and linear homomorphic equation proofs
based on an arbitrary additively homomorphic cryptosystem. In this thesis, we
constructed the concrete ZKPK protocols for the Paillier cryptosystem (see Sec-
tion 3.2) since we implemented a threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem as
the additively homomorphic cryptosystem in our implementation presented in Chap-
ter 7.
Based on the verifiable polynomial operations, we obtain verifiable multiset inter-
section, union, and reduction operations which are the core building blocks of our
reconciliation protocols secure in the malicious model (see Chapter 5). In part, this
work is based on parts of the master thesis of L. Brutschy [24]. Compared to [24], we
present a revised version of the description of the constructions. In this thesis, we
also included a complexity analysis of our approach which shows that our construc-
tions for verifiable multiset operations are more efficient than the ones proposed by
Kissner et al (see Section 2.5.2.7).
Parts of the work presented in this thesis have been published in [143, 144, 145].
Outline: In Section 3.1, we present our results in the area of privacy-preserving set
operations. In Sections 3.2, we propose novel ZKPK protocols for the Paillier cryp-
tosystem. In Section 3.3, we show our results on verifiable polynomial construction
and operations.
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3.1 Privacy-Preserving Set Operations
We start with a description of the generalized multiset operation in Section 3.1.1.
In Section 3.1.2, we present our novel protocol for the multiset membership test.
This enables the multiset erase operation such that we can eliminate a set element
from a multiset. In Section 3.1.3, we specify a protocol for the sub-multiset test
which enables the multiset difference operation, i. e., subtracting of a multiset from
another multiset.
3.1.1 Generalized Privacy-Preserving Multiset Intersection Operation
We generalize the multiset intersection operation presented in Section 2.5.2.
Definition 3.1.1.1 The intersection S1∩S2 of two multisets S1 and S2 of arbitrary
size (represented by the polynomials f1 and f2 of degrees d1, d2 respectively) can be
expressed by the polynomial
f1 ∗ r + f2 ∗ s,
where r, s are random polynomials of degree max{d1, d2}. Each element a appearing
y1 times in S1 and y2 times in S2 with y1, y2 > 0 occurs min{y1, y2} times in the
resulting multiset.
Theorem 3 by Kissner et al. [114] shows that an attacker obtains the same amount
of information from f1 ∗ r + f2 ∗ s as from S1 ∩ S2. However, Theorem 3 is based
on Kissner’s Lemma 2 which is only valid for two polynomials of the same degree.
Therefore, we generalize Kissner’s Lemma 2 (see Lemma 2.5.1 in Section 2.5.2)
such that it holds for two polynomials of arbitrary degree. The general idea is,
given two polynomials f, g, we choose two random polynomials r, s of degree ≥
max{deg(f), deg(g)}, to compute the intersection f ×h r +h g ×h s in a privacy-
preserving manner. The generalized Lemma is:
Lemma 3.1.1 Let f, g be polynomials in R[x] where R is a commutative ring such
that no polynomial-time bound adversary can find the size of its subfields with non-
negligible probability, deg(f) = α , deg(g) = γ , β ≥ α ≥ γ , gcd(f, g) = 1, and
f [deg(f)] ∈ R∗ ∧ g[deg(g)] ∈ R∗. Let r = ∑βi=0 r[i]xi and s = ∑βi=0 s[i]xi, where
∀0≤i≤β r[i]← R, ∀0≤i≤β s[i]← R (independently). Let u = f∗r+g∗s =
∑α+β
i=0 u[i]xi.
Then ∀0≤i≤α+β u[i] are distributed uniformly and independently over R.
Proof: Our goal is to calculate the number z of (r, s) pairs such that f ∗r+g∗s = u
for any fixed polynomials f, g, u with gcd(f, g) = 1. If the number of possible result
polynomials u is equal to the total number of possible (r, s) pairs divided by z, then
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this implies that the coefficients of the result polynomial u are distributed uniformly
and independently if we choose the coefficients of r, s uniformly and independently
from R. Let us assume there exists at least one pair (rˆ, sˆ) for a specific u such
that f ∗ rˆ + g ∗ sˆ = u. For any pair (rˆ′, sˆ′) such that f ∗ rˆ′ + g ∗ sˆ′ = u, it holds
that
f ∗ rˆ + g ∗ sˆ = f ∗ rˆ′ + g ∗ sˆ′
f ∗ (rˆ − rˆ′) = g ∗ (sˆ′ − sˆ).
As gcd(f, g) = 1, we conclude that g|rˆ−rˆ′ and f |sˆ′−sˆ using Kissner’s Lemma 22 [114].
We may apply Lemma 22, since it is proven for polynomials of arbitrary degree.
Let
p ∗ g = rˆ − rˆ′ ∧ p ∗ f = sˆ′ − sˆ. (3.1)
On the one hand we have to show that there exist no pairs rˆ′, sˆ′ such that f ∗
rˆ′ + g ∗ sˆ′ = u that are not generated by a single choice of the polynomial p with
degree at most β − α. On the other hand we need to show that each polynomial
p, of degree at most β − α, determines exactly one unique pair rˆ′, sˆ′ such that
f ∗ rˆ′ + g ∗ sˆ′ = u.
We first show that the two terms in Equation 3.1 can only be valid if the degree of p
is at most β − α. The degree of rˆ− rˆ′ is β and the degree of g is γ. The product of
g and p yields a polynomial of degree γ + deg(p). Since rˆ− rˆ′ is of degree β, deg(p)
can be at most β−γ. The degree of sˆ′− sˆ is β and the degree of f is α. The product
of f and p yields a polynomial of degree α + deg(p). Since the result sˆ′ − sˆ is of
degree β, deg(p) can be at most β−α. Since it holds that α ≥ γ, the two equations
are only valid if deg(p) is at most β − α.
Now we show that there exist no pairs rˆ′, sˆ′ such that f ∗ rˆ′ + g ∗ sˆ′ = u, that are
not generated by some choice of one polynomial p of degree at most β − α. Let
p′ ∗g = rˆ− rˆ′ and p∗f = sˆ′− sˆ be valid for any p′, p. As we have proven that g|rˆ− rˆ′
and f |sˆ′ − sˆ, we can represent f and g as
f ∗ (rˆ − rˆ′) = g ∗ (sˆ′ − sˆ) ∧ f ∗ (p′ ∗ g) = g ∗ (p ∗ f).
We apply Lemma 21 [114] as the leading coefficients of f and g are inR∗:
f ∗ (p′ ∗ g) = (g ∗ p) ∗ f
⇒ p′ ∗ g = g ∗ p ⇒ p′ = p
We have shown the validity of our assumption since it holds that p = p′. Finally,
we show that each polynomial p exactly determines one unique pair rˆ′, sˆ′ such that
f ∗ rˆ′ + g ∗ sˆ′ = u. It holds that rˆ′ = rˆ − g ∗ p, sˆ′ = sˆ + f ∗ p and f, g, rˆ, sˆ are
fixed. Thus, a choice of p determines both rˆ′, sˆ′. The uniqueness is guaranteed
due to Lemma 21 [114]. If these assignments were not unique, there would exist
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polynomials p, p′ such that either rˆ′ = rˆ−g∗p = rˆ−g∗p′ or sˆ′ = sˆ+f ∗p = sˆ+f ∗p′
for some polynomials p 6= p′.
As a result, the number of polynomials p, of degree at most β −α, is exactly equiv-
alent to the number of r, s pairs such that f ∗ r+ g ∗ s = u. There are z = |R|β−α+1
such polynomials p and |R|2β+2 pairs r, s. It holds that
|R|2β+2
z
= |R|
2β+2
|R|β−α+1 = |R|
α+β+1
which is equivalent to the |R|α+β+1 possible result polynomials u.
Summary: We have shown that all u[i] are distributed uniformly and indepen-
dently over R if we choose both random polynomials r, s with the degree β ≥
max{deg(f), deg(g)}. Thus, Kissner’s Theorem 3 also holds for polynomials of arbi-
trary degrees, i. e., an attacker learns exactly the same amount of information from
f1∗r+f2∗s as from S1∩S2. Thus, the multiset intersection operation is also correct
and privacy-preserving for input multisets of arbitrary sizes. The generalized multi-
set intersection operation is an integral component in our protocol constructions in
Chapters 4 and 5.
3.1.2 Privacy-Preserving Multiset Membership Test
In this section, we propose a protocol that enables two parties to check whether an
input z ∈ D is a member of a multiset B in a privacy-preserving manner1. Here,
one party (issuer) holds the private input z and the other party (data holder) has
the private multiset B. At the end of the protocol, the issuer learns whether z ∈ B
or z 6∈ B. Each multiset is represented as a polynomial where the input elements
are the roots of the polynomial, see Section 2.5.2.1. Intuitively speaking, the check
is done by computing the polynomial long division of the polynomial representation
of B by the linear divisor (X − z) and checking the remainder of the result. If the
remainder is 0, then z is in B, otherwise z is not in B.
3.1.2.1 Polynomial Long Division with a Linear Divisor
We consider an encryption E(f) of a polynomial f = adXd+ad−1Xd−1+...+a1X1+
a0 of degree d as a dividend and a linear divisor (X − z) (see Section 2.5.2.2). The
polynomials are chosen over a commutative ring R[X]. The coefficients of the divisor
1Due to consistency, we fitted the notation to the notation used in Section 3.1.3.
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Algorithm 3.1.1: Polynomial Long Division with an Encrypted Dividend and an
Unencrypted Linear Divisor
Setting: There exists an additively homomorphic cryptosystem E with a plaintext
space (R,+, ·). The plaintext space (R,+, ·) has the structure of a commuta-
tive ring with identity.
Input: An encrypted polynomial E(f) with f = adXd+ad−1Xd−1+...+a1X1+a0 ∈
R[X] (dividend) of degree d with encrypted coefficients E(a0), ..., E(ad) and
an unencrypted polynomial (X − z) ∈ R∗[X] (linear divisor).
• Computation
1. E(bd−1) = E(ad)
2. E(bi) = E(ai+1) +h (E(bi+1)×h z) , ∀i = d− 2, ..., 0
3. E(r) = E(a0) +h (E(b0)×h z)
Output: An encrypted quotient q given by an ordered list of encrypted coefficients
E(b0), ..., E(bd−1) and an encrypted remainder r given by E(r). The quotient
is a polynomial q = bd−1Xd−1 + bd−2Xd−2 + ...+ b1X1 + b0 ∈ R[X] of degree
d− 1 and the remainder is a value r ∈ R.
polynomial are chosen over R∗ which is the set of multiplicatively invertible elements
in R (group of units, see also Definition 2.1.2.13).
Recap that our goal is the design of a privacy-preserving protocol for the multiset
membership test. We use an additively homomorphic cryptosystem for encryption.
The result of the polynomial long division of f by (X − z) is an encrypted quotient
q = bd−1Xd−1 + bd−2Xd−2 + ...+ b1X1 + b0 with an encrypted remainder r, see Def-
inition 2.1.2.19. We can compute the encrypted coefficients of q and the encrypted
remainder r using the polynomial long division shown in Algorithm 3.1.1. Due to the
Horner scheme, we obtain a simplified commonly known algorithm for a polynomial
long division with a linear divisor [8].
Correctness: The computation steps of Algorithm 3.1.1 are exactly the same as
in the polynomial long division Algorithm 2.1.2.19 using the Horner scheme. The
only differences are that we use encrypted coefficients of the dividend, the addi-
tion + is substituted by a homomorphic addition +h, and the multiplication ∗
is replaced by a homomorphic scalar multiplication ×h. The correctness of Al-
gorithm 3.1.1 now follows from the correctness of the homomorphic operations
+h,×h of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem, see Section 2.2.2 and Defi-
nition 2.1.4.8.
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Complexity: We count the number of homomorphic operations during computa-
tion. Overall, we need d homomorphic additions +h and d homomorphic scalar ×h
operations for an encrypted polynomial f of degree d.
3.1.2.2 Protocol Description
Based on Algorithm 3.1.1, we now devise a two-party protocol for a privacy-preserving
multiset membership test secure in the semi-honest model. The issuer holds an un-
encrypted input z ∈ R∗ and the data holder holds an unencrypted multiset B of
size k. The issuer should learn in a privacy-preserving manner whether z ∈ B holds.
The protocol should be correct in the sense that after completing the protocol the
issuer learns whether z is a set element of B or not. The protocol should be privacy-
preserving in the sense that if z is a set element of B, the issuer only learns that z
is a set element of B and if z is not a set element of B, the issuer learns nothing
more besides that z is not a set element of B. Nothing more can be inferred from
the intermediate results and the output of the protocol run and no further infor-
mation should be disclosed about the multiset B, especially no information about
the set elements is leaked. In both cases, i. e., z ∈ B and z 6∈ B, the data holder
learns nothing after completing the protocol run, especially no information about z
is leaked.
The complete protocol is shown in Protocol 3.1.1. We assume a threshold version
of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem where each party Pi holds a private
key share ski of the cryptosystem. In Step 1), the data holder P2 computes an
encryption of its input multiset B using the polynomial representation as discussed
in Section 2.5.2.1. Then, P2 sends the encryption E(f2(X)) to the issuer P1. The
issuer P1 checks the membership of z by computing the polynomial long division
of E(f2(X)) by z in Step 2). The issuer P1 sends the encryption of the remainder
E(r) to the data holder P2. In Step 3, the data holder P2 blinds and partially
decrypts the encrypted remainder. In Step 4, the issuer P1 partially decrypts E(r ·x)
with its key share sk1 and then recovers r · x by combining the partially decrypted
ciphertexts. Then, the issuer P1 checks the result of the protocol, i. e., whether
z ∈ B or z 6∈ B.
Correctness: As described in Section 2.5.2.1, the multiset B is represented as a
polynomial f2(X). Here, f2(X) is a product of roots where each input element
corresponds to a root of the polynomial f2(X). Considering the polynomial long
division presented in Algorithm 3.1.1, it holds that if the remainder r of the poly-
nomial long division of B by z is 0, then z is an element of the multiset B due to
the polynomial representation of B (see Section 2.5.2.1). If r ! = 0, then z is not an
element of B.
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Protocol 3.1.1: Privacy-Preserving Multiset Membership Test
Setting: There are two parties P1, P2. Each party Pi holds a private key share
ski for a (2, 2) threshold version of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem
with a plaintext space (R,+, ·), e. g., the Paillier cryptosystem. The plaintext
space (R,+, ·) has the structure of a commutative ring with identity. The
issuer P1 holds an unencrypted input z ∈ R∗ and the data holder P2 holds an
unencrypted multiset B = {s21, ..., s2k} with k elements chosen from R.
1. Encryption
a) The data holder P2 calculates the polynomial
f2(X) = (X − s21) · ... · (X − s2k) ∈ R[X] where deg(f2(X)) = |B| = k.
b) The data holder P2 encrypts the polynomial representation of its input
multiset B using the public key of the cryptosystem.
c) The data holder P2 sends the encrypted coefficients of E(f2(X)) to the
issuer P1.
2. Polynomial Long Division
a) The issuer P1 computes the polynomial long division of E(f2(X)) by
(X − z) ∈ R∗[X] using Algorithm 3.1.1 and obtains an encryption E(q)
of the quotient q and an encryption E(r) of the remainder r.
b) The issuer P1 sends the encryption E(r) to the data holder P2.
3. Blinding & Partial Decryption
a) The data holder P2 blinds the remainder E(r) using a randomly chosen
x ∈ R∗ by computing E(r · x) = E(r)×h x.
b) The data holder P2 computes a partial decryption of the blinded en-
crypted remainder E(r · x) using its private key share sk2 and sends
Dsk2(E(r · x)) and E(r · x) to the issuer P1.
4. Decryption & Result Check
a) The issuer P1 computes a partial decryption of E(r · x) using its private
key share sk1.
b) The issuer P1 recovers the blinded remainder r · x by combining the par-
tially decrypted ciphertexts Dsk1(E(r · x)) and Dsk2(E(r · x)).
c) The issuer P1 checks the following:
i. If D(E(r · x)) = 0, the output of the protocol is z ∈ B.
ii. If D(E(r · x)) ! = 0, the output of the protocol is z 6∈ B.
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In our protocol presented in Protocol 3.1.1, the remainder r is blinded by the data
holder P2 using a randomly chosen x ∈ R∗ and r · x is the protocol output. In case
z ∈ B, if r = 0, then r · x is also 0 which is the correct protocol output. If r ! = 0,
then r·x is a uniformly distributed value over R. In case z 6∈ B, it holds that r·x ! = 0
which is the correct protocol output. Thus, the protocol given in Protocol 3.1.1 is
correct since the issuer exactly learns z ∈ B or z 6∈ B.
Privacy: The protocol is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model since the
remainder r is blinded before decryption by P2. If r ! = 0, then the issuer P1 can
not infer any further information from r · x since x ∈ R∗ is randomly chosen by the
data holder P2. Thus, r · x is uniformly distributed over R. On the other hand,
the data holder P2 only sees encrypted data. Due to the semantic security of the
cryptosystem, the data holder P2 can not infer any further information, especially
no information about z is leaked.
More formally, similar to Kissner et al. [114], we prove a Theorem stating that
there exists a translation algorithm which takes the output of a trusted third party
computing the result z ∈ B or z 6∈ B and translates the output in such a way that it is
indistinguishable from the output of a protocol execution as shown in Protocol 3.1.1.
Thus, the issuer only learns z ∈ B or z 6∈ B.
Theorem 3.1.2 Let TTP be a trusted third party which receives the private input
multiset B of size k from data holder P2 and the private input element z from issuer
P1, and then returns to the issuer P1 the result z ∈ B or z 6∈ B directly. Let
PT (B, z, x) denote the protocol execution of Protocol 3.1.1 with the private input
multiset B of size k from data holder P2, the private input element z from issuer
P1, and the random value x ∈ R∗. The issuer P1 learns the protocol output r · x.
There exists a translation algorithm such that, to the issuer P1, the results of the
following two views are indistinguishable: (1) returning the output of the translation
algorithm which translates the output of the trusted third party TTP ; (2) returning
the output of PT (B, z, x) directly.
Let z ∈ B or z 6∈ B be the output of TTP . The translation algorithm operates
as follows: (1) computes the remainder r of the polynomial long division of B by
(X−z); (2) randomly chooses x′ ∈ R∗; (3) translates the output of TTP by returning
r · x′ to the issuer P1. The output distributions of the translation algorithm and
PT (B, z, x) are indistinguishable for the issuer P1 since x, x′ are chosen randomly
from R∗.
Complexity: We count the number of encryption, homomorphic, blinding, and de-
cryption operations as well as the number of ciphertexts transmitted. In Step 1b)
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the data holder encrypts its multiset B which requires O(k) encryptions. The most
expensive operation is the polynomial long division of a polynomial f2(X) of degree
k with a linear divisor. As described in Section 3.1.2.1, we need k homomorphic
additions +h and k scalar operations ×h. In Step 3a), we have one additional blind-
ing operation. Finally, we have two partial decryptions. Overall, the computation
complexity is bound by O(k) operations. The largest amount of data transmitted is
given in Step 1c) of the protocol where the data holder P2 sends an encryption of
f2(X) to the issuer P1. Overall, the communication overhead is bound by the size
of the multiset B, i. e., O(k) transmitted ciphertexts.
3.1.2.3 Multiset Erase Operation
The erase operation eliminates an element within a set. The following corollary
holds for Protocol 3.1.1:
Corollary 3.1.1 Let z ∈ B be the protocol output of Protocol 3.1.1. The issuer P1
also obtains an encryption of
Υerase = B \ z
represented by the encryption E(q) of the quotient given by the polynomial long
division of B by z. This follows from the polynomial construction discussed in
Section 2.5.2.1 and the correctness of Algorithm 3.1.1 for a polynomial long division
of an encrypted dividend by a linear divisor.
Thus, if z is in the multiset B, we can erase z from the multiset B. We com-
pute the polynomial long division of B by z and the encryption E(q) of the quo-
tient represents E(B \ z). This can be useful in different application scenarios
such as e-voting to implement a veto option, see Section 6.4. Next, we present
a set operation to check whether a multiset Z is a sub-multiset of another multi-
set B.
3.1.3 Privacy-Preserving Sub-Multiset Test
In this section, we propose a protocol that enables two parties to check whether a
multiset Z is a sub-multiset of a multisetB in a privacy-preserving manner. Here, the
issuer holds the private multiset Z and the data holder has the private multiset B. At
the end of the protocol, the issuer learns whether Z ⊆ B or Z 6⊆ B. Essentially, this
is done by computing the polynomial long division of the polynomial representation
of B by the polynomial representation of Z and checking the remainder polynomial
of the result. If all coefficients of the remainder polynomial are 0, then Z is a sub-
multiset of B, otherwise Z is not a sub-multiset of B.
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Algorithm 3.1.2: Polynomial Long Division with an Encrypted Dividend and an
Unencrypted Divisor
Setting: There exists an additively homomorphic cryptosystem with a plaintext
space (R,+, ·). The plaintext space (R,+, ·) has the structure of a commuta-
tive ring with identity.
Input: An encrypted polynomial E(f) with f = adXd+ad−1Xd−1+...+a1X1+a0 ∈
R[X] (dividend) of degree d and an unencrypted polynomial g = ceXe +
ce−1Xe−1 + ...+ c1X1 + c0 ∈ R∗[X] (divisor) of degree e. The encrypted (un-
encrypted) polynomial f (g) is given by an ordered list of encrypted (plaintext)
coefficients E(a0), ..., E(ad) (c0, ..., ce).
• Polynomial Long Division
1. If d < e, return q = E(0) and r = E(f)
2. For i = d− e, ..., 0, compute q by
a) E(bi) = E(ai+e)×h c−1e
b) For j = e, ..., 0, compute
i) E(ai+j) =a E(ai+j) +h (−cj ×h E(bi))
3. For j = e− 1, ..., 0, compute r by
a) E(hj) = E(aj)
Output: An encrypted quotient q given by an ordered list of encrypted coefficients
E(b0), ..., E(bd−e) and an encrypted remainder r given by an ordered list of
encrypted coefficients E(h0), ..., E(he−1). The quotient q is a polynomial q =
bd−eXd−e+ ...+ b0 ∈ R[X] of degree d− e and the remainder r is a polynomial
r = he−1Xe−1 + ...+ h0 ∈ R[X] of degree e− 1.
If d < e, return an encrypted quotient q = E(0) and an encrypted remainder
polynomial r = E(f).
aNote that this is an assignment operator and E(ai+j) is iteratively overwritten with the new
value E(ai+j) +h (−cj ×h E(bi)).
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3.1.3.1 Polynomial Long Division with an Arbitrary Divisor
We consider an encryption of a polynomial f = adXd+ad−1Xd−1 + ...+a1X1 +a0 of
degree d as a dividend and an unencrypted polynomial g = ceXe + ce−1Xe−1 + ...+
c1X1 + c0 of degree e as a divisor. The polynomials are chosen over a commutative
ring R[X]. The coefficients of the divisor polynomial are chosen over R∗. We use an
additively homomorphic cryptosystem for encryption. The result of the polynomial
long division of f by g is a quotient q = bd−eXd−e + ...+ b0 with a remainder poly-
nomial r = he−1Xe−1 + ... + h0, see Definition 2.1.2.19. Algorithm 3.1.2 illustrates
the polynomial long division where the result are the encrypted coefficients of q and
the encrypted remainder polynomial r.
Correctness: The computation steps of Algorithm 3.1.2 are exactly the same as in
the polynomial long division Algorithm 2.1.2.19. The correctness of Algorithm 2.1.2.19
follows due to the same argumentation as given for the polynomial long division with
a linear divisor, see Section 3.1.2.1.
Complexity: We count the number of homomorphic operations to compute the
polynomial long division on an encrypted dividend of degree d with an unencrypted
arbitrary divisor of degree e. In Step 2a), we need d− e+ 1 homomorphic scalar ×h
operations. In Step 2b), we need
d−e∑
i=0
(e+ 1) = (d− e+ 1) · (e+ 1) ∈ O(d · e+ e2)
homomorphic additions +h and homomorphic scalar ×h operations. Overall, the
computation complexity is bound by O(d · e+ e2).
3.1.3.2 Protocol Description
Based on Algorithm 3.1.2, we introduce a two-party protocol for a privacy-preserving
sub-multiset test secure in the semi-honest model. Here, the issuer holds an unen-
crypted multiset Z and the data holder holds an unencrypted multiset B of size k.
The issuer is interested in the sub-multiset test Z ⊆ B. Again, the protocol should
be correct and privacy-preserving. After completing the protocol the issuer learns
whether it holds that Z ⊆ B or Z 6⊆ B. If Z is a sub-multiset of B, the issuer only
learns Z ⊆ B and if Z is not a sub-multiset of B, the issuer only learns Z 6⊆ B.
In both cases, the data holder learns nothing after completing the protocol run,
especially no information about Z is leaked.
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Protocol 3.1.2: Privacy-Preserving Sub-Multiset Test
Setting: There are two parties P1, P2. Each party Pi holds a private key share ski for a
(2, 2)-threshold decryption scheme of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem with a
plaintext space (R,+, ·), e. g., the Paillier cryptosystem. The plaintext space (R,+, ·)
has the structure of a commutative ring with identity. The issuer P1 holds an unen-
crypted multiset Z = {s11, ..., s1k′} with k′ set elements chosen from R∗. The data
holder P2 holds an unencrypted multiset B = {s21, ..., s2k} with k set elements chosen
from R. It holds that k′ ≤ k.
1. Encryption
a) The data holder P2 calculates the polynomial
f2(X) = (X − s21) · ... · (X − s2k) ∈ R[X] where deg(f2(X)) = |B| = k.
b) The data holder P2 encrypts the polynomial representation of its input multiset
B using the public key of the cryptosystem.
c) The data holder P2 sends E(f2(X)) to the issuer P1.
2. Polynomial Long Division
a) The issuer P1 calculates the polynomial
f1(X) = (X − s11) · ... · (X − s1k′) ∈ R∗[X] where deg(f1(X)) = |Z| = k′.
b) The issuer P1 computes the polynomial long division of E(f2(X)) by f1(X)
using Algorithm 3.1.2 and obtains an encryption E(q) of the quotient q and an
encryption E(r) of the remainder polynomial r.
c) The issuer P1 sends the encryption of the remainder polynomial E(r), i. e.,
E(hk′−1), ..., E(h0), to the data holder P2.
3. Blinding & Partial Decryption
a) The data holder P2 blinds the remainder polynomial E(r) using randomly chosen
x0, ..., xk′−1 ∈ R∗ by computing
E(hk′−1 · xk′−1) = E(hk′−1)×h xk′−1, ... , E(h0 · x0) = E(h0)×h x0.
b) The data holder P2 computes the partial decryptions of the coefficients of the
blinded remainder polynomial E(hk′−1 · xk′−1), ..., E(h0 · x0) using its private
key share sk2 and sends Dsk2(E(hk′−1 · xk′−1)), ..., Dsk2(E(h0 · x0))
and E(hk′−1 · xk′−1), ..., E(h0 · x0) to the issuer P1.
4. Decryption & Result Check
a) The issuer P1 computes a partial decryption of the blinded remainder polynomial
E(hk′−1 · xk′−1), ..., E(h0 · x0) using its private key share sk1.
b) The issuer P1 recovers the blinded remainder polynomial given by the encrypted
coefficients E(hk′−1 · xk′−1), ..., E(h0 · x0) by combining the partially decrypted
ciphertexts Dsk1(E(hk′−1 · xk′−1)), ..., Dsk1(E(h0 · x0)) and
Dsk2(E(hk′−1 · xk′−1)), ..., Dsk2(E(h0 · x0)).
c) The issuer P1 checks the following:
i. If ∀ i = 0, ..., k′ − 1 : hi · xi = 0, the output of the protocol is Z ⊆ B.
ii. If ∃ i ∈ {0, ..., k′ − 1} : hi · xi 6= 0, the output of the protocol is Z 6⊆ B.
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The complete protocol is shown in Protocol 3.1.2. The protocol is very similar to the
protocol presented in Protocol 3.1.1 with the following differences. In Step 2a), the
issuer P1 computes the polynomial representation of its input multiset Z. Then, the
issuer P1 checks the sub-multiset of Z by computing the polynomial long division
of E(f2(X)) by f1(X) in Step 2b) using the generalized polynomial long division
shown in Algorithm 3.1.2. The data holder blinds the remainder polynomial using
k′ random values. At the end, the issuer P1 checks the result of the protocol, i. e.,
whether Z ⊆ B or Z 6⊆ B.
Correctness: As described in Section 2.5.2.1, the multisets Z and B are represented
as polynomials f1(X), f2(X). Here, f1(X), f2(X) are products of roots where each
input element corresponds to a root of the polynomials f1(X), f2(X). It holds that
if the remainder r of the polynomial long division of B by Z is 0, then Z is a sub-
multiset of the multiset B due to the polynomial representation of Z and B (see
Section 2.5.2.1) and the correctness of Algorithm 3.1.2. If the remainder polynomial
r ! = 0, then Z is not a sub-multiset of B.
In our Protocol 3.1.2, the remainder polynomial r is blinded by the data holder P2
using randomly chosen x0, ..., xk′−1 ∈ R∗ and hk′−1 · xk′−1, ..., h0 · x0 is the protocol
output. Note that the remainder polynomial r is an ordered list of k′ encrypted
coefficients and we use a different blinding value for each coefficient. We apply
the correctness results given for the multiset membership test protocol presented in
Section 3.1.2. Thus, the protocol given in Protocol 3.1.2 is correct since the issuer
exactly learns Z ⊆ B or Z 6⊆ B.
Privacy: The protocol is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model since the
remainder polynomial r is blinded before decryption by the data holder P2. If r ! = 0,
then the issuer P1 cannot infer any further information from hk′−1 · xk′−1, ..., h0 · x0
since x0, ..., xk′−1 ∈ R∗ are randomly chosen by the data holder P2. Due to the
semantic security of the cryptosystem, the data holder P2 cannot infer any further
information, especially no information about Z is leaked.
More formally, we can again formulate a Theorem that there exists a translation
algorithm that takes the output of a trusted third party computing the result Z ⊆ B
or Z 6⊆ B and translates the output in such a way that its output is indistinguishable
from the output of a protocol execution as shown in Protocol 3.1.2. Thus, the issuer
only learns Z ⊆ B or Z 6⊆ B.
Theorem 3.1.3 Let TTP be a trusted third party which receives the private input
multiset B of size k from data holder P2 and the private input multiset Z of size
k′ from issuer P1, and then returns to the issuer P1 the result Z ⊆ B or Z 6⊆ B
directly. Let PT (B,Z, x0, ..., xk′−1) denote the protocol execution of Protocol 3.1.2
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with the private input multiset B, the private input multiset Z, and the k′ random
values x0, ..., xk′−1. The issuer P1 learns the protocol output hk′−1 · xk′−1, ..., h0 · x0.
There exists a translation algorithm such that, to the issuer P1, the results of the
following two views are indistinguishable: (1) returning the output of the translation
algorithm which translates the output of the trusted third party TTP ; (2) returning
the output of PT (B,Z, x0, ..., xk′−1) directly.
Let Z ⊆ B or Z 6⊆ B be the output of TTP . The translation algorithm oper-
ates as follows: (1) computes the remainder polynomial r of the polynomial long
division of B by Z; (2) randomly chooses x′0, ..., x′k′−1 ∈ R∗; (3) translates the
output of TTP by returning to the issuer P1 hk′−1 · x′k′−1, ..., h0 · x′0. The out-
put distributions of the translation algorithm and PT (B,Z, x0, ..., xk′−1) are indis-
tinguishable for the issuer P1 since x0, ..., xk′−1, x′0, ..., x′k′−1 are chosen randomly
from R∗.
Complexity: We count the number of encryption, homomorphic, blinding, and
decryption operations as well as the number of ciphertexts transmitted. In Step 1b),
the data holder encrypts its multiset B which requires O(k) encryptions. In Step 3,
the data holder blinds the remainder polynomial with k′ random values. We also
have k′ decryption operations. The most expensive operation is the polynomial long
division of a polynomial f2(X) of degree k with a polynomial f1(X) of degree k′.
As described in Section 3.1.3.1, the computation complexity is bound by O(k · k′ +
k′2) which is also the overall bound of the protocol. The overall communication
overhead is bound by the size of the multiset B and Z, i. e., O(k + k′) transmitted
ciphertexts.
3.1.3.3 Multiset Difference Operation
The difference operation on two multisets is defined in Definition 2.1.1.14. The
following corollary holds for Protocol 3.1.2:
Corollary 3.1.2 Let Z ⊆ B be the protocol output of Protocol 3.1.2. The issuer P1
also obtains an encryption of
Υdifference = B \ Z
represented by the encryption E(q) of the quotient given by the polynomial long
division of B by Z. This follows by the polynomial construction discussed in Sec-
tion 2.5.2.1 and the correctness of Algorithm 3.1.2 for a polynomial long division of
an encrypted dividend by an arbitrary divisor.
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Thus, if Z is a sub-multiset of the multiset B, we can compute the difference B \Z.
We compute the polynomial long division of B by Z and the encryption E(q) of
the quotient represents E(B \ Z). Again, this can be useful in different application
scenarios. For example as a building block in a multi-party protocol where we have
to eliminate a number of set elements from a multiset B.
3.1.4 Summary
In this section, we generalized and extended Kissner’s grammar for privacy-preserving
multiset operations shown in Equation 2.1 in Section 2.5.2 in the following way.
First, we generalized Kissner’s multiset intersection operation to arbitrary input
multisets. As a consequence, Kissner’s grammar is now valid for arbitrary input
multisets and not only for input multisets of equal size. Note that the multiset
union and reduction operations have already been valid for arbitrary input multi-
sets. Second, we presented new multiset operations in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. We
introduced operations to check the membership of a set element z in a multiset B and
whether a multiset Z is a sub-multiset of another multiset B. Those two multiset op-
erations also enable two multiset operations which allow eliminating elements from a
multiset B. Note that the multiset erase operation B \ z and the multiset difference
operation B \Z are only valid if it holds that z ∈ B respectively Z ⊆ B. Table 3.1.1
summarizes our supported multiset operations.
The new multiset operations have major differences compared to Kissner’s multi-
set operations. First, the result of the membership and the sub-multiset opera-
tions is not an encrypted multiset but only a test if z ∈ B respectively Z ⊆ B
holds. Second, in contrast to Kissner’s multiset operations, the protocols require
the threshold decryption of ciphertexts representing a part of the computation, i. e.,
the decryption of the remainder respectively the remainder polynomial. Third, the
multiset erase and the multiset difference operations are only valid if the member-
ship respectively the sub-multiset relation holds. It is possible to combine the new
multiset operations with Kissner’s multiset operations to create larger protocols.
However, due to the major differences, this is a more complex and challenging task.
3.2 Zero-Knowledge-Proofs for the Paillier Cryptosystem
In this section, we propose novel ZKPK protocols for the Paillier cryptosystem.
We describe a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for plaintext knowledge in Sec-
tion 3.2.1, for correct multiplication in Section 3.2.2, and for homomorphic linear
equations in Section 3.2.3.
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Operation Condition Reference
∩ Input multisets of equal size Kissner et al. [114], Section 2.5.2
∪ Arbitrary input multisets Kissner et al. [114], Section 2.5.2
Rdt Arbitrary input multisets Kissner et al. [114], Section 2.5.2
∩ Arbitrary input multisets Section 3.1.1
∈ Arbitrary input multisets Section 3.1.2
⊆ Arbitrary input multisets Section 3.1.3
\ If relation ∈ respectively ⊆ holds Sections 3.1.2.3 and 3.1.3.3
Table 3.1.1: Overview of the Supported Multiset Operations.
3.2.1 Non-Interactive Proof of Plaintext Knowledge
We start with the description of the non-interactive plaintext knowledge proof. The
algorithm given here is based on the same idea as used in the Schnorr protocol [178].
The authors of [39] describe interactive proof protocols for plaintext knowledge based
on the Paillier cryptosystem. Here, we use slightly modified algorithms which have
been converted into non-interactive proof constructions and we also construct the
corresponding proofs in the random oracle model.
In a proof of plaintext knowledge, the prover proves the knowledge of a plaintext
to a corresponding ciphertext. Protocol 3.2.1 illustrates the ZKPK protocol. The
proof generation consists of computing the commitments, the challenge, and the
responses. The proof verification consists of reconstructing the commitment t from
the received challenge and the responses, and finally verifying that the challenge
was correctly generated for this particular commitment. In a multi-party protocol,
each party Pi has a random pidPi assigned to it, that is used by the prover as a
hash argument to prevent the reuse of the proof by other parties. We denote it as
pidprover in the following ZKPK protocol descriptions between the prover and the
verifier.
Completeness: We can see that the reconstructed commitment t′ matches the
original commitment t :
t′ = gm′′r′′Nyc = gm′′ · (r′ · r−cg−z)N · (gmrN)c
= gm′′−z·N+cm · r′N · r−cN+cN = gm′r′N = t (mod N2)
Therefore, it holds that h(pidPi , g, y, t′) = c. Note that the value z is only used to
allow us to compute the modulus of the term m′ − cm. Essentially, z removes the
mod N in the exponent.
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Protocol 3.2.1: Construction and Verification of a Plaintext Knowledge Proof
Specification: ZKPK {(m, r)|y = E(m, r)}
Construction:
(1) Select random m′, r′ ∈ Z∗N
(2) Compute commitment t = gm′r′N mod N2
(3) Obtain a challenge c = h(pidprover, g, y, t)
(4) Compute responses m′′ = m′− cm mod N and r′′ = r′ · r−c · g−z mod N2
where z is defined by m′ − cm+ z ·N = m′′
(5) Send (c,m′′, r′′)
Verification:
(1) Compute t′ = gm′′r′′Nyc mod N2
(2) Verify h(pidprover, g, y, t′)
?= c
Special Soundness: We show special soundness for the interactive proof, i. e., in
Step (3) of the protocol the challenge is computed by the verifier as a randomly
chosen value c ∈ Z∗n. Special soundness for the non-interactive variant is achieved
by instantiation of the strong Fiat-Shamir heuristic similar to the constructions in
[124].
Given two transcripts (c1,m′′1, r′′1) and (c2,m′′2, r′′2) for the same commitment, we can
extract the values of m and r as follows. Let σ, s be defined by σ (c2 − c1) = 1+sN .
σ and s exist under the assumption that c2 − c1 is coprime to N (which is true
if c2 − c1 is less than p and q). Extract m, r by computing m = (m′′1 −m′′2)σ and
r =
(
r′′1
r′′2
)σ
y−s mod N2. We can see thatm, r are extracted correctly by following the
proof idea of [38, 39]. Since both transcripts are valid, and the commitment t in both
cases is the same, t′1 and t′2 are the same as well, i. e.,
gm
′′
1 r′′N1 y
c1 = gm′′2 r′′N2 yc2 (mod N2).
By transformation and exponentiation by σ, we obtain
g(m′′1−m′′2)σ
(
r′′1
r′′2
)σN
= yσ(c2−c1) (mod N2).
The right side is by definition of σ simply y1+sN . If we substitute the right side of
the equation with y1+sN where y = gmrN , we obtain
g(m′′1−m′′2)σ
((
r′′1
r′′2
)σ
· y−s
)N
= gmrN (mod N2).
74
3 Novel Cryptographic Tools
Thus, we havem = (m′′1 −m′′2)σ and r =
(
r′′1
r′′2
)σ·y−s mod N2.
Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: The verifier learns the transcript (c,m′′, r′′).
It is sufficient to show special honest-verifier zero-knowledge as the verifier V can-
not manipulate the challenge c. A simulator can easily generate such an accepting
transcript in the following fashion:
1. Select random m′′ ∈ Z∗N , r′′ ∈ Z∗N2 , and random challenge c.
2. Compute t = gm′′r′′Nyc mod N2.
3. Make the random oracle output c for input pidprover, g, y, t.
The transcript (c,m′′, r′′) is accepting and randomly distributed, and thus it is com-
putationally indistinguishable from the transcript of a real protocol run. Note that
the simulator can control the output of the hash function since we prove the prop-
erties in the random oracle model.
Complexity: The computation and communication required for this proof depends
on the hash and the bit size of the Paillier modulus. As we require the hash size to
be smaller than the bit size of the cryptosystem, we can approximate both values by
b, the bit size of the Paillier modulus N . The only message exchanged is (c,m′′, r′′),
therefore we have the communication complexity O (b).
The complexity of the hash function is linear in the used bit size b. Furthermore, we
use several binary exponentiations and multiplications to compute the proof. Each
multiplication is quadratic and each exponentiation is cubic, i. e., the overall compu-
tation required to both generate and verify a proof isO
(
b2.585
)
.
3.2.2 Non-Interactive Proof of Correct Multiplication
In a proof of correct multiplication, a prover proves the correct multiplication of
two values and the knowledge of the corresponding plaintext and random values.
Suppose both parties know three ciphertexts α, β, γ. The goal of the prover is
to show that he knows the plaintext m of γ and that m ∗h α = β. The additional
commitment t1 and response r′′1 are used to prove the knowledge of the randomization
factor r1 which is used to compute m ∗h α = β.
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Protocol 3.2.2: Construction and Verification of Multiplication Proof
Specification: ZKPK{(m, r1, r2)|αmrN1 = β ∧ γ = E(m, r2)}
Construction:
(1) Select random m′, r′1, r′2 ∈ Z∗N2
Compute commitments t1 = αm
′
r′N1 mod N2 and t2 = E(m′, r′2)
(2) Obtain a challenge c = h(pidprover, g, α, β, γ, t1, t2)
(3) Compute responses m′′ = m′ − cm mod N ,
as well as r′′2 = r′2 · r−c2 · g−z mod N and r′′1 = r′1 · r−c1 · α−z
where z is defined by m′ − cm+ z ·N = m′′
(4) Send (c,m′′, r′′1 , r′′2)
Verification:
(1) Compute t′1 = βcαm
′′
r′′N1 mod N2 and t′2 = gm
′′
r′′N2 γc mod N2
(2) Verify h(pidprover, g, α, β, γ, t′1, t′2) = c
Protocol 3.2.2 illustrates the ZKPK. The construction is again similar to the corre-
sponding interactive proof protocols for correct multiplication based on the Paillier
cryptosystem presented in [38, 39].
Completeness: We have t2 = t′2, following the completeness argument for Protocol
3.2.1. For t1 and t′1, the same can be verified by:
t′1 = βcαm
′′
1 r′N1
=
(
αmrN1
)c
αm
′′ (
r′1 · r−c1 · αz
)N
= αm′′+cm−zNrcN−cN1 r′N1
= αm′r′N1
= t1 (mod N2)
Thus, the hash function returns the challenge c and the verification succeeds.
Special Soundness: First, we extract m, r2 in the same way as in the plain-
text knowledge proof. Similarly, we can extract r1 from two responses r′′1,1, r′′1,2
with the same commitment and different challenges c1, c2 by finding σ, s such that
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σ (c2 − c1) = 1 + sN , and computing
r1 =
(
r′′1,1
r′′1,2
)σ
· β−s mod N2.
Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: The verifier learns the transcript (c,m′′, r′′1 , r′′2).
A simulator can generate an accepting transcript in the following fashion:
1. Select random m′′, r′′1 , r′′2 and challenge c
2. Compute t1 = βcαm
′′
r′′N1 mod N2 and t2 = gm
′′
r′′N2 γc mod N2
3. Make the random oracle output c for pidprover, g, α, β, γ, t1, t2
Both transcripts are computationally indistinguishable (based on the semantic secu-
rity of the cryptosystem), therefore the verifier does not learn anything secret.
Complexity: As before, the asymptotic complexity is the same, i. e., the communi-
cation complexity isO (b) and the computation complexity isO
(
b2.585
)
.
3.2.3 Non-Interactive Proof of a Homomorphic Linear Equation
Assume the following homomorphic linear equation m1×hα1 +h ...+hmp×hαp = β
where α1, ..., αp, β are Paillier ciphertexts in Z∗N2 and m1...mp are plaintexts in
ZN . It is possible to construct a proof for the correctness of a homomorphic linear
equation, where the scalar factors are only known to the verifier in encrypted form.
For an equation with p linear factors we perform p plaintext knowledge proofs in
parallel, together with an additional constraint that the given equation holds, similar
to the construction for proving correct multiplication.
Protocol 3.2.3 lists the steps required to construct and verify the corresponding
proof. The values αi are the ciphertext factors involved in the computation, β is the
right side of the equation, mi are the secret scalar factors used in the multiplications,
ri the secret randomization factors used for the ciphertexts γi, Rd ∈ Z∗N a random
value used to re-randomize ciphertext (see Section 2.2.3.1), and pidprover is a random
value used in the challenge generation by the prover to prevent the reusing of the
proof. We use a single challenge, but p + 1 commitments and 2p + 1 responses
in our proof. The construction and reconstruction of the commitments follow the
same principle as in the proofs for plaintext knowledge and correct multiplication.
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Protocol 3.2.3: Construction and Verification of a Linear Equation Proof
Specification:
ZKPK
{
m1, ...,mp
r1, ..., rp, Rd
∣∣∣∣∣ [α1 ×h m1 +h ...+h αp ×h mp]Rd = β∧pi=1(γi = E(mi, ri))
}
Construction:
(1) Select random m′i, r′i ∈ Z∗N for i ∈ {1, .., p} and Rd′ ∈ Z∗N
(2) Compute equation commitment tRd′ =
[
α1 ×h m′1 +h ...+h αp ×h m′p
]
Rd′
(3) Compute plaintext knowledge commitments ti = E(m′i, r′i)
(4) Get a challenge c = h(pidprover, g, α1, ..., αp, γ1, ..., γp, β, tRd′ , t1, ..., tp)
(5) For i ∈ {1, ..., p}, compute responses m′′i = m′i − cmi mod N
and r′′i = r′i · r−ci · g−zi mod N
where zi is defined by m′i − cmi + zi ·N = m′′i
(6) Compute Rd′′ = Rd′ ·Rd−c ·∏pi=1 α−zii
(7) Send (c,m′′1, ...,m′′p, r′′1 , ..., r′′p , Rd′′)
Verification:
(1) Reconstruct equation commitment
t′Rd′′ = βc
[
α1 ×h m′′1 +h ...+h αp ×h m′′p
]
Rd′′
(2) For i ∈ {1, ..., p}, reconstruct plaintext commitments t′i = gm
′′
i r′′Ni γci
(3) Verify h(pidprover, g, α1, ..., αp, β, t′Rd′′ , t′1, ..., t′p) = c
Completeness: We show that the commitments t′Rd′′ , t′i, i ∈ {1, ..., p} match the
original commitments tRd′ , ti, and thus h(pidprover, g, α1, ..., αp, β, t′Rd′′ , t′1, ..., t′p) = c.
The plaintext knowledge commitments are constructed in the same way as in Pro-
tocol 3.2.1, and thus the correctness argument for those commitments also holds for
this protocol. The equation commitment t′Rd′′ is also equal to tRd′ :
t′Rd′′ = βc
[
α1 ×h m′′1 +h ...+h αp ×h m′′p
]
Rd′′
=
( p∏
i=1
αmii ·RdN
)c
·
p∏
i=1
α
m′i−cmi
i ·
(
Rd′ ·Rd−c ·
p∏
i=1
α−zii
)N
=
( p∏
i=1
α
m′′i +cmi−zi·N
i
)
·Rd′N =
( p∏
i=1
α
m′i
i
)
·Rd′N = tRd′
Thus, the reconstructed challenge is equal to the transmitted c, and the verification
succeeds.
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Special Soundness: If we can extract the private values mi, ri, i ∈ {1, ..., p}, and
Rd from two protocol transcripts with the same commitment but different challenges,
then it follows thatmi, ri, andRdmust have been used to generate the two responses,
and thus, the prover must know mi, ri, and Rd.
We can construct an extractor in the following way: Given the following two tran-
scripts
(
c1,m′′11, ...,m′′1p, r′′11, ..., r′′1p, Rd′′1
)
and
(
c2,m′′21, ...,m′′2p, r′′21, ..., r′′2p, Rd′′2
)
for
the same commitments, we can extract the private values as follows. Let σ, s be de-
fined by σ (c2 − c1) = 1 + sN . Extract mi, ri by computing mi = (m′′1i −m′′2i)σ and
ri =
(
r′′1i
r′′2i
)σ
y−s mod N2. We can see that mi, ri are extracted correctly by following
the proof idea of [38, 39]. Since both transcripts are valid and the commitments
ti, tRd′ , i ∈ {1, ..., p} in both cases are the same, we also have equal commitments
t′i: gm
′′
1ir′′N1i yc1 = gm
′′
2ir′′N2i yc2 (mod N2),∀i ∈ {1, ..., p}. By transformation and ex-
ponentiation by σ, we obtain
g(m′′1i−m′′2i)σ
(
r′′1i
r′′2i
)σN
= yσ(c2−c1) (mod N2).
The right side is by definition of σ simply y1+sN . If we substitute the right side of
the equation with y1+sN where y = gmrN , we obtain
g(m′′1i−m′′2i)σ
((
r′′1i
r′′2i
)σ
· y−s
)N
= gmrN (mod N2).
Thus, we havemi = (m′′1i −m′′2i)σ and ri =
(
r′′1i
r′′2i
)σ·y−s mod N2.
Similarly, we extract Rd from two responses Rd′′1, Rd′′2 with the same randomness
and different challenges c1, c2 by finding σ, s such that σ (c2 − c1) = 1 + sN , and
computing
Rd =
(
Rd′′1
Rd′′2
)σ
· β−s mod N2.
Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Here, the transcript of this proof pro-
tocol is simply the proof
(
c,m′′1, ...,m′′p, r′′1 , ..., r′′p , Rd′′
)
. A simulator can generate
an accepting transcript in the following way. Again, select all values randomly
(c,m′′1, ...,m′′p, r′′1 , ..., r′′p , Rd′′), and compute the commitments t′i = gm
′′
i r′′Ni γci and
t′Rd′′ = βc
[
α1 ×h m′1 +h ...+h αp ×h m′p
]
R′′
. Then, let the random oracle return c for
the input pidprover, g, α1, ..., αp, γ1, ..., γp, β, tRd′ , t1, ..., tp.
Complexity: The proof consists of a hash, p random Paillier plaintexts (with ran-
dom components) and an additional random value of size b, i.e., the bit size b of the
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Paillier cryptosystem. For p linear factors, we need to perform p binary exponenti-
ations with a Paillier modulus N of size b, thus we have the overall computation com-
plexityO
(
p · b2.585) and a communication complexity ofO (p · b).
3.3 Verifiable Polynomial Construction and Operations
Next, we show how to build proofs for computations and constructions involving
polynomials. This was also observed by Sang et al. [172], Kissner et al. [114],
and Frikken et al. [71], but they do not illustrate how to construct them. They only
mentioned that their constructions can be made secure against active attackers using
ZKPK protocols on polynomials. Sang et al. [172] also construct ZKPK protocols
similar to ours, but based on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [23] instead of
the Paillier cryptosystem [161].
The following proofs are based on parallel execution of several linear homomorphic
equation proofs, but using a common challenge for all protocols. This is commonly
referred to as And-Composition of proofs [28]. Our constructions are generic, i. e.,
we can use non-interactive plaintext knowledge, correct multiplication, and linear
homomorphic equation proofs based on an arbitrary additively homomorphic cryp-
tosystem. For example, we can use the non-interactive plaintext knowledge, correct
multiplication, and linear homomorphic equation proofs based on the Paillier cryp-
tosystem presented in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3.
3.3.1 Correct Polynomial Operations
We start with the construction of proofs for the correct multiplication of an en-
crypted polynomial with an unencrypted polynomial. We use the representation of
multisets, polynomials, and encrypted polynomials as introduced in Sections 2.5.2.1
and 2.5.2.2. Assume we want to prove that ψ = f ×h γ for some f ∈ ZN [X] and
that φ = E(f) where γ ∈ Z∗N2 [X] is an encrypted polynomial and ψ ∈ Z∗N2 [X] is
the encrypted result of the multiplication. To construct a corresponding proof, we
consider the homomorphic polynomial multiplication using the standard long mul-
tiplication of polynomials with homomorphic operations. In this expanded form, we
get a set of deg(ψ) + 1 = deg(f) + deg(γ) + 1 homomorphic linear constraints. We
can denote this proof in general as listed below.
ZKPK
(f [0], ..., f [deg(f)])
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∧deg(ψ)
i=0
(∑˜i
j=0γ[j]×h f [i− j]
)
= ψ[i]∧deg(φ)
i=0 φ[i] = E (f [i])

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Here, a coefficient f [l] of a polynomial f is considered to be zero if l > deg(f) or l < 0.
This ZKPK protocol enables verifiable multiset union.
The security and correctness of the proof directly follows from the correctness and
security of the used sub-protocols for plaintext knowledge, correct multiplication
and homomorphic linear equations. This approach can be extended to arbitrary
linear expressions of polynomials:
υ1 ×h f1 +h ...+h υs ×h fs = ψ
The construction is completely analogous to the construction above, only that we
have s times the number of multiplications in each linear homomorphic constraint.
As described in Section 2.5.2, the multiset intersection operation is an addition of
two polynomial multiplications and the reduction operation is a sum of t+1 polyno-
mial multiplications. Thus, both operations can be expressed as a linear expression
of polynomials and this enables verifiable multiset intersection and multiset reduc-
tion.
As a summary, we can construct verifiable multiset intersection, union, and re-
duction operations based on verifiable polynomial multiplication. Note that the
efficiency of each of these operations depends on the efficiency of the verifiable
polynomial multiplication. In the following, we analyze the efficiency of our ap-
proach in more detail and compare our approach with the existing one presented
in [114].
3.3.1.1 Complexity Analysis of a Verifiable Polynomial Multiplication
In our SMC setting (see Section 2.4.2), each party holds an input set with k
set elements. Thus, we analyze the complexity for two input sets of equal size
k. We use our non-interactive multiplication proof described in Section 3.2.2 to
prove the correctness of a multiplication. A multiplication proof consists of one
challenge, three responses, and two commitments. We use our non-interactive lin-
ear equation proof described in Section 3.2.3 to prove the correctness of a linear
equation. A linear equation proof consists of one challenge, 2p + 1 responses, and
p+ 1 commitments where p denotes the number of linear factors in the given equa-
tion.
The multiset intersection, union, and reduction operations are based on polynomial
multiplication. Recall that in order to calculate E(g) for a product g = f1 ∗f2 where
f1 is given as an encrypted polynomial E(f1) of degree d1 and f2 is an unencrypted
polynomial of degree d2, we compute
E(g[i]) = (f2[0]×h E(f1[i])) +h (f2[1]×h E(f1[i− 1])) +h (3.2)
...+h (f2[i]×h E(f1[0]))
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for each 0 ≤ i ≤ d1 + d2.
Approach based on Correct Multiplication Proofs by Kissner et al.: As de-
scribed in Section 2.3.1, Kissner et al. [114] proposed verifiable set operations by
proving the correct multiplication of all intermediate results. Each party holds
an input set of k input elements. Thus, if we are using the simple input en-
coding described in Section 2.5.2, each input polynomial consists of k + 1 coeffi-
cients.
Recall that a polynomial is represented by an ordered list of its coefficients. Thus,
a product of two polynomials with k + 1 coefficients can be computed by (k +
1)2 multiplications, i. e., multiplying each coefficient of polynomial f1 with each
coefficient of polynomial f2. As described in Section 2.5.2.7, this requires that the
prover sends all multiplication results for each coefficient with a corresponding zero-
knowledge proof to the verifier. Also, there is an additional computation overhead
for the verifier due to the addition of the intermediate multiplication results for each
coefficient of the result polynomial. Consequently, we need (k+1)2 proofs of correct
multiplication as stated by Kissner et al. [114].
In order to compare Kissner’s approach against our approach, we assume that the
non-interactive multiplication proof described in Section 3.2.2 is used to proof the
correct multiplication. Then, for a polynomial multiplication with input polynomials
of degree k, i. e., for (k + 1)2 multiplication proofs, we need (k + 1)2 challenges,
3(k + 1)2 responses, and 2(k + 1)2 commitments.
Our Approach based on Linear Equation Proofs: In order to prove the correctness
of a polynomial multiplication, we use several linear equation proofs. Each party
holds an input set of k input elements. Thus, each input polynomial consists of
k+ 1 coefficients. For a polynomial multiplication, we have deg(f1) + deg(f2) + 1 =
k + k + 1 = 2k + 1 homomorphic linear equations. Thus, we need 2k + 1 challenges
for a proof of correct polynomial multiplication.
Regarding the responses and commitments, the number of linear factors pi in linear
equation eqi depends on the current coefficient i for which we add up the multipli-
cations as shown in Equation 3.2. Consider, e. g., a polynomial multiplication where
each polynomial consists of three coefficients, i. e., the input size is k = 2 and the
degree of the polynomials is deg(f1) = deg(f2) = 2:
f1(X) = a12X2 + a11X + a10 ∧ f2(X) = a22X2 + a21X + a20.
Thus, we have deg(f1) + deg(f2) + 1 = 5 linear equations denoted as eq0, ..., eq4
where p0, ..., p4 denote the number of linear factors in each equation. We have two
82
3 Novel Cryptographic Tools
Inputs Coefficients Multiplications # of linear factors p∗
1 2 4 2 ∗ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p0+p2
+ 2︸︷︷︸
p1
2 3 9 2 ∗ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p0+p4
+ 2 ∗ 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1+p3
+ 3︸︷︷︸
p2
3 4 16 2 ∗ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p0+p6
+ 2 ∗ 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1+p5
+ 2 ∗ 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2+p4
+ 4︸︷︷︸
p3
4 5 25 2 ∗ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p0+p8
+ 2 ∗ 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1+p7
+ 2 ∗ 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2+p6
+ 2 ∗ 4︸ ︷︷ ︸
p3+p5
+ 5︸︷︷︸
p4
5 6 36 2 ∗ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p0+p10
+ 2 ∗ 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1+p9
+ 2 ∗ 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2+p8
+ 2 ∗ 4︸ ︷︷ ︸
p3+p7
+ 2 ∗ 5︸ ︷︷ ︸
p4+p6
+ 6︸︷︷︸
p5
Table 3.3.1: Number of multiplications for a polynomial multiplication with up to
k = 5 inputs. p∗ denotes the overall number of linear factors in all 2k+1
linear equations written in series expansion form.
equations with one multiplication, i. e., p0 = p4 = 1:
(a12 ∗ a22, a10 ∗ a20),
two equations with two multiplications, i. e., p1 = p3 = 2:
(a12 ∗ a21/a11 ∗ a22, a11 ∗ a20/a10 ∗ a21),
and one equation with three multiplications, i. e., p2 = 3:
(a12 ∗ a20/a11 ∗ a21/a10 ∗ a22).
Let p∗ = p0 + ... + p2k+1 denote the sum of the linear factors in all equations.
Table 3.3.1 shows the series expansion of p∗ for up to k = 5 inputs. More formally,
we can express the finite series for k inputs as
p∗ = 2 ·
k∑
i=1
i + (k + 1).
Now, we can formalize the number of responses. For each linear equation, we need
2pi + 1 responses where pi denotes the number of linear factors in equation eqi.
Overall, for k inputs, with 2k+ 1 linear equations, the number of responses is given
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Protocol Challenges Responses Commitments
Multiplication proofs
Kissner et al. [114] (k + 1)2 3k2 + 6k + 3 2k2 + 4k + 2
Linear equation proofs
Our approach 2k + 1 2k2 + 6k + 3 k2 + 4k + 1
Table 3.3.2: Number of challenges, commitments, and responses for a verifiable poly-
nomial multiplication where each input set consists of k elements.
as:
2k+1∑
i=1
(2pi + 1) = 2 ·
2k+1∑
i=1
pi + (2k + 1) = 2 · p∗ + (2k + 1)
= 2 ·
(
2 ·
k∑
i=1
i + (k + 1)
)
+ (2k + 1)
= 2 ·
(
2 · k · (k + 1)2 + k + 1
)
+ (2k + 1)
= 2 · (k · (k + 1)) + 2k + 2 + 2k + 1
= 2k2 + 2k + 2k + 2 + 2k + 1 = 2k2 + 6k + 3
Overall, we have 2k2 + 6k + 3 responses for a polynomial multiplication where each
party holds k inputs.
Next, we formalize the number of commitments. For each linear equation, we need
pi + 1 commitments where pi denotes the number of linear factors in equation eqi.
Overall, for k inputs, with 2k + 1 linear equations, the number of commitments is
given as:
2k+1∑
i=1
(pi + 1) = p∗ + (2k + 1)
=
(
2 ·
k∑
i=1
i + (k + 1)
)
+ (2k + 1)
=
(
2 · k · (k + 1)2 + k + 1
)
+ (2k + 1)
= k · (k + 1) + k + 1 + 2k + 1 = k2 + 4k + 2
We have k2 + 4k+ 2 commitments for a polynomial multiplication where each party
holds k inputs.
Table 3.3.2 summarizes the comparison of our approach based on linear equation
proofs with the previously proposed approach based on multiplication proofs by
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Kissner et al. [114]. As a result, our approach enables more efficient verifiable mul-
tiset operations due to a smaller number of challenges, responses, and commitments
required for a verifiable polynomial multiplication which is a building block for all
presented multiset operations.
Note that we only compare the ZKPK approaches and we do not take into account
the additional computation overhead (addition of intermediate multiplication re-
sults) and communication overhead (sending of intermediate multiplication results)
for a protocol using the approach by Kissner et al. [114].
3.3.2 Correct Polynomial Construction
In our protocols, each party computes an input polynomial with a certain set of
roots based on their input set. In the following, we show how to prove that the
polynomials are correctly constructed. A party Pi has an input set of k elements
with a polynomial representation as discussed in Section 2.5.2.1. The polynomial
contains the set of roots si1, .., sik. Each party Pi wants to prove that their en-
crypted polynomial φi = E(fi) is constructed by successive multiplication of the
linear factors (X − sij) , j = 1, ..., k. We assume that the corresponding encryptions
δi1, ..., δik of the set elements si1, .., sik are already known to the verifier. We need
to prove the following statements:
1. fi =
∏k
j=1 (X − sij) for some si1, .., sik and fi
2. δi1, ..., δik are encryptions of si1, ..., sik
3. The coefficients of the polynomial φi are encryptions of the coefficients of fi
We can write the proof goal as
ZKPK
 fisi1, ..., sik
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
fi =
∏k
j=1 (X − sij)
∧ ∧kj=1 δij = E (sij)
∧ ∧kj=0 φi[j] = E (fi[j])

The latter two statements can be easily expressed by plaintext knowledge proofs.
Proving the relation between set elements and coefficients is harder: We can only
prove linear homomorphic equations, thus we cannot prove the non-linear relation
f = ∏kj=1 (X − sij) directly. Instead, we have to prove each polynomial multiplica-
tion separately and send all intermediate results together with the proof.
In the following, we assume that the prover and the verifier agreed on an encryption
η of 1. Since the prover already sent encryptions δi1, ..., δik of the set elements,
the verifier knows an encryption of each (X − sij) for j = 1, ..., k which is given
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by the coefficients ψij =
(
η, δ′ij
)
where δ′ij = δij ×h (−1). Furthermore, we denote
the intermediate results of our sequence of polynomial multiplications by γi1, ..., γik.
Note that the initial polynomial is just the first linear factor γi1 = ψi1 and the final
result is the encryption of our constructed polynomial, i.e., γik = φi. The ZKPK
protocol is a sequence of k− 1 polynomial multiplication proofs and we provide the
following proof for j = 2, ..., k :
ZKPK
{
sij , R
∣∣γij = [γij−1 ×h (X − sij)]R ∧ ψij = E ((X − sij))}
The correctness and security of these proofs are implied by the correctness and
security results of the plaintext knowledge proofs and the polynomial multiplication
proofs presented in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented novel privacy-preserving set operations which we
need to construct reconciliation protocols for the minimum of ranks and the sum of
ranks composition scheme (see Section 2.6.2). In Chapter 4, we present our recon-
ciliation protocols secure in the semi-honest model. We also described novel zero-
knowledge proofs for the Paillier cryptosystem and ZKPK protocols for verifiable
polynomial construction and operations. In Chapter 5, we use those building blocks
to design reconciliation protocols secure in the malicious model.
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Reconciliation Protocols Secure in the
Semi-Honest Model
In this chapter, we construct privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols which are
secure in the semi-honest model. We use preliminary work presented in Chapter 2
and the generalized multiset intersection operation presented in Section 3.1.1.1. We
start with a formal definition of privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols of ordered
sets in Section 4.1. We then propose three different approaches to construct privacy-
preserving multi-party reconciliation protocols for the minimum of ranks (denoted
as MR-rb, MR-sb, MR-opt) and the sum of ranks composition scheme (denoted as
SR-rb, SR-sb, SR-opt) in the semi-honest model. Our reconciliation protocols are
based on a threshold version of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. We gen-
eralize those reconciliation protocols such that each party can use arbitrary totally
pre-ordered input sets instead of totally ordered input sets of size k. Finally, we
show how to solve the reconciliation problem if an efficient fully homomorphic en-
cryption scheme is available. In the following, we describe our contributions more
in detail.
As a first approach, we show that it is possible to extend the round-based con-
struction of [134] to the multi-party case using a multi-party private set intersection
protocol such as [114, 121, 175, 162] in each round. Compared to [134, 135] our
main contribution is the generalization of the protocols to multiple parties. We
describe this round-based construction and analyze its performance in terms of
the number of executions of the multi-party private set intersection protocol re-
quired. In addition, we show that our multi-party round-based constructions are
privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model. This work has also been published in
[148, 147].
Second, we propose a more efficient construction for privacy-preserving multi-party
reconciliation protocols of ordered sets. The core of the second construction is an in-
tricate encoding of both the parties’ input sets and their associated preferences. This
encoding is based on multisets. The protocols integrate the intersection, union, and
element reduction operations on multisets by Kissner et. al [114], see Section 2.5.2.
In general, the high-level descriptions of our reconciliation protocols would also work
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with other constructions for multiset operations that support intersection, union,
and element reduction. Compared to [114], the main contribution is the idea to en-
code the rank of an element in an ordered input set such that the rank corresponds
to the number of occurrences of that element in a corresponding multiset. We also
show that the preference-maximizing objectives can be expressed in the above gram-
mar. We specify these new multi-party protocols in detail. In addition, we provide
a detailed analysis of both the communication and the computation overhead, i. e.,
the number of messages transmitted and the number of operations to be computed,
of our new protocols and show that they are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest
model.
Third, we propose an optimized variant of the second approach which is based on
a reduced maximum polynomial degree encountered in the protocols. The first
protocol drafts were constructed in discussion with L. Brutschy and later formalized
in his master thesis [24]. Compared to [24], we present a revised version of the formal
protocol description for minimum of ranks with a corrected complexity analysis.
The author of [24] only provided a sketch of the protocol for the sum of ranks
composition scheme. Here, we propose the formal protocol for sum of ranks with
a detailed description of the protocol and an analysis of its correctness, security,
and complexity. We provide a detailed analysis of both the communication and
the computation overhead of our new protocols and show that they are privacy-
preserving in the semi-honest model.
A requirement for reconciliation protocols is that each party holds exactly totally
ordered input sets of size k. We lift this constraint such that each party is able to
choose arbitrary totally pre-ordered input sets. This allows for a broader applica-
tion of the protocols. Our solution is based on the generalization of the multiset
intersection presented in Section 3.1.1. We discuss the effects of our generalization
and how the three proposed approaches for reconciliation of ordered sets have to be
modified to cope with arbitrary pre-ordered input sets.
Recently, Gentry proposed the first Fully homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE)
[76] which allows not only homomorphic addition but also homomorphic multiplica-
tion in the ciphertext domain. However, research about the security guarantees of
those fully homomorphic encryption scheme is still not completed. Also, the practi-
cal efficiency of these schemes is not comparable with existing additively homomor-
phic cryptosystems and each homomorphic operation is computationally expensive
[195]. Nevertheless, we investigate how reconciliation protocols can be improved if
an efficient fully homomorphic encryption scheme exists as this is a promising field
of research. The work is based on parts of the diploma thesis of F. Weingarten
[195]. Compared to [195], we present slightly modified algorithm variants such that
the algorithms fit our problem definition. We also updated and revised the effi-
ciency analysis where we compare the new FHE-based approaches with our three
AHE-based approaches.
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Parts of the work shown in this chapter have been published in [143, 147, 148,
195].
Outline: In Section 4.1, we give a formal definition of privacy-preserving recon-
ciliation protocols of ordered sets. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we propose three pro-
tocol variants for the minimum of ranks and respectively the sum of ranks com-
position scheme. In Section 4.4, we present the generalization of reconciliation
protocols to arbitrary pre-ordered input sets. Finally, we investigate the useful-
ness of fully homomorphic encryption schemes for reconciliation protocols in Sec-
tion 4.5.
4.1 Problem Definition
We consider n parties P1, ..., Pn with input sets S1, ..., Sn each with exactly k elements
chosen from a common domain D. Each party has certain preferences associated
with its input set which allow a party to define a total order on its inputs, see
Definition 2.1.1.3.
We assume that at most c < n of the n parties collude. Furthermore, (kpub, kpriv)
denotes a public/private key pair for the asymmetric, semantically secure, additively
homomorphic threshold cryptosystem. Each party Pi holds an authentic copy of the
public key kpub as well as its share sharei (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of the private key kpriv. The
shares share1, . . . , sharen are generated by means of a suitable (n, n)-secret sharing
scheme, e. g. [182].
Next, we give a formal definition of protocols for multi-party privacy-preserving
reconciliation of totally ordered sets. We define a reconciliation protocol as fol-
lows:
Definition 4.1.0.1 (Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation of Totally Or-
dered Sets) A multi-party reconciliation protocol of ordered sets for an order com-
position scheme f is a multi-party protocol between n parties P1, ..., Pn each with an
input (Si, <i) of size k drawn from the same domain D. Upon completion of the
protocol, each party learns (X, t) with:
X = arg max
x∈(S1∩...∩Sn)
f(x) and t = max
x∈(S1∩...∩Sn)
f(x)
where arg maxx∈(S1∩...∩Sn)f(x) = {x|∀y ∈ D : f(y) ≤ f(x)}
A protocol execution is said to be privacy-preserving in the semi-honest (the mali-
cious) model iff no semi-honest (malicious) party learns anything about the inputs
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and preferences of the other parties, except what can be deduced from the output
(X, t) of the protocol and his own private input set.
The result of the protocol is the set of common elements with maximum rank in
the combined preference order and the corresponding maximum rank. The concrete
protocol depends on the chosen composition scheme. In the following, we describe
protocols for the composition schemes minimum of ranks and sum of ranks (see
Section 2.6.2). We show the security in the standard model (see Section 2.4.3.1)
with a semi-honest adversary model (see Section 2.4.4.1). In Chapter 5, we pro-
pose solutions for malicious adversaries. We will refer to the problem of Multi-
party privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets (MPROS) and the variants
for minimum of ranks and sum of ranks as MPROSMR and MPROSSR, respec-
tively.
4.2 Reconciliation Protocols for the Minimum of Ranks
Composition Scheme
In this section, we propose three different variants to solve MPROS for the min-
imum of ranks composition scheme. Thus, the function f to be computed (see
Definition 4.1.0.1) is the minimum of ranks function, see Definition 2.1.1.6. Sec-
tion 4.2.1 illustrates our first round-based approach. Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 present
the second and third approaches, which are set-based.
4.2.1 First Approach
The first approach denoted as MR-rb is based on a generalization of the privacy-
preserving reconciliation protocols in the two-party setting described in Section 2.6.
The main idea is to use any privacy-preserving multi-party set intersection protocol
secure in the semi-honest model to compute the intersection in a way that the
order in which the intersections are computed ensures one-element subsets of each
party’s inputs. This is done in such a way that the first non-empty intersection
found contains the element that maximizes the combined order under the respective
composition scheme.
The n parties participate in a multi-round protocol where each round consists of
one or more executions of a multi-party set intersection protocol with varying input
sets. In the first round, party Pi’s input set Si = {si1 ≥ ... ≥ sik} contains its
most preferred element si1. In each of the following rounds r = 2, . . . , k, the parties
participate in rn − (r − 1)n protocol execution of a privacy-preserving multi-party
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Figure 4.2.1: Minimum of ranks composition scheme with three parties and four
input elements for the first two rounds. In Round 1, the minimum of
ranks is four. In Round 2, the minimum of ranks is three which results
in seven different input combinations.
set intersection protocol. Each protocol execution takes a one-element subset of the
inputs of each party as input. The order in which the parties select the inputs is
determined such that in round r the maximum of the minimum of ranks of all of the
input sets is k − r + 1. Figure 4.2.1 illustrates the first two rounds for three parties
and four input elements.
If the result of the set intersection protocol is the empty set, then the parties proceed
with the next input values. Otherwise, the protocol terminates and each party
learns the preferred element according to the maximum of the minimum of ranks
composition scheme and the round in which the match was found. Since the input
sets used in each run of the multi-party set intersection only contain one element,
the input sets can be represented as polynomials of degree one. As a consequence,
the performance of the round-based approach is dominated by the number of runs
of the set intersection protocol. In the worst-case, i.e., if the parties do not share
any element, the set intersection protocol is executed for all possible combinations
of the k input elements of the n parties. Therefore, in the worst-case the overall
number of protocol executions is kn.
More precisely, we can, e. g., use the Set-Intersection-SHM protocol by Kissner et.
al [114], see Section 2.5.2.6. The communication complexity of one execution of the
Set-Intersection-SHM protocol with multisets of size one is O(c ·n). The same holds
for the computation complexity. Thus, in the worst-case, the overall communica-
tion and computation complexity of the round-based multi-party privacy-preserving
reconciliation of ordered sets approach is O(c · n · kn).
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Some Remarks. Combining the results in [135] and [114] directly provides for the
new protocols being privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model. It is important
to note that based on the constructions described in Section 2.6, it is possible to
achieve a slightly stronger privacy guarantee than that of Definition 4.1.0.1. This is
due to the fact that the protocols are designed to abort as soon as the first match
is found. The protocols could easily be modified to output all maximizing elements
found in one round.
4.2.2 Second Approach
In this section, we propose our second approach denoted as MR-sb which is a so-
lution to the problem of MPROSMR that is more efficient than the round-based
construction discussed in the last section. The main idea is to improve the perfor-
mance of the first approach by finding a way to directly encode preferences as part
of the inputs (instead of in the order in which the parties compare their inputs). It
turns out that a good candidate for this approach is to use multisets and to encode
the rank of a set element as its multiplicity in the multiset. Given this encoding,
the main challenge is to find a way to represent the inner workings of the preference
order composition scheme in the powerful grammar for privacy-preserving set opera-
tions proposed in [114]. More specifically, the challenge is to express the maximizing
of the preferences according to the preference composition scheme in question by
means of intersection, union, and reduction operations.
4.2.2.1 Protocol Description
For each party Pi (i = 1, . . . , n) we represent its input elements together with their
respective ranks as a multiset using the Rank encoding renc(Si), see Table 2.5.1. I.e.,
each element occurs in Si as often as its rank indicates such that the most preferred
element si1 occurs k times while the least preferred element sik occurs only once.
Using the grammar and Kissner’s multiset operations described in Section 2.5.2, we
now show that if it is possible to compute
Rdt(renc(S1) ∩ ... ∩ renc(Sn)) (4.1)
(where k > t ≥ 0 is an appropriate reduction value) in a privacy-preserving manner,
then this yields a protocol for MPROSMR. Intuitively speaking, for the computation
of Equation (4.1), the protocol entails the following steps:
1. Each party determines the polynomial representation of its multiset renc(Si).
2. All parties calculate the set intersection on input sets renc(S1), ..., renc(Sn)
in a privacy-preserving fashion. After this step, all parties hold an encrypted
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polynomial that represents the intersection renc(S1) ∩ ... ∩ renc(Sn). This
intersection encodes not only the elements which the parties have in common
but also the respective minimum preference for each of these elements over all
the participants.
3. All parties iteratively calculate the element reduction by t. The first time
this step is executed, the reduction value t = k − 1 is used. The reduction
operation is applied on the result of the set intersection from the previous step.
The goal of the reduction step is to determine the element in the intersection
renc(S1)∩ ...∩ renc(Sn) for which the minimum preference is maximized, i.e.,
to perform element reduction using the largest possible t. A reduction by t
eliminates up to t occurrences of each unique element in the multiset renc(S1)∩
... ∩ renc(Sn). If t is too large, the reduction will output the encryption of a
polynomial representing the empty set.
4. All parties participate in the threshold decryption of the result of the previous
step. Specifically, each party checks whether at least one of its input elements
is a root of the polynomial computed as part of the previous step. This will
not be the case until the previous step results in a non-empty set which in
turn corresponds to the maximum of the minimum of ranks. As long as the
previous step yields an empty set, the parties iterate Steps 3 and 4 with a
decreasing value of t.
Figure 4.2.1 details each of the steps of this new protocol. The n parties P1, ..., Pn
are arranged in a circular structure. To increase readability, we generally omit the
necessary mod n in the protocol description. For example, the P` for an arbitrary `
is in fact the shorthand for P` mod n.
In Step 1a), all parties construct polynomials which represent their totally ordered
input elements. Then, they calculate the encryption of their polynomial and send
it to the next c parties. Next, each party chooses c + 1 random polynomials and
calculates the encryption of the scalar product φi of the c received encrypted polyno-
mials, its own, and the randomly chosen polynomials using the algorithms given in
Section 2.5.2. Intuitively speaking, each φi represents some part of the polynomial
which encodes the set intersection.
In Steps 1b) and 1c), the φi’s are combined in a circular way starting with party P1
sending E(λ1) = E(φ1) to party P2. Upon receiving E(λi−1) from party Pi−1, party
Pi (i = 2, . . . , n) then calculates the encryption of λi−1 +φi using the sum operation
on encrypted polynomials and sends the result to Pi+1.
In Step 1d), party P1 distributes the result p = λn to c+1 randomly chosen other par-
ties. This ensures that at least one honest party receives p.
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Note that in the resulting polynomial p, each contributing polynomial fi is blinded by
c+ 1 random values. Consequently, the corresponding sum ∑cj=0 qi+j,j is uniformly
distributed and up to c colluding attackers cannot deduce any information from
it. Step 2 corresponds to the element reduction by t. The c + 1 parties calculate
the encryption of the p(1), ..., pk−1-th derivatives of p and the polynomial p∗s which
corresponds to the element reduction by t of the multiset represented by polynomial
p. The result p∗s is broadcast to all parties.
In Step 3a), all parties perform a threshold decryption to obtain polynomial Φ.
Again, each polynomial p(l) in Φ is blinded by c + 1 random values such that the
sum is uniformly distributed and up to c colluding attackers may not infer any
information from it. In Step 3b), each party checks if the multiset represented by
the polynomial Φ contains one of its input elements. If this is the case, the protocol
terminates and the elements that maximize the combined preferences of all parties
are found. If this is not the case, the parties reduce the value t by one and repeat
Steps 2b)− 3.
Correctness and Privacy. The above protocol first executes the multiset intersec-
tion operation followed by a sequence of element reductions. The multisets Si of
each party Pi are constructed in a way such that the intersection of the multisets
leads to a multiset in which each common element r of all parties occurs exactly
min{rankS1(r), . . . , rankSn(r)} times. Obviously, the maximum of the minimum of
ranks of the common elements is between k and 1. As a consequence, if the element
reduction by k − 1 of the multiset resulting from the intersection leads to a non-
empty set of common input elements, then the rank of these elements maximizes the
minimum of ranks. If the reduction by k−1 leads to an empty set, the maximum of
the minimum of ranks is lower than k. Continuing this argument with an iterative
reduction by k − 2,...,0 proves the correctness of our construction. In our proto-
col, each party Pi learns all maximally preferred common elements and the value t
corresponding to the reduction in which these elements were found. Note that in
the special case where all parties hold the same input set but all in complementary
order, the maximally preferred common elements are the complete common input
set.
In order to prove that the new protocol is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest
model, we can directly build on the results by Kissner et al. [114]. They show that
in the presence of at most c colluding attackers, their multiset operations (union,
intersection, and element reduction) are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model
and that these operations can be arbitrarily composed in a privacy-preserving man-
ner. As our protocol combines the intersection with several element reduction oper-
ations, it is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model in the presence of at most
c attackers as well.
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Protocol 4.2.1: Second Approach for MPROSMR
Setting: There are n parties P1, ..., Pn with totally ordered input sets (Si, <i) chosen from
a common domain D. There are at most c < n colluding attackers. F0, ..., Ft are fixed
polynomials of degree 0, ..., k− 1 that do not have any elements of the overall domain
D as root. The keys for a (n, n) threshold version of an additively homomorphic
cryptosystem have been distributed and secure communication channels between each
pair of the n parties have been established.
1. Set Intersection
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. calculates the polynomial fi(X) = (X − si1)k · (X − si2)k−1 · ... · (X − sik)1
where deg(fi(X)) = k·(k+1)2 ,
ii. sends E(fi(X)) to parties Pi+1, ..., Pi+c,
iii. chooses c+ 1 random polynomials qi,0, ..., qi,c of degree deg(fi(X)),
iv. calculates E(φi) with φi = fi−c ∗ qi,c + ...+ fi ∗ qi,0.
b) Party P1 sends the encryption of λ1 = φ1 to party P2.
c) For each i = 2, ..., n each party Pi:
i. receives E(λi−1) from party Pi−1,
ii. calculates the encryption of λi = λi−1 + φi,
iii. sends E(λi) to party Pi+1.
d) Party P1 distributes E(λn) with p = λn =
∑n
i=1 fi ∗ (
∑c
j=0 qi+j,j) to c + 1
randomly chosen parties Pj1 , . . . , Pjc+1 where deg(λn) = k · (k + 1).
2. Set Reduction (t=k-1,...,0)
a) Each party Pjs (s = 1, ..., c+ 1)
i. calculates the encryption of the 1, ..., (k− 1)-th derivatives of polynomial p,
denoted by p(1), ..., p(k−1).
b) Each party Pjs (s = 1, ..., c+ 1)
i. chooses t+ 1 random polynomials q′s,0, ..., q′s,t of degree 0, ..., t,
ii. calculates the encryption of the polynomial p∗s =
∑t
l=0 p
(l) ∗ Fl ∗ q′s,l and
sends it to all other parties.
3. Decryption
a) All parties
i. calculate the encryption of the sum Φ of the polynomials p∗s,
ii. perform a threshold decryption to obtain the polynomial Φ =
∑c+1
s=1 p
∗
s =∑t
l=0 p
(l) ∗ Fl ∗ (
∑c+1
s=1 q
′
s,l) where deg(Φ) = k · (k + 1) + t.
b) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) checks for each of its input elements sil ∈ Si (l =
1, ..., k) whether it is an element of Rdt(renc(S1) ∩ ... ∩ renc(Sn)) by checking
whether sil is a root of Φ, i.e., whether (X−sil)|Φ. If no match is found, proceed
with Step 2b) and a decreasing value of t.
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Complexity Analysis. In this section, we analyze the worst-case performance of
our second approach for the minimum of ranks composition scheme. We determine
the communication overhead by the number of ciphertexts exchanged between all
parties. The size of the ciphertext depends on the homomorphic cryptosystem used
and is not further specified here.
To determine the computation overhead, we count the number of encryptions of
polynomial coefficients (EOC), homomorphic add operations (+h), homomorphic
scalar operations (×h), decryption operations (DEC) and polynomial evaluations
(PE). Some steps in our protocols allow several parties to compute operations in
parallel. We indicate this potential speed up by an index pa but provide the com-
putational overhead of the individual steps without parallel computation. The over-
all computational complexity are given both with and without parallel computa-
tion.
Table 4.2.1 summarizes the performance analysis for MPROSMR. We first consider
the communication overhead. In Step 1a)ii n · c messages are sent, as each party
sends its encrypted polynomial to c parties. The degree of each of these polynomials
is k·(k+1)2 , so each message contains (
k·(k+1)
2 + 1) ciphertexts. In Steps 1b) and 1c) n
messages are exchanged due to the circular structure of the protocol. Each of these
messages contains the encrypted coefficients of a polynomial of degree k · (k + 1).
In Step 1d), party P1 distributes E(λn) to c + 1 parties. Each of these parties
calculates the reduction of the polynomial and sends it to all other parties resulting
in (c + 1) · (n − 1) messages. The degree of the transmitted polynomials p∗s is
k · (k+ 1) + t. This step will be repeated at most k times (t = k− 1, ..., 0). Overall,
the worst-case communication complexity is O(n ·c ·k3).
Next, we consider the computational overhead. In Step 1a)ii, each party computes
the encryption of its polynomial f . The degree of each polynomial is k·(k+1)2 . This
results in a total of n · [k·(k+1)2 +1] encryptions. In Step 1a)iv, each party computes a
part of the set intersection. The outer sums are computed over encrypted polynomi-
als. Each sum requires in total (max{deg(f1), deg(f2)}+1) +h−operations (compare
Section 2.5.2.3). Overall, with c+1 terms and n parties, we obtain n·c·[k ·(k+1)+1]
+h-operations.
Next, the parties compute c+1 products of unencrypted and encrypted polynomials.
Computing the products (compare Section 2.5.2.3) requires ×h and +h-operations.
All operations in Step 1a) can be calculated by the n parties in parallel. In Step 1c),
parties P2, ..., Pn first compute a sum of two encrypted polynomials of degree k ·(k+
1). In Step 2), c+ 1 parties compute the 1, ..., t-th derivatives of the polynomial p of
degree k · (k+ 1) using ×h-operations. The polynomial p∗s is calculated by the outer
sum over t terms with the degrees of the polynomials varying from k · (k + 1) to
k · (k+1)+ t and inner products of unencrypted and encrypted polynomials. Step 2)
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Step Comm. complex. (M) Type Comp. complex.
1aii) n · c · [k·(k+1)2 + 1] EOCpa n · [k·(k+1)2 + 1]
1aiv) - +hpa n · c · [k · (k + 1) + 1]
- ×hpa n · (c+ 1) · [ (k·(k+1)+1)·(k·(k+1)+2)2 ]
- +hpa n · (c+ 1) · [ (k·(k+1))·(k·(k+1)+1)2 ]
1b)/1c) n · [k · (k + 1) + 1] +h (n− 1) · [k · (k + 1) + 1]
1d) (c+ 1) · [k · (k + 1) + 1] - -
2)
∑k−1
t=0 (c+ 1) ·(n− 1) ×hpa (c+ 1)·[(k − 1) · k · (k + 1)− (k−2)·(k−1)2 )
·[k · (k + 1) + t+ 1] +hpa
∑k−1
t=0 (c+ 1)·[t · k · (k + 1) + t·(t+1)2 ]
×hpa
∑k−1
t=0 (c+ 1) · [
∑t
l=0(2.4)] ∈ O(c · k6)
deg(f1) = d1 = k · (k + 1)− l, deg(f2) = d2 = 2 · l
+hpa
∑k−1
t=0 (c+ 1) · [
∑t
l=0(2.5)] ∈ O(c · k6)
deg(f1) = d1 = k · (k + 1)− l, deg(f2) = d2 = 2 · l
3a) - +h
∑k−1
t=0 n · c · [k · (k + 1) + t+ 1]
- DEC
∑k−1
t=0 n · [k · (k + 1) + t+ 1]
3b) - PEpa n · k2
Overall O(n · c · k3) O(c · k6 + n · c · k4)
Overallp − O(k6 + c · k4 + n · c · k3)
Table 4.2.1: Worst-case analysis of the second approach for the minimum of ranks
composition scheme. The overall worst-case complexity corresponds to
the executing of at most k rounds (t = k − 1, ..., 0).
can be calculated in parallel by the c+ 1 parties.
In Step 3a), the polynomial Φ is calculated by a sum over the c + 1 encrypted
polynomials p∗s with degree (k · (k + 1) + t). In the worst-case, this operation is
repeated k times. Φ is then decrypted using the threshold decryption. Since there
are at most k rounds, these operations are also repeated at most k times. Finally,
the polynomial Φ is evaluated at k points. Overall, the computation complexity is
O(c · k6 + n · c · k4). Using parallelization the overall computation cost is O(k6 + c ·
k4 + n · c · k3).
4.2.3 Third Approach
The idea of the third approach denoted as MR-opt proposed in this section is to
improve MR-sb for the minimum of ranks composition scheme presented in Sec-
tion 4.2.2. The main idea is to improve the performance by using polynomials of
reduced degree in the protocol execution. In the following, we first describe our opti-
mization approach in more detail and then describe the new protocol.
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4.2.3.1 Optimization Approach
The MPROS protocols previously described are based on a combination of privacy-
preserving intersections, unions, and reductions of multisets that encode the ordered
input sets of the participating parties. The privacy-preserving multiset operations in
turn are based on homomorphic additions and scalar multiplications. The efficiency
of the multiset operations (intersection, union, and reduction) mostly depends on
the number of homomorphic scalar multiplications used. In the second approach,
almost all homomorphic scalar multiplications ×h are performed when an encrypted
polynomial is multiplied by an unencrypted polynomial. The number of homomor-
phic scalar multiplications per polynomial multiplication is quadratic in the degree
of the polynomials. We can therefore conclude that the efficiency of the protocol
depends largely on the highest degree polynomial encountered in the protocol exe-
cution.
Note that the size of the highest degree polynomial encountered in the protocols
depends on the encoding of the ordered input sets of the parties as well as the
number and type of operations performed during protocol execution. For example,
the highest degree polynomial in MR-sb is constructed by computing an element
reduction of an intersection of ranked encoded sets of all parties. We obtain the
following maximum polynomial degree:
deg
(
Rdk−1
(
n⋂
i=1
renc (Si)
))
= k · (k + 1) + (k − 1) = k · (k + 2)− 1
In the following, we construct a new protocol for the minimum of ranks compo-
sition scheme following the general idea of reducing the maximum polynomial de-
gree.
4.2.3.2 Protocol Description
Our new protocol is based on the following observation: Each minimum of ranks
problem can be defined as a composition of several minimum of ranks subproblems.
We show that we can construct a protocol for MPROSMR by iteratively solving
minimum of ranks subproblems. This third approach is a mix of the first and the
second approach.
First, we define extensions on ordered sets and then prove a theorem about the
extension of minimum of ranks problems.
Definition 4.2.3.1 An ordered set {s1 ≥ ... ≥ sq+p} is called p-extension of a set
{r1 ≥ .... ≥ rq} iff ∀i ∈ {1...q} : si = ri. A tuple of totally ordered sets (S1, ..., Sn)
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is a p-extension of another tuple of ordered sets (R1, ..., Rn) iff for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
Sj is a p-extension of Rj.
In other words, a p-extension adds low-ranked elements to the ordered set S, while
keeping the q highest-ranked elements the same. The rank of each element from the
ordered set S is therefore increased by p.
We can observe that if a minimum of ranks problem has a non-empty output R for
input sets S1, ..., Sn, R is also the output for all p-extensions, as expressed by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.1 Let S1, ..., Sn be totally ordered input sets. For every protocol for
MPROSMR with a non-empty output R ⊆
(⋂n
j=1 Sj
)
, R is also the output to proto-
cols for MPROSMR for all p-extensions of (S1, ..., Sn).
Proof.
Base case: Consider a 1-extension (E1, ..., En) of (S1, ..., Sn). Let x be an element
of the domain and R be the first part of the output of the MPROSMR protocol (see
Definition 4.1.0.1) for (S1, ..., Sn), as defined by
R = arg maxx∈(S1∩...∩Sn) {min1≤i≤nrankSi(x)}
and let R′ be the output for (E1, ..., En), defined accordingly. We show that R is
the output for (E1, ..., En) by proving that each element of R is also in R′, and each
value not in R is also not in R′. If x ∈ R, then
x ∈ (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn) and min1≤i≤nrankSi(x) > 0
⇒ x ∈ (E1 ∩ ... ∩ En) and min1≤i≤nrankEi(x) > 1.
Since the 1-extension (E1, ..., En) only adds low-ranked elements, it holds that
x ∈ R′. If x 6∈ R, then
∃y ∈ (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn) such that
min1≤i≤nrankSi(y) > min1≤i≤nrankSi(x)
⇒ ∃y ∈ (E1 ∩ ... ∩ En) such that
min1≤i≤nrankEi(y) > min1≤i≤nrankEi(x)
and therefore x 6∈ R′. As a consequence, the results R and R′ contain exactly the
same elements.
Induction Hypothesis: Theorem 4.2.1 holds for p-extensions (E1, ..., En) of (S1, ..., Sn).
Induction step: Assuming the induction hypothesis, we prove Theorem 4.2.1 for
all (p + 1)-extensions. Consider a p-extension (E1, ..., En) and a (p + 1)-extension
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(E∗1 , ..., E∗n) of (S1, ..., Sn). Let x be an element of the domain and R be the output
for (S1, ..., Sn) as defined above. Let R′ be the output for (E1, ..., En) and R∗ be the
output for (E∗1 , ..., E∗n). We show that R is the output for (E∗1 , ..., E∗n) by proving
that each element of R′ is also in R∗, and each value not in R′ is also not in R∗.
Then, as Theorem 4.2.1 holds for the p-extension (E1, ..., En), it also holds for the
(p+ 1)-extension (E∗1 , ..., E∗n).
If x ∈ R′, then
x ∈ (E1 ∩ ... ∩ En) and min1≤i≤nrankEi(x) > p
⇒ x ∈ (E∗1 ∩ ... ∩ E∗n) and min1≤i≤nrankE∗i (x) > p+ 1
Since the (p+1)-extension (E∗1 , ..., E∗n) only adds low-ranked elements, it holds that
x ∈ R∗. If x 6∈ R′, then
∃y ∈ (E1 ∩ ... ∩ En) such that
min1≤i≤nrankEi(y) > min1≤i≤nrankEi(x)
⇒ ∃y ∈ (E∗1 ∩ ... ∩ E∗n) such that
min1≤i≤nrankE∗
i
(y) > min1≤i≤nrankE∗
i
(x)
and therefore x 6∈ R∗. The results R′ and R∗ contain exactly the same elements.
Due to the induction hypothesis, it holds that R′ = R and as a consequence R∗ = R.
Thus, we have proven Theorem 4.2.1 for arbitrary p-extensions.
Furthermore, we can observe that a p-extension of a minimum of ranks problem
with an empty solution also has an empty solution or a solution with a maxi-
mum minimum of ranks of less or equal to p, as expressed by the following the-
orem.
Theorem 4.2.2 Let (S1, ..., Sn) be totally ordered input sets. For every protocol for
MPROSMR with an empty output, each p-extension (E1, ..., En) of (S1, ..., Sn) has
an empty output or an output with a maximum minimum of ranks of less or equal
to p.
Proof. It is sufficient to show the case p = 1; the general case follows by in-
duction similar to Theorem 4.2.1. Consider an element x of the domain D and
let R ⊆ D be the first part of the output of (E1, ..., En). Let (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn) be
empty. If x 6∈ (E1 ∩ ... ∩ En), then x 6∈ R. If x ∈ (E1 ∩ ... ∩ En), then we have
min1≤i≤nrankEi(x) = 1, since x 6∈ (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn) and (E1, ..., En) is a 1-extension of
(S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn). Therefore, x ∈ R and the maximum minimum rank of the output
is 1.
Let Si = {si1 > ... > sik} be the totally ordered input set of party Pi. Based on these
observations, we can construct a new MPROS protocol for the minimum of ranks
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composition scheme in the following way: Similar to the first approach, our protocol
starts with input multisets containing the most-preferred elements of each party Pi
in Simple encoding (see Table 2.5.1). We solve the minimum of ranks subproblem
on those multisets. If the result is empty, we extend those multisets with the next-
preferred elements in Simple encoding and solve the corresponding minimum of ranks
subproblem. We repeat this approach until a result is found or until we extended
the multisets to the complete input sets Si.
More formally, the protocol operates in rounds. In round 1 ≤ l ≤ k of the protocol,
the parties compute
∩ni=1{si1, . . . , sil}
If the resulting set is empty the parties continue with round l + 1. If the resulting
set is non-empty, the resulting set contains the common elements of all parties with
the maximum minimum of ranks value k − l + 1.
Note that in the worst case this protocol requires k rounds. In each round, the pro-
tocol performs a set intersection of n sets with at most k elements each. Therefore,
the highest polynomial degree that can occur during the protocol execution is 2k.
In contrast, MR-sb presented in Section 4.2.2 requires larger polynomials of degree
k(k+2)−1 due to the Rank encoding. Thus, we obtain a more efficient protocol for
MPROSMR by reducing the maximum polynomial degree. This leads to a decreased
number of necessary homomorphic operations to solve MPROSMR.
We now briefly explain the formal description of MPROSMR given in Protocol 4.2.2.
We assume c = n−1 in Protocol 4.2.2. A secure protocol for c < n can be constructed
in a way similar to the second approach shown in Section 4.2.2. In the initialization
in Step 1, each party encrypts its input element representing its highest ranked
input element, and broadcasts its encrypted value. Steps 2 and 3 compute the set
intersection of the polynomials φi,k−t and decrypt the result. In Step 4, the result
is tested for emptiness. Based on the outcome, one of two actions are performed:
If the result is not empty, we have found the correct result and we terminate the
protocol. If the result is empty, we consider a larger subproblem and repeat the set
intersection. For this purpose, each party adds the next highest ranked elements siw
where w = k − t+ 1 to its current polynomial φi,k−t using the homomorphic scalar
multiplication. The resulting polynomial φi,k−t+1 is broadcast for the next round.
Then, the protocol returns to Step 2 and decrements t.
Correctness. The correctness of the protocol follows directly from the Theorems 4.2.1
and 4.2.2.
101
4 Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation in the Semi-Honest Model
Security & Privacy. According to Definition 4.1.0.1 we have to prove that in our
new protocol none of the parties learns more than what can be deduced from the
desired output and its minimum of ranks value. The protocol consists of several
rounds of set intersection operations. As shown by Kissner et al. [114] in the semi-
honest model in the presence of at most n−1 attackers the set intersection operations
in each round are privacy-preserving. Therefore the parties learn nothing else but
what can be inferred from the result of the set intersection in each round. Note that
this result is the empty set in all but the last round of the protocol in which the
result is the desired output. In addition, each party learns the number of rounds
the protocol takes to terminate. In particular, in the first round, each party learns
that if there is a solution, then its minimum of ranks is larger than k − 1. In the
l-th round, each party learns that if there is a solution, then its minimum of ranks
is larger than k − l etc. This, however, is equivalent to knowing the minimum of
ranks value of the solution. According to Definition 4.1.0.1 this is part of the desired
output of a privacy-preserving reconciliation protocol. In particular, this means that
in the special case of n = 2 the party with the higher rank learns the rank assigned
to the elements in the intersection by the other party.
Complexity. Step 1 of the algorithm is an initialization step of negligible complex-
ity. Therefore, we can focus the analysis on Steps 2-4 which iterate up to k times.
The messages that are broadcast in each round are γi and the partial decryption
share of pi, both of which are of size deg (γi). As the degree of γi is 2(k − t), the
amount of data sent by each party is given by:
O
(
c ·
k∑
j=1
2j
)
= O
(
(n− 1) ·
k∑
j=1
2j
)
= O
(
n · k2
)
.
Similarly, the most expensive computations performed in each round are n polyno-
mial multiplications of an encrypted with an unencrypted polynomial both of degree
k− t. As each multiplication of coefficients is performed homomorphically, it corre-
sponds to scalar multiplications ×h. For each party the computational complexity
is:
O
(c+ 1) · k∑
j=1
j2
 = O
n · k∑
j=1
j2
 = O (n · k3)
For n parties, the overall communication complexity is O
(
c · n · k2) and the compu-
tation complexity is O
(
c · n · k3) without parallel computation. The new protocol
therefore improves on the MR-sb, reducing the computation by a factor of O
(
k3
)
and the communication by a factor of O (k).
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Protocol 4.2.2: Third Approach for MPROSMR
Setting: There are n parties P1, ..., Pn with totally ordered input sets (Si, <i) chosen from a
common domain D. There are at most c < n colluding attackers. The keys for a
(n, n) threshold version of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem have been
distributed and secure communication channels between each pair of the n parties
are established.
1. Input Encryption
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) encrypts its highest ranked input
φi,1 = E (x− si1) and broadcasts the encryption.
2. Set Intersection (Initially t = k − 1)
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Chooses random polynomials ri,j of degree k − t
ii. Calculates and broadcasts γi =
∑˜n
j=0 (φj,k−t ×h ri,j),
which is of degree 2 · (k − t)
b) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) calculates pi =
∑˜n
l=1γi
3. Decryption All parties jointly perform a threshold decryption of pi
4. Result Check
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Calculates the set of elements of Si which are roots of the decrypted
polynomial pi∗: R = {d |d ∈ Si, (X − d)|pi∗ }
ii. If R 6= ∅ terminates the protocol with result (R, t+ 1)
iii. If R = ∅ and t = 0 terminates the protocol with (∅, 0)
b) Computes φi,k−t+1 = φi,k−t ×h (x− siw) where w = k − t+ 1, broadcasts
the result and proceeds with Step 2 and t = t− 1
Protocol Communication Computation
MR-rb O(c · n · kn) O(c · n · kn)
MR-sb O(c · n · k3) O(c · k6 + n · c · k4)
MR-opt O(c · n · k2) O(c · n · k3)
Table 4.2.2: Summary of protocol complexities for MPROSMR.
4.2.4 Summary
Table 4.2.2 summarizes the computational complexity as well as the communication
overhead in the number of ciphertexts for the three newly-developed protocols for the
minimum of ranks composition scheme. Recall that k denotes the number of input
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elements, n the number of parties and c the maximum number of colluding attackers.
We give the overall complexity for all parties based on a worst-case analysis in the
semi-honest model.
The second and third approaches are polynomial-time bound with respect to both
the number of parties and input elements, whereas the first construction has expo-
nential runtime with respect to the number of parties. Furthermore, the table shows
that for more than three (two) parties the communication overhead of the second
(third) approach is smaller than the communication overhead of the first approach.
Furthermore, for more than five (three) parties the computation overhead of the
second (third) approach for the minimum of ranks composition scheme is smaller
than that of the first construction.
The MR-opt protocol is also faster than the MR-sb protocol. The communication
overhead for MR-opt is O(k) and the computation overhead is O(k3) lower than
for the MR-sb protocol. Thus, we expect the fastest runtime and the lowest data
transmission rates for MR-opt.
4.3 Reconciliation Protocols for the Sum of Ranks
Composition Scheme
In this section, we propose three different variants to solve MPROS for the sum of
ranks composition scheme. Analogous to the minimum of ranks composition scheme,
the first approach is round-based and uses the Set-Intersection-SHM protocol de-
scribed in Section 2.5.2.6. The second approach is based on the privacy-preserving
set operations described in Section 2.5.2. The third approach is again an optimized
protocol variant and is a mix of the first and the second approach. In the following,
Section 4.3.1 illustrates our first approach for MPROSSR. Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3
present our second and third approach for MPROSSR.
4.3.1 First Approach
Analogous to the minimum of ranks composition scheme, it is possible to generalize
the two-party round-based reconciliation protocol (see Section 2.6.3) to multiple
parties which is our first approach denoted as SR-rb for the sum of ranks composition
scheme. The multi-party protocol requires at most (n · k) − (n − 1) rounds. Each
round entails multiple executions of a privacy-preserving, multi-party set intersection
protocol. Specifically, in round s, the inputs siji with i = 1, ..., n for the different
runs of a set intersection protocol are determined such that ∑ni=1 rankSi(siji) = s
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where the ji are chosen from {1, ..., k}. As long as the result of the set intersection
is the empty set, the parties proceed with the next input values. Otherwise, the
protocol terminates and each party learns the preferred input element according to
the maximum of the sum of ranks composition scheme and the sum of ranks value
of the solution (see Definition 4.1.0.1). The maximum number of set intersection
protocol executions is again equal to kn. Again, if we use the Set-Intersection-SHM
protocol described in Section 2.5.2.6, the overall communication and computation
complexities of the round-based MPROSSR approach are O(c · n · kn) in the worst-
case.
4.3.2 Second Approach
Our second approach denoted as SR-sb is similar to the MR-sb protocol. We show a
way to express maximizing the preferences according to the sum of ranks composition
scheme by means of intersection, union, and reduction operations.
4.3.2.1 Protocol Description
We represent the input elements of each party Pi (i = 1, . . . , n) and the respec-
tive ranks by the multiset in Rank encoding renc(Si), see Table 2.5.1. In addition,
we use multisets in Multiplicity encoding menc(Si). Using the grammar and basic
operations described in Section 2.5.2, we now show that if it is possible to com-
pute
Rdt((renc(S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc(Sn)) ∩menc(S1) ∩ ... ∩menc(Sn)) (4.2)
in a privacy-preserving manner, then this yields a multi-party privacy-preserving
reconciliation protocol of ordered sets for MPROSSR. It is also important to note
that the seemingly simpler construction Rdt(renc(S1)∪ ...∪ renc(Sn)) does not lead
to the desired type of protocol. This is due to the fact that after applying the
union operation to the multisets, there may be elements in the union that are in
fact not common to all parties. Using the additional intersection with menc(S1) ∩
... ∩menc(Sn) eliminates this problem. The maximal multiplicity of a set element
in the union renc(S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc(Sn) is n · k. In turn, menc(S1) ∩ ... ∩menc(Sn)
contains all of the set elements that the parties have in common with a multiplicity
of n ·k. Thus, computing (renc(S1)∪ ...∪ renc(Sn))∩menc(S1)∩ ...∩menc(Sn) not
only eliminates those elements that are not held by all parties but it also preserves
the preferences of the common input elements. Intuitively speaking, the protocol
implementing Equation (4.2) works as follows:
1. Each party calculates polynomial representations of the multisets renc(Si) and
menc(Si).
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2. All parties use their multisets renc(S1), . . . , renc(Sn) to compute the multiset
union. After completing this step, all parties hold an encrypted polynomial
that represents renc(S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc(Sn). This union not only encodes all
the input elements held by the parties but it also represents the sum of the
preferences for each element across all parties.
3. All parties calculate the multiset intersection operation on input multisets
menc(S1), . . . ,menc(Sn) and the outcome of the previous Step 2. This step is
necessary in order to ensure that those elements are eliminated from renc(S1)∪
... ∪ renc(Sn) which are held by some but not all parties.
4. All parties iteratively participate in the element reduction by t with t = nk −
1, ..., n−1 on the result of the previous Step 3. As in the case of the multi-party,
privacy-preserving protocol for the minimum of ranks composition scheme, the
purpose of this step is to maximize the preference order. This is ensured by
possibly repeating this step and the following step for decreasing t.
5. All parties participate in the threshold decryption of the result of Step 4 and
check whether at least one of its input elements is a root of the polynomial
computed in the previous step. If this is the case, the common elements with
the maximum sum of ranks are found. If this is not the case (i.e., t was too
large and the polynomial computed as part of Step 4 corresponds to the empty
set), the parties repeat Step 4 with a value t decreased by one.
Protocol 4.3.1 details our protocol for MPROSSR. The protocol works as fol-
lows. In Step 1a), all parties construct the polynomials that represent the mul-
tisets Si. In Step 1b), party P1 sends the encrypted polynomial δ1 to party P2. In
Step 1c), starting with party P2 (up to Pn), each party Pi calculates a part of the
set union using the received encryption of the polynomial δi−1 and its own polyno-
mial fi. In Step 1d), party P1 receives and distributes the encrypted polynomial
p1 = δn. Step 1 corresponds to the calculation of the function renc(S1) ∪ ... ∪
renc(Sn).
In Step 2a), the n parties compute the multiset intersection of the n multisets
menc(S1), ...,menc(Sn) to obtain menc(S1)∩...∩menc(Sn). Party P1 then publishes
the encryption of the resulting polynomial p2 = λn to c+ 1 randomly chosen parties
(Step 2b).
In Step 3a), each of the chosen parties Pjs (s = 1, ..., c+1) determines the polynomial
p3 = p1∗q′′s,1 +p2∗q′′s,2 using the set intersection on two encrypted polynomials. Note
that the degree of polynomial p1 and p2 differs. The random polynomials q′′s,1, q′′s,2
are therefore chosen of degree deg(p2) which is the larger degree of the polynomials
p1, p2 since deg(p1) = n · k·(k+1)2 < 2n ·k2 = deg(p2) holds ∀k ≥ 1, n ≥ 2. Kissner and
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Song only proved the set intersection operation for two encrypted polynomials of the
same degree [114]. As shown in Section 3.1.1, we have proven the correctness of the
set intersection operation for two encrypted polynomials of different degree. The set
intersection operation f ∗r+g∗s for two encrypted polynomials f, g is still valid if we
choose the random polynomials r, s of degree max{deg(f), deg(g)}. In our protocol
this is exactly the chosen degree deg(p2) for the random polynomials q′′s,1, q′′s,2 as
max{deg(p1), deg(p2)} = deg(p2), ∀k ≥ 1, n ≥ 2.
Next, the parties perform the reduction step by t on polynomial p3. Specifically,
the c + 1 parties determine the 1, ..., t-th derivatives to construct the polynomial
p∗s which is the reduction by t of polynomial p3. The result p∗s is broadcast to
all parties which then perform a threshold decryption in Step 4a) to obtain the
polynomial Φ.
Finally, each party Pi checks whether the resulting polynomial Φ has at least one
of its input elements sil (1 ≤ l ≤ k) as root. If this is the case, all these elements
maximize the sum of ranks composition scheme. If this is not the case, the parties
reduce the value t by one and repeat Steps 3a)ii − 4.
Correctness. The above protocol combines the multiset union with the multiset in-
tersection operation and multiple element reduction operations. Step 1 corresponds
to the union operation on n multisets which, by construction (see Section 2.5.2), re-
turns a multiset containing each set element r exactly s times where s is the sum of
the occurrences of r in each input set. As mentioned above, this multiset may contain
set elements that are not shared by all parties. Intersecting the result of the union
operation with the intersection of the multisets S′i eliminates these non-shared set
elements while preserving the (sum of the) preferences.
To obtain the set elements that maximize the sum of ranks of all parties, we apply
the reduction step, this time starting with t = nk − 1 since the maximum possible
sum of the assigned rank for a set element is nk. Assuming a set element r occurring
d times in (renc(S1)∪ ...∪ renc(Sn))∩menc(S1)∩ ...∩menc(Sn), the reduction by
t returns all elements that appear max{d− t, 0} times.
Due to the order in which the reduction is applied (i.e., for decreasing t ≥ n − 1),
the correctness of the protocol is guaranteed.
Privacy. In our protocol, each party Pi learns all maximally preferred common in-
put elements and the value t corresponding to the reduction in which these elements
were found. In order to prove that the new protocol is privacy-preserving in the semi-
honest model, we can build on the results by Kissner et al. [114].
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Protocol 4.3.1: Second Approach for MPROSSR
Setting: There are n parties P1, ..., Pn with totally ordered input sets (Si, <i) chosen from
a common domain D. There are at most c < n colluding attackers. F0, ..., Ft are fixed
polynomials of degree 0, ..., k− 1 that do not have any elements of the overall domain
D as root. The keys for a (n, n) threshold version of an additively homomorphic
cryptosystem have been distributed and secure communication channels between each
pair of the n parties have been established.
1. Set Union
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) calculates the polynomial
fi(X) = (X − si1)k · (X − si2)k−1 · ... · (X − sik)1 with deg(fi(X)) = k·(k+1)2 .
b) Party P1 sends the encryption of δ1 = f1 to party P2.
c) For each i = 2 to n each party Pi (i = 2, ..., n)
i. receives E(δi−1) from party Pi−1,
ii. calculates the encryption of δi = δi−1 ∗ fi,
iii. sends E(δi) to party Pi+1.
d) Party P1 distributes E(δn) with p1 = δn =
∏n
i=1 fi to parties P2, ..., Pn, where
deg(p1) = n · k·(k+1)2
2. Set Intersection
a) All parties P1, ..., Pn perform Steps 1 of the second approach for the minimum
of ranks composition scheme (see Figure 4.2.1) to calculate S′1 ∩ ... ∩ S′n using
polynomials f ′i(X) = (X − si1)n·k · (X − si2)n·k · ... · (X − sik)n·k as input
where deg(f ′i(X)) = n · k2
b) Party P1 distributes the result E(λn) with p2 = λn =
∑n
i=1 f
′
i ∗ (
∑c
j=0 qi+j,j)
to c + 1 randomly chosen parties Pj1 , ..., Pjc+1 , where deg(qi+j,j) = n · k2 and
deg(p2) = 2 · n · k2
3. Set Reduction (t=nk-1,...,n-1)
a) Each party Pjs , (s = 1, ..., c+ 1)
i. calculates the encryption of p3 = p1∗q′′s,1+p2∗q′′s,2 with random polynomials
q′′s,1, q
′′
s,2 of degree deg(p2) such that deg(p3) = 4 · n · k2,
ii. performs Step 2 of the second approach for the minimum of ranks compo-
sition scheme (see Figure 4.2.1) on the encryption of polynomial p3. The
result is a reduced polynomial p∗s.
4. Decryption
a) All parties perform a threshold decryption to obtain the polynomial Φ =∑c+1
s=1 p
∗
s =
∑t
l=0 p
(l)
3 ∗ Fl ∗ (
∑c+1
s=1 q
′
s,l) where deg(Φ) = 4 · n · k2 + t.
b) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) determines the result of the function
Rdt((S1 ∪ ... ∪ Sn) ∩ S′1 ∩ ... ∩ S′n) by checking for each sil ∈ Si (l = 1, ..., k)
whether it appears in the polynomial Φ, meaning that the equation (X − sil)|Φ
holds. If no match is found, proceed with Step 3) and a decreasing value of t.
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They show that in the presence of at most c colluding attackers, their multiset
operations (union, intersection, and element reduction) are privacy-preserving in
the semi-honest model and that these operations can be arbitrarily composed in a
privacy-preserving manner. As our protocol combines the union and the intersection
with several element reduction operations, it is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest
model in the presence of at most c attackers as well.
Complexity Analysis. Table 4.3.1 shows the performance analysis of the multiset-
based protocol for the sum of ranks composition scheme.
We start with the communication overhead. In Step 1b) party P1 sends the en-
cryption of δ1 with degree k(k+1)2 to party P2 which results in
k(k+1)
2 + 1 cipher-
texts. In Step 1c), each party Pi, i = 2, ..., n calculates the encryption of δi and
sends the result to the next party Pi+1. Note that the degree of the polynomials
sent increases by a value of k·(k+1)2 after each calculation of δi. Overall, we obtain∑n−1
i=1 ((i + 1) · k(k+1)2 + 1) ciphertexts that are transmitted. In Step 1d), party P1
distributes E(p1 = δn) to all other parties where the degree of polynomial p1 is
n · k·(k+1)2 . In Step 2a), n · c messages are sent, as each party sends its encrypted
polynomial f ′i to c parties. The degree of each of these polynomials is n · k2, so each
message contains n · k2 + 1 ciphertexts.
Furthermore, n additional messages are exchanged due to the circular structure of
the set intersection step. Each of these messages contains the encrypted coefficients
of a polynomial of degree 2n · k2. In Step 2b), party P1 distributes E(p2 = λn) to
c + 1 parties where the degree of polynomial p2 is 2n · k2. Each of these parties
calculates the reduction of the polynomial p3 where deg(p3) = 4nk2 and sends it to
all other parties resulting in (c+1) · (n−1) messages. The degree of the transmitted
polynomials p∗s is 4n · k2 + t.
This step will be repeated at most k times (t = nk − 1, ..., n− 1) (Step 3). Overall,
the worst-case communication complexity is O(n3 ·c·k3).
Next, we consider the computational overhead. In Step 1a)/1b), party P1 computes
the encryption of its polynomial. The degree of the polynomial is k·(k+1)2 . This
results in a total of k·(k+1)2 + 1 encryptions. In Step 1c), each party computes a part
of the set union. Each party Pi computes δi by receiving the encrypted polynomial
fi−1 and multiplying it with their own unencrypted polynomial fi. Overall, we
have n− 1 products of unencrypted and encrypted polynomials where the degree of
the polynomials differs for each party. Computing the products (see Section 2.5.2.3)
requires ×h and +h-operations. All operations can be calculated by the n−1 parties
in parallel.
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Step Comm. complex. Type Comp. complex.
1a)/1b) k·(k+1)2 + 1 EOC
k·(k+1)
2 + 1
1c)
∑n
i=2(i · k(k+1)2 + 1) ×h
∑n−1
l=1 (2.5) ∈ O(n3 · k4)
deg(f1) = k·(k+1)2 · l, deg(f2) = k·(k+1)2
+h
∑n−1
l=1 (2.4) ∈ O(n3 · k4)
deg(f1) = k·(k+1)2 · l, deg(f2) = k·(k+1)2
1d) (n− 1) · [n · k·(k+1)2 + 1] -
2a) n · c · [n · k2 + 1] EOC n · [n · k2 + 1]
n · [2 · n · k2 + 1] +hpa n · c · [2 · n · k2 + 1]
- ×hpa n · (c+ 1) · [ (n·k
2+1)·(n·k2+2)
2 ]
- +hpa n · (c+ 1) · [ (n·k
2)·(n·k2+1)
2 ]
+hpa (n− 1) · [2 · n · k2 + 1]
2b) (c+ 1) · [2 · n · k2] -
3)
∑nk−1
t=n−1(c+ 1) · (n−1) +h (c+ 1) · [4 · n · k2]
·[4 · n · k2 + t+ 1] ×h (c+ 1) · [(2.5) + (2.5)′] ∈ O(c · n2 · k4)
deg(f1) = nk(k+1)2 , deg(f2) = 2nk2
deg(f ′1) = 2nk2, deg(f ′2) = 2nk2
+h (c+ 1) · [(2.4) + (2.4)′] ∈ O(c · n2 · k4)
deg(f1) = nk(k+1)2 , deg(f2) = 2nk2
deg(f ′1) = 2nk2, deg(f ′2) = 2nk2
×h (c+ 1) · [(nk − 1) · 4 · n · k2 − (nk−2)·(nk−1)2 ]
+h
∑nk−1
t=n−1(c+ 1) · [t · 4 · n · k2 + t·(t+1)2 ]
×h
∑nk−1
t=n−1(c+ 1) · [
∑t
l=0(2.5)] ∈ O(n4 · c · k6)
deg(f1) = 4n · k2 − l, deg(f2) = 2 · l
+h
∑nk−1
t=n−1(c+ 1) · [
∑t
l=0(2.4)] ∈ O(n4 · c · k6)
deg(f1) = 4n · k2 − l, deg(f2) = 2 · l
4a) +h
∑nk−1
t=n−1 n · c · [4 · n · k2 + t+ 1]
DEC
∑nk−1
t=n−1 n · [4 · n · k2 + t+ 1]
4b) PE (nk − (n− 1)) · n · k
Overall O(n3 · c · k3) O(n4 · c · k6)
Overallp − O(n4 · k6 + n2 · k4 · c)
Table 4.3.1: Analysis of the protocol for the sum of ranks composition scheme. The
overall worst-case complexity corresponds to the executing of at most
nk − (n− 1) rounds (t = nk − 1, ..., n− 1).
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In Step 2a), each party computes the encryption of its polynomial f ′i . The degree
of each polynomial is n · k2. This results in a total of n · [n · k2 + 1] encryptions.
Furthermore, each party computes a part of the set intersection to calculate S′1 ∩
...∩S′n. Each sum requires in total (max{deg(f1), deg(f2)}+ 1) +h−operations (see
Section 2.5.2.3). Overall, with c+1 terms and n parties, we obtain n·c·[2nk2+1] +h-
operations. Next, the parties compute c+ 1 products of unencrypted and encrypted
polynomials. Computing the products (see Section 2.5.2.3) requires ×h and +h-
operations. Finally, parties P2, ..., Pn compute a sum of two encrypted polynomials
of degree 2nk2. All operations in Step 2a) can be calculated by the n parties in
parallel.
In Step 3a), c+1 parties calculate the encryption of the polynomial p3 where the
degree deg(p3) = 4nk2 since the degrees of the polynomials p1, p2, q′′s,1, q′′s,2 are given
by deg(p1) = nk(k+1)2 , deg(p2) = deg(q′′s,1) = deg(q′′s,2) = 2nk2. So, for the outer sum
we need 4nk2 +h-operations calculated by c+1 parties. Similar to Step 1c), the mul-
tiplication of encrypted and unencrypted polynomials needs ×h and +h-operations.
Next, the c + 1 parties compute the 1, ..., t-th derivatives of the polynomial p3 of
degree 4nk2 using ×h-operations. The polynomial p∗s is calculated by the outer sum
over t inner products of unencrypted and encrypted polynomials with the degrees of
the polynomials varying from 4nk2 to 4nk2 + t. Step 3 can be calculated in parallel
by the c+ 1 parties.
In Step 4a), the polynomial Φ is calculated by a sum over the c + 1 encrypted
polynomials p∗s with degree (4n ·k2 + t). In the worst-case, this operation is repeated
nk − (n − 1) times. Φ is then decrypted using the threshold decryption. Since
there are at most nk − (n − 1) rounds, these operations are also repeated at most
nk − (n− 1) times. Finally, the polynomial Φ is evaluated at k points. Overall, the
computation complexity is O(n4 · c · k6). With parallelism the overall computation
cost is O(n4 · k6 + n2 · k4 · c).
4.3.3 Third Approach
The idea of the third approach denoted as SR-opt proposed in this section is to
improve the second approach presented in Section 4.3.2 for the sum of ranks com-
position scheme by reducing the degree of the polynomials involved. Similarly to
the minimum of ranks protocol in Section 4.2.3, we obtain the following maximum
degree for the original protocol for MPROSSR:
deg (Rdn·k−1 (
⋃n
i=1 renc (Si) ∩
⋂n
i=1menc (n, Si))) = 4 · n · k2 + n · k − 1.
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4.3.3.1 Protocol Description
The subproblem relation presented in the Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 for the third
approach for MPROSMR does not hold for MPROSSR. However, we can reduce
the maximum polynomial size encountered in the second approach for MPROSSR.
We accomplish this by changing the sequence of set operations. Recall that, in
SR-sb the sequence of set operations was computed as given in Equation 4.2. Here,
the complete term inside the reduction operation can be computed at once. The only
iterative operation for each t is the element reduction. Note that in the reduction
step during which the solution is found, the maximum multiplicity of the set elements
is 1. Otherwise the protocol would have terminated in an earlier step. Furthermore,
note that the only purpose of the multiplicity encodings is to remove those elements
from the result, which are not contained in every input set while preserving the sum
of the ranks. Based on these observations, we can construct an optimized variant of
the protocol by computing:
Rdt
(
renc (S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc (Sn)
)
∩ (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn). (4.3)
The formal protocol description is given in Protocol 4.3.2. First, in Step 1 all parties
calculate the set union of their input multisets S1, . . . , Sn using the rank encoding
renc. This union encodes not only all the input elements that are held by the parties
but it also represents the sum of the preferences for each element across all parties.
In Step 2, all parties calculate the set intersection operation on the input sets. This
step is necessary in order to ensure that all elements which are not held by all parties
are eliminated from S1 ∪ ... ∪ Sn. All parties iteratively participate in the element
reduction by t (Step 3) with t = nk−1, ..., n−1 on the result of the union step. The
purpose of this step is to maximize the preference order.
Next (Step 4), we compute the intersection of the result with the common elements
obtained in Step 2. Finally, all parties participate in the threshold decryption of the
result and check whether at least one of its input elements is a root of the polynomial.
If this is the case, the common elements with the maximum sum of ranks were found.
If this is not the case, the parties repeat the reduction and intersection step with t
decreased by one.
Correctness. The correctness of the protocol is due to the fact that the left side of
the outermost intersection (Equation 4.3) will still return an empty set if no result
exists for t, or a set where each element appears at most once. Therefore, it is
sufficient to intersect this result of the element reduction with the set of elements
that appear in all input sets—using the simple encoding instead of the multiplicity
encoding (menc).
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Security & Privacy. According to Definition 4.1.0.1 we have to prove that in our
new protocol none of the parties learns more than what can be deduced from the
desired output and its sum of ranks value. Our protocol consists of several rounds
of compositions of set intersections, set unions, and set reductions. Each of these
operations as well as their composition is privacy-preserving according to Kissner et
al. [114].
I.e., in each round, the parties learn nothing but the result of the composition of
operations carried out. Note that this result is empty in all but the last round of
the protocol, in which the result is the desired output according to the sum of ranks
scheme. In each round, the reduction operation is carried out with a different value
of t decremented by one.
Thus, in addition to the round results, each party learns the number of rounds re-
quired to obtain the solution. In particular, in the first round the parties learn that
there is no solution with a sum of ranks of nk etc. This is equivalent to learning the
sum of ranks of the solution and according to Definition 4.1.0.1 this is part of the de-
sired output of a privacy-preserving reconciliation protocol.
Complexity. The asymptotic complexity for the third and the second approach is
the same. However, the constants in the complexity are smaller in the optimized
protocols since the maximum polynomial degree occurring during protocol execution
is decreased. Note that the term inside the element reduction and the right side of
the intersection does only need to be computed once (Equation 4.3). In each round,
the parties have to compute an element reduction and a set intersection. Although
we add an additional operation, the maximum polynomial degree involved in these
operations becomes smaller:
2 ·max
{
n · k(k + 1)2 + n · k − 1, 2 · k
}
= n · k2 + 3 · n · k − 1.
The maximum polynomial size in SR-sb is 4 · n · k2 + n · k − 1. Based on our tight
coupling of polynomial degrees to computation cost, this encoding leads to a protocol
with the same asymptotical complexity but lower constants. Thus, we obtain a more
efficient protocol for MPROSSR.
113
4 Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation in the Semi-Honest Model
Protocol 4.3.2: Third Approach for MPROSSR
Setting: There are n parties P1, ..., Pn with totally ordered input sets (Si, <i) chosen
from a common domain D. There are at most c < n colluding attackers. F0, ..., Ft are
fixed polynomials of degree 0, ..., k − 1 that do not have any elements of the overall
domain D as root. The keys for a (n, n) threshold version of an additively
homomorphic cryptosystem have been distributed and secure communication
channels between each pair of the n parties have been established.
1. Input Generation & Set Union
a) Each party Pi for i = 1, ..., n calculates the input polynomial
fi (x) =
∏
sij∈Si (x− sij)
rankSi (sij)
b) P1 sends an encryption φ1 of f1 to P2
c) For each i = 2...n, party Pi
i. Receives φi−1 from Pi−1 and computes φi = φi−1 ×h fi
ii. If i < n, sends φi to Pi+1, otherwise sends φn
with deg(φn) = n · k·(k+1)2 to P1, ..., Pn−1
2. Set Intersection
a) Each party Pi broadcasts the encryption λi of its input
using the Simple encoding gi (x) =
∏
di,j∈Si (x− sij)
b) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Chooses random polynomials ri,j of degree k
ii. Calculates and broadcasts γi =
∑˜n
j=0 (λj ×h ri,j),
which is of degree 2 · k
c) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) calculates pi =
∑˜n
l=1γi
3. Set Reduction (Initially t = n · k − 1)
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Calculates the 1...(n · k − 1)-th derivatives of encrypted polynomial
φ denoted by φ(1), ..., φ(t).
ii. Chooses t+ 1 random polynomials qi,0, ..., qi,t of degree 0, .., t
iii. Calculates the encrypted polynomial φ∗i =
∑˜t
l=0φ
(l) ×h Fl ×h qi,l
and broadcasts φ∗i
b) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) computes Φ =
∑˜n
j=1φ
∗
j
4. Set Intersection All parties jointly compute the set intersection on Φ and pi
and obtain the encrypted result µ
5. Decryption All parties jointly perform a threshold decryption of µ
6. Result Check Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) calculates the set of elements of Si
which are roots of µ: R = {d |d ∈ Si, (X − d)|µ}
a) If R = ∅ and t > 0, proceed with Step 3a)ii and t = t− 1
b) If R = ∅ and t = 0, the result of the protocol is (∅, 0)
c) Otherwise the result of the protocol is (R, t+ 1)
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Protocol Communication Computation
SR-rb O(c · n · kn) O(c · n · kn)
SR-sb O(c · n3 · k3) O(c · n4 · k6)
SR-opt O(c · n3 · k3) O(c · n4 · k6)
Table 4.3.2: Summary of protocol complexities for MPROSSR.
4.3.4 Summary
Table 4.3.2 summarizes the computational complexity and the communication over-
head in the number of ciphertexts for the newly-developed protocols for the sum of
ranks composition scheme. We give the overall complexity for all parties based on
a worst-case analysis in the semi-honest model.
The second and third approach are polynomial-time bound with respect to the
number of parties and input elements, whereas the first construction has exponen-
tial runtime with respect to the number of parties. Furthermore, the table shows
that for more than three parties the communication overhead of the second and
third approaches is smaller than the communication overhead of the first approach.
For more than six parties the computation overhead of the second and third ap-
proaches for the sum of ranks composition scheme is smaller than that of the first
construction.
The approaches SR-sb and SR-opt have the same asymptotic complexity but the
maximum degree of the polynomials in the SR-opt protocol is smaller than in the
SR-sb protocol. Thus, we expect a slightly faster runtime for SR-opt compared to
SR-sb.
4.4 Reconciliation Protocols with Arbitrary Pre-Ordered
Input Sets
In this section, we generalize the privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols for the
minimum of ranks (MR) and the sum of ranks (SR) composition scheme, i. e., relax
the input constraint from totally ordered input sets (see Definition 2.1.1.3) of equal
size to totally pre-ordered input sets (see Definition 2.1.1.2) of arbitrary size. Note
that the multi-party reconciliation protocols proposed above are based on totally
ordered input sets all of size k. Our generalization allows parties to order their
inputs less strictly and assign the same rank to some of their input elements. This
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makes our reconciliation protocols suitable for a broader range of applications. The
approach is based on the generalized multiset intersection operation proposed in
Section 3.1.1.
In the second and third approach for MPROSMR and MPROSSR, we represent the
ordered input sets as multisets. Generalizing the previously introduced reconciliation
protocols from totally ordered input sets of equal size k to totally pre-ordered input
sets of arbitrary size requires a private multiset intersection operation that allows
for the intersection of multisets of different sizes.
However, Kissner’s multiset intersection operation has only been proven to be cor-
rect and privacy-preserving for input multisets of the same size (see Section 2.5).
Instead of Kissner’s multiset intersection operation, we can use the generalized
multiset intersection operation described in Section 3.1.1. Lemma 3.1.1 enables
MPROS protocols on totally pre-ordered input sets of arbitrary size. The general
idea is to choose random polynomials of the maximum degree of the given (en-
crypted) input polynomials for each multiset intersection operation. In the follow-
ing, we discuss the necessary modifications to the protocols presented in Sections 4.2
and 4.3.
First Approach for MR and SR. Recall, that in the first round-based approaches
for MPROSMR and MPROSSR (see Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1) the set intersection
protocol is used repetitively in multiple rounds on one-element subsets of the to-
tally ordered input sets. If we allow each party to choose an arbitrary totally pre-
ordered input set, then the size of the subsets can vary in each round. In the
following, each party represents its subset in each round as a multiset and con-
structs the corresponding polynomial using the encoding techniques described in
Section 2.5.2.1.
In order to enable reconciliation on arbitrary totally pre-ordered input sets, we need
a multiset intersection operation that is correct and privacy-preserving for input
multisets of different sizes such as the generalized multiset intersection operation,
see Definition 3.1.1.1 in Section 3.1.1. Thus, we replace the set intersection pro-
tocol used in each round by our generalized multiset intersection operation in the
first approaches for MPROSMR and MPROSSR. In order to compute the multiset
intersection operation correctly, in each round r, all parties have to negotiate the
maximum size polyr,max of their input polynomials such that each party can choose
appropriate random polynomials of the maximum degree polyr,max of the input poly-
nomials for the multiset intersection operation. If a party has no input in a round
r, then the party chooses a one-element multiset in round r with a set element that
is not part of the common domain D as its input.
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Third Approach for MR. Recall, that in the third approach for MPROSMR (see
Section 4.2.3) the multiset intersection operation is used repetitively in multiple
rounds on multisets where in each round the size of the multisets is increased
by one. If we allow each party to choose an arbitrary totally pre-ordered input
set, then the size of the multisets can arbitrarily vary in each round for all par-
ties.
Similar to the first approach, we replace Kissner’s multiset intersection operation
used in each round by our generalized multiset intersection operation in the third
approach for MPROSMR. Again, in each round r, all parties have to negotiate
the maximum size polyr,max of their input polynomials. If a party has no input in a
round r, than the party adds one set element that is not part of the common domain
D to the multiset.
Second Approach for MR and SR, Third Approach for SR. In the second ap-
proach for MPROSMR and MPROSSR (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2) and the third
approach for MPROSSR (see Section 4.3.3), the multiset intersection operation is
not used repetitively in multiple rounds where the size of the multiset changes in each
round. However, if we allow each party to choose an arbitrary totally pre-ordered in-
put set, then the sizes of the initial input multisets each party holds can differ. In the
following, we describe two approaches to solve this challenge.
We can change the protocol constructions in the following way to cope with arbitrary
totally pre-ordered input sets. In all three protocols, we replace Kissner’s multiset
intersection operation by our generalized multiset intersection operation described in
Section 3.1.1. Again, this requires the parties to reveal the size of their encoded input
sets to each other. All parties have to negotiate the maximum size polymax of their
input polynomials beforehand. Then, the protocol proceeds as before but each party
chooses appropriate random polynomials of the maximum degree polymax of the in-
put polynomials for the multiset intersection operation.
One way to prevent this extra step is to fix the maximum degree of the input
polynomials beforehand. This is a good solution for MR-sb and for both approaches
for sum of ranks.
Similar to the first approach, the third approach for minimum of ranks iteratively
applies the set intersection operation. Fixing the maximum degree of the input
polynomials is not a good solution in rounds where the input sets are small. Thus
considering efficiency, we are better off with the negotiation of the maximum degree
of the input polynomials in each round.
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If Size Matters. As shown before, all protocols can be adapted to cope with ar-
bitrary totally pre-ordered input sets. However, each party learns the maximum
degree polymax and all degrees of the other parties’ input polynomials. In applica-
tions in which the disclosure of the size of the input sets is considered to be sensitive,
further adjustments to the protocols with size hiding techniques (e. g., as described
in [4]) are required.
A way to solve this new privacy challenge is that each party fills up their input poly-
nomials to the maximum degree polymax respectively to polyr,max in each round r
with random dummy elements chosen from a common dummy domain Ddummy. The
common domains D and Ddummy are disjoint sets. As a consequence of the padding,
each party holds an input polynomial of the same degree polymax respectively
polyr,max in each round r. Thus, we can use the multiset intersection operation for
two input polynomials of the same degree as described in Section 2.5.2. However, the
protocols are less efficient since the input polynomials are padded to the maximum
degree polymax respectively polyr,max in each round r.
4.4.1 Summary
In general, it is possible to modify the existing approaches for reconciliation of
totally ordered sets to cope with arbitrary totally pre-ordered input sets. The most
interesting insight is that allowing different input sizes introduces a new privacy
challenge because the size of the input sets can be different. The disclosure of the
set sizes may be sensitive in certain applications. Thus, size hiding techniques are
necessary to preserve the privacy of the input sets each party holds which results in
less efficient protocols.
4.5 Reconciliation Protocols using a Fully Homomorphic
Cryptosystem
In the previous Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we have constructed efficient protocols for
MPROSMR and MPROSSR using a threshold version of an additively homomorphic
cryptosystem. Recently, the first fully homomorphic cryptosystem was proposed by
Gentry [75] and also a threshold version by Myers et al. [139]. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.4, fully homomorphic encryption schemes are still under active research and
little is known about their practical efficiency. Nevertheless, in this section, we inves-
tigate whether we can construct more efficient MPROS protocols using a threshold
version of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
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We design a circuit transformation for the minimum of ranks and the sum of ranks
composition schemes, i.e., we propose algorithms and protocols which make use of
fully homomorphic encryption in order to achieve privacy-preserving multi-party
reconciliation on ordered sets. Assuming the existence of a sufficiently efficient fully
homomorphic encryption scheme, the protocols using FHE perform better than the
approaches based on AHE presented in Section 4.2 and 4.3 in terms of communica-
tion overhead and number of homomorphic operations.
4.5.1 General Approach
We assume that D ⊆ {0, 1}` \ {0`}, so all parties agree on an `-bit binary encoding
of the possible inputs such that 0` is not a valid input encoding. Let χi denote an
extended rank function rankSi which assigns the rank 0 to all elements which are
not included in the input of party Pi at all:
χi : {0, 1}` → {0, ..., k}, x 7→
{
rankSi(x) x ∈ Si
0 x 6∈ Si
If k := |S1| = ... = |Sn| ≤ |D| < 2` is the number of inputs, we can assume that
every χi maps to {0, 1}K instead of {0, ..., k} where K = dlog2(k + 1)e. In practice,
the rank function χi of a party Pi could for example be described by an ordered
list of |D| bit-strings each of length K, i.e., a complete truth table of all K output
components. Let X1, ..., Xn be encryptions of the extended rank functions such that
we have Xi : {0, 1}` → CK with D(Xi(x)) = χi(x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}`. For an input
x ∈ {0, 1}`, the value Xi(x) ∈ CK is an encryption of the rank of x in the input of
Pi.
Example Let D = {a, b, c, d, e, f} be the possible inputs and S1 = {a, b, e} the
input of P1 with ranking a <S1 e <S1 b. We need at least ` = 3 bits to encode
the possible inputs, for example a = 001, b = 010, c = 011, d = 100, e = 101,
and f = 110. Assume that the parties agreed to use k = 3 input elements in their
inputs, we therefore need K = dlog2(3 + 1)e = 2 bits to encode each possible rank
(including 0). The extended rank function of P1 and the encryption X1(x) are given
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as follows:
Input x ∈ D ⊆ {0, 1}` χ1(x) ∈ {0, 1}K X1(x) ∈ CK
000 (invalid) − −
001 (a) 01 (1) E(01)
010 (b) 11 (3) E(11)
011 (c) 00 (-) E(00)
100 (d) 00 (-) E(00)
101 (e) 10 (2) E(10)
110 (f) 00 (-) E(00)
The ordered list of |D| = 6 ciphertext K-tuples of the third column of this table is
what P1 sends to the other participants.
4.5.1.1 Protocol Description, MPROSMR
First, we look at the case of minimum of ranks because this can be modeled as
a multiset intersection similar to the second approach for MPROSMR described in
Section 4.2.2. We will use the basic algorithms and notations from Section 2.2.4.
The detailed steps are given in Algorithm 4.5.1.
In Step 2, party Pi computes the value of minimum of ranks for all elements. Since
S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn ⊆ Si, the set Si is an upper bound for the intersection and party Pi
never needs to process more than k = |Si| elements. For each element, the minimum
of ranks is computed and the result together with its encrypted rank is added to
the set S. In Step 4, we iterate over all the elements from Step 2 and compute the
maximum by comparing with the largest element known at this point. In Step 5,
we iterate again over all elements (of length `) and multiply them with the result of
Equal, thus effectively canceling out all elements which have rank other than maxy.
Elements which are not shared by all parties are implicitly canceled because they
all have rank 0.
The output is the encrypted maximum rank maxy and a set R of encrypted elements
which either have maximum rank maxy or decrypt to 0`. If there exists no maximum
rank (because the inputs are disjoint), maxy will decrypt to 0 and all elements in R
will decrypt to 0`.
Computational complexity. In the following, we use the notation TAB (`) to denote
the number of times algorithm A calls algorithm B on inputs of bit-length `, In Step 2,
we loop |Si| = k times and call Min each time on n inputs of length K. In Step 4, we
call Max on inputs of length K and in Step 5, we call Equal on inputs of length K.
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Algorithm 4.5.1: FHE Algorithm for the Computation of Minimum of Ranks
Input: Encrypted X1, ..., Xn as described before and one Si in plaintext.
• Computation
1. Set S := ∅ and R := ∅.
2. ∀x ∈ Si, compute y = Min(X1(x), ..., Xn(x)) and add (x, y) to S.
3. Set maxy = E(0) ∈ CK .
4. For each (x, y) ∈ S, compute maxy = Max(y,maxy).
5. For each (x, y) ∈ S, compute x′ = E(x)  Equal(y,maxy) and add it to
the set R.
Output: The tuple (maxy, R) where maxy is the encrypted maximum rank and R
is a set of encrypted elements with maximum rank maxy.
The result is multiplied with ` bits. This gives a total of
=k︷︸︸︷
|Si| ·TnMin(K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Step 2
+
=k︷︸︸︷
|S| · TMax(K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Step 4
+
=k︷︸︸︷
|S| ·` · TEqual(K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Step 5
∈ k · (O(nK) +O(K) +O(`K)) ⊆ O(nk log(k)`)
homomorphic operations. As already mentioned in the example above, we use
K · |D| ciphertexts to encode every Xi. Note that Step 5 can easily be mod-
ified to only return one maximum element instead of all of them, which would
reduce the complexity to O(nk`). Also, we could omit the output of the rank
maxy, which would increase privacy in cases where rank maxy is considered pri-
vate.
4.5.1.2 Protocol Description, MPROSSR
We now have a look at the sum of ranks composition scheme. Similar to the second
approach for MPROSSR described in Section 4.3.2, the basic idea is to compute a
multiset union but omit all the elements which are not in the intersection. This is
achieved by adding the ranks using the Add algorithm in combination with negated
Equal calls to filter out elements which are not shared by all parties. The basic idea
is the same as in case of minimum of ranks, with some modifications to Step 2. Here
we compute the value of sum of ranks instead of minimum of ranks. We use Add to
compute the sum of ranks. Next, we check if any of the terms used in this sum was
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Algorithm 4.5.2: FHE Algorithm for the Computation of Sum of Ranks
Input: Encrypted X1, ..., Xn as described before and one Si in plaintext.
• Computation
1. Set S := ∅ and R := ∅.
2. For every x ∈ Si, compute
y = Add(X1(x), ..., Xn(x)) ∈ CK+dlog2(n)e
y′ = y  (ni=1Not(Equal(Xi(x),E(0))))
and add (x, y′) to the set S.
3. Set maxy = E(0) ∈ CK+dlog2(n)e.
4. For each (x, y) ∈ S, compute maxy = Max(y,maxy).
5. For each (x, y) ∈ S, compute x′ = E(x)  Equal(y,maxy) and add it to
the set R.
Output: The tuple (maxy, R) where maxy is the encrypted maximum rank and R
is a set of encrypted elements with maximum rank maxy.
zero. If so, the result will be multiplied by zero thus eliminating this entry from the
set of possible maximal elements. The output is the encrypted maximum rank maxy
and a set R of encrypted elements which either have maximum rank maxy or decrypt
to 0`. Algorithm 4.5.2 lists the necessary steps in details.
Computational complexity. In Step 2, we use Add to compute the sum of n cipher-
texts, each having length K. The result has length K+dlog2(n)e. Next, we compute
Equal on inputs of length K and negate the result. This is done n times and the prod-
uct of those n bits is then multiplied with every bit of y. In Step 4, we compute Max
on inputs of length K+dlog2(n)e. Summing up, we have
k · (TnAdd(K) + n · (TEqual(K) + TNot(1)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Step 2
+ k · TMax(K + dlog2(n)e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Step 4
+ k · ` · TEqual(K + dlog2(n)e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Step 5
∈ k · (O(n(log(n) +K)) + nO(K) + ` ·O(K + log(n)))
⊆ O(n log(n)k log(k)`)
homomorphic operations.
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Like before, we can reduce the complexity to O(n log(n)k`) by only computing one
maximum element instead of all. Also, we do not have to returnmaxy.
4.5.1.3 Reducing the Encoding Size
Our algorithms for minimum of ranks and sum of ranks have runtime (almost)
linear in the number of parties n but use dlog2(k + 1)e · |D| ciphertexts to encode a
k-element input where D is the input domain with |D| < 2`. In certain situations,
very large input domains D might be required and the resulting large number of
ciphertexts may not be acceptable due to the communication overhead or bandwidth
limitations.
The factor |D| originates from the idea of using complete truth tables for representing
the rank functions χi : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}K . We now give a smaller representation to
allow our algorithm to use smaller encodings and therefore fewer ciphertexts. The
price for this is a slightly higher computational complexity in terms of homomorphic
operations. Let
Xi := {(rankSi(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈{1,...,k}
,E(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C`
) | x ∈ Si},
so for each set element, we save an encryption of the set element itself together with
its (unencrypted) rank.
We will be able to reuse both variants of our algorithm (Sum of ranks and minimum
of ranks), the only thing we change is the way Xi(x), the encrypted rank of the
element x in the input of party Pi, is computed. Before, this was a lookup from a
table we have received from party Pi, therefore, this can be done in constant time.
We obtain the same value by computing
Xi(x)← 
(r,c)∈Xi
E(r)︸︷︷︸
∈CK
Equal(c,E(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C1
 .
This basically just compares x to all inputs in Xi. If one of the inputs in Xi
encrypts x, the rank of x is returned. This is correct since exactly one of the terms
in this sum will encrypt a non-zero value.
Computational complexity. Computing Xi(x) this way takes |Xi| = k calls to
Equal on inputs of length `. The result will be multiplied by E(r) which has length
K := dlog2(k + 1)e. We then use k − 1 calls to  (in each component) for adding
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the results. In total, we get:
T(`) = k · TEqual (`) + (k − 1) ·K ∈ O(k`)
T(`) = k · (TEqual (`) +K) ∈ O(k`)
TE(`) = k · (K + `) ∈ O(k`)
Having a look at the modified Step 2 again, we see that we need to compute Xi(x)
for every x ∈ Si and every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In total, we use nk computations of the
above kind, resulting in O(nk2`) additional homomorphic operations which will
lead to a complexity of O(nk2`) for minimum of ranks and O(n log(n)k2`) for sum
of ranks.
Summarizing, by increasing the asymptotic number of homomorphic operations by
a factor of k we can change the number of ciphertexts we need for encoding an input
from |D| · dlog2(k + 1)e to log2(|D|) · k. Which method is preferable will depend on
the application parameters. For large values of k but small values of `, we might
still be better off with the truth table approach. If we have a large input domain D
and thus a large parameter l, we obtain a more efficient solution with the reduced
encoding approach presented in this section.
4.5.2 Putting it all together: Protocol Design
Recall that our algorithms take encrypted encodings of the parties’ sets as inputs and
return an encryption of an element which is maximum with respect to the preference
order composition scheme minimum of ranks (sum of ranks). Next, we show how
to use those algorithms in a secure and privacy-preserving way in order to solve the
reconciliation problem.
We assume a fully homomorphic encryption scheme (G,E,D,,) with plain-
text space M = F2 which is semantically secure. Our protocol assumes that we
have a threshold fully homomorphic encryption scheme such that the keys are pre-
distributed and the decryption algorithm D have to be jointly performed by all
parties together. In addition, no single party or collaboration of less than n parties
can decrypt any ciphertext on its own but everyone can compute E,  and . The
authors of [139] published such a threshold version of Gentry’s fully homomorphic
encryption scheme [76].
Protocol 4.5.1 lists the reconciliation protocol using threshold FHE. If a semantically
secure homomorphic encryption scheme is used and no party can decrypt any cipher-
texts on its own, no information about the private inputs will leak except what can be
deduced from the maximum elements and their rank.
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Protocol 4.5.1: Multi-party Reconciliation Protocol using Threshold FHE
Setting: All parties agree on the preference order composition scheme, on the num-
ber of inputs k in each party’s set, and on an `-bit binary encoding of the
possible input elements such that 0` is not a valid encoding. Each party Pi
holds a key share ski and knows the public key pk of a threshold fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme.
1. Every party Pi generates an encrypted encoding Xi of its input and sends it
to the other n− 1 parties.
2. Every party runs the previously agreed algorithm for minimum of ranks (Al-
gorithm 4.5.1) or sum of ranks (Algorithm 4.5.2).
3. All parties participate in a threshold decryption of all outputs.
Algorithm Communication Computation
IMR O(λ · log(k) · 2l) O(λ · n · k · log(k) · `)
IIMR O(λ · k · l) O(λ · n · k2 · `)
ISR O(λ · log(k) · 2`) O(λ · n · log(n) · k · log(k) · `)
IISR O(λ · k · `) O(λ · n · log(n) · k2 · `)
Table 4.5.1: Summary of algorithm complexities using FHE.
4.5.3 Efficiency Analysis
We now compare our results using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) with the
approaches based on additively homomorphic encryption (AHE) presented in Sec-
tion 4.2 and 4.3. We are counting the total number of operations, i.e., the sum of the
number of operations each single party has to perform. We assume the parties al-
ready agreed on a fully homomorphic encryption scheme and its security parameter
λ [76]. The security parameter λ is similar to the chosen bit size b of an additively
homomorphic cryptosystem, compare Section 2.2.3.1. Table 4.5.1 summarizes the
complexity results of our algorithms. Algorithm I denotes Algorithm 4.5.1 in case
of minimum of ranks and Algorithm 4.5.2 in case of sum of ranks. Algorithm II
denotes Algorithm I with the reduced encoding size presented in Section 4.5.1.3.
Recall that n is the number of parties, k is the number of inputs in each party’s set,
` is the bit-length of the input elements.
Beginning with Step 1, each party has to encrypt its own input. Each input consists
of k input elements and each input element has bit-length `. As Table 4.5.1 shows,
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with Algorithm I each party has to encrypt at most dlog2(k + 1)e· |D| bits and sends
those bits to all other parties. Using Algorithm II, each party encrypts k · ` bits.
In Step 2, every party runs the selected algorithm on the inputs it received from
the other n− 1 parties. This step requires no communication or further encryption
operations.
Table 4.5.2 shows the number of operations which have to be performed in the
different protocols as well as the number of messages which are exchanged. The
analysis shows total numbers for all parties combined rather than for each single
party. Recall that the new parameter ` in our results stands for the length of the
input encodings (so 2` is the size of the input domain). In the approaches based
on AHE, the size of the input domain is tightly coupled to the bit size b of the
cryptosystem whereas with our solution, ` is chosen by the user and the protocol
will run faster if only small input domains are required.
Note that interpretation of those numbers themselves is complicated without men-
tioning the specific cryptosystems which are used. The number of messages are
counted as number of ciphertexts. This is not the same as the actual amount of
data which has to be transmitted, as this relies on the bit-length of the ciphertexts
and will depend on the security parameter λ in a fully homomorphic cryptosystem.
Also, the number of calls to ,, or   does not reflect the actual computational
complexity because we cannot precisely state how expensive each of those calls
is.
We could try to be more precise by comparing an instantiation of our scheme using
the Gentry scheme [76] with an AHE-based MPROS protocols using the Paillier
scheme [161]. However, since Gentry’s scheme is still under active research and
little is known about it’s practical efficiency, we think that such a comparison would
not yield reliable insights. But, we are confident that given a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme with comparable efficiency to current homomorphic encryption
schemes, our protocols will be much faster than AHE-based reconciliation protocols.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed three different AHE-based approaches for privacy-
preserving multi-party reconciliation protocols for MPROSMR and MPROSSR in
the semi-honest model. Interestingly, all three approaches have their application
scenario depending on the number of parties n and the number of inputs k. In
Section 4.4, we have shown that it is possible to generalize reconciliation protocols
to arbitrary totally pre-ordered input sets. The disclosure of the set sizes can be
a challenge in certain application scenarios. This privacy challenge can be solved
by using dummy elements and pad the input polynomials to a certain size. We
will also use this techniques in different application scenarios presented in Chap-
ter 6.
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Protocol Communication Computation
MR-rb O(b · c · n · kn) O(b2.585 · c · n · kn)
MR-sb O(b · c · n · k3) O(b2.585 · (c · k6 + n · c · k4))
MR-opt O(b · c · n · k2) O(b2.585 · c · n · k3)
FHE with IMR O(λ · n2 · log(k) · 2`) O(λ · n2 · k · log(k) · `)
FHE with IIMR O(λ · n2 · k · `) O(λ · n2 · k2 · `)
SR-rb O(b · c · n · kn) O(b2.585 · c · n · kn)
SR-sb O(b · c · n3 · k3) O(b2.585 · (c · n4 · k6))
SR-opt O(b · c · n3 · k3) O(b2.585 · (c · n4 · k6))
FHE with ISR O(λ · n2 · log(k) · 2`) O(λ · n2 · log(n) · k · log(k) · `)
FHE with IISR O(λ · n2 · k · `) O(λ · n2 · log(n) · k2 · `)
Table 4.5.2: Complexities for MPROSMR and MPROSSR using FHE and AHE.
In Section 4.5, we presented reconciliation protocols of ordered sets based on fully ho-
momorphic encryption. The results show that we will obtain faster protocols for both
composition schemes if an efficient fully homomorphic encryption scheme exists. Up
to now, there is still a lot of ongoing research in that area and, most importantly, it is
not clear how secure the proposed schemes are. This is due to the fact that the math-
ematical problems on which all FHE schemes are based are less well-studied than,
e. g., the factorization or the discrete logarithm problem.
In the next chapter, we discuss solutions for MPROSMR and MPROSSR which are
secure against active attackers, i. e., privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols se-
cure in the malicious model. We have also implemented and evaluated all our solu-
tions for MPROSMR and MPROSSR in the semi-honest model. We present our im-
plementation in Section 7 and our evaluation in Section 8.
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5 Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving
Reconciliation Protocols Secure in the
Malicious Model
In the previous chapter, we proposed MPROS protocols which are secure in the semi-
honest model, i. e., are secure against passive attackers. However, active attackers
can extract private information or manipulate the result of the protocol by deviating
from the prescribed actions. Protocols which inhibit such a behavior by an active
attacker are secure in the malicious model, see Section 2.4.4.2. In this chapter, we
propose protocol variants for MPROSMR and MPROSSR which are secure against
active attackers and use our newly-developed zero-knowledge proofs presented in
the Sections 3.2 and 3.3 to achieve malicious model security. Section 5.1 describes
the concrete ZKPK protocols used in our protocols. As a main contribution of
this chapter, we discuss the protocol variants for MPROSMR in Section 5.2 and for
MPROSSR in Section 5.3.
We focus on the second (MR-sb, SR-sb) and third (MR-opt, SR-opt) set-based ap-
proaches for MPROSMR and MPROSSR. As a shorthand for the malicious variants,
we use MR-sbMM for the second approach for minimum of ranks, SR-sbMM for the
second approach for sum of ranks, MR-optMM for the third approach for mini-
mum of ranks, and SR-optMM for the third approach for sum of ranks. The first
round-based approach has, even in the semi-honest model, exponential runtime with
respect to the number of parties n and is therefore not a promising starting point
for the malicious model. In the following, we describe our contributions in greater
detail.
In Section 5.1, we discuss the challenges of achieving security in the malicious model
by presenting the ways a malicious attacker might deviate from the protocol and
what advantages the attacker can take from those attacks. Furthermore, we de-
fine the protocol setting in the malicious model and compare it with the setting
in the semi-honest model defined in Section 4.1. Last, we give a complete list
of all ZKPK protocols used in our malicious model variants for MPROSMR and
MPROSSR. We explain the ZKPK protocols which are based on the zero-knowledge
proof constructions presented in the Sections 2.3.4.3, 2.3.4.4 , 3.2, and 3.3 which en-
able verifiable multiset constructions, verifiable multiset operations, and verifiable
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decryption.
In Section 5.2, we construct new protocol variants for the minimum of ranks compo-
sition scheme that use zero-knowledge proofs to inhibit deviation from the protocol
and thus make the protocols secure in the malicious model. We present two pro-
tocol variants one based on the second and one based on the third approach for
minimum of ranks in the semi-honest model (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). The
first protocol drafts were constructed in discussion with L. Brutschy and later for-
malized in his master thesis [24]. Compared to [24], we present a revised version
of the formal protocol description of MR-sb. The author of [24] only provided the
formal protocol including a complexity analysis of MR-opt. The author also only
provided a sketch of the simulation proof. Here, we propose the formal protocol of
MR-opt with a detailed description of the protocol and the ZKPK protocols used,
and an analysis of the correctness, security, and complexity of our construction. This
includes the formal simulation proof for the new protocol. Our complexity analy-
sis discusses both the communication and the computation overhead of our new
protocols and our analysis shows that they are privacy-preserving in the malicious
model.
In Section 5.3, we present new protocol variants for the sum of ranks composition
schemes which are secure in the malicious model. We present two protocol variants
for SR-sb and SR-opt in the semi-honest model (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). The
first protocol drafts were jointly designed with L. Brutschy. The author of [24] only
provided the formal protocol including a complexity analysis of the second approach
for MPROSSR in his master thesis [24]. The third approach for MPROSSR was
not discussed in [24]. Here, we propose the formal protocol of the second and
third approach for MPROSSR with a detailed description of the protocol and the
ZKPK protocols used, and an analysis of the correctness, security, and complexity of
our construction. This includes the formal simulation proof for the new protocols.
Our complexity analysis discusses both the communication and the computation
overhead of our new protocols and show that they are privacy-preserving in the
malicious model.
In part, the work presented in this chapter has also been published in [144, 145].
Outline: In Section 5.1, we discuss the challenges to solve in the malicious model,
describe the setting of our protocols, and the used ZKPK protocols. In Section 5.2
and 5.3, we propose two protocol variants for the minimum of ranks respectively the
sum of ranks composition scheme.
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5.1 Security in the Malicious Model
In this section, we briefly describe the challenges encountered in the construction of
reconciliation protocols which are secure in the malicious model. First, we specify
the different operations each party computes during a protocol execution. We then
discuss the possibilities of a malicious attacker by characterizing four exemplary
attacks on an MPROS protocol run. Second, we describe the protocol setting in the
malicious model. We especially discuss the changes compared to the semi-honest
model. Finally, we present the different zero-knowledge-proofs used in our malicious
model protocols.
5.1.1 Challenges
In the second and third approach for MPROSMR and MPROSSR, each party per-
forms the following computations that are sent to the other parties:
1. Transform one’s ordered inputs into a polynomial and broadcast an encryption
of the polynomial.
2. Compute the encrypted sum of the products of encrypted polynomials and
private random polynomials and broadcast the result. This is needed for the
multiset element reduction and the multiset intersection operation.
3. Compute the encrypted product of an encrypted polynomial with its private
input polynomial and broadcast the result. This is needed for the multiset
union operation.
4. Generate a partial decryption of an encrypted polynomial.
In our protocols, we guarantee that all these operations are correctly computed and
sent to the other parties. In the following, we describe several examples of possible
attacks by malicious adversaries.
A malicious party can, e. g., replace the result of each of these operations with any
other value of the same length without being detected. A malicious attacker can
replace the encrypted input polynomial by a polynomial not representing a valid
input set. For example, an encrypted polynomial representing a multiset that is not
a valid rank encoding.
More concretely, in the second approach for MPROSMR with k = 3 input elements
and a private input {a > b > c}, a malicious party can replace the correct polynomial
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in the first step E
(
(x− a)3 (x− b)2 (x− c)
)
with E
(
(x− a)6
)
. This violates the
correctness of the protocol as the outcome of the protocol is modified in favor of
the active attacker. The malicious party’s most preferred choice a will always be
the output of the reconciliation, if it is contained in the intersection of all input
sets. Otherwise, no result except a can be found since the attackers input set only
contains the set element a.
There are many possibilities how an active attacker can manipulate an MPROS
protocol run. In the following, we present our protocol setting in the malicious
model and discuss the core techniques that inhibit malicious behavior in an MPROS
protocol run.
5.1.2 Protocol Setting
As before, there are n parties P1, ..., Pn of which at most c = n − 1 collude as
attackers. Each party Pi holds a totally ordered input set Si = {si1 > ... > sik} of
size k. Each party Pi is assigned a random number pidPi used in the generation of
the zero-knowledge proofs. We assume that all parties share the keys for a threshold
version of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. Thus, neither the prover nor
the verifier can decrypt values on its own in a ZKPK protocol. All parties have
also agreed on which hash function is used to compute challenges used in the ZKPK
protocols.
We solve the MPROS problem (see Definition 4.1.0.1 in Section 4.1) for a fixed value
c = n − 1. In the problem definition, we had a variable parameter c denoting the
number of colluding attackers in a protocol run. It is possible to construct MPROS
protocols secure in the malicious model with a variable parameter c based on the
constructions in the semi-honest model.
We constructed protocols for c = n − 1 due to the following reason. Our malicious
model protocols do not use a circular structure where intermediate results are only
sent to the next c parties in the circular structure. Instead, in our protocols each
party Pi broadcasts all relevant values to all other parties. Due to the fixed parameter
c, we have simpler zero-knowledge-proof constructions and proof verifications. This
also leads to a simpler presentation of the formal protocols for MPROSMR and
MPROSSR.
The zero-knowledge-proof protocols are based on Σ-Protocols that have been con-
verted into non-interactive protocols using the strong Fiat-Shamir heuristic (see
Section 2.4.3.2). In our protocols, we use non-interactive ZKPK protocols to in-
hibit malicious behavior in the following way: All encryptions of the chosen ran-
dom polynomials, the private input sets, and all intermediate computation re-
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ΠCONSTRUCT,i = ZKPK
 fisi1, ..., sik
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
fi =
∏k
j=1
∏k
p=j (x− sij)
∧ ∧kj=1 δij = E (sij)
∧ φi = E(fi)

ΠSHUFFLE,i = ZKPK
si1, .., sik
∣∣∣∣∣∣{si1, .., sik} ⊆ D ∧
k∧
j=1
δij = E (sij)

ΠINTERSECT,i = ZKPK
{
ri1, ..., rin, Rd
∣∣∣∣∣ γi =
[∑˜n
j=0 (φj ×h rij)
]
Rd∧ ∧nl=0 ρij = E(rij)
}
ΠUNION,i = ZKPK
{
fi, Rd
∣∣∣∣ φ′i = [φ′i−1 ×h fi]Rd∧ φi = E (fi)
}
ΠREDUCE,i,t = ZKPK
{
qi0, ..., qit, R
∣∣∣∣∣ pi∗i =
[∑˜t
l=0pi
(l) ×h Fl ×h qil
]
Rd
∧ ∧tl=0 ϑil = E (qil)
}
ΠDECRYPT,i = ZKPK
{
ski
∣∣∣c2i = (c4∆)ski ∧ vki = (v∆)ski }
Table 5.1.1: The ZKPK used in our malicious model protocols.
sults are broadcast to all other parties together with zero-knowledge-proofs proving
the correctness of the computations involving those private values. The security
of the protocol is given in the random oracle model (see Section 2.4.3.2) by a
simulation proof using the simulation paradigm in the malicious model, see Sec-
tion 2.4.4.2.
5.1.3 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Protocols
Our malicious model protocols for minimum of ranks and sum of ranks use several
types of proofs, all of which are listed in Table 5.1.1. In the following, we briefly
explain the proofs:
• ΠCONSTRUCT,i: In this ZKPK protocol, party Pi proves that its input poly-
nomial fi is correctly constructed using an input multiset Si containing the
set elements si1, ..., sik. Therefore, party Pi proves that fi is the product of
the set elements in Si using the Rank encoding (see Table 2.5.1). In addition,
party Pi constructs k plaintext knowledge proofs to prove the knowledge of the
plaintext of the values δij . The values δij are encryptions of the set elements
si1, ..., sik of party Pi. Finally, party Pi proves that φi is an encryption of the
correctly constructed polynomial fi. The newly-developed proof for correct
polynomial construction ΠCONSTRUCT,i is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2.
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• ΠSHUFFLE,i: Here, party Pi proves that its chosen set elements si1, ..., sik of
Si are drawn from the common domain D. Second, party Pi constructs k
plaintext knowledge proofs to prove the plaintext knowledge of the values δij
which correspond to encryptions of the set elements si1, ..., sik. The proof for
a correct subset relation ΠSHUFFLE,i is based on prior work and discussed in
Section 2.3.4.3.
• ΠINTERSECT,i: In this ZKPK protocol, party Pi proves the correct computation
of the multiset intersection of n known encrypted polynomials φ1, ..., φn with
n random unencrypted polynomials ri1, ..., rin using a randomization value
Rd. Party Pi also proves the plaintext knowledge of the n encrypted values
ρij . The proof for correct multiset intersection ΠINTERSECT,i is based on the
newly-developed ZKPK protocols for verifiable set operations presented in
Section 3.3.
• ΠUNION,i: Here, party Pi proves the correct computation of the multiset union
of a known encrypted polynomial φ′i−1 with an unencrypted polynomial fi
using a randomization value Rd. Also, party Pi proves the plaintext knowledge
of the encrypted value φi. The proof for correct multiset union ΠUNION,i is
also based on the ZKPK protocols presented in Section 3.3.
• ΠREDUCE,i,t: In this ZKPK protocol, party Pi proves the correct computation
of the multiset reduction of the (t+1) known encrypted derivatives pi(0), ..., pi(t)
and fixed unencrypted random polynomials F0, ..., Ft (see Section 2.5.2) with
(t + 1) unencrypted randomly chosen polynomials qi0, ..., qit using a random-
ization value Rd. Party Pi also proves the plaintext knowledge of the en-
crypted random polynomials ϑi0, ..., ϑit. The proof for correct multiset reduc-
tion ΠREDUCE,i,t is also based on the ZKPK protocols presented in Section 3.3.
• ΠDECRYPT,i: Here, party Pi proves the correct partial decryption ci of a known
ciphertext c and public parameters v,∆ using its private key share ski. The
proof for a verifiable threshold decryption ΠDECRYPT,i is based on prior work
and discussed in Section 2.3.4.4.
In the following, we design new protocol variants secure in the malicious model
that use the ZKPK protocols illustrated in Table 5.1.1 to verify the input con-
struction, the computation of multiset operations, and the decryption of cipher-
texts.
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5.2 Reconciliation Protocols for the Minimum of Ranks
Composition Scheme
We present malicious model protocols for MPROSMR based on the second and third
approach for minimum of ranks in the semi-honest model.
5.2.1 MR-sbMM
The protocol structure is similar to the construction in the semi-honest model
presented in Section 4.2.2. The main difference is that we add zero-knowledge
proofs in our protocol construction to inhibit malicious behavior of active attack-
ers.
5.2.1.1 Protocol Description
The formal protocol is shown in Protocol 5.2.1. The protocol starts with the distribu-
tion of the input sets in rank encoding. Each party computes a shuffle of the domain,
such that the first k elements represent its input set and proves the correctness of the
shuffle. Each party then creates the polynomial fi corresponding to the rank encoded
set elements. The constructed polynomial is encrypted and broadcast to all other
parties together with a proof of the correct construction.
Once all encrypted polynomials have been distributed, the parties verify the proofs
of all other parties. Whenever a proof verification fails, the protocol is aborted.
The parties then commit to n random polynomials, that will be used in the set
intersection step. After completion of the input distribution, the parties continue
to compute the set intersection. First, each party opens its commitments to the
previously chosen random polynomials. Then, each party multiplies all encrypted
input polynomials with the random polynomials, computes the sum and distributes
the result with a proof of its correctness. After all proofs have been verified, all
parties sum up the results. Next, the parties compute the element reduction. Each
party selects the required random polynomials, computes the element reduction
operation and broadcasts the proof of the result’s correctness. The proof is verified,
the results are summed up and then decrypted using the malicious model threshold
decryption of the Paillier cryptosystem as described in Section 2.3.4.4. Finally, each
party verifies if the resulting polynomial contains any roots of its own input set, and
terminates the protocol if it finds such an element. Otherwise, it repeats the element
reduction with a round counter t decreased by one.
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Protocol 5.2.1: MR-sbMM
Setting: The same setting as in the semi-honest variant, see Protocol 4.2.1.
1. Input Distribution
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Computes an encrypted shuffle (si1, ..., sik, ...) of the domain D
where the first k elements denote the input set elements.
ii. Broadcasts the shuffle and correctness proof ΠSHUFFLE,i
iii. Calculates the polynomial fi (x) = (x− si1)k · (x− si2)k−1 · ... · (x− si,k)1
iv. Broadcasts encryptions of the polynomial φi = E (fi)
v. Broadcasts proof ΠCONSTRUCT,i that φi is correct.
b) Each party Pi (i ∈ {1, ..., n}) for j ∈ {1, .., n}
i. If j 6= i, verifies ΠCONSTRUCT,j and ΠSHUFFLE,j
ii. Chooses random polynomial ri,j of degree deg (fi) = k·(k+1)2
iii. Computes and commits to ρi,j = E(ri,j) (see Definition 2.1.4.2)
2. Set Intersection
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Opens the commitment to ρi,j
ii. Calculates and broadcasts γi =
[∑˜n
j=0 (φj ∗h ri,j)
]
R
of degree 2 · deg (fi)
iii. Broadcasts a proof ΠINTERSECT,i that γi is a correct
b) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. For j ∈ ({1, .., n} \ {i}) verifies ΠINTERSECT,j
ii. Calculates pi =
∑n
l=1 γl
3. Element Reduction (iteratively for t = k − 1 to 0)
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Calculates the 1, ..., t-th derivatives of encrypted polynomial pi denoted by
pi(1), ..., pi(t). Let pi(0) = pi.
ii. Chooses t+ 1 random polynomials qi,0, ..., qi,t of degree 0, .., t
iii. Calculates the enc. poly. pi∗i =
[∑˜t
l=0pi
(l) ∗h Fl ∗h qi,l
]
R
and broadcasts pi∗i .
iv. Broadcasts encryptions ϑi,0, ..., ϑi,t with ϑi,j = E (qi,j) for j ∈ {0, ..., t}
v. Broadcasts a proof ΠREDUCE,i,t that the above computation is correct.
b) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. For j ∈ ({1, .., n} \ {i}) verifies ΠREDUCE,j,t
ii. Computes Φ =
∑n
j=1 pi
∗
j
4. All parties perform a malicious model threshold decryption of Φ (see Section 2.3.4.4)
5. Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) calculates the set of elements of Si which are roots of Φ:
Output = {d |d ∈ Si, (X − d)|Φ}
a) If Output = ∅ and t > 0 proceeds with Step 3a)ii and a decreasing value of t
b) If t = 0, the output of the protocol is (∅, 0)
c) Otherwise the output of the protocol is (Output, t+ 1)
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5.2.1.2 Correctness
We compute the same function Rdt(S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn) as in the semi-honest variant.
Assuming that the zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge are difficult to forge, each
party is forced to perform the same computations as in the semi-honest variant of
the protocol. Thus, the correctness results for the semi-honest variant are also valid
for our malicious variant.
5.2.1.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Our protocol uses five types of proofs, all of which are listed in Table 5.1.1. We
require each party to prove that its chosen subset is part of the domain using a
proof of a subset relation ΠSHUFFLE,i and to prove the correct construction of the
input polynomial by a zero-knowledge proof for correct polynomial construction
ΠCONSTRUCT,i. All multiset operations are verified by zero-knowledge proofs. Each
party Pi proves the correct computation of the multiset intersection and the multi-
set element reduction by the zero-knowledge proofs ΠINTERSECT,i and ΠREDUCE,i,t.
Finally, each party verifies the correct partial decryption of the result polynomial
using the proof ΠDECRYPT,i.
5.2.1.4 Simulation Proof
The security proof follows the real-vs.-ideal paradigm as described in Section 2.4.4.2.
We define a simulator that translates the actions of the adversary to the ideal world.
We show that the adversary cannot detect this translation, i.e., that his view is indis-
tinguishable from a normal protocol execution and that the protocol will terminate
correctly.
Theorem 5.2.1 Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem
E(·) is semantically secure and the specified zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of
correct decryption cannot be forged, then the following holds for the malicious model
protocol MPROSMR described in Protocol 5.2.1. For any coalition Γ of colluding
parties (n − 1 such colluding parties), there is a party (or group of parties) SIM
operating in the ideal model, such that the views of the parties in the ideal model is
computationally indistinguishable from the views of the honest parties and Γ in the
real model.
We give the algorithm for a simulator SIM in the ideal world that represents one or
more honest participants and executes the above protocol with the set of potentially
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malicious and colluding parties P1, ..., Pl. At the same time, the simulator performs
the ideal world protocol with the trusted third party TTP :
P1, .., Pl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ

 SIM 
 TTP 
 Pl+1, ..., Pn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ
The simulator SIM acts as a translator between the real world protocol and the ideal
world protocol and also takes on the role as the honest parties Pl+1, ..., Pn in the
interaction with the malicious parties.
The intuition of the simulation proof is the following: If we can generate all protocol
messages from only the interaction with the trusted third party, which, in the ideal
world, does not leak any information about the private inputs of parties Pl+1, ..., Pn,
then the exchanged protocol messages can not contain more information than the
information provided in the ideal world. We give the simulator the power to extract
values from zero-knowledge proofs and to equivocate trapdoor commitments (i.e.,
open commitments to arbitrary values), which is a common approach in malicious
model security proofs [82].
The algorithm for the simulator is given in Protocol 5.2.2. The simulator starts
by constructing random inputs to the real-world protocol, i.e., selecting a ran-
dom totally ordered set of size k, constructing and sending the corresponding en-
cryptions and proofs. The random inputs are used in place of the real inputs
of the honest parties, which ensures that no information is leaked in the first
step.
After receiving the encryptions and the proofs from the malicious parties, it then uses
the extractors given in the soundness proofs of the zero-knowledge proof protocols
to extract the private sets and the random polynomials for the second step from
the provided proofs. This enables it to perform the ideal-world protocol with the
TTP and the honest parties. After receiving the result of the protocol from the
TTP, it inserts a polynomial representation of the result into the real-world protocol
execution by choosing the random polynomials ri,j it contributes to the protocol
accordingly.
Due to Kissner’s Lemma 2 (see Lemma 2.5.1 in Section 2.5.2), these random polyno-
mials ri,j exist. Note that although the simulator has to commit to the encryptions
of ri,j in the first step of the protocol, he can open the commitment to different
values.
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Protocol 5.2.2: Simulation Protocol for MR-sbMM
1. For each simulated honest party Pi ∈ Φ, with input set Si
a) Generate an ordered set of random values Ri of size k
b) Follow the first step according to the protocol, using Ri as input
2. For each malicious party Pi ∈ Γ
a) Extract the private ordered set Si from the received proof ΠCONSTRUCT,i
3. Send the extracted ordered sets {Si|Pi ∈ Γ} to TTP
Each honest party Pi ∈ Φ sends its set Si to TTP
4. TTP computes and sends the following results to SIM and the honest parties
A = argmax
x∈(S1∩...∩Sn)
{
min
1≤i≤n
ranki(x)
}
m = max
x∈(S1∩...∩Sn)
{
min
1≤i≤n
ranki(x)
}
5. For each simulated honest party Pi ∈ Φ and every Pj ∈ (Φ ∪ Γ)
a) Select a random polynomial s of size k(k+1)2 − |A| ·m
b) Compute polynomial p = ∏a∈A(x− a)m · s
c) Select the remaining polynomials ri,j (those of the honest parties) such
that ∑ni=1 fi (∑nj=1 ri,j) = p
d) Open the commitments to the random polynomials from Step 1) to ri,j
6. Follow the protocol for each user
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5.2.1.5 Complexity
Let n denote the number of parties, k the number of inputs, and D the domain of all
inputs. Overall, we have the following computation complexity:
O
((
|D|+ k6 + k4 · n
)
· n
)
The communication of the protocol is tightly associated with the computation, since
each computation needs to be proven by a corresponding proof sent over the network.
The size of all messages exchanged is therefore bound by
O
((
|D|+ k6 + k4 · n
)
· n
)
Compared to the semi-honest protocol, we have two differences here: First of all,
we have an additional computation overhead of |D| · n. The protocol is O(n) times
more complex, because we have to verify n− 1 proofs in each step. Also, the semi-
honest protocol is independent of the size of the domain D because we do not need
a verification of the input construction.
5.2.2 MR-optMM
The protocol structure is similar to the construction in the semi-honest model pre-
sented in Section 4.2.3. We add zero-knowledge proofs in our protocol construction
to inhibit malicious behavior of active attackers.
5.2.2.1 Protocol Description
The formal protocol description is shown in Protocol 5.2.3. The protocol starts with
the distribution of the input sets. Each party computes a shuffle of the domain,
such that the first k elements represent its input set and proves the correctness of
the shuffle. When all encrypted shuffles have been distributed, the parties verify
the proofs of all other parties. Whenever a proof verification fails, the protocol is
aborted. In Step 2 and 3, all parties compute the set intersection of the polynomials
φi,k−t, verify the corresponding proofs ΠINTERSECT,i and decrypt the result pi. In
Step 4, the result is tested for emptiness. Based on the outcome, one of two actions is
performed: If the result is non-empty, we have found the correct result and terminate
the protocol. If the result is empty, we repeat the set intersection with a decreased
threshold value t. For this purpose, each party adds the next highest ranked element
si,k−t to its current polynomial φi,k−t using a simple set union operation, resulting
in the polynomial φi,k−t+1 for the next round. After the verification of the set union
operation, the protocol returns to Step 2.
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Protocol 5.2.3: MR-optMM
Setting: The same setting as in the semi-honest variant, see Protocol 4.2.2.
1. Initial Polynomial
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Computes an encrypted shuffle (δi,1, ..., δi,k, ...) of the domain D
where the first k elements denote the input set elements.
ii. Broadcasts the shuffle and correctness proof ΠSHUFFLE,i
b) Each party Pi (i ∈ {1, ..., n}) for j ∈ {1, .., n}
i. If j 6= i, verifies ΠSHUFFLE,j
ii. Chooses random polynomial ri,j,1 of degree 1
iii. Computes and commits to ρi,j,1 = E (ri,j,1)
2. Set Intersection (Initially t = k − 1. Let φi,1 =
(
E(1), δ−1i,1
)
)
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Opens the commitment to ρi,j,k−t
ii. Computes and broadcasts γi =
[∑˜n
j=0 (φj,k−t ∗h ri,j,k−t)
]
r
iii. Broadcasts a proof ΠINTERSECT,i that γi is correctly computed
b) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. For j ∈ {1, .., n} \ {i} verifies ΠINTERSECT,j
ii. Calculates pi =
∑n
i=1 γi
3. Decryption All parties perform a malicious model threshold decryption of pi and
obtain the result polynomial p.
4. Emptiness Test / Set Union
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n)
i. Computes the set of elements of Si which are roots of p:
Output = {d ∈ Si : (X − d)|p}
ii. If Output 6= ∅, terminates the protocol with result (Output, t+ 1)
iii. If R = ∅ and t = 0, terminates the protocol with (∅, 0)
iv. Computes and broadcasts φi,k−t+1 = [φi,k−t ∗h (x− si,k−t)]r
v. Broadcasts a proof ΠUNION,i that φi,k−t+1 is correctly computed
b) Each party Pi (i ∈ {1, ..., n}) for j ∈ {1, .., n}
i. If j 6= i, verifies ΠUNION,j
ii. Chooses random polynomial ri,j,k−t+1 of degree k − t + 1 and commits to
ρi,j,k−t+1 = E (ri,j,k−t+1)
c) Proceed with Step 2 using t− 1
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5.2.2.2 Correctness
We compute the same function Rdt(S1 ∩ ...∩Sn) as the semi-honest variants follow-
ing the protocol construction discussed in Section 4.2.3. Assuming that the zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge are difficult to forge, each party is forced to perform
the same computations as in the semi-honest variant of the protocol. Therefore,
the correctness results from Section 4.2.3 also apply to our malicious model vari-
ant.
5.2.2.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Our protocol uses four types of proofs, see Table 5.1.1. We require each party
to prove that its chosen subset is part of the domain using a proof of a subset
relation ΠSHUFFLE,i. Each party Pi proves the correct computation of the multiset
intersection and the multiset union by the zero-knowledge proofs ΠINTERSECT,i and
ΠUNION,i. Finally, each party verifies the correct partial decryption of the result
polynomial using the proof ΠDECRYPT,i.
5.2.2.4 Simulation Proof
Theorem 5.2.2 Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem
E(·) is semantically secure and the specified zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of
correct decryption cannot be forged, then the following holds for the malicious model
protocol MPROSMR described in Protocol 5.2.3. For any coalition Γ of n−1 colluding
parties, there is a party (or group of parties) SIM operating in the ideal model, such
that the views of the parties in the ideal model are computationally indistinguishable
from the views of the honest parties and Γ in the real model.
The algorithm for the simulator is given in Protocol 5.2.4. The simulator starts by
constructing random inputs to the real-world protocol, i.e., constructing a random
ordered set of size k and sending the corresponding encryptions and proofs (Step 1).
The random inputs are used in place of the real inputs of the honest parties, which
ensures that no information is leaked in the first step.
After receiving the encryptions and the proofs from the malicious parties, the sim-
ulator then uses the extractors given in the soundness proofs of the zero-knowledge
proof protocols to extract the private sets from the provided proofs (Step 2). This
makes it possible to perform the ideal-world protocol with the TTP and the honest
parties (Steps 3 and 4). After receiving the result of the protocol from the TTP,
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the simulator proceeds with the protocol execution in the real model until threshold
value t = m− 1 (Step 5). Then, it inserts a polynomial representation of the result
into the real-world protocol execution by choosing the random polynomials ri,j,m−1
accordingly (Step 6).
Under the assumption of a semantically secure threshold cryptosystem, the views of
the parties in the ideal model given by the simulator are computationally indistin-
guishable from the views in the real model. The protocol output (Definition 4.1.0.1)
is the same for the ideal and the real model (Step 6 and 7).
Protocol 5.2.4: Simulation Protocol for MR-optMM
1. For each simulated honest party Pi ∈ Φ, with input set Si
a) Generate an ordered set of random values Ri of size k
b) Follow Step 1a) according to the protocol, using Ri as input
2. For each malicious party Pi ∈ Γ, extract from the received proof ΠSHUFFLE,i
the private ordered set Si
3. Send the extracted ordered sets {Si|Pi ∈ Γ} to TTP
Each honest party Pi ∈ Φ sends its set Si to TTP
4. TTP computes and sends the following results to SIM and the honest parties
A = argmax
x∈(S1∩...∩Sn)
{
min
1≤i≤n
ranki(x)
}
m = max
x∈(S1∩...∩Sn)
{
min
1≤i≤n
ranki(x)
}
5. For t = k−1, ...,m follow the protocol (Steps 1b - 4) for each simulated honest
party Pi ∈ Φ with input Ri and each malicious party Pi ∈ Γ with input Si
6. For t = m− 1 and each simulated honest party Pi ∈ Φ and every Pj ∈ (Φ ∪ Γ)
a) Select random polynomial s of size (k − (m− 1)− |A|)
b) Compute polynomial p = ∏a∈A(x− a) · s
c) Select the remaining polynomials ri,j,m−1 (of the honest parties) such that∑n
i=1 fi,m−1
(∑n
j=1 ri,j,m−1
)
= p
7. Follow and complete the protocol for each party
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5.2.2.5 Complexity
For the protocol, we have the computational complexity O
((|D|+ k3 · n) · n) for
each party. The computations in the malicious model protocol are O(n) more com-
plex compared to the semi-honest approach in Section 4.2.3, because we have to
verify n− 1 proofs in each step.
The shuffle proof verification (which depends on the size of the domain D), increases
the complexity by a factor of O (|D| · n) for n−1 such verifications. The communica-
tion of the protocol is again tightly coupled to the computation, since each computa-
tion needs to be proven by a corresponding proof sent over the network. The size of
all messages exchanged over the network is therefore bound by O
((|D|+ k3 · n) · n).
Compared to the semi-honest variant presented in Section 4.2.3, the communication
complexity is increased due to the additional transmission of the zero-knowledge
proofs.
Remark on Solving the 0-Polynomial Problem
Protocol constructions in the malicious model are not secure against input substi-
tution attacks, see Section 2.4.4.2. There exists a simple substitution attack against
our MPROS protocols which we handle in the following. Malicious attackers can
manipulate the protocol by inserting 0-polynomials in the protocol, i.e., polyno-
mials where all coefficients are set to zero. Other parties can not detect these
polynomials, as they only receive encrypted versions and because of the seman-
tic security of the cryptosystem it is infeasible to check if it encrypts a zero or
not.
The malicious party can replace the input polynomial or the results of a multiplica-
tion by a polynomial f0 where all coefficients are 0. For example, in a 2-party setting
of the MPROS protocol, this modification can be used by an attacker A to reveal the
highest ranked element of the other party B. In the intersection, instead of comput-
ing fA · r+ fB · s, the protocol will then compute f0 · r+ fB · s = fB · s which has the
same root as fB. The result of the element reduction will always reveal the highest
ranked element of B and thus violate the privacy of B.
We solve the problem in the following manner: The first coefficient of polynomials
that are chosen by a party is always assumed to be a known encryption of 1 (E1).
Thus, an attacker cannot choose a polynomial where are coefficients are 0. We use
E1 (f) to denote the encryption of f with an implicit one as the first coefficient.
In Protocol 5.2.1, we replace φi = E (fi) in Step 1a)iv with φi = E1 (fi), ρi,j =
E(ri,j) in Step 1b)iii with ρi,j = E1(ri,j), and ϑi,j = E (qi,j) in Step 3a)iv with
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Protocol Communication Computation
Second ApproachMM O
((|D|+ k6 + k4 · n) · n) O ((|D|+ k6 + k4 · n) · n)
Third ApproachMM O
((|D|+ k3 · n) · n) O ((|D|+ k3 · n) · n)
Table 5.2.1: Computation and communication complexities for MPROSMR in the
malicious model.
ϑi,j = E1 (qi,j). In Protocol 5.2.3, we substitute ρi,j,1 = E (ri,j,1) in Step 1b)iii
with ρi,j,1 = E1 (ri,j,1) and ρi,j,k−t+1 = E (ri,j,k−t+1) in Step 4b)ii with ρi,j,k−t+1 =
E1 (ri,j,k−t+1).
All these computations are re-randomized (see also Section 2.2.3.2) before they
are sent to the other parties. Thus, this technique does not reduce the secu-
rity of the protocol and we prevent this input substitution attack. Note that
MPROS is not secure against arbitrary or more sophisticated input substitution
attacks.
5.2.3 Summary
Table 5.2.1 summarizes the theoretical performance results. All reconciliation proto-
cols are polynomial-time bound with respect to the number of parties n and inputs
k. As expected, the runtime for the malicious model variants for MPROSMR is
higher than the corresponding semi-honest model variants for MPROSMR. Never-
theless, the impact is acceptable as the runtime is only increased by a factor of O(n).
However, since each party verifies n − 1 zero-knowledge proofs whenever required
in a protocol step, each party has to transmit more data to the other parties. This
significant difference in terms of communication overhead will be confirmed in our
evaluation presented in Section 8.
5.3 Reconciliation Protocols for the Sum of Ranks
Composition Scheme
Next, we present malicious model protocols for MPROSSR based on the second and
third approach for sum of ranks in the semi-honest model.
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5.3.1 SR-sbMM
Similar to the minimum of ranks protocol presented in Section 5.2.1, a malicious
model protocol for ordered set reconciliation with the sum of ranks composition
scheme can be constructed. The main difference between the construction of the
sum of ranks protocol and the minimum of ranks protocol is that the former also
uses set union. As noted in Section 2.5.2, we cannot compute a set union of two or
more encrypted polynomials, but we can only compute the union of an encrypted
polynomial and an unencrypted polynomial. We therefore have to construct the
ZKPK protocol of the set union operation in a circular way. Here, each party Pi ex-
cept the first one receives an encrypted polynomial representing (S1 ∪ ... ∪ Si−1) and
performs a multiplication of this polynomial and its input polynomial. To compute
a set union, we need a polynomial multiplication which can be proven using the zero-
knowledge proof construction presented in Section 3.3.
Otherwise, the protocol structure is similar to the construction in the semi-honest
model presented in Section 4.3.2. We add zero-knowledge proofs in our protocol con-
struction to inhibit malicious behavior of active attackers.
5.3.1.1 Protocol Description
The complete protocol is listed in Protocol 5.3.1. At first, all parties construct and
verify their input polynomials fi(x) and gi(x) using Step 1 of the malicious model
protocol for MPROSMR presented in Section 5.2.1. Afterwards, we have the new
ZKPK construction to compute the set union f1(x)∪ ...∪ fn(x). Then, the protocol
essentially repeats Step 2) of the malicious model protocol for the minimum of
ranks composition scheme presented in Section 5.2.1, with the difference that the
constructed input polynomials gi(x) contain each element for the input set n·k times
and that the intersection is computed not only over the polynomials g1(x), ..., gn(x),
but also the previously computed union φ′n. Finally, we iteratively compute the
element reduction with threshold value t on the result η of the set intersection until
a result is found using Step 3-5 of the malicious model protocol for the minimum of
ranks composition scheme presented in Section 5.2.1.
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Protocol 5.3.1: SR-sbMM
Setting: The same setting as in the semi-honest variant, see Protocol 4.3.1.
1. Input Construction
a) All parties perform Step 1 of the malicious model protocol for MPROSMR
shown in Protocol 5.2.1 to verify the construction of φi = E(fi) with
fi (x) = (x− si1)k · (x− si2)k−1 · ... · (x− sik)1
where deg(fi(x)) = k·(k+1)2
b) All parties perform Step 1a)iii−v of the malicious model protocol for
MPROSMR shown in Protocol 5.2.1 to verify the construction of γi, the
encryption of
gi (x) = (x− si1)n·k · (x− si2)n·k · ... · (x− sik)n·k
where deg(gi(x)) = n · k2
2. Set Union
a) Let φ′1 = φ1. For each i = 2 to n, party Pi computes the union of f1, ..., fi:
i. Compute φ′i =
[
φ′i−1 ∗h fi
]
R
ii. Broadcasts the result φ′i and the proof
ΠUNION,i = ZKPK
{
fi, R
∣∣∣∣∣ φ′i =
[
φ′i−1 ∗h fi
]
R
∧ φi = E (fi)
}
iii. All parties Pj (j ∈ {1, ..., n} \ {i}) verify ΠUNION,i
3. Set Intersection
a) All parties perform Step 2 of the malicious model protocol for MPROSMR
shown in Protocol 5.2.1 to obtain η which is the encryption of the set
intersection of the polynomials
γ1, ..., γn, φ
′
n
4. Element Reduction, Threshold Decryption, and Result Check
a) All parties perform Steps 3-5 of the malicious model protocol for
MPROSMR shown in Protocol 5.2.1, iterating from t = n · k − 1 to n− 1
with η as input
147
5 Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation in the Malicious Model
5.3.1.2 Correctness
We compute the same function
Rdt((renc(S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc(Sn)) ∩menc(S1) ∩ ... ∩menc(Sn))
as the semi-honest variants following the protocol construction discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.2. Assuming that the zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge are difficult to
forge, each party is forced to perform the same computations as in the semi-honest
variant of the protocol. Therefore, the correctness results from Section 4.3.2 also
apply to our malicious model variant.
5.3.1.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Our protocol uses six types of proofs, all of which are listed in Table 5.1.1. We require
each party to prove that its chosen subset is part of the domain using a proof of a
subset relation ΠSHUFFLE,i and to prove the correct construction of the input polyno-
mial by a zero-knowledge proofs for correct polynomial construction ΠCONSTRUCT,i.
Each party Pi proves the correct computation of the multiset intersection, the
multiset union, and the multiset element reduction by the zero-knowledge proofs
ΠINTERSECT,i, ΠUNION,i, and ΠREDUCE,i,t. Finally, each party verifies the correct
partial decryption of the result polynomial using the proof ΠDECRYPT,i.
5.3.1.4 Simulation Proof
Theorem 5.3.1 Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem
E(·) is semantically secure and the specified zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of
correct decryption cannot be forged, then then the following holds for the malicious
model protocol MPROSSR described in Protocol 5.3.1, For any coalition Γ of n − 1
colluding parties, there is a party (or group of parties) SIM operating in the ideal
model, such that the views of the parties in the ideal model are computationally
indistinguishable from the views of the honest parties and Γ in the real model.
The algorithm for the simulator is given in Protocol 5.3.2. The proof is very similar
to the simulation proof shown in Protocol 5.2.2 in Section 5.2.1. Note that the
trusted third party computes the sum of ranks instead of the minimum of ranks for
all x ∈ S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn in Step 4.
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Protocol 5.3.2: Simulation Protocol for SR-sbMM
1. For each simulated honest party Pi ∈ Φ, with input set Si
a) Generate an ordered set of random values Ri of size k
b) Follow Step 1a) according to the protocol, using Ri as input
2. For each malicious party Pi ∈ Γ
a) Extract the private ordered set Si from the received proof ΠCONSTRUCT,i
3. Send the extracted ordered sets {Si|Pi ∈ Γ} to TTP
Each honest party Pi ∈ Φ sends its set Si to TTP
4. TTP computes and sends the following results to SIM and the honest parties
A = argmax
x∈(S1∩...∩Sn)
{
n∑
i=1
ranki(x)
}
m = max
x∈(S1∩...∩Sn)
{
n∑
i=1
ranki(x)
}
5. For each simulated honest party Pi ∈ Φ and every Pj ∈ (Φ ∪ Γ)
a) Select a random polynomial s of size k(k+1)2 − |A| ·m
b) Compute polynomial p = ∏a∈A(x− a)m · s
c) Select the remaining polynomials ri,j (those of the honest parties) such
that ∑ni=1 fi (∑nj=1 ri,j) = p
d) Open the commitments to the random polynomials from Step 1a) to ri,j
6. Follow the protocol for each user
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Under the assumption of a semantically secure threshold cryptosystem, the views of
the parties in the ideal model given by the simulator are computationally indistin-
guishable from the views in the real model. The protocol output (Definition 4.1.0.1)
is the same for the ideal and the real model (Step 5 and 6).
5.3.1.5 Complexity
As it is the case for the semi-honest protocols, the complexity of the sum of ranks
variant for the malicious case is considerably higher when compared to the minimum
of ranks variant. The set intersection in Step 3a) produces a polynomial of degree
2 · k2 · n such that the element reduction operation is very costly. Also, the element
reduction operation is run up to (k − 1) · n times. The dominant operations in
the protocol are again the element reduction proof verifications, the polynomial
construction proof verifications and, new in the sum of ranks protocol, the union
operation.
Similar to the minimum of ranks variant, we have an additional |D| · n · k · b2.585 in
the runtime bound. Overall, the protocol is O(n) more complex, because we have
to verify n − 1 proofs in each step. Thus, we obtain the computation complexity
of
O
((
|D|+ n4 · k5
)
· n · k
)
.
and a communication complexity of
O
((
|D|+ n4 · k5
)
· n · k
)
.
The communication complexity of the protocol is again tightly connected to the
computation complexity due to the ZKPK proofs.
5.3.2 SR-optMM
Our approach is similar to the minimum of ranks protocol presented in Section 5.2.1.
We add ZKPK proofs to verify the correct computation of all set operations, the cor-
rect construction of the input sets, and the correct threshold decryption. Otherwise,
the protocol is similar to the malicious model constructions for the second approach
presented in Section 5.3.1 with a slightly different sequence of set operations similar
to the semi-honest variant presented in Section 4.3.3.
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5.3.2.1 Protocol Description
The complete protocol is listed in Protocol 5.3.3. At first, all parties construct and
verify their input polynomials fi(x) and gi(x) using Step 1 of the malicious model
protocol for the minimum of ranks composition scheme presented in Section 5.2.1.
Note that the inputs gi(x) are constructed using the Simple encoding where each set
element occurs once. Afterwards, we compute the set union f1(x)∪ ...∪fn(x). Then,
the protocol repeats Step 2) of the malicious model protocol for the minimum of
ranks composition scheme presented in Section 5.2.1 to compute the set intersection
over the polynomials g1(x), ..., gn(x). Next, we compute the element reduction with
threshold value t on the result φ′n of the set union. Then, we compute the set
intersection over the polynomials η and θ to compute the result polynomial λ. In
Step 6-7, we decrypt the polynomial λ and check if a result exists. Otherwise, we
repeat Step 4-7 with a decreasing value of t.
5.3.2.2 Correctness
We compute the same function
Rdt
(
renc (S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc (Sn)
)
∩ (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn)
as the semi-honest variants following the protocol construction discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.3. Assuming that the zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge are difficult to
forge, each party is forced to perform the same computations as in the semi-honest
variant of the protocol. Therefore, the correctness results from Section 4.3.3 also
apply to our malicious model variant.
5.3.2.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Our protocol uses six types of proofs. We require each party to prove that its
chosen subset is part of the domain using a proof of a subset relation ΠSHUFFLE,i
and to prove the correct construction of the input polynomial by a zero-knowledge
proofs for correct polynomial construction ΠCONSTRUCT,i. Each party Pi proves
the correct computation of the multiset intersection, the multiset union, and the
multiset element reduction by the zero-knowledge proofs ΠINTERSECT,i, ΠUNION,i,
and ΠREDUCE,i,t. Finally, each party verifies the correct partial decryption of the
result polynomial using the proof ΠDECRYPT,i.
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Protocol 5.3.3: SR-optMM
Setting: The same setting as in the semi-honest variant, see Protocol 4.3.2.
1. Input Construction
a) All parties perform Step 1 of the malicious model protocol for MPROSMR shown
in Protocol 5.2.1 to verify the construction of φi = E(fi) with
fi (x) = (x− si1)k · (x− si2)k−1 · ... · (x− sik)1
where deg(fi(x)) = k·(k+1)2
b) All parties perform Step 1a)iii−v of the malicious model protocol for MPROSMR
shown in Protocol 5.2.1 to verify the construction of γi, the encryption of
gi (x) = (x− si1) · (x− si2) · ... · (x− sik)
where deg(gi(x)) = n · k2
2. Set Union
a) All parties perform Step 2 of the malicious model protocol for MPROSSR shown
in Protocol 5.3.1 to obtain φ′n which is the encryption of the set union of the
polynomials
f1, ..., fn
3. Set Intersection I
a) All parties perform Step 2 of the malicious model protocol for MPROSMR shown
in Protocol 5.2.1 to obtain η which is the encryption of the set intersection of
the polynomials
γ1, ..., γn
4. Element Reduction
a) All parties perform Steps 3 of the malicious model protocol for MPROSMR shown
in Protocol 5.2.1, iterating from t = n · k− 1 to n− 1 with φ′n as input to obtain
θ which is the encryption of the set reduction by t of φ′n
5. Set Intersection II
a) All parties perform Step 2 of the malicious model protocol for MPROSMR shown
in Protocol 5.2.1 to obtain λ which is the encryption of the set intersection of
the polynomials
η, θ
6. Threshold Decryption
a) All parties perform a malicious model decryption of λ (see Section 2.3.4.4)
7. Result Check
a) Each party Pi (i = 1, ..., n) calculates the set of elements of Si which are roots
of λ: Output = {d |d ∈ Si, (X − d)|λ}
i. If Output = ∅ and t > 0 proceeds with Step 4 and a decreasing value of t
ii. If t = 0, the result of the protocol is (∅, 0)
iii. Otherwise the result of the protocol is (Output, t+ 1)
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5.3.2.4 Simulation Proof
Theorem 5.3.2 Assuming that the additively homomorphic, threshold cryptosystem
E(·) is semantically secure and the specified zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of
correct decryption cannot be forged, then in the MPROSSR protocol in Protocol 5.3.1,
for any coalition Γ of n − 1 colluding parties, there is a party (or group of parties)
SIM operating in the ideal model, such that the views of the parties in the ideal model
are computationally indistinguishable from the views of the honest parties and Γ in
the real model.
Our protocol is very similar to the second approach for sum of ranks in the mali-
cious model, especially the input construction. Thus, the simulator for the second
approach for sum of ranks given in Protocol 5.3.2 is also a simulator for our protocol
presented in Protocol 5.3.3.
Under the assumption of a semantically secure threshold cryptosystem, the views of
the parties in the ideal model given by the simulator are computationally indistin-
guishable from the views in the real model. The protocol output (Definition 4.1.0.1)
is the same for the ideal and the real model (Step 5 and 6).
5.3.2.5 Complexity
Similar to the minimum of ranks variant, we have an additional |D| · n · k in the
runtime bound. Overall, the protocol is O(n) more complex, because we have to
verify n − 1 proofs in each step. Thus, we obtain the computation complexity
of
O
((
|D|+ n4 · k5
)
· n · k
)
.
and a communication complexity of
O
((
|D|+ n4 · k5
)
· n · k
)
.
The communication complexity of the protocol is again tightly connected with the
computation complexity due to the ZKPK proofs.
Remark on Solving the 0-Polynomial Problem
Similar to the MPROSMR protocols, the MPROSSR protocols are also prone to the
0-Polynomial substitution attack. We solve this problem in the same way as for
the MPROSMR protocols. In Protocols 5.3.1 and 5.3.3, we replace φi = E(fi) in
Step 1a) with φi = E1(fi).
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Protocol Communication Computation
Second ApproachMM O
((|D|+ n4 · k5) · n · k) O ((|D|+ n4 · k5) · n · k)
Third ApproachMM O
((|D|+ n4 · k5) · n · k) O ((|D|+ n4 · k5) · n · k)
Table 5.3.1: Protocol Complexities for MPROSSR in the Malicious Model.
5.3.3 Summary
Table 5.3.1 summarizes the theoretical performance results. All four protocols are
polynomial-time bound with respect to the number of parties n and inputs k. For
the malicious model variants, the computation overhead is slightly increased by a
factor of O(n). The communication overhead is again much larger than for the
semi-honest variants. Compared to the minimum of ranks variants, both sum of
ranks approaches have the same asymptotic complexity. However, we show in our
evaluation presented in Section 8 that the third approach compared to the second
approach is faster and less data need to be transmitted during a protocol execution.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have constructed protocol variants which are secure in the ma-
licious model for MPROSMR and MPROSSR. Overall, we presented six ZKPK
protocols which are used in our malicious model variants and explained each ZKPK
protocol in detail. We briefly described all our protocol variants. As a main contri-
bution, we analyzed the correctness, security (formal simulation proof), and com-
plexity (computation and communication overhead) of our protocols. The complex-
ity analysis clearly shows that the stronger security model comes at the price of
efficiency.
In the next chapter, we present a number of applications for privacy-preserving rec-
onciliation protocols. We also discuss the adversary model for each application sce-
nario. We have also implemented and evaluated all our solutions for MPROSMR and
MPROSSR in the malicious model. We present our implementation in Section 7 and
our evaluation in Section 8.
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Reconciliation Protocols
In practice, there is a wealth of applications which share the requirement for privacy-
preserving reconciliation. We present three high impact areas for privacy-preserving
reconciliation protocols: event scheduling, e-voting, and electronic auctions. In sev-
eral scenarios, the unbiased treatment of all parties involved is also important. We
show how privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols can be effectively used in these
contexts. Finally, we show that end-users have a demand for privacy in the context
of those application scenarios.
In the context of event scheduling, involved parties have various incentives to keep
their free time slots and their respective preference (w.r.t. an event time) private.
Yet, the result of the scheduling should be as suitable as possible for all parties
involved. For electronic auctions it is crucial that the identity of the bidders and
their bids remain private. Only the winning bid and the respective winner should
be generally known to everyone at the end of the auction. Fairness in this context
ensures that each bid is taken into consideration and that the true winner is deter-
mined. In electronic voting, the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. In addition,
the tallying, i.e., the determining of the winner should be performed under unbiased
consideration of all votes.
In Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, we show how our proposed privacy-preserving multi-
party reconciliation protocols (see Chapters 4 and 5) can be applied to enable differ-
ent forms of event scheduling, e-voting, and electronic auctions respectively. Specif-
ically, we propose solutions for unbiased and privacy-preserving Doodle, First-Price
Sealed-Bid Auctions, Vickrey Auctions, and Borda Count Voting Systems. For each
application scenario, we present an encoding of the private inputs of each party into
totally ordered input sets. Thus, the meaning of the ordered input sets differs in each
application scenario, e. g., free time slots and assigned preferences in the context of
event scheduling. Based on the input encoding, we define the unbiased functions
utilizing MPROS building blocks which enable the computation of the desired out-
puts. This is a joint work with D. Mayer working in the group of Professor Wetzel at
the Stevens Institute of Technology, see Section 1.2. D. Mayer has especially worked
on the e-voting applications. The work presented in Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 have
been published in [129].
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Finally, we evaluate the usability of our proposed applications. Therefore, in Sec-
tion 6.5, we present our user study on privacy-preserving reconciliation in the In-
ternet. In the user study, we tested whether the application scenarios in the areas
of event scheduling and electronic auctions described in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 are
useful for common Internet users. We also explore how users perceive the fairness
provided by the minimum of ranks and sum of ranks composition schemes. A pilot
study was conducted by Philipp Siebenkotten presented in his diploma thesis [183].
Compared to [183], we completely revised the questions about personal character-
istics and added questions about the Internet habits of the users. We adopted two
scenarios but revised the descriptions and the formulation of the questions. In ad-
dition, we included four further application scenarios and added several questions
in the context of the applications. We also revised the question descriptions and
formulations about the fairness of the minimum of ranks and sum of ranks compo-
sition schemes. The initial pilot study [183] in paper form with 18 questions in the
context of privacy-preserving reconciliation has been further developed to an online
survey with overall 52 questions in the context of privacy-preserving reconciliation
in the Internet.
Outline: In Section 6.1, we define the setting for our application scenarios. Sec-
tions 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 present the work in the area of event scheduling, e-voting,
and electronic auctions. In Section 6.5, we describe the evaluation of our user
study.
6.1 Application Setting
In the following, we demonstrate how our introduced application scenarios can in
fact be reduced to privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols of ordered sets. There-
fore, we show how the inputs for each application are mapped to ordered sets, how
privacy-preserving reconciliation is applied, and how the results of the reconcili-
ation protocol are translated back into the domain-specific realm of the applica-
tions.
More in detail, we show how the inputs, for instance in event scheduling, can be
mapped into suitable multisets. Then, we demonstrate how the purpose of the
application and its intended outcome can be expressed by crafting a specific com-
position of union, intersection, and element reduction operations on these multisets.
Finally, we present how the obtained result on multisets can be translated back into
the context of the respective application.
Since we have proposed privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols which are secure
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in the semi-honest and the malicious model, one can choose between the semi-honest
and malicious model protocols depending on the adversary type in the respective
application scenario.
The privacy guarantees of our constructions only hold if all parties Pi use input
multisets Si of equal size chosen from a common domain D. For some of the appli-
cations this is not always naturally the case. To address this problem, we apply a
padding scheme as described in Section 4.4. Here, the multisets are extended with
a sufficient number of dummy elements chosen from a common domain Ddummy. To
enable the distinguishing of real input values from dummy elements it is necessary
that D ∩Ddummy = ∅.
For each application we define the desired output as it would be computed if a
trusted third party was used. We then show how the output can be computed
using MPROS building blocks such that no party learns anything but the desired
output.
6.2 Scheduling
In the following, we present two different scheduling applications where multiple
parties are interested in scheduling a meeting. Specifically, our constructions will
enable an unbiased and privacy-preserving version of Doodle [55]. Further applica-
tions would be a privacy-preserving version of ZocDoc [200], a service for scheduling
doctor’s appointments online.
Currently, Doodle allows several parties to schedule a meeting in a distributed and
efficient manner. However, today’s Doodle application does not allow the parties to
order the time slots at which they would be available for the meeting according to
their preferences. Furthermore, all parties or at least the initiator of the poll see
which time slots were (not) selected by the others.
In this context, our work allows an extension of Doodle which will take the prefer-
ences of all parties into account when determining the best time slot for the meeting.
A possible choice to ensure fairness is the sum of ranks composition scheme (see Def-
inition 2.1.1.7) which optimizes the sum of the preferences for common time slots of
all parties. In addition, the advanced Doodle will keep the settings of all parties pri-
vate. I.e., neither the information on what time slots were (not) selected nor a party’s
corresponding preferences will be disclosed to the others.
Figure 6.2.1 illustrates a scheduling example where four parties attempt to find a
time for a joint project meeting. The optimal solution according to the sum of
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Figure 6.2.1: Scheduling example with four parties each holding three time slots.
ranks composition scheme is the common time slot 08.05. 5 pm, which is most-
preferred among the four parties. The sum of ranks value for this time slot is eight.
6.2.1 Formal Mapping
In the following, we define the input and output of a scheduling application. We
then show which encoding should be used and design a privacy-preserving protocol
to obtain an unbiased solution.
6.2.1.1 Input
Let each party Pi have k time slots si1, ..., sik in an input set S with a ranking
rankPi(sij) = k − j + 1 for j = 1, ..., k. Thus, each party holds a totally ordered
input set S.
6.2.1.2 Output
Let S∩ := S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn contain all common time slots. Then, the desired output is
defined by
argmaxxl∈S∩
n∑
i=1
rankPi(xl)
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i.e., the output is the set of all xl which maximize the sum of ranks over all par-
ties.
6.2.1.3 Encoding
Each party Pi uses the Rank encoding (see Table 2.5.1). The protocol input is
renc(Si) where each party holds a multiset Si = {si1, si2, ..., sik} and the size of the
protocol input is |renc(Si)| = k·(k+1)2 . That is, the protocol input of each party
encodes all of Pi’s free time slots with the preferences represented in the multiplicity
of the set elements. In addition, each party Pi uses the Simple encoding of Si with
|Si| = k to enable the reconciliation.
6.2.1.4 Privacy-Preserving Protocol
In order to obtain the desired output in a privacy-preserving manner, the n par-
ties compute Wt = Rdt
(
renc(S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc(Sn)
)
∩ (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn) using the
reconciliation protocol SR-opt, see Section 4.3.3. First, the union of the multi-
sets renc(Si) is determined which is equivalent to calculate the sum of ranks for
all possible time slots sij ∈ Si (∀i, j). Next, the multisets Si are used to elimi-
nate all sij /∈ S∩, i. e., eliminating all elements which are not common among all
parties.
The maximum of the sum of ranks is computed through an iterative process start-
ing with a reduction by t = nk − 1. Note that if all parties assign the highest rank
to the same time slot, it will appear nk times in the union of the input multisets
(renc(S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc(Sn)). This time slot would then be the only member of the
multiset after reduction by t = nk − 1 and the intersection with (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn).
If no such time slot exists, an empty set is obtained. t is then iteratively reduced
until for some t = t′ a non-empty set Wt′ is obtained for the first time. Wt′ only
contains the optimal solution, i. e., all time slots sij maximizing the sum of ranks.
Thus, the privacy of the remaining elements in the multisets Si, i = 1, ..., n is guar-
anteed.
6.2.2 Scheduling with the Chief Executive Officer
In the previous scheduling application, we considered symmetric scenarios where
the influence of each party is equal. However, there are asymmetric application
scenarios as well. E. g., consider a company where the chief executive officer (CEO)
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wants to schedule a meeting with its employees. The CEO plays a major role in
a company. In order to represent the asymmetry in the importance of the chief
executive officer and the employees, we introduce weights representing the impor-
tance of each party (we for the employees and wb for the chief executive officer). As
a result, the CEO has a higher influence than the employees on the result of the
scheduling.
6.2.2.1 Encoding
For each employee Pi, i = 1, . . . , n and the chief executive officer, we then define
the following multisets where we consider the weights of each party using a modified
Rank encoding
renc′(Si) = {(si1)we·k, ..., (sik)we·1}, i = 1, ..., n,
renc′(Sb) = {(sb1)wb·k, ..., (sbk)wb·1},
Si = {si1, ..., sik}, i = 1, ..., n,
Sb = {sb1, ..., sbk}.
E. g., if we set wb = 2 and we = 1, then each element in the multiset of the chief
executive officer will appear twice as often as the element would appear in an em-
ployees multiset. In this case, it is more likely that a time slot is chosen which is an
element of the CEO’s multiset.
6.2.2.2 Privacy-Preserving Protocol
Again, we can use the SR-opt protocol that calculates the following operations on
the input multisets in a privacy-preserving way and takes the weighted preferences
into count while using the sum of ranks composition scheme to combine the prefer-
ences:
Υ ::= Rdt−1
(
renc′(S1) ∪ ... ∪ renc′(Sn) ∪ renc′(Sb)
)
∩ (S1 ∩ ... ∩ Sn ∩ Sb).
However, since the size of the input multisets differs for the employees and the chief
executive officer, we have to apply the techniques for arbitrary totally pre-ordered
input sets, see Section 4.4. I. e., we have to use our proposed novel generalized
multiset intersection operation in our protocol.
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6.3 Electronic Auctions
Next, we show that MPROS building blocks prove suitable for solving certain chal-
lenges in the area of auction theory which is an applied branch of game theory
[118, 32, 115]. We consider closed auctions where the buyers submit sealed bids. The
goal of an auction is to sell a single or multiple items to the bidder with the highest
bid (standard auction) such that the outcome of the auction does not depend on the
identity of the bidders. Auctions are universal in the sense that any item can be sold.
The outcome of the auction is the highest bid and the identity of the corresponding
bidder. All other bids and identities are kept private.
A further common auction type are Open Ascending-Bid Auctions. These are also
called English Auctions and are open-end auctions. In this type of auctions, the price
is steadily raised typically until only one bidder is left. Further Open Auctions are
Open Descending-Bid Auctions, so-called Dutch Auctions, and Reverse Auctions.
Due to the continuous process of the auction it is not clear how those types of auc-
tions can be efficiently mapped to MPROS building blocks. Combinatorial Auctions
[167, 40] are another well-studied type of auctions. In Combinatorial Auctions the
bidders can place bids on combinations of items, so-called packages. The goal is to
find an allocation of items to bidders which maximizes the auctioneer’s income. It
is allowed that the auctioneer retains items and that the bid for a package is higher
than the sum of bids for the individual items.
In the following, we introduce reductions to MPROS building blocks for two popular
types of closed auctions: First-Price Sealed-Bid and Vickrey Auctions.
6.3.1 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
In First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions [111] the bidders keep their bid private by submit-
ting it in a sealed envelope to the auctioneer. The auctioneer acts as a trusted third
party and determines the winner of the auction, i. e., the bidder with the highest bid,
without revealing the identities and bids of the other bidders.
6.3.1.1 Input
There are n parties P1, ..., Pn with identities idP1 , ..., idPn and bids bidP1 , ..., bidPn .
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6.3.1.2 Output
The desired result of the auction is given by the pair
({Pl},maxni=1bidPi) with l ∈ argmaxni=1bidPi
which contains the set of winning bidders1 and the highest bid.
6.3.1.3 Encoding
Our construction requires an arbitrary but fixed maximum amount bidmax which
any party is allowed to bid. Each party Pi chooses its input set Si such that it only
contains its identity idPi where Pi’s bid is encoded as the multiplicity of this element.
Since this encoding would result in multisets Si of different size, these sets must be
padded such that |Si| = bidmax + n holds ∀i. Specifically, corresponding to bidPi ,
party Pi creates a set Dbidmax−bidPi with bidmax − bidPi elements chosen from the
dummy domain resulting in Si = {idbidPi+nPi } ∪Dbidmax−bidPi .
6.3.1.4 Privacy-Preserving Protocol
In order to obtain the output in a privacy-preserving way, we use MPROS building
blocks to compute the output of the function Wt = Rdt(S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn). The union
ensures that all bidders are taken into account and the reduction is used to determine
the identity of the bidder with the highest bid as well as the highest bid itself. Due
to the definition of the dummy sets Dbidmax−bidPi , each dummy element appears
at most n times in the multiset S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn. The bid of each party is shifted by
n to ensure that the multiplicity of each bid is greater than that of any dummy
element. The reduction therefore starts with t = bidmax + n− 1 and then proceeds
with decreasing values of t as long as the reduction results in the empty set. Let
Wt′ be the first non-empty set implying that the multiplicity of the winning identity
was t′ + 1. Thus, the winning bid is given by t′ + 1 − n where n is the adjustment
for the shift introduced earlier. It is important to note that the identities and bids
of non-winning bidders are not revealed. Due to our construction, Wt′ does not
contain any dummies. This is important since a dummy value in the output could
potentially leak information about the bid values.
A variation of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions are All-Pay Auctions where everybody
pays their bid in the end. A solution can be obtained by computingWt = S1 ∪ ... ∪ Sn
1Note that the output can contain multiple winners. Obtaining the final winner of the auction in
such a case is a general problem in auction theory. The same holds for electronic voting. We do
not address this problem here.
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using the same encoding as above. The output contains all identities idP1 , ..., idPn
and their corresponding bids bidP1 , ..., bidPn . Since all values are revealed, MPROS is
used to only ensure fairness and not to preserve privacy in this case.
6.3.2 Vickrey Auction
Vickrey Auctions [189] follow a procedure which is similar to First-Price Sealed-Bid
Auctions except that the winner only pays the second-highest bid.
6.3.2.1 Input
There are n parties P1, ..., Pn with identities idP1 , ..., idPn and bids bidP1 , ..., bidPn .
6.3.2.2 Output
The desired output is defined as the 2-tuple
({Pl},maxi=1,...,n ; i 6=lbidPi) with l ∈ argmaxni=1bidPi
where the first component is the set of bidders with the highest bid and the second
component is the second-highest bid.
6.3.2.3 Encoding
Each party constructs two sets: set Si to determine the second highest bid without
leaking the identity of any bidder and set S′i to determine the identity of the winner.
For this, each party Pi chooses a random value rPi ∈ R from some agreed upon
domain R with R ∩ D = ∅. The domain R has to be large enough such that the
probability of two parties choosing the same random number is negligible. As in
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions the bid of each party is encoded in the multiplicity
of the set element and the input multiset is padded with dummy elements such that
Si = {rbidPi+nPi } ∪Dbidmax−bidPi with |Si| = bidmax + n , ∀i. Similarly, each party
constructs S′i = {id
bidPi+n
Pi
} ∪Dbidmax−bidPi with |S′i| = bidmax + n where the set
element is party Pi’s identifier idPi and its corresponding bid bidPi is encoded in the
multiplicity of the set element.
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6.3.2.4 Privacy-Preserving Protocol
First, all parties use MPROS building blocks to compute Wt = Rdt(S1 ∪ ... ∪ Sn).
The union guarantees that all bids are taken into account and the reduction is used
to determine the highest and second highest bids without revealing the identities of
any of the bidders. This is ensured by the fact that the multisets in this step contain
only random numbers rPi . As above, the reduction starts with t = bidmax + n − 1
and t is iteratively reduced. Let Wt′ be the first non-empty set and Wt∗ be the
first set with cardinality greater or equal to two (i.e., t∗ ≤ t′). Then, as above, the
second-highest bid is given by t∗+1−n and the highest bid is given by t′+1−n. The
threshold t′ is used in a second run of MPROS to compute Wt′ = Rdt′(S′1 ∪ ... ∪ S′n).
Since t′ + 1− n is the highest bid, the reduction by t′ returns a set Wt′ which only
contains the identity of the winner. Note that, for the same reasons discussed above,
the set Wt′ cannot contain any dummy elements and will thus not violate any privacy
guarantees.
6.4 E-Voting
The area of voting is another very interesting area of application for MPROS. Many
voting systems, satisfying a range of different properties, have been proposed in the
literature [184]. Here, we focus on Borda Count which is a preferential voting system.
Prominent implementations of electronic voting systems are the public-audit Helios
online voting system [1] and Civitas [35].
In voting, the secrecy of the ballot is an important requirement which allows voters
to cast their vote independently and limits the possibility of bribery and other forms
of coercion. In the following, we show how the Borda Count voting system can be re-
duced to operations on ordered sets thus allowing the use of MPROS.
6.4.1 Borda Count
The Borda count is a preferential voting system which uses a ranked ballot. A
variant is the Borda Count with Veto where each voter has the possibility to veto
against the result of an election.
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6.4.1.1 Input
Each voter Pi ranks (sorts) the candidates cj (j = 1, . . . , k) according to its pref-
erence. Based on its rank, candidate cj is associated with a unique number of
pointsPi(cj) = rankPi(cj) ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that the most preferred candidate gets
k points and the least preferred gets 1 point.
6.4.1.2 Output
The desired winner is the candidate which, in sum, receives the most points, i.e.,
{cl} with l ∈ argmaxkj=1
n∑
i=1
pointsPi(cj)
6.4.1.3 Encoding
The input multiset for party Pi is given by Si = {cpointsPi (cj)j | j = 1, . . . , k} with
|Si| = k(k+1)2 , i.e., all candidates are contained in the multiset and the multiplicity
represents the points according to Pi’s ranking.
6.4.1.4 Privacy-Preserving Protocol
To determine the winner, the voters jointly compute the set Wt = Rdt(S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn)
using MPROS building blocks. The union effectively sums up all the votes per can-
didate and the maximum of the votes is then determined by means of the reduction
operator Rdt. The reduction begins with t = nk − 1, since the winner can have re-
ceived at most k points from n voters. The reduction may stop as soon as the winner
was determined, or continue to obtain a ranking of all candidates in decreasing order
of points.
In the following, we evaluate the usefulness of our application scenarios in the areas
of scheduling, and electronic auctions.
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6.5 User Study
In this section, we present a user study where we assess the benefit that privacy-
preserving reconciliation can bring to a number of application scenarios. We also
evaluate the two different notions of fairness, namely minimum of ranks and sum of
ranks. We present a selection of our test results. A comprehensive presentation of
our user study evaluation is part of future work.
Recruitment: The study has been carried out in the greater vicinity of Aachen
in Germany. We have recruited test subjects with different characteristics, mainly
pupils, students, and employees. We have posted an invitation flyer (see Figure B.1.1
in Appendix B) in several busy locations around Aachen. In addition, we have
personally friends and collegues of the assistants and students working at our IT-
Security research group. Overall, 60 subjects have participated in our user study. As
an incentive, we have offered a Cineplex cinema voucher (15 EUR) as a compensation
for the time spent participating in our user study.
Demographics: 33 subjects are male and 27 are female. There are 8 subjects under
18 years, 5 in the range of 18−20 years, and 27 in the range of 21−29 years. 30−39
and 40− 49 years old are 7 subjects in each case, and 6 subjects are above 50 years.
We had 27 full-time students/pupils and 33 full-time employees. We also asked for
the highest level of education. 26 subjects completed their university degree, 15 had
a university entrance qualification2, and 13 had the secondary school level3. 19 (22)
subjects had a more technical job (course of studies) compared to 17 (12) subjects
with a non-technical job (course of studies).
The sample distribution is nearly uniformly distributed with respect to the gender
and occupation of the participants. However, the sample distribution is slightly
biased towards younger and highly-educated subjects.
Purpose of Study: The main goal of our study is to evaluate whether common In-
ternet users set a high value on privacy in the reconciliation on the Internet.
2Hochschulreife (Germany).
3Mittlere Reife (Germany).
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Reconciliation Scenario Study Questionnaire
Scheduling with Friends (SF) Figure B.1.2
Scheduling a Project Meeting (SPM) Figure B.1.3
Negotiating a Destination of a School Excursion (NDSE) Figure B.1.4
Scheduling a Conference (SCM) Figure B.1.5
Negotiating a Destination of a Company Outing (NDCO) Figure B.1.6
Buying an Item at a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (BIA) Figure B.1.9
Table 6.5.1: Overview of the Different Reconciliation Scenarios.
6.5.1 Course of Study
We have created a web-based survey4 hosted at SurveyMonkey [185] which is a well-
known provider for web-based survey solutions. Each subject should fill out the
study survey. The survey starts with a brief description of the study and a consent
form about the voluntary participation, the clearness of the study description, and
the confidentiality of the stored data of each participant. Then, we ask each subject
about demographic data followed by several questions about their Internet habits.
The main part of the study are questions in the context of different reconciliation
scenarios and about the two composition schemes minimum of ranks and sum of
ranks. The study survey is slightly different for students/pupils and employees. The
full-time students/pupils are presented with two scenarios in the school environment
whereas the full-time employees are presented with two scenarios in the working
environment. In Section 6.5.3, each scenario is shortly described along with the
evaluation results. Overall, there are six different reconciliation scenarios shown
in Table 6.5.1. Appendix B provides the corresponding questionnaires used in our
study.
In each of these scenarios, the subject should imagine a certain reconciliation sce-
nario between a number of parties, choose between three reconciliation methods, and
answer additional questions in the application context. The reconciliation is to be
conducted over the Internet, i. e., all parties are connected over the Internet during
reconciliation. The three reconciliation methods are open negotiation, closed nego-
tiation, and negotiation by secure multi-party computation (SMC). In the open and
closed negotiation, there is a service provider which computes the result of the rec-
onciliation. Thus, the service provider learns the private inputs of all parties and the
result of the reconciliation. In the open negotiation, each party additionally learns
all private inputs of all other parties. Using the negotiation by secure multi-party
computation, the private inputs remain private, i. e., the service provider and the
other parties do not learn anything about the private inputs of each party. The re-
4Study Survey: https://de.surveymonkey.com/s/TY56285.
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Reconciliation Method Description
Open Negotiation Reconciliation by a service provider. The service provider
learns the private inputs of all parties and the result of the
reconciliation. Each party learns the result and all private
inputs of the other parties.
Closed Negotiation Reconciliation by a service provider. The service provider
learns the private inputs of all parties and the result of the
reconciliation. Each party only learns the result.
Negotiation by SMC Reconciliation by secure multi-party computation where
the private inputs of each party remain private. Neither
the service provider nor the other parties learn anything
about the private inputs of each party. Each party only
learns the result.
Table 6.5.2: Overview of the Different Reconciliation Methods.
sult of the reconciliation is computed in a privacy-preserving way by all parties, e. g.,
using our MPROS protocols presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Each party only learns
the result of the reconciliation. Table 6.5.2 summarizes our evaluated reconciliation
methods with a short description.
6.5.2 Hypotheses
We have different hypotheses used in our user study. In this thesis, we focus on the
different reconciliation scenarios and the two composition schemes MR and SR. Ta-
ble 6.5.3 presents our hypotheses with a short description.
6.5.3 Main Results
In this thesis, we present a selection of our test results with a focus on the different
reconciliation scenarios and the two composition schemes MR and SR. Parts of the
evaluated study survey (in German) are shown in Appendix B. We present overall
statistics for all evaluated questions and analyze the influence of the gender and the
full-time activity (student, pupil or employee) on the data set. A more elaborated
analysis where we consider all personal characteristics and Internet habits is part of
future work.
In general, privacy on the Internet is very important for the subjects. 28 (47%) of
60 subjects answer that privacy is very important, 29 (48%) state that privacy is
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Hypotheses Description
Hypothesis 1 Internet users prefer the negotiation by secure multi-party computation
over the open and closed negotiation in all tested scenarios.
Hypothesis 2 The users accept the open negotiation in the friend environment (Sce-
narios SF, SPM, NDSE) and reject the open negotiation in the business
environment (Scenarios NDCO, SCM, and BIA).
Hypothesis 3 The users reject the closed negotiation in all tested scenarios.
Hypothesis 4 The gender has no influence on the users’ opinion about the reconciliation
methods (Hypotheses 1 & 2).
Hypothesis 5 Full-time employees are more privacy aware than full-time stu-
dents/pupils in the different scenarios (Hypotheses 1 & 2).
Hypothesis 6 The users consider the sum of ranks composition scheme to be a
fair/unbiased option to choose the result of the reconciliation.
Hypothesis 7 The users consider the minimum of ranks composition scheme to be a
fair/unbiased option to choose the result of the reconciliation.
Hypothesis 8 The users opinion about the fairness of composition schemes (Hypotheses
6 & 7) is independent of the gender and full-time activity.
Hypothesis 9 The users consider both composition schemes to be equally fair/unbiased
options.
Table 6.5.3: Overview of the Hypotheses.
important. Only three subjects state that privacy is not very important. In the
following, we shortly describe the scenario, present the test results, discuss the open
feedback provided, and interpret our results with respect to the presented hypotheses
in Section 6.5.2. In all reconciliation scenarios, we ask the test person whether they
would conduct the reconciliation using the three different reconciliation methods,
see Table 6.5.2. The subjects can choose between the options Strongly agree, Agree,
Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly disagree to specify their position towards the three
reconciliation methods.
6.5.3.1 Scheduling and Negotiation
We present our evaluation results for the three scheduling scenarios and the two
negotiation scenarios in the study survey.
Scheduling with Friends: The scheduling with friends scenario is shown in Fig-
ure B.1.2 in the Appendix B. Here, four friends wish to schedule a meeting for a
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Figure 6.5.1: Application Scenario: Scheduling with Friends.
leisure time activity, e. g., going to the movies or a restaurant. The subject can
choose between the open negotiation, the closed negotiation, and the negotiation
by secure multi-party computation, see Table 6.5.2. Figure 6.5.1 shows the result
for the scheduling with friends scenario. The subjects prefer the negotiation by se-
cure multi-party computation which supports our Hypothesis 1. Overall, 76% of
the subjects strongly agree or agree to this reconciliation method. Only two sub-
jects disagree and 12 have a neutral position. 19 subjects state that this is the
best option with a maximum of security and four subjects explicitly mention that
the protection against the potentially untrusted service provider is also very impor-
tant.
A large number of subjects strongly disagree (14%) or disagree (30%) to the open
and the closed negotiation. 18% (22%) have a neutral position, 26% (22%) agree,
and only 12% (12%) strongly agree to the open (closed) negotiation. Here, nine
subjects state that there is no important data in this scenario and thus no secu-
rity/privacy needed. Four subjects even state that privacy-preserving reconciliation
makes finding a compromise between the parties even more complicated such that
one should prefer the open negotiation. Overall, the current results do neither prove
nor disprove our Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Table 6.5.4 shows the average ratings for the three reconciliation methods. A rating
of 5 corresponds to the answer Strongly Agree, 4 to Agree, 3 to Neutral, 2 to Disagree,
and 1 to Strongly Disagree. The first column shows the average rating over all
subjects. The second and third column show the average rating of male and female
respectively. The forth and fifth column show the average rating of students and
employees respectively.
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Reconciliation Method ∅ ∅M ∅W ∅SP ∅E
Open Negotiation 2.93 3.06 2.77 2.81 3.03
Closed Negotiation 2.93 2.97 2.88 2.93 2.93
Negotiation by SMC 4.19 4.25 4.11 3.93 4.41
Table 6.5.4: Average Ratings (∅), gender-specific average ratings (male, ∅M / fe-
male, ∅F ), and average ratings for students/pupils (∅SP ) and employ-
ees (∅E) for the three reconciliation methods in the SF scenario.
The negotiation by SMC has a very high rating of 4.19. The average ratings for
the open and closed negotiation are close to Neutral with a rating of 2.93. With
respect to the gender, there are no large differences in the average ratings for the
three reconciliation methods. This supports our Hypothesis 4. With respect to the
full-time activity, we have similar results for the open and closed negotiation but a
difference of nearly 0.5 points for the negotiation by SMC. The average value ∅E
is higher for the full-time employees with a very high rating of 4.41 points. This
supports our Hypothesis 5.
We have two further scheduling scenarios. The scheduling scenario for students/pupils
is shown in Figure B.1.3 in the Appendix B. Here, four pupils plan a project meeting
in the afternoon of the next week. The scheduling scenario for employees is shown
in Figure B.1.5 in the Appendix B. Here, four employees plan a conference in the
core working hours. Again, the subject can choose between the three reconciliation
methods in both scenarios.
The left side of Figure 6.5.2 shows the result for the SPM scenario. Again, the test
results slightly support our Hypothesis 1. 41% of the subjects totally agree and 30%
agree to the negotiation by secure multi-party computation. 11%, totally disagree,
4% disagree, and 14% of the subjects have a neutral position. Eight subjects answer
that this solution provides the best security. One subject states that the SMC
approach might be to complicated for all parties.
Regarding the open and closed negotiation, the majority (40%) of the subjects dis-
agree to these reconciliation methods. But, 30% of the subjects strongly agree or
agree to the open or closed negotiation. Two subjects state that too much privacy
makes the reconciliation complicated. I. e., it is not possible to achieve a compro-
mise between all parties or persuade someone to answer in a different way. Also, the
reconciliation process is faster using the open negotiation. Three subjects answer
that there is no important data in this scenario and four subjects emphasize that
the protection against (possibly untrusted) third parties is important. Again, the
current results do neither prove nor disprove our Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the SPM
scenario.
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Figure 6.5.2: Application Scenarios: Scheduling Meetings.
Reconciliation Method ∅SPM ∅SPMM ∅SPMW ∅SCM ∅SCMM ∅SCMW
Open Negotiation 2.93 2.88 3 2.65 2.81 2.38
Closed Negotiation 2.93 2.88 3 2.71 2.69 2.69
Negotiation by SMC 3.85 3.94 3.73 4.29 4 4.59
Table 6.5.5: Average Ratings (∅), and gender-specific average ratings (∅M ,∅F ), for
the three reconciliation methods in the SPM and SCM scenario.
The right side of Figure 6.5.2 shows the results in the SCM scenario. Here, we can
see that Hypothesis 1 has been proven. 65% strongly agree and 16% agree to the
negotiation by SMC. 10 subjects highlight that privacy is especially important in
the work environment. Only six subjects have a neutral or negative position towards
this reconciliation method. The majority (36%/42%) disagree to the open/closed
negotiation. Also, five subjects totally disagree and seven have a neutral position
towards the open negotiation. Only eight subjects have a positive position. Re-
garding the closed negotiation, we have 10 subjects with a positive and four with a
neutral position. Four subjects totally disagree to this reconciliation method. The
main reason mentioned by the subjects is that privacy is important in the work
environment. We have minimal support for Hypothesis 2 but it is undetermined
whether Hypothesis 3 holds.
Table 6.5.5 shows the average ratings for the three reconciliation methods. The
negotiation by SMC has a very high rating of 4.29 in the SCM scenario and a high
rating of 3.85 in the SPM scenario. The average rating for the open and closed
negotiation is close to Neutral in both scenarios. Regarding the gender, we have
no significant differences in the SPM scenario which supports our Hypothesis 4.
However, we have a variance in the SCM scenario. Women seem to be more privacy
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aware in the working environment. The average rating for the open negotiation
is 2.38 compared to 2.81 for men. Also, the rating for the negotiation by SMC is
very high with 4.59 compared to 4. This disproves our Hypothesis 4 in the SCM
scenario.
Next, we present the result for the two negotiation scenarios NDSE and NDCO. The
negotiation scenario for students/pupils is shown in Figure B.1.4 in the Appendix B.
Here, the pupils at school plan a school excursion in the next month. They wish
to negotiate the destination of the excursion. Each pupil can choose between a
variety of ventures, e. g., going swimming or to the zoo. The negotiation scenario
for employees is shown in Figure B.1.6 in the Appendix B. Here, the employees in a
company plan a company outing in the next month. Similar to the other negotiation
scenario, they wish to negotiate the destination of the excursion and have the same
choices for the venture. The subject can choose between the three reconciliation
methods in both scenarios.
The left side of Figure 6.5.3 shows the results for the NDSE scenario. 97% of the
subjects have a positive (67%) or neutral position (30%) to the negotiation by SMC.
Only one subject disagrees to this reconciliation method. This clearly supports
Hypothesis 1 in the NDSE scenario. The main reason provided by the subjects
is that this reconciliation method provides the best security and privacy for all
parties. The majority (41%) of the subjects also disagree to the open negotiation.
But we also have positive and neutral answers for the open negotiation. However, the
results rather disprove our Hypothesis 2. Again, three subjects mention that privacy
complicates the reconciliation process and it is not possible to personally influence
the result of the reconciliation. Regarding the closed negotiation, the test results are
very mixed with the majority (37%) of the subjects having a neutral position. We
also have positive and negative answers. Thus, the current results do neither prove
nor disprove our Hypothesis 3 in the NDSE scenario.
The right side of Figure 6.5.3 shows the results in the NDCO scenario. Again, we
have a strong positive position (78%) of the subjects towards the negotiation by
SMC. This proves our Hypothesis 1 in this scenario. Most of the subjects like the
security guarantees using this reconciliation method and emphasize that privacy is
very important in the work environment. The results for the open negotiation are
mixed with a trend towards a positive (41%) and neutral position (31%). Thus, this
supports our Hypothesis 2 in the NDCO scenario. Three subjects answer that there
are no important data in this scenario and two subjects mention that the reconcilia-
tion process is easier and faster using the open negotiation. The results for the closed
negotiation are mixed with roughly an equal number of positive (38%) and negative
answers (39%). 23% of the test persons are undecided. This does neither prove nor
disprove our Hypothesis 3 in the NDCO scenario.
Table 6.5.6 shows the average ratings for the three reconciliation methods. We
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Figure 6.5.3: Application Scenarios: Scheduling Excursions.
Reconciliation Method ∅NDSE ∅NDSEM ∅NDSEW ∅NDCO ∅NDCOM ∅NDCOW
Open Negotiation 2.93 2.94 2.91 3.13 3.24 3
Closed Negotiation 3 2.88 3.18 3.03 2.81 3.27
Negotiation by SMC 4 4.06 3.91 4.06 3.88 4.25
Table 6.5.6: Average Ratings (∅), and gender-specific average ratings (∅M ,∅F ), for
the three reconciliation methods in the NDSE and NDCO scenario.
have high ratings for the negotiation by SMC in the NDSE (4) and NDCO scenario
(4.06). Again, the average rating for the open and closed negotiation is close to
Neutral in both scenarios. Regarding the gender, we have only minor differences in
both scenarios which supports our Hypothesis 4 in the NDSE and NDCO scenarios.
6.5.3.2 Electronic Auctions
The electronic auction scenario is shown in Figure B.1.9 in the Appendix B. The
description of the scenario is as follows. The auction type is a first-price sealed bid
auction. Here, each bidder has the chance to place one maximal bid for the item to
be purchased. The bid has to be placed until the end of the week. Afterwards, the
winner of the auction and the price is determined. The winner of the auction is the
bidder with the highest bid. The specific property of a first-price sealed bid auction is
that the winner only pays the second-highest bid for the item. The subject can again
choose between the open negotiation, the closed negotiation, and the negotiation by
secure multi-party computation, see Section 6.5.1. Figure 6.5.4 shows the result
174
6 Applications for Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation Protocols
Figure 6.5.4: Application Scenario: Electronic Auctions.
Reconciliation Method ∅ ∅M ∅W ∅SP ∅E
Open Negotiation 2.18 2.55 1.73 2.33 2.03
Closed Negotiation 2.95 3.55 2.23 2.85 3.03
Negotiation by SMC 4.32 4.30 4.33 4.07 4.52
Table 6.5.7: Average Ratings (∅), gender-specific average ratings (∅M ,∅F ), and
average ratings for students/pupils (∅SP ) and employees (∅E) for the
three reconciliation methods in the BIA scenario.
for the electronic auction scenario. The subjects strongly prefer the negotiation
by secure multi-party computation. Overall, 85% of the subjects strongly agree or
agree to this reconciliation method. Only 1 subject strongly disagrees, 2 subjects
disagree, and 6 have a neutral position. 15 subjects answer that financial data is
strictly confidential and 9 state that this is the most secure variant and thus the
best option for reconciliation.
The majority of the subjects strongly disagree (42%) and 26% disagree to the open
negotiation. Only 3 subjects strongly agree, 10 agree, and 5 have a neutral position.
This clearly supports our Hypothesis 2. Interestingly, 2 subjects state that they
prefer the open negotiation since the knowledge about the other bids is useful for
upcoming auctions. Also, 2 subjects state that the transparency of the auction
process is important. Regarding the closed negotiation, we have mixed results. 8
(14) subjects strongly agree (agree) and 13 (10) strongly disagree (disagree) to this
reconciliation method. 12 subjects have a neutral position. This does not prove or
disprove our Hypothesis 3 (Table 6.5.3).
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Table 6.5.7 shows the average ratings for the three reconciliation methods. The
negotiation by SMC has a very high rating of 4.32. The average rating for the
closed negotiation is close to Neutral with a rating of 2.95 and the rating for the
open negotiation is in the area of Disagree (2.18). For the open/closed negotiation,
we have significant differences (0.82/1.32) considering the gender. This indicates
that women are more privacy aware in the electronic auction scenario and disproves
our Hypothesis 4 in the BIA scenario. Regarding the full-time activity, we have
a difference of 0.45 points for the negotiation by SMC. This is a small indicator
that employees are more privacy aware than students/pupils and it supports our
Hypothesis 5 (Table 6.5.3).
6.5.3.3 Fair and Unbiased Reconciliation
In this section, we present the results on the two composition schemes. We ask the
subjects about the minimum of ranks and sum of ranks composition schemes which
can be used to achieve different notions of fairness in our application scenarios, see
Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
The parts of the study survey about the composition schemes are shown in Fig-
ures B.1.7 and B.1.8 in the Appendix B. Here, a scheduling scenario with prefer-
ences is illustrated. The subject can see a reconciliation example where the result is
chosen according to the sum of ranks or the minimum of ranks composition scheme.
Both composition schemes are explained in detail followed by four questions in the
context of preferences.
We ask the subjects how fair they think it is to select the time slot according to
the sum of ranks and minimum of ranks composition scheme. Figure 6.5.5 shows
the result of the two questions. Surprisingly, the majority (34%) of the subjects
have a neutral position to the sum of ranks composition scheme. 20% even con-
sider this composition scheme to be an unfair option to reconcile the result of the
scheduling. The main reason mentioned by 22 subjects is that the individual is
not considered and it is possible that the result is very bad for individuals. On
the other hand, 14% (32%) state that the sum of ranks is a very fair (fair) option.
3 subjects mention that everybody has the same amount of points and 9 subjects
answer that most of the parties are “happy” with the reconciliation result. Overall,
the current results do neither prove nor disprove our Hypotheses 6 (Table 6.5.3).
The results are more clear for the minimum of ranks composition scheme. 33%
(54%) of the 60 subjects state that the minimum of ranks scheme is a very fair (fair)
option for reconciliation. Only 13% have a neutral position and nobody states that
the composition scheme is unfair or very unfair. 14 subjects answer that everybody
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Figure 6.5.5: Fairness of Sum of Ranks and Minimum of Ranks.
Answer MRM MRW SRM SRW MRSP MRE SRSP SRE
Strongly Agree 8 12 2 6 8 12 3 5
Agree 19 13 13 6 17 15 8 11
Neutral 6 2 10 10 2 6 11 9
Disagree 0 0 8 4 0 0 5 7
Table 6.5.8: Fairness of the two composition schemes (MR,SR) considering the gen-
der (M,W ) and the full-time activity (SP,E) of the subjects.
is somehow happy with the reconciliation result although the result is not optimal
for everybody. Only 2 subjects note that the individual has a high influence on the
reconciliation result. E. g., in a situation where a certain time slot is a very good
solution for the majority of a large number of parties, an individual can outvote the
majority by a very low preference for this time slot. This is not the case using the
sum of ranks composition scheme. Overall, the current results have clearly proven
our Hypotheses 7 (Table 6.5.3).
Table 6.5.8 shows the results for the two composition schemes differentiated by the
gender and the full-time activity of the subjects. The results for both composition
schemes are very similar with only minor differences considering the gender and the
full-time activity of the subjects. Thus, the current results support our Hypotheses 8
(Table 6.5.3). In order to test our Hypotheses 9, we ask the subjects which compo-
sition scheme is preferable. Interestingly, 65% vote for minimum of ranks, only 13%
for sum of ranks, and 22% are undecided. These results have clearly disproven our
Hypotheses 9 (Table 6.5.3).
Finally, we want to know whether our reconciliation protocols based on ordered input
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sets (see Definition 4.1.0.1) are desirable for the users. One way to interpret ordered
sets is to encode preferences into ordered sets as shown in Sections 6.2 and 6.4.1.
Thus, we ask whether the assignment of preferences is desirable in reconciliation
scenarios. The majority of the 60 subjects (88%) answer with Yes which indicates
that our application scenarios are useful for the users.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented different application scenarios in the areas of
event scheduling, e-voting, and electronic auctions for our reconciliation protocols.
We have shown the usefulness of our reconciliation protocols for the subjects in
a comprehensive user study. Most importantly, the evaluation results show that
the subjects always prefer the negotiation by secure multi-party computation in
all reconciliation scenarios. Thus, we can surely state that our MPROS protocols
are useful in our proposed application scenarios. In the next chapter, we present
an efficient implementation of our MPROS protocols within our SMC-MuSe frame-
work.
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Multi-Party Computation on Multisets
In this chapter, we introduce SMC-MuSe, a new framework for Secure Multi-party
Computation on MultiSets in which all SMC-related computations are carried out
on the clients themselves. The framework is targeted at the efficient computation of
arbitrary compositions of privacy-preserving multiset operations. Here, we support
the multiset intersection, union, and element reduction operation of Kissner et al.
(see Section 2.5.2) as well as the multiset membership test and the sub-multiset
test newly introduced in the context of this thesis (Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3). All
these operations are based on an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. SMC-MuSe
currently uses a threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem, see Section 2.2.3.1. In
addition, we implemented several zero-knowledge components based on the Paillier
cryptosystem which are used in the reconciliation protocols secure in the malicious
model.
We show the potential of SMC-MuSe by implementing the multi-party privacy-
preserving reconciliation protocols proposed in Chapters 4 and 5. Each of the
MPROS protocols is based on a composition of multiset operations and thus a
canonical candidate for an implementation in SMC-MuSe. We have implemented
the six MPROS protocols MR-rb, MR-sb, MR-opt, SR-rb, SR-sb, and SR-opt which
are secure in the semi-honest model (see Chapter 4) and the four MPROS protocols
MR-sbMM , MR-optMM , SR-sbMM , and SR-optMM which are secure in the mali-
cious model (see Chapter 5).
In addition, we show how SMC-MuSe allows an application developer to easily turn a
protocol implementation into a user-friendly SMC application. The latter is demon-
strated by the implementation of a scheduling application on top of the MPROS
protocols in the desktop and mobile environment. SMC-MuSe enables the imple-
mentation of e-Voting schemes, electronic auctions, scheduling applications, and
generally, any other application that can be built on top of the supported multiset
operations or reconciliation protocols.
Outline: In Section 7.1, we present the general design of our SMC-MuSe frame-
work. In Section 7.2 we provide an overview of our implementation. Sections 7.3,
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7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 describe the different components of SMC-MuSe. We conclude the
chapter with a comparison against related SMC frameworks in Section 2.4.1.2. Ap-
pendix A provides a more technical view on all projects within SMC-MuSe.
7.1 Framework Design
SMC-MuSe is a carefully designed framework for secure multi-party computation on
multisets and as such allows application developers to implement privacy-preserving
applications. SMC-MuSe supports the developer in generating code for the dis-
tributed computation of any function that can be expressed by a composition of
multiset operations as defined in Table 3.1.1. SMC-MuSe also provides implemen-
tations of our privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols which are a good example
for protocols based on privacy-preserving multiset operations. Finally, we show how
SMC-MuSe allows an application developer to easily turn a protocol implementation
into a user-friendly SMC application. The latter is demonstrated by the implemen-
tation of a scheduling application on top of the MPROS protocols in the desktop
and mobile environment. In the following, we describe our design characteristics in
Section 7.1.1, discuss the used system model in Section 7.1.2, and present the core
design features of SMC-MuSe in Section 7.1.3.
7.1.1 Design Characteristics
The SMC-MuSe framework was designed to exhibit a number of core properties.
• Security and Privacy: Building on privacy-preserving multiset operations, the
framework is implemented in a way that provides for suitable security and
privacy guarantees.
• Usability: SMC-MuSe is implemented in a way that makes SMC easily acces-
sible to application developers and thus ultimately supports SMC applications
for end-users.
• Platform Support: On the client side, our framework supports all major oper-
ating systems including Linux, Windows, OS X, and Android.
• Efficiency and Scalability: Each component is implemented in an efficient way
such that SMC-MuSe supports a large number of users simultaneously.
• Reliability: Our framework is resilient against a range of possible errors dur-
ing SMC computations such as network transmission failures or unstable user
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systems.
• Modularity and Simplicity: The framework is built in a way such that it can
easily be extended to support additional modules such as other cryptosystems
or different implementations of multiset operations. In addition, an application
developer can integrate any function that is a composition of the multiset
operations shown in Table 3.1.1 in a straightforward manner.
7.1.2 System Model
The general goal of multi-party privacy-preserving protocols is to support n parties in
jointly computing a function of their private inputs without revealing their inputs to
each other. In the following we discuss four different choices for a system model sup-
porting this goal and thereby motivate our own choice.
Model (1) of Figure 7.1.1 illustrates the centralized approach which allows for an
easy solution. It assumes that there is a third party that is trusted by all parties.
Specifically, each party sends its inputs to the trusted third party (over a secure
channel), the third party computes the output from the received plaintext inputs
and sends back the result and only the result to each one of the participating parties.
Unfortunately, in practice the existence of such a trusted third party is a very strong
and quite unrealistic assumption.
A second approach is the distributed approach which is widely adopted in theoretical
SMC. In theory, secure multi-party computation protocols solve the problem of a
trusted third party and allow n parties to jointly compute a function of their pri-
vate inputs without revealing anything but what can be deduced from the intended
outcome to each other or to anyone else, not even to a trusted third party. To
reach these privacy goals, SMC protocols typically assume that (A) all participating
parties can directly communicate with each other, (B) there is a secure channel be-
tween any two of the participating parties, (C) any additional keying material that
is required by the parties to jointly compute the function in a privacy-preserving
manner is already available at the parties. In particular, these assumptions also
hold for privacy-preserving multiset operations, where assumption (C) implies that
each party holds a key share for an asymmetric semantically secure threshold homo-
morphic cryptosystem. Model (2) of Figure 7.1.1 illustrates the system model and
assumptions of theoretical SMC in general. Unfortunately, all three of the above
assumptions on which SMC protocols are built are hard to establish in practice.
Direct communication between Internet users is often prohibited due to policy re-
strictions, the presence of NATs, or firewall configurations. Establishing a secure
channel between any two users either requires an out of band channel to check
the authenticity of credentials or the involvement of a third party like a certificate
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Figure 7.1.1: System models (1) - (4) for SMC.
authority or some form of a key server. Finally, in case of privacy-preserving mul-
tiset operations, assumption (C) requires the existence and implementation of a
distributed key generation protocol that allows the n parties to jointly generate the
key shares for the threshold cryptosystem.
Model (3) in Figure 7.1.1 illustrates a system model which is widely used in existing
frameworks for SMC [13, 21, 26]. Here, the parties are divided according to their role
within the SMC computation. There are input parties, computing nodes, and result
parties. The input parties provide the encrypted input to the computing nodes. The
computing nodes perform the computation of the chosen function and forward their
results to the result parties. In theory, a party/node can have any subset of those
roles. Typically, the clients are input and result parties. The computation nodes are
trusted servers within the network. The clients trust that the nodes correctly carry
out the computations and forward the messages. All parties/nodes agree on keying
material beforehand. This system model is a mix between system model (1) and (2).
Here, the computing nodes act as trusted third parties with respect to computation.
A problem with this approach is that a majority of corrupted computing nodes
leads to a complete information leakage of the private inputs. One could also argue
that Model (3) is very similar to Model (1) with the only difference that there
are a number of trusted third parties instead of only one trusted third party. We
argue that it is better to have the computation on the client-side because it is less
likely that a majority of all existing client systems is corrupted. Furthermore, the
distributed computing property is the main feature of theoretically secure multi-
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party computation. I. e., computation on the client systems rather than on trusted
servers. The third assumption of SMC about pre-distributed keys is also not solved
in this system model.
Model (4) of Figure 7.1.1 illustrates our system model. We solved the challenges of
theoretical SMC by introducing two independent non-colluding third parties called
the Server and Keyserver component in the following. The client components are re-
sponsible for all SMC computations, the initiation of protocol runs, and the exchange
of messages with each other via the Server component. The Server component is
responsible for correctly forwarding messages with encrypted content between the
clients. The Keyserver component is responsible for generating SSL-certificates and
generating key shares for the public/private key for the homomorphic threshold
cryptosystem.
It is important to note that in contrast to the trusted third party in Model (1),
the Server component in Model (4) does not learn anything about the plaintext
inputs of the participating parties. Also, the Keyserver—although in possession of
the private key pairs for the threshold homomorphic cryptosystem—does not have
access to the messages exchanged between the clients via the Server component.
Thus, unlike the trusted third party in Model (1), the Keyserver in Model (4) does
not learn anything about the inputs or the output of the SMC computations. Note
that SMC implementations operating in Model (3) typically assume pre-established
keying material such that as opposed to Model (4) the key management problem of
the theoretical Model (2) is not addressed in Model (3).
In summary, our system model allows for an easy automated setup phase and solves
the theoretical assumptions for secure channels and key generation in a convenient
way. However, one relies on the Server and Keyserver components which are partially
trusted in correct message forwarding and key generation. We argue that without
any trust as suggested in theoretical SMC (Model (2) in Figure 7.1.1), it is hardly
possible to implement SMC in a way that it is easily accessible and usable for appli-
cation developers and especially for non-technical users.
7.1.3 Features
Based on the system model, we now describe the design features of the SMC-MuSe
framework. In the following we categorize design and implementation decisions
based on the properties they enable (see Section 7.1.1)—indicated in parenthe-
sis.
Asynchronous Communication: Our choice of a system model implies that the
Server component is involved in all communication between the users. Thus, for a
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huge user base the expected traffic on the server-side is assumed to be very high.
Therefore, we have adapted the JBoss Netty project [142] which provides an efficient
asynchronous event-driven network application framework such that it can handle
encrypted traffic, certificate verification, and serialization (Efficiency and Scalabil-
ity).
Fast Message Processing: We chose the MessagePack project (MP) [72] to se-
rialize messages. MP provides small and fast serialization for many programming
languages. Fast message processing on Keyserver/Server component- and client-side
is possible since messages are handled in an asynchronous event-loop (Efficiency and
Scalability).
Efficient SMC Computations: SMC-MuSe provides interfaces to compute the
intersection, union, reduction, membership, and sub-multiset operation on multisets.
These SMC operations provide the core security and privacy functionality of the
framework (Security and Privacy). These expensive computations are outsourced
to so-called worker components such that computation and message handling are
separated (Efficiency and Modularity).
State-based SMC-Protocol Implementation: Any SMC-protocol that can be
implemented in SMC-MuSe is a composition of multiset operations. SMC-MuSe en-
ables the implementation of SMC-protocols in a modular state-based fashion which
yields three main advantages. First, it allows the Server component to store the state
of the computation and encrypted intermediate results. In case of an error during
the computation or when a client disconnects, the stored information can be used to
later on resume an SMC-protocol run (Usability). In addition, storage failures (e. g.,
database errors) can be handled by means of frequent backups. Overall, this results
in highly resilient SMC-protocol runs (Reliability). Second, the state-based imple-
mentation allows for easy adaptation of protocol runs (Modularity). This enables an
easy modification of the computed function. Third, the modular design yields source
code that can easily be comprehended (Simplicity).
Secure and Efficient Storage of SMC-protocols: We chose MongoDB [136]
to store encrypted serialized SMC-protocol runs on the Server component and a
file-based storage mechanism to keep intermediate results on the clients (Usability).
MongoDB is a high-performance NOSQL database available for different platforms
(Scalability).
Automated Secure Channel Establishment: SMC-MuSe provides interfaces to
automatically generate a keystore containing a private/public key pair for a client.
The client can then use the keystore to establish mutually authenticated SSL con-
nections with the Server as well as the Keyserver component (Security and Usabil-
ity).
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Automated Key Generation and Distribution: SMC-MuSe supports several
threshold homomorphic cryptosystems. The Keyserver component automatically
generates key shares of the cryptosystem for any keysize/clients combination (Us-
ability). Keying material is distributed to connected clients via secure channels
(Security).
Summary: SMC-MuSe provides a sophisticated implementation of all components
such that application developers can easily make use of them when implementing a
privacy-preserving application based on privacy-preserving multiset operations. In
particular, they do not need to worry about implementing a threshold homomorphic
cryptosystem, implementing privacy-preserving multiset operations, setting up se-
cure channels, and generating and distributing keys to the clients.
7.2 Overview of the Implementation
The SMC-MuSe framework currently comprises several homomorphic cryptosys-
tems, zero-knowledge proofs, privacy-preserving multiset operations, multi-party
reconciliation protocols, different computation and communication components, and
also two end-user applications for the desktop and mobile environment.
In the following, we describe all projects and components within the SMC-MuSe
framework. Appendix A provides a more technical view on the projects of SMC-
MuSe which especially addresses developers using the SMC-MuSe framework.
7.2.1 Description of the Projects
As described in Section 7.1.1, one of the design characteristics is Modularity and
Simplicity. Thus, we arranged our implementation in different modular projects.
Each project is well structured and documented such that future developments can
benefit of the components of our SMC-MuSe framework. Figure 7.2.1 gives an
overview of the SMC-MuSe projects and their relation to each other. The main
project is the Privacy-Preserving Application library and there are three support
libraries which are used in different components of the main project. Appendix A
provides further information about the structure of each project, the build process,
library dependencies, code repositories, and installation instructions. For the latest
version and updated dependencies, it is recommended to use the repositories and
installation instructions listed in the Appendix A.
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; SMC-MuSe
; Privacy-Preserving Applications Library ; Support Libraries
; Cryptographic Components
; Support Infrastructure
; Reconciliation Protocols
; User-Friendly Applications
;PPA JNI Natives
;PPA Netback
;Prefer
Figure 7.2.1: Overview of the SMC-MuSe projects.
7.2.1.1 Java Project: Privacy-Preserving Applications Library
The Privacy-Preserving Applications (PPA) Library is the core project of our frame-
work SMC-MuSe and provides the implementation of various components presented
in Sections 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6. The package namespace is ppa.* and we give a
high-level description of all packages in the corresponding sections. Appendix A.1
provides additional information about the project structure and the content of the
packages.
7.2.1.2 C++ Project: PPA JNI Natives
This project is used in the implementation of the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem,
see Section 7.3.1.1. The project consists of a native C++ library for arithmetic
computations and bindings to the PPA library using the JNI technique. The pack-
age namespace is ppa.utils.natives. The main source file of the C++ library is
ppa jni natives.cpp, see Appendix A.2 for more details.
7.2.1.3 Java Project: PPA Netback
This project provides an implementation of efficient and secure asynchronous com-
munication using the JBoss Netty project [142]. The JBoss Netty project provides
an asynchronous event-driven network application framework to the Java program-
ming language. The PPA-Netback project is an abstraction from the Netty project
and copes with encrypted network communication, mutual certificate verification
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and MessagePack [72] packing/unpacking. The PPA-Netback is an enhancement
of the itsecnetback project1 initially developed by M. Schlo¨sser in his diploma the-
sis [177].
We use this project to establish encrypted and authenticated channels between each
party and the Server/Keyserver Component, see Section 7.4.1.1. The PPA-Netback
is also used by our desktop client (Section 7.6.1) and our Android application (Sec-
tion 7.6.2) for usable secure multi-party computation to establish secure and au-
thenticated connections. The package namespace is ppanetback.* and we give a
high-level description of all packages in the corresponding sections. Appendix A.3
provides additional information about the project.
7.2.1.4 Android Project: Prefer
This project provides an implementation of our Android application Prefer, see
Section 7.6.2. Prefer is a user-friendly smartphone application that allows the user
to schedule events in a privacy-preserving manner, see Section 6.2. The package
namespace is ppaprefer.* and we give a high-level description of all packages in the
corresponding sections. Appendix A.4 provides additional information about the
project.
7.3 Cryptographic Components
Figure 7.3.1 shows an overview of all cryptographic components of SMC-MuSe. In
the following, we describe the different components. In Section 7.3.1, we start with
the cryptographic primitives. In Section 7.3.2, we describe the implemented privacy-
preserving multiset operations and in Section 7.3.3 we present our implementation
of the zero-knowledge proofs.
7.3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we describe all cryptographic primitives which are the basic building
blocks of our SMC-MuSe framework.
1Pwrcall: https://github.com/rep/pwrcall
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Figure 7.3.1: Overview of SMC-MuSe’s Cryptographic Components.
7.3.1.1 Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem
The core cryptographic primitive in our implementation is a threshold version of
the additively homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem, see Section 2.2.3.1. The Paillier
cryptosystem is the basic building block for our multi-party privacy-preserving rec-
onciliation protocols described in Chapters 4 and 5. We implemented a threshold
version [67] and the non-threshold version [161] of the Paillier cryptosystem. The
threshold variant of the Paillier cryptosystem uses the Shamir Secret Sharing scheme
over a finite field to generate key shares for each party, see Definition 2.1.4.6. Our
implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem uses a native C++ library which we
detail in the following.
Native C++ Library: The native C++ library is used for efficient arithmetic com-
puting. The main cryptographic operations of the Paillier cryptosystem used in our
protocols are homomorphic additions (+h) and scalar multiplications (×h). In the
Paillier cryptosystem, these operations correspond to a modular multiplication (+h)
and a modular exponentiation (×h) in ZN2 .
We implemented these two basic modular operations using the GNU Multiple Preci-
sion arithmetic library (GMP) [79] to provide a very efficient implementation of our
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reconciliation protocols. GMP implements the Karatsuba [112] and Scho¨nhage and
Strassen algorithm [179] for multiplication of b-bit integers. For modular exponenti-
ation, exponentiation by squaring with Montgomery reduction [137] is implemented,
compare [79].
The native library is linked against the GMP library version 5.0.5. The native library
(.so) is used by our PPA library using the JNI technique [155]. Here, we have a Java
class that maps all implemented native functions to Java methods. Thereby, the
developer can call the native functions in a convenient way using only the Java native
interface. Further details can be found in Appendix A.2.
7.3.1.2 Other Cryptosystems
The library also contains implementations of three further cryptosystems. Namely,
the additively homomorphic Benaloh cryptosystem [15], a threshold version [67]
and the non-threshold version [60] of the multiplicatively homomorphic ElGamal
cryptosystem, and a threshold version [68] and the non-threshold version [170] of
the RSA cryptosystem. Our reconciliation protocols require a threshold version of an
additively homomorphic cryptosystem. Thus, we do not use these cryptosystems in
the implementation of our reconciliation protocols but they may be useful in future
work or projects.
Table 7.3.1 gives an overview of the package structure and a short description of the
content of our cryptographic primitives implementation.
7.3.2 Privacy-Preserving Multiset Operations
A core part of our framework SMC-MuSe is the implementation of the privacy-
preserving multiset operations based on an additively homomorphic cryptosystem
as presented in Sections 2.5.2 and 3.1. Here, multisets are represented as poly-
nomials. Thus, we created classes to efficiently represent and manipulate poly-
nomials. An encrypted polynomial is represented by its encrypted coefficients.
Building on our polynomial implementation, we implemented methods for com-
putation on encrypted polynomials using an additively homomorphic cryptosys-
tem.
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Package Description
ppa.crypto.interfaces Interface classes for all components of a cryptosystem imple-
mented in SMC-MuSe. Each cryptosystem implements inter-
faces for encryption, decryption, and key generation.
ppa.crypto.paillier Our implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem as described
in Section 7.3.1.1. The package contains classes for key gen-
eration, encryption, homomorphic operations, and decryption.
The package is used by the Chat component of our user-friendly
applications, see Sections 7.6.1 and 7.6.2.
ppa.crypto.paillier.threshold Our implementation of the Threshold Paillier cryptosystem as
described in Section 7.3.1.1. The package contains classes for key
generation, encryption, homomorphic operations, and threshold
decryption. The package is especially used by the implementa-
tion of the reconciliation protocols and thus in particular also
by the scheduling application, see Sections 7.5 and 7.6. The
package also contains an extension of the semi-honest imple-
mentation of the threshold variant of the Paillier cryptosystem
by the zero-knowledge proofs that are required in the malicious
model, see Section 2.3.4.4. This includes an extension of the key
generation algorithm to generate verification keys, which are dis-
tributed to all parties to verify partial decryptions of each other,
see also Section 7.3.3.
ppa.utils.natives All implemented JNI methods using the native C++ library.
There is also an initialization class that loads the native library
together with the linked GMP library for the Android, Windows,
and Linux architecture.
ppa.secretsharing Implementation of the Shamir Secret Sharing scheme over a fi-
nite field as defined in Definition 2.1.4.6. The package contains
a class to initialize the secret sharing scheme with a threshold
value, a secret, a bit length for the coefficients and a modulus
for the finite field. Furthermore, there are methods to generate
shares and reconstruct a secret given an array of shares.
ppa.crypto.benaloh
ppa.crypto.elgamal
ppa.crypto.rsa Our implementation of the Benaloh, ElGamal, and the RSA
cryptosystem respectively (see Section 7.3.1.2). The package
content is similar to the ppa.crypto.paillier package.
Table 7.3.1: Overview of the packages for the cryptographic primitives.
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The computation of the addition, multiplication, and the derivative of encrypted
polynomials as described in Section 2.5.2 enables the implementation of the privacy-
preserving multiset intersection, union, and reduction operations proposed by Kiss-
ner et al. [114]. Using our polynomial implementation, we also implemented the
newly-developed multiset membership and sub-multiset test proposed in Sections 3.1.2
and 3.1.3.
We use the implementation of the multiset operations in our reconciliation protocols
which we describe in Section 7.5. In our protocols, we use the Threshold Paillier
Cryptosystem as the additively homomorphic cryptosystem. Table 7.3.2 briefly ex-
plains the content of our implementation of multiset operations.
7.3.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
In this section, we describe all implemented zero-knowledge proofs based on the
Paillier cryptosystem. We use those zero-knowledge proofs in our reconciliation
protocols secure in the malicious model (see Chapter 5). In Section 7.3.3.1, we
describe the general approach to specify, construct, and verify a zero-knowledge
proof. In Section 7.3.3.2, we present an overview of all implemented zero-knowledge
proof protocols.
7.3.3.1 Proof Specification, Construction, and Verification
For specifying a proof goal, a tree structure similar to the one in the Camenisch-
Stadler framework [28] is used. Each subtree states a property of a tuple of secret
Paillier plaintexts. There are two types of leaves: Plaintext(α) specifies the knowl-
edge of a single plaintext that is encrypted by α, and LinearEq(α1,...,αp,β) specifies
the knowledge of p plaintexts m1, ..,mp, such that β is the result of α1 ×h m1 +h
...+h αp ×hmp where α1, ..., αp, β are ciphertexts. Both proofs can be combined by
two types of inner nodes: Concat specifies to concatenate the tuples of plaintexts of
both subtrees and And specifies that the plaintexts in both subtrees of equal tuple
size are the same.
Specifications are built by both the prover and the verifier and thus contain no se-
cret information. They can be understood as a contract upon which the parties
have agreed. If the parties construct different specifications, the proof verification
will fail. The specification can be passed to a proof generator which requires the
input of all secret information claimed in the specification. The proof generator
traverses the tree and computes the commitments, challenge and responses as de-
fined by the plaintext knowledge and the linear equation proofs, see Protocols 3.2.1
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Package Description
ppa.datastructures.polynomials Classes to represent and manipulate unencrypted polyno-
mials. It is possible to add, differentiate, divide, and mul-
tiply polynomials. One can also evaluate a polynomial at
a certain point and check the equality of polynomials.
ppa.polynomials multisetops
.intersectunionreduction This package enables the computation on encrypted poly-
nomials using an additively homomorphic cryptosystem.
The package supports the encryption of a polynomial,
the partial decryption and recovery of an encrypted poly-
nomial, the addition of two encrypted polynomials, the
multiplication of an encrypted polynomial with an unen-
crypted polynomial, and the computation of the deriva-
tive of an encrypted polynomial. The package also pro-
vides an implementation of the multiset intersection,
union, and element reduction operations.
ppa.polynomials multisetops
.membership/.submultiset Implementation of the multiset membership and sub-
multiset test using an additively homomorphic cryptosys-
tem. Here, we implemented the simplified polynomial
long division using the Horner scheme with a linear divi-
sor and the general polynomial long division with an ar-
bitrary divisor as proposed in Algorithms 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
Table 7.3.2: Overview of the packages for the multiset operations.
and 3.2.3. Finally, the proof is compiled to a simple array of arbitrary-precision
integers that can be sent to the verifier. A receiving party can then call the proof
verifier, which returns a true/false decision upon the input of a specification and a
proof.
7.3.3.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocols
SMC-MuSe provides interfaces to all zero-knowledge proof protocols presented in
Sections 2.3.4, 3.2, and 3.3. We implemented a non-interactive proof of a
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Package Description
ppa.zeroknowledge.datastructures Data objects used in the construction of the zero-
knowledge proofs. We use the MessagePack serialization
to exchange objects with other parties.
ppa.zeroknowledge.commitments Implementation of the trapdoor commitment generation
and verification as proposed by Catalano et al. [33]. We
use this package to implement commitment schemes, see
Definition 2.1.4.2.
ppa.zeroknowledge.shuffle subset Data structures for specifying the knowledge of a per-
mutation as well as algorithms for generation and veri-
fication of the corresponding proofs. Based on the im-
plementation of verifiable shuffles, this package provides
high-level methods to prove subset relations in a non-
interactive way as described in Section 2.3.4.3..
ppa.zeroknowledge.framework Implementation of the main framework for proving com-
putations involving Paillier ciphertexts, including the
general specification, construction, and verification of
zero-knowledge proofs. This package also provides an
implementation of the plaintext knowledge, correct mul-
tiplication, and homomorphic linear equation proofs as
described in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3.
ppa.zeroknowledge.polynomials Based on the general framework for proving computa-
tions using the Paillier cryptosystem, this package pro-
vides high-level methods to prove polynomial operations
(Section 3.3.1) and polynomial constructions (Section
3.3.2), as well as malicious model implementations of the
multiset intersection, union and element reduction oper-
ations (Section 3.3.1).
Table 7.3.3: Overview of the packages for the zero-knowledge proofs.
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subset relation based on verifiable shuffles. The algorithms are the same algorithms
as described in [150], converted to a non-interactive form using the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic, see Section 2.3.4.3. We also implemented the malicious model threshold de-
cryption of the Paillier cryptosystem as described in Section 2.3.4.4.
The core of SMC-MuSe’s zero-knowledge components are the non-interactive plain-
text knowledge proof, the non-interactive correct multiplication proof, and the ho-
momorphic linear equation proof as described in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
Based on those proofs, we then implemented proof protocols for polynomial oper-
ations which can be used to realize verifiable multiset operations as described in
Section 3.3.1. We also implemented proofs for the construction of polynomials as
described in Section 3.3.2.
Table 7.3.3 explains the content of our zero-knowledge proofs implementation.
7.4 Support Infrastructure
SMC-MuSe has an elaborated support infrastructure which assists the developer
to set up the environment for secure multi-party computation. Especially, this in-
cludes components that help in the communication between the parties and in the
computation effort of each party. Figure 7.4.1 shows an overview of all compo-
nents of SMC-MuSe’s support infrastructure. In the following, we describe the main
components of the communication and computation components in more detail. Ta-
ble 7.4.2 provides implementation details on all implemented components including
the miscellaneous components.
7.4.1 Communication Components
As discussed in Section 7.1.2, SMC-MuSe uses a system model with a Server and
Keyserver component. In order to achieve efficient and secure communication be-
tween all parties, each party has to set up a secure connection with the Server and
the Keyserver component. Since the Server component acts as a relay server and
forwards all messages between all parties, it has to be ensured that the message
processing is very fast. In the following, we describe our components to support the
communication between all parties.
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Figure 7.4.1: Overview of SMC-MuSe’s Support Infrastructure.
7.4.1.1 Secure Channels
SMC-MuSe supports the developer to set up secure channels between all parties.
As described in Section 2.4, a secure channel provides an encrypted and authen-
ticated connection between two parties. We implemented a secure channel as a
mutually authenticated SSL connection [53]. SMC-MuSe supports a Java keystore
for the desktop environment and a BouncyCastle keystore for the Android plat-
form.
In our system model, each party establishes secure channels with the Keyserver and
Server component in the following way. As a prerequisite, each party is in pos-
session of an authentic public key of the Keyserver and Server component. First,
the party connects to the Keyserver component and authenticates the SSL connec-
tion. The public key of the client is submitted to the Keyserver component for
signing. The Keyserver component signs the public key of the party and gener-
ates a public key certificate. The certificate is sent to the party over the estab-
lished SSL connection. The client can then use the certificate to establish mutually
authenticated SSL connections with the Server as well as the Keyserver compo-
nent.
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7.4.1.2 Asynchronous Communication
In our system model, all communication traffic is routed through the Server com-
ponent to simplify the communication between all parties. The Server component
should be able to cope with a large number of parties. We implemented the com-
munication in an asynchronous way using an event loop at the Server component.
Therefore, we have adapted the JBoss Netty project [142] which provides an efficient
asynchronous event-driven network application framework such that it can handle
encrypted traffic, mutual certificate verification, and serialization. The Server com-
ponent has a separate message handling part which is responsible for the message
processing. We use message queues to report results, new messages and state changes
between different components of our framework.
7.4.1.3 Message Serialization
We choose the MessagePack project (MP) [72] to serialize messages in a fast and
efficient way. MP provides small and fast serialization for many programming lan-
guages. Fast message processing on the Keyserver/Server component- and client-
side is possible since messages are handled in an asynchronous event-loop. We
provide a message handling part for each component to pack and unpack mes-
sages using the MP format. We implement the serialization of all exchanged mes-
sages in our reconciliation protocols and user-friendly applications. If the appli-
cation developer needs a different format, the serialization library can be easily
exchanged.
7.4.2 Computation Components
We support the developer in the key generation and provide useful classes to imple-
ment all computations within our reconciliation protocols in an efficient way.
7.4.2.1 Keyserver Component
SMC-MuSe uses the Threshold Paillier cryptosystem for the implementation of
the reconciliation protocols. The Keyserver component automatically generates
key shares for any keysize/clients combination. Keying material is distributed to
connected clients via secure channels. In addition, the Keyserver keeps a pool of
freshly generated keying material for different combinations of keysize/clients to
avoid delays while starting a reconciliation protocol run. Note that fresh key shares
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Worker Name Computation Purpose / Task
ENCRYPT Encrypt an input polynomial (poly).
KEYGEN Generate key pairs for an MPROS run.
ADD Add two encrypted polys.
MULT Multiply an encrypted poly and
an unencrypted poly.
INTERSECT, UNION, Combination of ADD/MULT operations
REDUCTION, MEMBERSHIP, on encrypted polys.
ERASE, SUB-MULTISET,
DIFFERENCE
PARTIALDECRYPT Partial decryption of an encrypted poly.
RECOVERY Decryption of an encrypted poly
by combining partially decrypted polys.
RESULTCHECK Compute the roots of a decrypted poly.
Table 7.4.1: List of Implemented Workers.
are distributed to the clients whenever a new reconciliation protocol run is initi-
ated.
7.4.2.2 Workers for Secure Multi-Party Computation
As discussed in Section 7.4.1.2, all communication is routed through the Server
component and thus the processing of messages should be very fast. In our recon-
ciliation protocols, we have to compute expensive cryptographic operations as the
computation of privacy-preserving multiset operations. We implemented a Worker
Thread Pool which can handle up to 10 jobs in parallel. All expensive computations
are outsourced to those Workers. A list of available workers is given in Table 7.4.1.
The outsourced multiset operations operate on input multisets encrypted by an
additively homomorphic threshold cryptosystem. The output of any combination
of operations on multisets is jointly decrypted by the participating parties. This
is why apart from the workers for the multiset operations there are workers for
the encryption of inputs, the partial threshold decryption of an output and the
combination of partial decryptions of an output. Each client uses the same set
of implemented workers used for secure multi-party computations. Note that all
workers (except for KEYGEN, which is computed on the Keyserver component) are
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Package Description
ppa.datastructures.* Implementation of all data structures used in SMC-
MuSe. We used cryptographic, database, policy, poly-
nomial, result, and user data structures. All components
are serializable using MessagePack.
ppa.utils.* Implementation of most components of the support in-
frastructure. Thus includes classes for certificate gener-
ation and verification. We also provide methods to gen-
erate Java or BouncyCastle keystores. We implemented
measurements for the runtime of a protocol and the num-
ber of data transmitted by each party. The package also
contains the message and worker queues and classes to
store data in a database or a file-based manner.
ppa.smc worker.* Implementation of all secure multi-party computation
workers used in our reconciliation protocols (see Ta-
ble 7.4.1).
ppa.examples.* Implementation of examples for different components of
the SMC-MuSe framework. We also implemented JUnit
tests for all cryptographic primitives, see Section 7.3.1.
Table 7.4.2: Overview of the packages for the support infrastructure.
executed on the clients.
Table 7.4.2 describes the packages of our support infrastructure implementation.
7.5 Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation Protocols
The most important part of SMC-MuSe is the implementation of the reconciliation
protocols proposed in Chapters 4 and 5. Figure 7.5.1 shows an overview of all
implemented reconciliation protocols. We also ported the C++ implementation of
PROS protocols presented in [128]. In Section 7.5.1, we present the implementation
of the semi-honest variants and we discuss the malicious variants in Section 7.5.2.
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Figure 7.5.1: Overview of SMC-MuSe’s Reconciliation Protocols.
7.5.1 Reconciliation Protocols Secure in the Semi-Honest Model
First, we explain the state-based implementation of the reconciliation protocols se-
cure in the semi-honest model in Section 7.5.1.1. Then, we describe the different
protocol implementations.
7.5.1.1 State-based Implementation of Reconciliation Protocols
Each protocol run is identified by a unique session id. A protocol run consists of
input generation, input encryption, computation of set operations, threshold de-
cryption, and computation of the final result. All computations are done by the
clients utilizing the workers for SMC computation described in Section 7.4.2.2. All
communication is asynchronous. The Server component forwards messages between
the parties during an MPROS run. A message contains an opcode, information
about the receiver, and encrypted data. The Keyserver component securely pro-
vides the keying material to all parties using mutually authenticated SSL connec-
tions.
We describe our approach to implement the MPROS protocols on the example of the
set-based variant for the minimum of ranks composition scheme MR-sb focusing on
the communication and computation components. Figure 7.5.2 illustrates our state-
based implementation of MR-sb as an SMC-protocol. First, the MR-sb protocol
starts with an initialization. Each client chooses its inputs and orders them ac-
cording to his preferences (1.). Second, the Keyserver generates key shares for all
clients and distributes them (2.). Third, all clients compute the encryption of the
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Figure 7.5.2: State-based implementation of MR-sb.
polynomial representing their input (3.). Next, all clients jointly compute the in-
tersection operation on the encrypted polynomials (4.). c + 1 clients compute the
reduction operation on the encryption of the intersection polynomial (5.). All clients
jointly decrypt the encryption of the reduction polynomial (6.). Finally, each client
calculates the result of the computation by calculating the roots of the polynomial
(7.).
During an MPROS protocol run, the Server component forwards incoming encrypted
messages and stores encrypted intermediate results of the states ENC, ∩, and Rdt
to resume an MPROS run in case of client or Keyserver/Server component errors
(A.). Due to the state-based implementation, clients can conveniently disconnect
and reconnect during an SMC-protocol run.
7.5.1.2 First, Second, and Third Approach
We have implemented the three variants for the minimum of ranks and sum of
ranks composition scheme MR-rb, MR-sb, MR-opt, SR-rb, SR-sb, and SR-opt (see
Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3). All protocols are implemented in
a state-based fashion. Table 7.5.1 gives an overview of the different states and their
meaning.
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State Name Purpose / Task
INIT Waiting for the key distribution.
KEYS RECEIVED Ready for protocol start.
POLYENC Encryption of the input multisets.
CALCINTERSECTION Computation of a multiset intersection.
CALCUNION Computation of a multiset union.
CALCREDUCTION Computation of a multiset reduction.
AGGREGATE Sum up intermediate computation result.
PARTIALDECRYPT Computation of a partial decryption of a result.
RECOVERY Recovery of a result.
RESULTCHECK Check the result of the computation.
Table 7.5.1: List of States used in our state-based implementation of the semi-honest
reconciliation protocols.
7.5.2 Reconciliation Protocols Secure in the Malicious Model
We have also implemented the reconciliation protocols secure in the malicious model
MR-sbMM , MR-optMM , SR-sbMM , and SR-optMM (see Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.3.1,
and 5.3.2). Here, we use verifiable multiset operations utilizing our zero-knowledge
proof implementation (see Section 7.3.3.2) to achieve security in the malicious model.
We measure the communication overhead of each party using the MessagePack se-
rialization.
Table 7.5.2 explains the content of our implementation of reconciliation protocols.
7.6 Applications
One of the major design goals of the SMC-MuSe framework is to provide an imple-
mentation of usable secure multi-party computation for end-users. Therefore, we
built a privacy-preserving scheduling application (see Section 6.2) for regular Inter-
net users on top of the reconciliation protocols. Further applications, e. g., Sealed-
Bid Auctions or Borda Count Voting (see Chapter 6), could easily be integrated
reusing most of the existing GUI components.
Our applications make use of the semi-honest protocol variants to enable a privacy-
201
7 SMC-MuSe: A Framework for Secure Multi-Party Computation
Package Description
ppa.mpros.semihonest Implementation of all semi-honest model variants of our
reconciliation protocols. Here, we also implemented the
message handle and frontend classes necessary for the
PPA-Netback used for efficient and secure asynchronous
communication. Both classes are implemented for all
clients and the Server as well as the Keyserver compo-
nent. The message handling class contains all used mes-
sages including the opcodes. The frontend class imple-
ments the logic of our reconciliation protocols. Here, the
developer can find the different states of the state-based
implementation.
ppa.mpros.malicious Implementation of all malicious model variants of our
reconciliation protocols. The package also implements
an automated test setup to test the efficiency of the pro-
tocols with respect to computation and communication.
ppa.pros Implementation of the PROS protocols for the minimum
of ranks and sum of ranks composition schemes presented
in Section 2.6.3.
Table 7.5.2: Overview of the packages for the reconciliation protocols.
preserving scheduling application, see Section 7.5.1. We do not integrate the mali-
cious model protocol variants since the runtime and the communication overhead is
relatively high. The integration of those protocol variants is part of future work as
discussed in Chapter 9.
We implemented a desktop application which runs on any Linux-based operating
system, Windows, and OS X operating system. As a second effort, we devel-
oped an Android application running on any smartphone with Android version
2.3+. The graphical user interfaces (GUI) of the applications are designed for
non-tech-savvy users. Figure 7.6.1 illustrates the implemented components. We
present the desktop application in Section 7.6.1 and the Android application in
Section 7.6.2.
7.6.1 Desktop Application for Reconciliation Protocols
The desktop application is a front end for our reconciliation protocols using the Java
Swing framework [157]. We have also created a Java Web Start browser frontend
[158]. The application detects which OS is running and automatically loads the re-
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Figure 7.6.1: Overview of SMC-MuSe’s User-Friendly Applications.
spective native libraries which are included within the jar-file.
The application allows users to register an account with the Server component,
maintain a friends list, add and delete friends from this list, securely chat with the
friends, and —most importantly— execute reconciliation protocol runs for scheduling
a meeting with any subset of its friends. In the following, we briefly describe the
main components of our application.
User Registration: When a user first registers an account, the client application
automatically generates an SSL keystore. After the Keyserver signing process (see
Section 7.4.2.1), the application establishes mutually authenticated SSL connections
with the Server as well as the Keyserver component. The public key of the Keyserver
component is built-in within the Jar-file of the client software. We also implemented
a Java Web Start browser frontend for our desktop application. The Java Web Start
technology [158] enables the execution of a standalone Java application with a single
click over the network. This allows even non-tech savvy users to run our desktop
application in a browser. Figure 7.6.2 shows the Java Web Start frontend and the
user registration view.
Buddy List and Chat Client: After a successful registration, the Buddy List view
is shown. A user has a Buddy List to add and remove friends and the user can
also chat with its friends. It is also possible to open a group chat and the Chat
component stores a history of the chat messages. Each user account is associated
with a unique email address, a full name, and a 1024 bit public key for the Pail-
lier cryptosystem. The public key is used for end-to-end encryption of the chat
messages exchanged between a user and its friends. In a group chat, a message
is encrypted multiple times to a number of ciphertexts with the public key of the
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Figure 7.6.2: Frontend with the User Registration of the Desktop Application.
respective recipients. Figure 7.6.3 shows the Buddy List and the Chat component.
Scheduling Events: The main component of the desktop application is the Sched-
uler interface. Here, a user can create, initiate, and execute scheduling instances
with any subset of its friends in a privacy-preserving way. The application supports
the reconciliation protocols secure in the semi-honest model presented in Chap-
ter 4. The implementation of those reconciliation protocols is discussed in Sec-
tion 7.5.1.
Figure 7.6.4 shows the different views of the Scheduling component. On the top
left, the creation window is shown where the initiator of the meeting can specify a
meeting name, choose a security level (in number of bits of the cryptosystem), select
one of the reconciliation protocols MR-rb, MR-sb, SR-rb, or SR-sb, and a forced
start date. I. e., a date when the reconciliation protocol run starts even if not all
of the desired participants have entered their possible time slots and preferences.
In the second creation window shown at the top right, the initiator can select the
available dates for the meeting. The final creation view is shown on the top right.
If it is not a day-long meeting, the initiator can set the duration and choose the
possible time slots for the meeting. At the end, the initiator sets the maximum
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Figure 7.6.3: Buddy List and Chat Component of the Desktop Application.
number of selectable time slots (number of inputs k) for each party. This feature
is useful to speed up the runtime of the reconciliation protocols since the runtime
depends on the number of inputs k of each party.
On the bottom right of Figure 7.6.4, the invitation window is shown. Here, the initia-
tor invites its friends to the scheduling of the meeting. Also, the scheduling window
of an invited user is shown. On the left, the user sees a list of available reconciliation
protocols. In the middle, the user can choose from the available time slots the ones
at which the user is available. On the right, the current selection of the user is shown
which can be reordered with the Up/Down arrows.
Table 7.6.1 briefly explains the content of the implementation of our desktop ap-
plication. The Java Web Start browser frontend is in a separate repository, see
Appendix A.6 for more details.
7.6.2 Prefer: An Android Application for Reconciliation Protocols
The Android application Prefer is a user-friendly mobile application for our recon-
ciliation protocols using the Android User Interface [90]. We have developed the
application for Android version 2.3+. Similar to the desktop application, Prefer
allows users to register an account within SMC-MuSe, maintain a friends list, se-
curely chat with the friends, and schedule meetings with any subset of its friends.
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Figure 7.6.4: Scheduler Interface of the Desktop Application.
We have also conducted a user study to improve our application with respect to
functionality, design, and usability. We present the results of our user study in
Section 7.6.2.1. In the following, we present the latest version of our Android appli-
cation.
Prefer uses the cryptographic components, the support infrastructure, and the
MPROS implementation of SMC-MuSe. Each view contains a detailed help menu
where the user can find additional documentation about the current view. The latest
graphical user interface was also re-designed in a way such that it is easy and pleas-
ant to navigate for the user. The documentation and the design are a result of the
feedback obtained in the user study, see Section 7.6.2.1. In the following, we briefly
describe the main components of our application.
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Package Description
ppa.gui.clientapp.setup Implementation of the user registration and the login
window. The package also contains the main class to
run the desktop application.
ppa.gui.clientapp.buddylist
ppa.gui.clientapp.chat Implementation of the Buddy List and the chat compo-
nent. The package also contains the configuration file of
the desktop application. The configuration file is serial-
ized on the file system in the .ppa folder in the home di-
rectory of the user. This makes the application portable,
e. g., the user can use the same user account on different
systems.
ppa.gui.clientapp.scheduler Implementation of the scheduling interface which is a
user-friendly frontend for our reconciliation protocols.
This package uses the implementation of the semi-honest
reconciliation protocols discussed in Section 7.5.1. We
implemented the scheduler component in a modular and
simple way such that it is possible to built similar GUI
frontends easily.
Table 7.6.1: Overview of the packages for the desktop application.
User Registration / Login: The process of the user registration is the same as in
the desktop application. After the registration, the user establishes mutually au-
thenticated SSL connections with the Server and the Keyserver component. Here,
Prefer detects the currently available network connection, i. e., whether the smart-
phone has a WiFi connection, a Mobile data connection of the registered operator
or if there is no connection available. Depending on the network state, Prefer re-
establishes the SSL connections to the Server and Keyserver components. This is
especially useful since the location of the smartphone changes frequently. Thus, the
network state of the smartphone also changes frequently. Figure 7.6.5 shows the
user registration and login view of Prefer.
Buddy List and Chat Client: After a successful registration, the Buddy List view
is shown. Prefer has a similar functionality as the desktop application. A user has
a Buddy List to add and remove friends. Here, the user can search the contact list
of its smartphone to import email addresses which are used to add existing user
accounts. The Chat component provides encrypted communication between the
users. However, we do not implement the group chat feature. Figure 7.6.6 shows
the Buddy List and the Chat component.
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Figure 7.6.5: User Registration and Login View of the Android Application.
Scheduling Events: As in the desktop environment, the main component of the
Android application is the Scheduler interface. A user can schedule meetings in
a privacy-preserving way. Prefer supports the semi-honest reconciliation protocols
proposed in Chapter 4.
Figure 7.6.7 shows the different views of the Scheduling component. On the top
left (a.), the first view is shown where the initiator can specify a name, location,
and a duration of the meeting. In the following views (b., c., d.), the initiator
can select the possible dates/time slots of the meeting, choose a security level, and
select the reconciliation protocol. The re-designed calendar view (b.) is based on
the user feedback of our user study, see Section 7.6.2.1. On the bottom left (e.),
the invitation view is shown where the initiator chooses the participants of the
schedule. In the next view (f.) of Figure 7.6.7, the user can select the dates at
which the user is available for the meeting. Then, the user can assign preferences
to the users’ selection of dates where the most-preferred element is at the top (g.).
In the final view (h.), the result view is shown where each participant can see some
metadata about the schedule and the result of the reconciliation, i. e., the date for
the meeting.
Table 7.6.2 explains the content of our implementation of the Android applica-
tion.
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Figure 7.6.6: Buddy List and Chat Component of the Android Application.
7.6.2.1 Usability
In this section, we evaluate the usability of our Android application Prefer. We con-
ducted a user study with 44 test subjects. The usability study was part of a more
comprehensive user study in the context of a diploma thesis about Secure Multi-
Party Computation on Smartphones by Philipp Siebenkotten [183].
Recruitment: The first part of the study took place at the RWTH Aachen Univer-
sity. Here, we recruited people with an academic background during a graduation
celebration at the Department of Computer Science. 32 test subjects participated
in the study at RWTH Aachen University. Each test subject received a Cineplex
cinema voucher (15 euro) as a compensation.
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Package Description
ppaprefer.setup Implementation of the user registration and the login
view. The package also contains the main class to run
the Android application Prefer.
ppaprefer.service
ppaprefer.misc The ppaprefer.service package contains an implementa-
tion of the network communication functionality based
on the PPA library. Secure channels to the Server and
Keyserver component are established using the PPA li-
brary, see Section 7.4.1.1. The classes handle buddy list,
chat, and protocol events and can be used to send mes-
sages to other parties using the MP serialization. The
ppaprefer.misc package enables the user to import and
export the Prefer configuration file. The configuration
file is serialized on the internal storage of the Android
device using the same file format as used in the desktop
application. Thus, a user can have the same account on
its desktop computer and smartphone..
ppaprefer.buddys
ppa.chats Implementation of the Buddy List and the chat compo-
nent using Android GUI components similar to the im-
plementation of the desktop application.
ppaprefer.scheduler Implementation of the scheduling interface using Android
GUI components with similar functionality as the desk-
top application. Prefer uses the MPROS implementation
of the PPA library to enable the reconciliation of meet-
ings, see Section 7.5.1. We implemented the scheduler
component in a modular and simple way such that it is
possible to built similar mobile GUI frontends easily.
Table 7.6.2: Overview of the packages for the Android application Prefer.
210
7 SMC-MuSe: A Framework for Secure Multi-Party Computation
Figure 7.6.7: Scheduler Interface of the Android Application.
The second part took place at the Stevens Institute of Technology in the USA.
Here, we recruited students by invitation per university mailing lists. Overall,
12 test subjects participated. Each test subject received an Amazon Gift Card
(15 dollar) as a compensation for their efforts. The study was approved by the
IRB.
Sample Characteristics: 35 test subjects are male and nine are female. The mean
age is 24, 5 years. All test subjects have an academic background. In detail, 31 are
students and 13 have an academic degree. 21 students are in the field of computer
science. 35 test subjects have a smartphone. Here, 24 test subjects use an An-
droid phone, 11 an iPhone and one test subject uses a smartphone with a different
operating system. We do not have an ideal sample distribution. Especially, the
distribution is biased towards test subjects who have an academic background, are
technically versed, and own a smartphone.
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Figure 7.6.8: Android App Questionnaire, Part I
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Figure 7.6.9: Android App Questionnaire, Part II
213
7 SMC-MuSe: A Framework for Secure Multi-Party Computation
Study Process: First of all, each test subject filled out a a consent form. The
consent form mainly covers the topics voluntary participation, clearness of the study
procedure, confidentiality of the data, and incentive for participation. Then, each
test subject filled out a sheet about personal characteristics. Afterwards, we in-
troduced the study topic and our Android application Prefer described in Sec-
tion 7.6.2.
Each test subject had to solve several tasks with the Android application Prefer.
The tasks introduced the features of the application, especially the scheduling ap-
plication, see Section 7.6.2. First, the subject should log into the registered user
account. Then, the subject should answer existing chat messages. Third, the test
subject should schedule a visit to the movies, an excursion, and a meeting at work
using the application.
We used the Think-Aloud technique. Here, the test subject comments on each of
its steps or actions and loudly speaks about its thinking. At the end, the test
subject filled out a sheet about the usability of our mobile application Prefer. The
questionnaire is shown in Figures 7.6.8 and 7.6.9. More information about the study
process can be found in [183].
Main Study Results: In Question 1, 2 and 3, we tested whether the features of our
Android application Prefer are understandable and make sense. 34 test subjects
strongly agreed that they understand the features of the application and 30 test
subjects think that the features make sense. Figure 7.6.10 shows the results for
Questions 5, 10, 11, and 12. We asked about problems with the application and
whether the test subject liked the handling, the design, and the functionality of the
application.
In (1) we see the results for Question 5. The majority of the test subjects (18)
had no problems and 11 test subjects had minor problems with the navigation in
our Android application Prefer. However, major problems had 5 test subjects and
numerous problems had 8 test subjects. We also obtained a lot of constructive
feedback about problems and improvements in the free text field Questions 4, 6,
and 8 (see next Section).
In (2) of Figure 7.6.10, we show the results for Questions 10, 11, and 12. Overall,
our Android application Prefer is very good with respect to the handling (naviga-
tion), the design, and the functionality of the application. 23 (18, 24) test subjects
have given the best rating (a lot) in the category Handling (Design, Functionality).
Further 17 (17, 18) test subjects have rated the handling (design, functionality) of
Prefer with the second best rating (Somewhat). Only 4 test subjects had a neu-
tral position regarding the handling within the application and only 2 test subjects
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Figure 7.6.10: Study Results for Questions 5, 10, 11, and 12.
regarding the functionality. The design was rated neutral by 7 test subjects and
slightly negative (Little) by 2 test subjects. Overall, concerning the usability, the
results are very good for our Android application Prefer. Further results of the
entire user study can be found in [183].
Revisions based on the User Feedback: In Questions 4, 6, and 8, we asked the
test subjects about further desirable features, any problems encountered during the
test, and whether the design of the application should be improved. Based on the
feedback, we revised our Android application Prefer. In the following, we briefly
recap the major improvements and changes of Prefer. More information about
Prefer can be found in Section 7.6.2.
• Help/Documentation integration: Each view contains a help menu where the
user gets information and help about the current functionality of the presented
view, see Section 7.6.2.
• Reconnection feature: Depending on the network state, the application re-
connects to the Server and Keyserver component, i. e., the SSL connections
are re-established, see Section 7.6.2.
• Calendar view: The scheduling events functionality is improved by a more
appealing calendar view during the creation of an event, see Section 7.6.2.
• Contact list integration: The user has the option to search the contact list
of its smartphone and import all stored email addresses. The application
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Figure 7.6.11: Comparison of the old and new theme for Prefer.
automatically adds existing accounts (registered email addresses) to the buddy
list of the user, see Section 7.6.2.
• Graphical redesign: The graphical user interface was re-designed with a new
theme which is brighter and more pleasant to view/navigate for the user.
Figure 7.6.11 shows a comparison of the previous dark-colored theme with the
new bright-colored theme.
Discussion: The goal of the user study with respect to our Android application
Prefer was to analyze the usability of the mobile application. Here, we tested
the usability by asking the test subjects whether the functionality of the applica-
tion makes sense, the design is appealing, the navigation is straight-forward, and
if the user has problems within the application. Overall, we can state that our
Android application Prefer is very usable and a major step towards usable secure
multi-party computation on smartphones. Especially, with the additional features
and improvements presented in the last section, the mobile application comes close
to a productive application. I. e., one could distribute and publish the applica-
tion in the Android market or sell variants of Prefer to companies interested in
privacy-preserving computation. More information about the complete user study
can be found in the diploma thesis Secure Multi-Party Computation on Smartphones
[183].
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7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our implementation of SMC-MuSe which is a new
framework for secure multi-party computation. We implemented cryptographic
components, a support infrastructure, multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation
protocols, and user-friendly applications. The cryptographic components consist of
additively homomorphic cryptosystems, privacy-preserving multiset operations, and
zero-knowledge proof protocols. The support infrastructure assists the developer in
the communication and computation process of each party.
The core part is the implementation of our reconciliation protocols proposed in
Chapters 4 and 5. Here, we implemented the semi-honest protocols in a way such
that the reconciliation protocols can be efficiently used in our user-friendly applica-
tions. The user-friendly applications include a desktop application and an Android
application to schedule meetings with multiple parties in a privacy-preserving and
preference-maximizing way. Especially, the user study has shown that our Android
application Prefer is a useful and very interesting application for today’s smart-
phone users. In the next chapter, we evaluate all implemented components of SMC-
MuSe.
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8 Performance Evaluation
In this chapter, we provide an extensive performance evaluation of all components of
our framework SMC-MuSe for secure multi-party computation. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the primary goal of our framework SMC-MuSe is to enable the effi-
cient multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets in the semi-honest
and the malicious model. Therefore, we present an efficient implementation of all
components of SMC-MuSe to verify the theoretical analysis of the MPROS protocols
presented in Chapters 4 and 5. I. e., we show that the computation and communi-
cation overhead of all implemented MPROS protocols are polynomial-time bound
with respect to the number of parties and inputs. The computation overhead is ob-
tained by measuring the runtime of a protocol run. The communication overhead is
computed by counting the number of transmitted bytes during a protocol run. Our
implementation supports different application scenarios described in Chapter 6. To
the best of our knowledge, there are no other (more efficient) implementations for
multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols. Thus, this is the first imple-
mentation solving the multi-party reconciliation problem in practice. In the follow-
ing, we describe our contributions in more in detail.
In Section 8.2, we analyze the efficiency of a threshold version of the Paillier cryp-
tosystem denoted as Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem. We show runtime results for
all cryptographic operations and compare our results to a C++-based implementa-
tion by D. Mayer [128].
In Section 8.3, we analyze the efficiency of our implementation of the privacy-
preserving multiset operations by Kissner et al. [114] (see Section 2.5.2) and our
newly-proposed multiset operations (see Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3) in terms of com-
putation and communication overhead. For the multiset intersection and union
operation, we compare our results with the SEPIA framework and also show the
communication overhead for those two operations. We show runtime results for the
multiset reduction operation, the multiset membership test, and the sub-multiset
test.
In Section 8.4, we provide a detailed analysis of our reconciliation protocols secure in
the semi-honest model. We show runtime results for MR-rb, MR-sb, MR-opt, SR-rb,
SR-sb, and SR-opt. We also count the number of homomorphic operations used in
the first and second approach and show the influence of the key size on the runtime
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of MPROS protocols. Finally, we compare the computation and communication
overhead of our implementation of reconciliation protocols using either the SMC-
MuSe or the SEPIA framework.
In Section 8.5, we analyze the computation and communication overhead of our
reconciliation protocols secure in the malicious model. We compare our results
with the respective protocols in the semi-honest model and show the influence of
the domain on and the runtime variance of MPROS protocols. In Section 8.6, we
analyze the efficiency of MPROS protocols in the mobile environment. We show
runtime results for the third approach in the semi-honest model using our Android
application Prefer.
Outline: We present evaluation results for the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem
(Section 8.2), privacy-preserving set operations (Section 8.3), MPROS in the semi-
honest model (Section 8.4), MROS in the malicious model (Section 8.5), and MPROS
on the Android phone (Section 8.6).
8.1 Test Environment
We chose a test environment of desktop computers rather than a cluster-based test
setup as the applications currently implemented in SMC-MuSe typically run on a
user’s desktop. The setup consists of 12 identical systems each with a 2.93 GHz i7
CPU 870 and 16 GB RAM running a 64-bit Linux with kernel version 3.2.0. One
machine is dedicated as the Keyserver and another one as the Server component.
The remaining ten machines are set up as clients. All systems are connected via
secure channels using TLS in a local environment with a 1 Gb/s Ethernet connection
and the keys are pre-distributed at start-up.
In the majority of our test scenarios, we tested the influence of the number of parties
n and the number of inputs k on the computation and communication overhead of
the tested operation or protocol. For the computation overhead, we measure the
runtime using the built-in System.nanoTime() Java functionality [156]. For the
communication overhead, we measure the number of bytes transmitted using the
RX/TX values (received/transmitted bytes) provided by the operating system. We
evaluate SMC-MuSe with up to n = 10 parties which is large enough to identify
problems with respect to scalability and small enough to be realizable in a desktop-
based test environment. We averaged the results over a number of test runs where
the number of repetitions depends on the variance of the tested protocol. All inputs
are chosen from a common input domain D. In general, the input domain is equal to
the possible key space of the used cryptosystem, i. e., D = {0, 1}b. Inputs are varied
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by randomly choosing different inputs from the same type. The implementation is
based on a threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem with a key size parameter
b = log2(N) where N is the modulus. In the majority of our tests, we used a key
size of b = 1024 or b = 2048 bits. A key size of 1024 bits is the minimal key size
recommended by NIST in 2012 [7]. In each test scenario, we shortly recap the used
test parameters.
8.2 Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem
In this section, we evaluate our implementation of a threshold version of the Pail-
lier cryptosystem which is the core cryptographic primitive used in our framework
SMC-MuSe. In Section 8.2.1, we analyze the computation overhead for the Thresh-
old Paillier Cryptosystem and in Section 8.2.2 we compare our results against a
C++-based implementation by D. Mayer [128].
8.2.1 Efficiency
For the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem, we show the influence of the key size b
and the plaintext size on the runtime of the cryptographic operations. We evaluate
the efficiency of the encryption, partial decryption, homomorphic addition, homo-
morphic scalar multiplication, and the re-randomization (blinding) operation. A
definition of these operations can be found in Section 2.2.3.1. The description of the
concrete implementation can be found in Section 7.3.1.1.
Test Parameters: We varied the key size b = log2(N) and the plaintext size
for inputs chosen from the domain D. The runtime is averaged over 100 test
runs.
8.2.1.1 Test Results
Figure 8.2.1 shows the runtime results for the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem. In
(1) we varied the key size b up to 2048 bit in steps of 128 with a fixed plaintext
size of 64 bit1. We see that the homomorphic addition has a low runtime up to 0.7
milliseconds for a key size of b = 2048 bit. Recap that the homomorphic addition
is a modulo multiplication in the ciphertext space ZN2 . The homomorphic scalar
1We choose a plaintext size of 64 bit to be comparable to the implementation by D. Mayer [128].
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Figure 8.2.1: Efficiency of the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem.
multiplication is also very fast up to a runtime of 1 ms for a key size of b = 2048
bit. Recall that the homomorphic scalar multiplication is a modulo exponentiation
with a scalar value in the ciphertext space ZN2 . Since the scalar value is only 64 bit
the scalar operation is also very fast.
The blinding and encryption operation are more expensive with a runtime up to
20 ms for a key size b = 2048 bit. Here, we can see the influence of a larger
exponent on the runtime of a modular exponentiation. Recap that the blinding
operation is a multiplication of a plaintext (64-bit) with a random value (b bit) to
the power of N which is a b bit modulus. Since the multiplication is very fast even
for a key size of b = 2048 bit, the overhead is primarily induced by the modular
exponentiation with a large exponent of b bit. The same holds for the encryption
operation which includes the blinding with a random value to the power of N .
The encryption operation is slightly slower than the blinding operation due to the
additional exponentiation of the generator to the power of the plaintext. The slowest
operation is the partial decryption with a runtime of up to 36 milliseconds for a key
size b = 2048 bit. Recap that the partial decryption of party Pi is a modular
exponentiation of the ciphertext where a part of the exponent is the 2b-bit private
key share ski of party Pi. Thus, the operation is more expensive than the encryption
operation. We measure the partial decryption without the recovery algorithm, see
Section 2.2.3.1.
In (2) of Figure 8.2.1, we show the results for a fixed key size of b = 2048 bit. The
plaintext size varies in steps of 32 between 32 and 608 bit which is a more than
sufficient size to cope with the input domains used in the different application sce-
narios presented in Chapter 6. Again, we obtain a low runtime for the homomorphic
addition. The operation is independent of the size of the plaintext with a runtime
of 0.7 milliseconds. We see an increase of the runtime of the homomorphic scalar
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operation with larger plaintext values. This is due to the fact that the plaintext is
used as the exponent in the modular exponentiation. We have a runtime of 6 ms for
a plaintext size of 608 bit.
The blinding operation is also independent of the plaintext size and the runtime lies
in the range of 19 milliseconds. The runtime increases for the encryption operation
from 19.5 ms for a plaintext of 32 bit up to 25 ms for a plaintext of 608 bit. The
partial decryption operation has the highest runtime which is independent of the
plaintext size and in the range of 36 milliseconds. Next, we compare our Java-based
implementation with a C++-based implementation.
8.2.2 Comparison against a C++-based Implementation
D. Mayer also implemented the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem to enable efficient
privacy-preserving reconciliation in the two-party setting, see Section 2.6. The im-
plementation is C++-based and also uses the GMP library. The results are shown
in Figures 10.16 and 10.17 of the thesis [128]. D. Mayer also varied the key size
and the plaintext size. Overall, the results are very similar to our results presented
in the previous Section. Note that D. Mayer presents the results for the homo-
morphic operations with and without an additional blinding. In the following, we
compare our implementation results with the results of D. Mayer provided in his
thesis [128] for the operations of the Paillier cryptosystem without any additional
blinding.
The runtime for the homomorphic addition is very fast in the range of 0.015 ms
for a key size b = 2048 bit compared to 0.7 ms in our Java-based implementation.
We also use a native C++ library for the expensive arithmetic operations with
the JNI technique, see also Section 7.3.1.1. Thus, the difference in the runtime is
mainly due to the overhead introduced by the JNI technique. The runtime for the
homomorphic scalar multiplication is 6 ms for a plaintext size of 512 bit and a key
size b = 2048 bit. Here, our implementation is slightly faster with a runtime of 5
ms. In general, the pure C++-based implementation should be faster than our Java-
based implementation. Probably, the reason is that in our test setup we use a 2.93
GHz processor and a newer GMP version 5.0.5 compared to a 2.83 GHz processor
and GMP version 5.0.2.
The runtime for encryption of the C++-based implementation is also slightly higher
with 29 ms for a plaintext size of 512 bit and a key size b = 2048 bit compared to 24
ms in our implementation. In the same setting, the runtime for partial decryption is
in the range of 46 ms in the C++-based implementation compared to 36 ms in the
Java-based implementation. The blinding operation was not explicitly tested by D.
Mayer [128].
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Overall, the comparison shows that our Java-based implementation using a C++
native library with the JNI technique is competitive with a pure C++-based im-
plementation. However, in case of the homomorphic addition operation we clearly
see an overhead introduced by the JNI technique. Also, there are a large number
of parameters to tune like the test architecture (CPU, RAM), the used libraries,
the version numbers, the build process, and the operating system. Any optimiza-
tion will only have a small impact on the core cryptographic operations. However,
since the homomorphic addition and the homomorphic scalar operations are fre-
quently used in our MPROS protocols, the overall impact of any such optimization
on the runtime of more complex protocols based on these cryptographic operations
is significant.
8.3 Privacy-Preserving Multiset Operations
In this section, we evaluate the privacy-preserving multiset operations, which are
basic building blocks of our MPROS protocol implementations. In Section 8.3.1,
we start with an evaluation of set intersection, multiset intersection, set union, and
multiset union. We compare our results with an implementation of those multiset
operations within the SEPIA framework presented in Section 2.5.2.8. We also im-
plemented and evaluated the reconciliation protocol MR-opt based on the SEPIA
framework, see Section 8.4.3. More information about the SEPIA integration can
be found in Appendix A.5.
In Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.3, we evaluate the multiset reduction operation and our
newly-developed protocols to test the multiset membership of a set element and to
check the sub-multiset relation of two multisets. We do not compare those multiset
operations against SEPIA since the operations are not supported by the SEPIA
framework.
8.3.1 Test Results for Multiset Intersection and Union
We present a selection of our test results which shows the influence of the number
of parties n and the number of inputs k for (multi)set intersection, and (multi)set
union. For each party, the runtime is measured in number of seconds and the
communication overhead in transmitted and received data (MB). The implemen-
tation of the multiset intersection and union operations in SEPIA is described in
Section 2.5.2.8.
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Test Parameters: In our test setup, SEPIA’s Input Peers are the same as the
Privacy Peers, i. e., the computation is done by the Input Peers. The authors of
SEPIA assume a cluster-based setup where the computation is done by the pri-
vacy peers which are arranged and connected within a cluster. In order to achieve
a fair comparison of our SMC-MuSe framework with the SEPIA framework, we
assume a local area network setup with a 1 Gb/s data connection between all In-
put Peers. We measure the communication overhead in terms of byte transmitted
such that we can estimate the efficiency of both frameworks in different network
setups.
The adjustable parameters for each run are the number of parties n, the number
of inputs k, and the key size b for SMC-MuSe respectively the size of the field
Zp for SEPIA. in number of bits b. As suggested in [127], we set the size of the
bloom filter for k input elements to s = 5k · (−log10(FPR)) with a false positive
rate FPR = 10−3, i. e., s = 15k. We use eight hash functions which is the default
value used in the framework. We set the degree of the polynomials used in the
Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme to t = b (n−1)2 c such that private multiplication of
shares is still possible, as n ≥ 2t + 1 must hold [27]. Thus, any set of t + 1 or
more privacy peers can interpolate a shared secret and the framework is secure
against t = b (n−1)2 c colluding attackers. In order to achieve a fair comparison, we
set the number of colluding attackers c = b (n−1)2 c in the SMC-MuSe framework as
well.
Regarding the SEPIA framework, the runtime and communication overhead is shown
as a step function where each step indicates an increase in the number of bits log2(s)
to represent the Bloom filter of size s where s = 15k. Thus, for all values k leading to
a Bloom filter representation of size log2(s), we have the same runtime for those input
values k. We chose the input test values k = 2, 4, 8, 17, 34, 68, 136, 273, 546, 1092 in
each case leading to a larger Bloom filter representation. Regarding SMC-MuSe,
the runtime differs for different number of input values k and we tested for inputs
in the range of [2, 1092].
We used the same input values k to evaluate the SMC-MuSe framework. As we can
represent sets and multisets with encrypted polynomials, we tested SMC-MuSe with
random input values independently of the cardinality of an input element. Note that
e. g. the multiset {a2, b2} and the set {a, b, c, d} both result in a polynomial of the
same degree and thus multiset operations involving either of the two sets have the
same runtime.
SEPIA is limited to 64 bit fields as the implementation works on 64-bit long values.
This also limits the input domain D. As the multiset intersection, set intersection,
and set union operations require a share multiplication, the maximal input size
supported by SEPIA for these operations is 32 bit [27]. Thus, we use 32 bit inputs
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Parameter SMC-MuSe SEPIA
# Parties 3, 5, 7 3, 5, 7
# Input values (∩,∪) [2, 1092] 2, 4, 8, 17, 34, 68
136, 273, 546, 1092
Keysize / Field size 1024 263 − 25
Input size 32 32
False positive rate - 10−3
# of hash functions - 8
Colluding Attackers b (n−1)2 c b (n−1)2 c
# Test runs 10 10
Table 8.3.1: Parameter settings of the two frameworks SMC-MuSe and SEPIA.
in a 64 bit prime field for SEPIA. For the SMC-MuSe framework, we set the key
size to 1024 bit and also use 32 bit inputs. The overall runtime and communication
effort is averaged over ten test runs. We present representative test results for both
frameworks with 3, 5 and 7 parties. Table 8.3.1 summarizes the parameter settings
used in our tests.
8.3.1.1 Set Intersection
Figure 8.3.12 shows the results for set intersection of sets with varying number
of inputs and with three, five, and seven parties. In case of three parties, SMC-
MuSe is faster than SEPIA with up to 60 set elements with a runtime of a few
seconds. With larger inputs, SEPIA outperforms SMC-MuSe with a runtime of
a few seconds. SMC-MuSe runtime increases up to 11 minutes with 1092 in-
puts.
Regarding communication, SMC-MuSe performs slightly better than SEPIA even
for larger input sets with an overhead of up to 2 MB for 1092 input elements3. The
data transmitted is also very low for SEPIA.
We obtain similar results with five and seven parties. SMC-MuSe is still faster for
up to 50 inputs. For larger inputs, SEPIA is the better choice with respect to the
runtime. In both frameworks, the number of parties have an observable influence
on the efficiency of a protocol run. In case of SEPIA, the runtime is increased by
15% (50%) and in case of SMC-MuSe by 30% (60%) with five (respectively seven)
2Note that in general we use the log scale for both axes of the graphs in the following figures.
3Note the linear scale for the y-axis in the graph at the top right in Figure 8.3.1.
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Figure 8.3.1: Computation and communication overhead of the set intersection op-
eration with three, five, and seven parties.
parties compared to the runtime with three parties.
Regarding communication, SMC-MuSe is more data efficient than SEPIA. SMC-
MuSe with seven parties is even better than SEPIA with five parties. In case
of 1092 inputs and five (seven) parties, we have to transmit 4 (5.9) MB of data
using the SMC-MuSe framework and nearly 6.5 (14) MB using the SEPIA frame-
work.
Conclusion: Regarding the set intersection operation, both frameworks are fast and
have acceptable data transmission rates even for large number of inputs. SEPIA is
the clear winner with respect to the runtime due to an efficient parallelized imple-
mentation based on 64-bit long values in a small field of size 263−25.
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Figure 8.3.2: Computation and communication overhead of the multiset intersection
operation with three, five, and seven parties.
8.3.1.2 Multiset Intersection
Figure 8.3.2 shows the results for multiset intersection for varying number of inputs
with three, five, and seven parties. In case of three parties, SMC-MuSe is faster than
SEPIA even for larger input sets with up to 340 set elements with a runtime of up
to 60 seconds. With very large input values (e. g. 1092), SEPIA is 75% faster than
SMC-MuSe with a runtime of 3 minutes. In terms of transmitted data, SMC-MuSe
clearly outperforms SEPIA with an overhead of up to 2 MB for 1092 input elements.
The communication overhead of SEPIA is very high with approximately 650 MB (log
scale) for 1092 input elements. Thus, SEPIA’s communication overhead is 300 times
higher than the communication overhead of SMC-MuSe.
The differences are even more significant with five and seven parties. SMC-MuSe
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Figure 8.3.3: Computation and communication overhead of the set union operation
with three, five, and seven parties.
is faster for up to 850 (980) inputs in case of five (seven) parties. For 1092 input
elements, SEPIA is only 40% (30%) faster than SMC-MuSe with a runtime of 14
(18) minutes.
Regarding SEPIA, the number of parties have an significant influence on the effi-
ciency of a protocol run. The data transmission rate is increased by 400% (580%)
with five respectively seven parties up to 2600 (3800) MB. In case of SMC-MuSe, we
still have very small data rates with up to 4 (6) MB. SMC-MuSe with seven parties is
even better than SEPIA with three, five, or seven parties.
Conclusion: Regarding multiset intersection, SMC-MuSe is the clear winner with
respect to computation and communication. In case of multisets, the representa-
tion of input elements as roots of polynomials is superior to the use of counting
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Bloom filters. SMC-MuSe has the same runtime and data transmission rates for
set and multiset intersection while there are significant differences between set and
multiset intersection in case of SEPIA. Regarding communication, SMC-MuSe also
benefits of a compact serialization format [146] and a small number of communi-
cation rounds. SEPIA’s multiset intersection operation consists of several share
multiplications which requires a lot of synchronization between the n parties. The
communication overhead is very high for large Bloom filters, i. e., for a large number
of inputs k it is crucial that the computing nodes are connected in a network setup
with fast data transmission rates.
8.3.1.3 Set Union
Figure 8.3.3 shows the results for set union with three, five, and seven parties and
varying number of inputs. In case of three parties, SMC-MuSe is faster than SEPIA
with up to 45 set elements with a runtime of a few seconds. With larger inputs,
SEPIA again outperforms SMC-MuSe with a runtime of a few seconds. SMC-MuSe
runtime significantly increases up to 115 minutes with 1092 inputs. SMC-MuSe is
again better than SEPIA regarding data transmission rates with an overhead of up
to 0.6 MB compared to 2.3 MB for 1092 input elements4.
We obtain similar results with five and seven parties. SMC-MuSe is faster for up
to 38 (35) inputs in case of five (seven) parties. Again, SEPIA shows good perfor-
mance in the range of seconds with larger input sets. The number of parties have
a significant impact on the efficiency of a protocol run in the SMC-MuSe frame-
work. The runtime is increased by 57% (130%) with five (seven) parties up to 180
(265) minutes. In comparison, SEPIA has a runtime of 4 (5) seconds in case of
five (seven) parties. Regarding communication, SMC-MuSe is more data efficient
than SEPIA. SMC-MuSe with seven parties is more data efficient than SEPIA with
three, five, or seven parties. However, SEPIA also shows acceptable data trans-
mission rates in the range of 14 MB with seven parties and 1092 input elements
compared to 1 MB for the same number of inputs in case of SMC-MuSe. SEPIA’s
communication overhead is increased by 300% (700%) with five (respectively seven)
parties.
Conclusion: SEPIA is a very efficient framework for set union. SMC-MuSe shows
very good data transmission rates but the runtime is significantly higher. Thus, for
set union SMC-MuSe is suitable for application scenarios where it is crucial to have
low data transmission rates or where longer protocol runs with large input values
are acceptable.
4Note the linear scale for the y-axis in the graph at the top right in Figure 8.3.3.
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Figure 8.3.4: Computation and communication overhead of the multiset union op-
eration with three, five, and seven parties.
SMC-MuSe’s performance clearly degrades with very large polynomials. This is
the case for SMC-MuSe’s set union operation with many parties as a polynomial
multiplication doubles the degree of the result polynomial. SEPIA ’s set union
requires only one multiplication per bit position of the Bloom filter. Thus, the
synchronization amount is not as high as for multiset intersection. Also, Bloom filters
are more data efficient than counting Bloom filters.
8.3.1.4 Multiset Union
Figure 8.3.4 shows the results for multiset union with three, five, and seven parties.
In case of three parties, SMC-MuSe is faster than SEPIA for up to 45 set elements
with a runtime of up to 6 seconds. With larger input values, the SEPIA framework
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still performs very well with a runtime of several seconds while SMC-MuSe’s runtime
quickly increases up to several minutes. In terms of transmitted data, SMC-MuSe
is slightly better than SEPIA. Both frameworks need around 1 MB of transmitted
data for 1092 input elements.
We obtain similar results with five and seven parties. SMC-MuSe is faster with up
to 42 (35) inputs in case of five (seven) parties. For larger input sets, SEPIA is
more efficient than SMC-MuSe. The data transmission rates are very good for both
frameworks. Regarding SEPIA, the communication overhead is increased by 100%
(200%) with five (seven) parties up to 2.4 (3.6) MB. In comparison, SMC-MuSe’s
communication overhead is increased by 16% (64%) with five (seven) parties up to
0.7 (1) MB.
Conclusion: Regarding multiset union, SEPIA is the clear winner with respect to
computation and communication. In case of multisets, SEPIA’s union operation
needs only local computations and no multiplication, see also Section 2.5.2.8. Thus,
there is no synchronization overhead due to transmitted shared counting Bloom
filters. Again, SMC-MuSe scores regarding the communication overhead. However,
the difference to the SEPIA framework is marginal. One can use both frameworks
for small input multisets but should switch to the SEPIA framework with larger
multisets.
8.3.1.5 Summary
In summary, SEPIA is faster than SMC-MuSe for (multi)set intersection and union
with a large number of inputs. For smaller input sets, one should prefer the SMC-
MuSe framework. On the other side, SEPIA has a high communication overhead,
especially for multiset intersection. Thus, if one is interested in a small amount of
transmitted data, one should prefer the SMC-MuSe framework.
The reason for the high communication overhead in SEPIA is that it needs syn-
chronization after each multiplication operation. Large input sets yield large Bloom
filters as the input to a protocol run. Synchronization is needed at each Bloom fil-
ter position which is even worse in networks with limited bandwidth. This can
lead to a significant increase in the runtime, especially if the computing nodes
are arranged in a non-local area network. Thus, for multiset intersection SMC-
MuSe seems to be the better choice regarding efficiency and communication over-
head.
Regarding (multi)set union one should clearly favor SEPIA. The communication
overhead is somewhat higher compared to the SMC-MuSe framework. But the
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amount of transmitted data is in the range of several MBs. Thus, the impact of
network latencies cannot be expected to lead to an advantage of SMC-MuSe as
the runtime for (multi)set union is very high compared to SEPIA. However, SMC-
MuSe is still very data efficient for (multi)set union and also very fast for smaller
data sets. Thus, one should use SMC-MuSe in application scenarios where it is
crucial that the amount of transmitted data is very low and the number of inputs
is small.
8.3.2 Test Results for Multiset Reduction
In this section, we present our test results for multiset reduction. We did not compare
our results with the SEPIA framework since the multiset reduction operation is not
supported by SEPIA. Recall that the multiset reduction operation Rdt is computed
on a polynomial f of degree d with a threshold value t. The polynomial is represented
by an ordered list of coefficients. The runtime is measured in number of milliseconds
respectively seconds. The communication overhead of sending the result of Rdt(f)
is given by (deg(f) + t) · b bits where deg(f) denotes the degree of the polynomial f
and b is the key size of the used cryptosystem.
Test Parameters: We show the influence of the degree d and the threshold value
t on the efficiency of the multiset operation. We tested up to a degree d = 1092.
We used the key size b = 1024 bits. The overall runtime is averaged over ten test
runs.
8.3.2.1 Efficiency
Figure 8.3.5 shows our results for the multiset reduction operation Rdt(f). In (1)
of Figure 8.3.5 we varied the degree of the polynomial f up to a degree of 1092 in
steps of 36 with a fixed threshold value t = 1. A larger fixed threshold value t just
leads to a constant increase of the runtime. As expected, the runtime is linear with
respect to the degree of the polynomial f and lies in the range of several seconds,
even for a large polynomial of degree 1092 (7.5 seconds).
The influence of the threshold value t is shown in (2) of Figure 8.3.5. We var-
ied the threshold t in steps of 3 and used a polynomial f of fixed degree 100. A
polynomial with a larger fixed degree just leads to a constant increase of the run-
time. The runtime for a threshold value t = 10 (50, 90) lies in the range of 10
(180, 343) seconds. Interestingly, the gradient of the runtime curve increases with
larger threshold values and then decreases logarithmically. The gradient converges
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Figure 8.3.5: Efficiency of the Multiset Reduction Operation.
since the computation effort is negligible for large threshold values, i. e., values nearly
equal the degree of the polynomial f . A main part of the multiset reduction opera-
tion is the computation of the derivative of the polynomial f , see also Section 2.5.2.
8.3.2.2 Summary
Overall, the multiset reduction operation is very fast even for large polynomi-
als. However, the operation is more expensive the larger the threshold value is.
8.3.3 Test Results for Multiset Membership and Sub-Multiset Test
In this section, we present our test results for the multiset membership and sub-
multiset test. Recall that the multiset membership test enables two parties to check
whether an input element z is a member of a multiset B (z ∈ B) where one party
holds the input element z and the other party the multiset B. The sub-multiset test
enables two parties to check whether a multiset Z is a sub-multiset of a multiset B
(Z ⊆ B).
We evaluate the multiset membership test described in Protocol 3.1.1 and the sub-
multiset test described in Protocol 3.1.2. The runtime is measured in number of mil-
liseconds respectively seconds. The communication overhead of the multiset mem-
bership test is given by |B|·b+3·b bits where b is the key size of the used cryptosystem.
The sub-multiset test has a communication complexity of |B| · b + 3 · (|Z| − 1) · b
bits.
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Figure 8.3.6: Efficiency of the Multiset Membership Test.
Test Parameters: We show the influence of the size of the multiset B for the
multiset membership test and the sub-multiset test. For the sub-multiset test, we
also show the effect of the size of the multiset Z on the runtime of the protocol. We
tested up to a size |B| = 1092. We used the key size b = 1024 bits. The overall
runtime is averaged over ten protocol runs.
8.3.3.1 Multiset Membership Test
Figure 8.3.6 shows the runtime results for the multiset membership test where we
varied the multiset B between 2 and 1092 in steps of 36. We see a linear behavior
with respect to the size of the multiset B. The runtime lies in the range of up to
600 ms with a multiset B of 1092 elements. Thus, the membership test is a very
efficient operation even for very large multisets.
8.3.3.2 Sub-Multiset Test
Figure 8.3.7 shows the runtime results for the sub-multiset test. In (1) we set |Z| = 1
and varied the multiset B between 2 and 1092 in steps of 36. We see that the size
of the multiset B has linear influence on the runtime of the sub-multiset operation.
The operation is relatively fast with a runtime of up to 4.5 seconds with a multiset
B of 1092 elements.
In (2) of Figure 8.3.7 we see the influence of the size of the multiset Z for a fixed size of
the multiset B with |B| = 546 elements and a varied multiset Z between 2 and 1092
in steps of 36. Interestingly, the gradient of the runtime curve increases up to a size
235
8 Performance Evaluation
Figure 8.3.7: Efficiency of the Sub-Multiset Test.
|Z| = 254 and then decreases up to the maximal tested size |Z| = 546. The reason is
that Step 2 of Algorithm 3.1.2 of the general polynomial long division has the highest
complexity for the size |Z| = 254 which we explain in the following. In Step 2, we
iterate d− e+ 1 times to compute the polynomial long division and in Step 2b), we
again iterate e + 1 times where d denotes the size of the multiset B and e the size
of the multiset Z. For |Z| = 254, we have 293 outer and 255 inner iterations which
lead to the highest runtime of 44.5 seconds. Overall, the sub-multiset operation is
more expensive than the multiset membership test.
8.3.3.3 Summary
Overall, the newly-developed protocols for the multiset membership test and the sub-
multiset test are very efficient even for large multisets.
8.4 Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation Protocols
Secure in the Semi-Honest Model
We evaluate the efficiency of our MPROS protocols secure in the semi-honest model
with respect to the computation overhead.
In Section 8.4.1, we start with an evaluation of MR-rb, MR-sb, SR-rb, and SR-sb.
The formal protocols are described in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2. We
analyze the number of necessary homomorphic operations for all four MPROS pro-
tocols, present runtime results, and show the influence of the key size on MPROS
protocol runs. The description of the concrete implementation can be found in Sec-
tion 7.5. In Section 8.4.2, we evaluate MR-opt and SR-opt. The formal protocols
are described in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.3. We present runtime results for both proto-
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cols and compare our results with the second approach MR-sb respectively SR-sb.
In Section 8.4.3, we evaluate the computation and communication overhead of rec-
onciliation protocols using the SEPIA framework. Here, we focus on MR-opt and
compare the implementations of MR-opt using the SEPIA framework with an im-
plementation using our SMC-MuSe framework.
8.4.1 Test Results for the First and Second Approach
In this section, we present our evaluation of the first and second approach for min-
imum of ranks (MR-rb, MR-sb) and sum of ranks (SR-rb, SR-sb). For all four
MPROS protocols, the computation effort is dominated by the Number of homo-
morphic operations (NOH) as shown by the theoretical performance results, see also
Sections 4.2 and 4.3. We therefore start the presentation of our test results counting
the NOH per party (see Section 8.4.1.1). In Section 8.4.1.2, we present our results
measuring the overall runtime of the four MPROS protocols varying the number
of parties or the number of inputs. Finally, we include performance measurements
varying the number of parties and the number of inputs at the same time. We also
show the influence of the key size b on the runtime of an MPROS protocol run (see
Section 8.4.1.3).
Test Parameters: We vary the number of parties n from 2 to 10 and the number of
inputs k from 2 to 20. We use a key size of b = 1024 bits. The inputs of each party
are randomly generated integers chosen from the input domain D = {0, 1}b with one
common input among all parties. In order to enforce the worst case behavior, the
common input is fixed as the input with least preference for each party. We set the
number of colluding attackers as c = n − 1. The overall runtime is averaged over
three MPROS protocol runs for each parameter set.
8.4.1.1 Number of Homomorphic Operations
Figure 8.4.1 shows an analysis of the number of homomorphic operations per party
for all four protocols MR-sb, MR-rb, SR-rb, and SR-sb for varying number of inputs
k. Figure 8.4.2 shows the NOH results for varying number of parties n.
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Figure 8.4.1: Number of homomorphic additions (A), homomorphic scalar (S) oper-
ations or both in sum (AS) for one party with c = n− 1 in the worst
case. (1-2) show the results for MR-sb, (3-4) for MR-rb, SR-rb, and
(5-6) for SR-sb for n = 2, n = 5.
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Figure 8.4.2: Number of homomorphic additions (A), homomorphic scalar (S) oper-
ations or both in sum (AS) for one party with c = n− 1 in the worst
case. (7) shows the results for MR-sb, (8) for MR-rb, SR-rb, and (9)
for SR-sb for k = 5.
Note that the worst case runtime and NOH are the same for the round-based pro-
tocols MR-rb, SR-rb for any combination of k, n. We analyzed the NOH value per
party during an MPROS protocol run in the cases n = 2, n = 5, k = 5 and varied k
respectively n from 2 to 10 with c = n−1. Recall that for the Paillier cryptosystem,
the homomorphic addition is a modular multiplication and the homomorphic scalar
operation is a modular exponentiation.
In the case of n = 2 (see (1), (3), (5) in Figure 8.4.1), the round-based protocols
MR-rb, SR-rb have the lowest NOH as the number of rounds is small (k2) and
the degree of the input polynomials is only one. With respect to the set-based
protocols, MR-sb has a lower NOH than SR-sb in all three cases n = 2, n = 5, k =
5. This is due to the fact that the function to be computed in MR-sb is simpler
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than the one for SR-sb. In the case n = 5 (see (2), (4), (6) in Figure 8.4.1),
the MR-sb has the lowest and SR-sb the highest NOH. However, the round-based
protocols MR-rb and SR-rb also show a high NOH due to the larger number of
rounds (k5). The exponential influence of the number of parties n in the round-
based protocols becomes more clear in the case k = 5 (see (7), (8), (9) in Figure
8.4.2). Here, MR-rb and SR-rb have the largest NOH of approximately one billion
for n = 10.
We expect that the set-based protocols MR-sb, SR-sb have a lower runtime than the
round-based protocols MR-rb, SR-rb for larger values of n and for a fixed value of
k. As the NOH is relatively large for MR-rb, SR-rb, and SR-sb we limit our tests to
n, k combinations up to n = 6, k = 6 for those protocols. In the special case n = 2,
we extend our tests with values of k up to 20 for MR-sb and up to 10 for MR-rb,
SR-rb, and SR-sb.
8.4.1.2 Efficiency
We provide a detailed performance analysis of MR-rb, MR-sb, SR-rb, and SR-sb in
Figures 8.4.3 and 8.4.4. Table 8.4.1 compares our runtime results with the theo-
retical analysis given in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Recap that an MPROS protocol run
consists of input generation, input encryption, computation of the function, thresh-
old decryption, and computation of the final result. The plots show the overall
runtime (red with points) and the Fitting curve (FC) best-fitting (green), i. e., the
FC with the lowest asymptotic standard error.
(1), (3), and (5) in Figure 8.4.3 show the results for n = 2. We see that, as expected,
the round-based protocols MR-rb, SR-rb have the lowest overall runtime. The
FC matches the theoretical results of O(k2) with two parties. The set-based proto-
col MR-sb is also comparatively fast. Note that we tested MR-sb with up to k = 20
inputs. The best FC is one with expected runtime of O(k3). The slowest protocol is
SR-sb. Here, the best-fitting FC shows a runtime ofO(k4).
(2), (4), and (6) in Figure 8.4.3 show the results for n = 5. MR-sb is the fastest pro-
tocol with cubic runtime with respect to the number of inputs. The SR-sb protocol
is still the slowest one with a best-fitting curve of O(k4). The round-based protocols
MR-rb, SR-rb are much slower than in the case n = 2. The FC of O(k5) is best-
fitting and matches the theoretical results presented in Chapter 4.
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Figure 8.4.3: Worst case runtime results with c = n − 1, b = 1024 for all MPROS
protocols. (1-2) show the results for MR-sb, (3-4) for MR-rb, SR-rb,
and (5-6) for SR-sb for n = 2, n = 5.
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Figure 8.4.4: Worst case runtime results with c = n − 1, b = 1024 for all MPROS
protocols. (7) shows the results for MR-sb, (8) for MR-rb, SR-rb, and
(9) for SR-sb for k = 5 and varying n.
(7), (8), and (9) in Figure 8.4.4 show the results for k = 5. MR-sb is the fastest
protocol5 with linear behavior with respect to the number of parties n as expected
from theory, see Table 8.4.1. For n = 6 the round-based protocols MR-rb, SR-rb are
even slower than SR-sb. In the case of MR-sb, the advantage of the set-based
approach in practice already holds for n = 3. Figure 8.4.5 shows the overall results
for MR-rb, MR-sb, SR-rb, and SR-sb for the tested n, k combinations with b = 1024
respectively b = 1024, 2048 for MR-sb.
Conclusion: MR-sb shows the best results for large values of n and k and thus
seems practical for many applications—even for a larger number of parties and in-
puts. For the SR-sb protocol, the results indicate that a simpler function to compute
5Note that the scale of the y-axis in Figure 8.4.4 is in seconds for (7) and minutes for (8) and (9).
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Figure 8.4.5: Overall worst case runtime results with c = n − 1, b = 1024, 2048 for
all MPROS protocols.
for SR-sb would be desirable. The round-based protocols MR-rb, SR-rb are rather
slow for a larger number of parties and inputs.
There are two reasons for the advantage of the set-based protocols MR-sb, SR-sb over
the round-based protocols MR-rb, SR-rb. The first one lies in the increasing NOH
for larger n, k combinations (kn rounds in the worst case). The second reason is that
the communication overhead for each round is high. This becomes even more clear
considering the following observation. The protocols MR-sb with n = 5, k = 9 and
MR-rb with n = 5, k = 4 require approximated the same number of homomorphic
operations per party, namely about 36,000 NOH. However, the runtime of MR-sb is
in the range of 130 seconds while the runtime of MR-rb is in the range of 717 seconds
due to the additional communication overhead.
8.4.1.3 Influence of the Key size
Figure 8.4.6 shows the influence of the key size b on the MR-sb protocol with ten
parties and ten inputs. We use the MR-sb protocol as a showcase since the runtime
behavior with respect to the key size b is the same for all MPROS protocols. The
runtime is relatively stable with respect to the chosen key size b with an approxi-
mated quadratic behavior.
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Figure 8.4.6: Influence of the key size on MPROS protocol runs.
Protocol Comm. (T) Comp. (T) Practice
MR-rb,SR-rb O(c · n · kn) O(c · n · kn) O(c · n · kn)
MR-sb O(c · n · k3) O(c · (k6 + n · k4)) O(c · n · k4)
SR-sb O(c · n3 · k3) O(c · n4 · k6) O(c · n3 · k4)
Table 8.4.1: Summary of MR-rb, MR-sb, SR-rb, SR-sb complexities in theory and
practice. The complexities in practice are given with respect to compu-
tation (Comp.) and communication (Comm.) overhead.
8.4.1.4 Summary
Our implementations perform well within our test range with a runtime of a few
seconds up to a few minutes. In particular, since the runtime is polynomial-time
bound with respect to the number of parties n and the number of inputs k, the
implementation is well-suited to enable a distributed Doodle-like scheduling appli-
cation or a Borda Count Voting as described in Sections 6.2 and 6.4. It is clear
that with a large number of inputs k, e. g. k = 100, all four implemented proto-
cols are expected to have a high runtime. Especially for time-critical applications
this might be a problem. Further optimizations as pre-computation can be applied
to our MPROS protocol implementation. Especially, the round-based protocols
MR-rb, SR-rb would benefit of such optimizations as, e. g., this would allow for the
compensation of communication delays.
Table 8.4.1 summarizes the theoretical and practical performance results for all four
MPROS protocols. Note that in theory (T), separate complexities are given for
communication as well as computation. The complexities for the practical results
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are based on the overall runtime of an MPROS protocol run which includes com-
munication and computation. All solutions are polynomial-time bound with respect
to the number of parties n and the number of inputs k. The practical results for
MR-sb and SR-sb are even better than expected from theory. The reason is that all
SMC-related computation is parallelized due to the outsourcing of the computation
to worker threads, see also Section 7.1.3.
8.4.2 Test Results for the Third Approach
In this section, we present our evaluation of the third approach for minimum of ranks
(MR-opt) and sum of ranks (SR-opt). In Section 8.4.2.1, we present our results
measuring the overall runtime of MR-opt and SR-opt varying the number of parties
or the number of inputs. We also compare our results with the second approach for
minimum of ranks (MR-sb) and sum of ranks (SR-sb).
Test Parameters: The setup is exactly the same as discussed in the previous Sec-
tion 8.4.1 for the first and second approach.
8.4.2.1 Efficiency
Figure 8.4.7 shows the results for n = 5 and varying number of inputs. We see that,
as expected in theory, the optimized variants MR-opt, and SR-opt outperform the
second approach for minimum of ranks (MR-sb) and sum of ranks (SR-sb). Again,
we calculated the best fitting curve (FC) with the lowest asymptotic standard error
for all data sets. The performance gain of the optimized protocol MR-opt compared
to MR-sb is very high. In case of 10 inputs, the runtime for MR-sb is in the range
of 9 minutes compared to only one minute for MR-opt. We obtain a fitting curve of
O(k2) for MR-opt compared to O(k4) for MR-sb.
The performance enhancement gained by the SR-opt protocol compared to SR-sb is
lower. The fitting curve for SR-opt is O(k4) which is the same as for SR-sb. E. g.,
with 10 inputs we obtain a runtime of 30 minutes for MR-opt and 125 minutes for
MR-sb. Still, we have a significant advantage of SR-opt compared to SR-sb with
a runtime in the range of a few minutes (SR-opt) rather than up to a few hours
(SR-sb) within our test range.
Figure 8.4.8 shows the results for k = 5 and varying number of parties. Again, the
optimized variants MR-opt and SR-opt are faster than MR-sb and SR-sb. In the
minimum of ranks case, the runtime is linear regarding the number of parties n for
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Figure 8.4.7: Runtime comparison of the second and third approach in case n = 5.
Figure 8.4.8: Runtime comparison of the second and third approach in case k = 5.
both approaches. For example, we have a runtime of 8 seconds for MR-opt compared
to 21 seconds for MR-sb with 10 parties. For the sum of ranks case, we obtain a
runtime of O(n3) for both approaches. In case of 10 parties, the runtime lies in the
range of 7 minutes for SR-opt and 68 minutes for SR-sb.
Conclusion: The protocol MR-opt is the fastest one with a runtime of seconds
within our test range. MR-sb is still fast, however, the runtime lies within seconds
up to a few minutes. SR-opt is fast with a runtime of minutes compared to a few
hours in case of SR-sb.
246
8 Performance Evaluation
Protocol Comm. (T) Comp. (T) Practice
MR-sb O(c · n · k3) O(c · (k6 + n · k4)) O(c · n · k4)
MR-opt O(c · n · k2) O(c · n · k3) O(c · n · k2)
SR-sb, SR-opt O(c · n3 · k3) O(c · n4 · k6) O(c · n3 · k4)
Table 8.4.2: Summary of MR-sb, MR-opt, SR-sb, SR-opt complexities in theory and
practice.
8.4.2.2 Summary
Table 8.4.2 summarizes the results in theory and practice. All four protocols are
polynomial-time bound with respect to the number of parties n and inputs k. All
protocols are suitable for a large number of parties n. MR-opt and SR-opt are also
very fast for a larger number of inputs k. The runtime of MR-opt for a larger
number of parties n and inputs k is in the range of seconds which is even suitable
for real-time applications. The FC for all MPROS protocols is better than ex-
pected from theory due to the parallelized computation of SMC-related operations.
8.4.3 Test Results for Reconciliation Protocols with the SEPIA
Framework
In this section, we compare the efficiency of our MPROS protocol implementation
with the SEPIA framework. The MR-opt protocol is a good candidate for the com-
parison since the core part is based on the computation of the multiset intersection
operation. Recall that SEPIA implements the multiset intersection operation. Thus,
it is possible to describe a protocol for the minimum of ranks function using SEPIA
based on MR-opt as described in Section 4.2.3. We shortly review the idea of the
protocol in the following.
Let Si = {si,1 > ... > si,k} be the input set of party Pi. The protocol operates in
rounds. In round 1 ≤ l ≤ k of the protocol, the parties compute ⋂ni=1{si,1, . . . , si,l}.
If the resulting set is empty the parties continue with round l+1. If the resulting set
is non-empty, the resulting set contains the common elements of all parties with the
maximum minimum of ranks value k − l + 1. Simplified, reconciliation on ordered
sets for the minimum of ranks composition scheme can be achieved by the repetitive
use of the multiset intersection operation either using the SEPIA or the SMC-MuSe
framework.
We implemented the MR-opt protocol using SEPIA’s multiset intersection protocol.
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Figure 8.4.9: MR-opt with three, five, and seven parties using the SEPIA framework.
The sum of ranks function can be computed using multiset intersection, union and
element reduction. The SEPIA framework has no protocol for multiset element
reduction. Thus, we do not evaluate the sum of ranks function using the SEPIA
framework.
Test Parameters: In our test setup, we either use the SEPIA or the SMC-MuSe
framework to compute the multiset intersection operation. We measure the worst
case complexity which means that the unbiased solution is the least preferred com-
mon input among all parties. As before, we use a key size of b = 1024 bits.
Figure 8.4.9 shows a comparison of the performance of reconciliation on ordered
sets for the MR-opt protocol with up to 100 inputs. As shown in Figure 8.4.9,
SMC-MuSe clearly outperforms SEPIA in terms of computation as well as com-
munication. The runtime for SMC-MuSe is within several seconds and the data
transmitted is under 1 MB. The runtime for SEPIA lies within several seconds up
to 51 minutes in case of seven parties and 100 inputs. In case of SEPIA, the data
transmitted is extremely high with up to 1200 (6910) MB in case of three (seven)
parties and 100 ordered inputs. Regarding SEPIA, the runtime is increased by 100%
(140%) with five (seven) parties up to 50 (60) minutes compared to the runtime with
three parties. The communication overhead is increased by 290% (475%) with five
(seven) parties up to 4729 (6910) MB compared to the communication overhead
with three parties. SMC-MuSe’s runtime is increased by 60% (124%) with five
(seven) parties up to 20 (29) seconds compared to the runtime with three parties.
SMC-MuSe’s communication overhead is increased by 50% (107%) with five (seven)
parties up to 0.45 (0.6) MB compared to the communication overhead with three
parties.
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Conclusion: The test results clearly show that one should favor SMC-MuSe over
SEPIA if one is interested in the reconciliation on ordered sets for the minimum of
ranks composition scheme. The reason that SMC-MuSe is also better in terms of
computation time lies in the repetitive use of the multiset intersection operation.
Here, SEPIA has a high initial overhead and the runtime is very high even for a
small number of inputs. Thus, SEPIA is slower than SMC-MuSe and more data
need to be transmitted.
8.4.3.1 Summary
SMC-MuSe is a good candidate to realize reconciliation on ordered sets in terms
of computation and communication. It seems that SEPIA is not the best choice
for the reconciliation on ordered sets problem based on multiset operations. How-
ever, it is not clear if there exists a more efficient solution using SEPIA’s share
operations.
8.5 Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation Protocols
Secure in the Malicious Model
We evaluate the efficiency of our MPROS protocols secure in the malicious model
with respect to computation and communication overhead. In Section 8.5.1, we eval-
uate the second approach for MPROSMR and MPROSSR. The formal protocols are
described in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. The description of the concrete implementation
can be found in Sections 7.3.3 and 7.5.
We present runtime results and compare our results with the second approach
MR-sb respectively SR-sb in semi-honest model. In Section 8.5.1.2, we analysis the
influence of the size of the domain D and in Section 8.5.1.3, we show the runtime
variance for MR-sb, MR-sbMM , SR-sb, SR-sbMM .
In Section 8.5.2, we evaluate the third approach for MPROSMR and MPROSSR.
The formal protocols are described in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.2. We present run-
time results for both protocols and compare our results with the third approach
MR-opt respectively SR-opt in the semi-honest model.
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Figure 8.5.1: Computation and communication overhead of the second approach for
MPROSMR in the semi-honest and malicious model in case n = 5.
8.5.1 Test Results for the Second Approach
In this section, we present our evaluation of the second approach for minimum of
ranks (MR-sbMM ) and sum of ranks (SR-sbMM ) in the malicious model (MM).
Test Parameters: We present our results for a reasonable key size of b = 1024 bit
varying the number of parties n or the number of inputs k. We set the number of col-
luding attackers as c = n−1. As discussed in Chapter 5, we have an input domain D
of fixed size to enable the construction of verifiable inputs. We set the input domain
to D = 200 input elements in our test environment. The overall runtime is averaged
over three MPROS protocol runs for each parameter set.
8.5.1.1 Efficiency and Communication Overhead
Figure 8.5.1 shows the results for n = 5. We see that, as expected in theory, the ef-
fort for the malicious model variants MR-sbMM and SR-sbMM is higher than for the
semi-honest variants MR-sb and SR-sb. For a input domain D of 200 elements and
up to 20 inputs, we have a runtime of up to 70 minutes for MR-sbMM and up to 3
minutes for MR-sb. Also the amount of data transmitted is higher for the malicious
model variants with, e. g., 60 MB for MR-sbMM compared to 11 MB for MR-sb in
case of 20 inputs. As expected in theory, the increase of the communication effort is
higher for MR-sbMM (O(k6)) compared to MR-sb (O(k3)).
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Figure 8.5.2: Computation and communication overhead of the second approach for
MPROSMR in the semi-honest and malicious model in case k = 5.
Figure 8.5.2 shows the results for 5 inputs each party and a varying number of
parties n. Both protocols MR-sb and MR-sbMM show linear behavior with respect
to the number of parties n. For MR-sbMM , this is due to the parallelized proof
verification. Again, the malicious model variant is slower than the corresponding
semi-honest variant. We have a runtime of up to 65 seconds for MR-sbMM and up
to 3 seconds for MR-sb. The communication effort is in the range of 0.2 up to 2 MB
for MR-sb respectively MR-sbMM .
Figure 8.5.3 and 8.5.4 show the results for the sum of ranks composition scheme. We
see that we obtain similar results as for the minimum of ranks composition scheme.
However, the runtime and data transmitted is in general higher. E. g., the compu-
tation time for SR-sbMM is relatively high in the range of 12 hours compared to
40 minutes for SR-sb with 10 inputs and five parties. The communication effort
is not linear as for the minimum of ranks variants as the constructed polynomials
depend on the number of participating parties, compare Figure 8.5.4. The com-
munication overhead of SR-sbMM is six times higher (360 MB) compared to the
semi-honest variant SR-sb (62 MB). In case k = 5 and 10 parties, SR-sbMM is 22
times slower (360 minutes) than SR-sb (16 minutes). Due to the zero-knowledge
proofs, the communication overhead is also increased by a factor of four. E. g., the
transmitted data for 10 parties lies in the range of 238 MB for SR-sbMM and 60 MB
for SR-sb.
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Figure 8.5.3: Computation and communication overhead of the second approach for
MPROSSR in the semi-honest and malicious model in case n = 5.
Figure 8.5.4: Computation and communication overhead of the second approach for
MPROSSR in the semi-honest and malicious model in case k = 5.
8.5.1.2 Influence of the Size of the Domain
Figure 8.5.5 shows runtime results for the malicious model variants MR-sbMM and
SR-sbMM for different sizes of the input domain D. We see that we have a linear
impact of the domain size on both protocols. The runtime for MR-sbMM is increased
up to six minutes with a domain size |D| = 1000. The runtime for SR-sbMM is
in the range of 42 up to 48 minutes with domain sizes |D| = 100 respectively
|D| = 1000.
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Figure 8.5.5: Runtime shown for different domain sizes in case n = 5, k = 5 for
MR-sbMM and SR-sbMM .
Figure 8.5.6: Runtime variance for MR-sb, MR-sbMM , SR-sb, and SR-sbMM for n =
3, k = 5, and |D| = 50.
8.5.1.3 Runtime Variance
Figure 8.5.6 shows the runtime variance over 100 protocol runs with three parties
and five inputs each party for MR-sb, MR-sbMM , SR-sb, and SR-sbMM . We use
those protocols as a showcase since the runtime behavior is the same for the other
MPROS protocols. As a showcase, we used a key size of b = 512 bits. We see that
the variance is relatively low in the range of 50 ms for MR, 120 ms for MR-zk, 180
ms for SR, and 1000 ms for SR-zk. This verifies that it is sufficient to average our
results over a small amount of protocol runs.
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Figure 8.5.7: Computation and communication overhead for MR-opt,
MR-optMM for n = 5.
8.5.1.4 Summary
Both malicious model variants MR-sbMM , SR-sbMM are polynomial-time bound
with respect to the number of parties n and inputs k. MR-sbMM and SR-sbMM are
suitable for a large number of parties n. The runtime of MR-sbMM is even in the
range of seconds up to several minutes. The runtime of SR-sbMM is in the range
of minutes up to several hours. The notion of a stronger security model comes
at the price of efficiency and a higher communication overhead compared to the
semi-honest variants.
8.5.2 Test Results for the Third Approach
In this section, we present our evaluation of MR-optMM and SR-optMM .
Test Parameters: See Section 8.5.1.
8.5.2.1 Efficiency and Communication Overhead
In Figure 8.5.7 and Figure 8.5.8, we present our results for MR-optMM , MR-opt with
a varying number of parties or number of inputs. Figure 8.5.9 and Figure 8.5.10
show the results for sum of ranks in the malicious model SR-optMM and in the
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Figure 8.5.8: Computation and communication overhead for MR-opt,
MR-optMM for k = 5.
semi-honest model SR-opt. As expected from theory, the runtime for the mali-
Figure 8.5.9: Computation and communication overhead for SR-opt and
SR-optMM for n = 5.
cious model variants MR-optMM and SR-optMM is higher than for the semi-honest
variants MR-opt and SR-opt. For an input domain D of 200 elements and up to 20
inputs k, we have a runtime of up to 4 minutes for MR-optMM and up to 12 seconds
for MR-opt. Also, the amount of data transmitted is higher for the malicious model
variants with, e. g., 2.5 MB for MR-optMM compared to 0.5 MB for MR-opt in case
of 20 inputs.
Both protocols MR-opt and MR-optMM show linear behavior with respect to the
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Figure 8.5.10: Computation and communication overhead SR-opt and
SR-optMM for k = 5.
number of parties n due to the parallelized proof verification. For 10 parties, we
have a fast runtime of 36 seconds for MR-optMM and 2.5 seconds for MR-opt.
Also the amount of transmitted data is in the range of a few MB with 2.9 MB
for MR-optMM and 0.15 MB for MR-opt.
Figure 8.5.9 shows the results for the sum of ranks composition scheme in case n = 5.
We see that we obtain similar results as for the minimum of ranks composition
scheme. But, the runtime and data transmitted is in general higher. E. g., the
computation time for SR-optMM is in the range of 150 minutes for 10 inputs with
five parties compared to 25 minutes for SR-opt. The communication overhead rises
up to 42 MB for SR-optMM compared to roughly 20 MB for SR-opt. In case k = 5,
SR-opt is 17 times faster (5 minutes) than SR-optMM (88 minutes) and 10 parties.
Due to the zero-knowledge proofs, the communication overhead is also increased
by a factor of 2.3 with 46 MB for SR-optMM and 20 MB for SR-opt in case of 10
parties.
8.5.2.2 Summary
As already shown for the second approach in the malicious model, the notion of a
stronger security model comes at the price of slower protocols and more data has to
be transmitted. But, the third approach is more efficient than the second approach
in terms of computation and communication. E. g. with five parties and eight
inputs, the runtime for MR-sbMM (SR-sbMM ) lies in the range of 2.5 minutes (4.5
hours) and for MR-optMM (SR-optMM ) in the range of 40 seconds (60 minutes).
The communication overhead is 3 (170) MB for MR-sbMM (SR-sbMM ) and 1.4 (23)
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MB for MR-optMM (SR-optMM ).
The malicious model variants for minimum of ranks MR-optMM and MR-sbMM seem
to be fast enough to cope with a large number of inputs k and a high number of
parties n since the runtime lies in the range of seconds respectively minutes and the
transmitted data is only a few MBs. The computation and communication over-
head of the malicious model variants for sum of ranks SR-optMM and SR-sbMM are
significantly higher. All malicious model variants are polynomial-time bound with
respect to the number of parties n and inputs k and suitable for a variety of appli-
cations, see Chapter 6.
8.6 Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation Protocols
on the Android Phone
In this section, we analysis the efficiency of MPROS protocols in a mobile envi-
ronment. In detail, we show runtime results for reconciliation protocols using our
Android application Prefer in Section 8.6.1. The description of the concrete im-
plementation can be found in Section 7.6.2. We also analysis the usability of the
Android application Prefer in Section 7.6.2.1.
8.6.1 Efficiency
We test the efficiency of reconciliation protocols with up to 5 Android devices. Each
device is equipped with a 1 GHz Cortex-A8 processor and 512 MB RAM running
Android 2.3+. All devices are connected via secure channels in a local environment
with a 54 Mb/s WiFi connection. We use the fastest protocol MR-opt to test the
performance of our protocols on mobile devices. We compare our results with a
desktop-based setup. Thus, we obtain a factor how much slower MR-opt is in a
mobile setup compared to a desktop-based setup.
Test Parameters: We vary the number of inputs for a fixed number of parties and
vice versa. We set the number of colluding attackers c = n−1 and used a key size of
b = 1024 bits. The inputs were generate in the same way as in Section 8.4.2.1. The
overall runtime is averaged over three protocol runs.
257
8 Performance Evaluation
Figure 8.6.1: Comparison for MR-opt for n = 5 and k = 5
8.6.1.1 Test Results
Figure 8.6.1 shows our runtime results. In (1) we see the runtime for five parties
with up to 10 inputs. As expected, the runtime is higher in the mobile setup than in
the desktop setup. E. g., the runtime for 10 inputs lies in the range of 10 seconds in
the desktop environment and is significantly higher in the mobile environment with
130 seconds. MR-opt is approximated 13 times slower with an increasing number of
inputs k if executed within our Android application Prefer on an Android device.
In (2) of Figure 8.6.1 we see the runtime for a fixed number of inputs k = 5. E. g.,
with five parties we have a runtime of 35 seconds (Android) compared to 5 seconds
(desktop). MR-opt is approximated 7 times slower with an increasing number of
parties n running on an Android device.
8.6.1.2 Lessons Learnt
As described in Section 7.6.2, our Android application Prefer uses the same im-
plementation of the reconciliation protocols as in the desktop setup in a modular
fashion. The reconciliation protocols were extensively tested in the desktop environ-
ment and the behavior of our Android application Prefer was normal during manual
inspection, i. e., without any errors or crashes.
However, during the extensive tests in the mobile environment, we encountered two
challenges which we detail in the following. During a longer protocol execution, one
of our phones turned off due to overheating. We also encounter the challenge that an
Android application is limited in the size of the heap. This limit is vendor-specific
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and can not be adjusted by the application developer. E. g., the Google Nexus phone
has a maximal heap size of 48 MB. During the automatic testing, our Android app
Prefer was killed by the Android operating system in a non-deterministic fashion.
We suspect that in some cases the garbage collection is fast enough to clear the heap
space. In order to solve those two challenges, one could outsource the computation
to a server component or a desktop computer of the smartphone user. One should
also try to write a heap-efficient mobile application. Overall, testing in a mobile
setup is more complicated than in a the desktop setup, especially the automation
process.
8.6.1.3 Summary
The execution on a mobile device comes at the cost of a higher runtime. As the
runtime is highly dependent on the CPU and RAM, we expect a better runtime
in the future since newer devices are shipped with better hardware. We can also
optimize our mobile application concerning the GUI overhead introduced by the
Android operating system.
8.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have evaluated our framework SMC-MuSe for secure multi-
party computation. We have shown that the core cryptographic building blocks are
efficient in terms of computation and communication overhead. We then evaluated
our MPROS protocols which are built on the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem and
use the privacy-preserving multiset operations. All solutions for MPROS in the
semi-honest and the malicious model are polynomial-time bound with respect to
the number of inputs k and the number of parties n. The results clearly motivate
that the semi-honest model should be applied wherever possible to gain efficiency.
Whenever a stronger security model is needed, we can switch to the malicious model
variants. Finally, we have demonstrated that our MPROS protocols are suitable to
be used in the mobile environment. Therefore, we evaluated our Android application
Prefer in terms of efficiency and usability. Overall, SMC-MuSe provides an efficient
implementation of the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem, privacy-preserving multiset
operations, MPROS protocols secure in the semi-honest and malicious model, and
MPROS on the Android phone.
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9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we summarize the main contributions of this thesis and discuss
open research directions. As motivated in Chapter 1, the main goal of this thesis
was to design and implement multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols
(MPROS) which are secure in the semi-honest and the malicious model, are efficient
enough to be practical, and are useful for common Internet users. The work in this
thesis can be divided into two main parts. The theoretical contribution towards
MPROS is presented in the Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. The practical contribution is
shown in the Chapters 7 and 8.
On the theoretical side, our work presents different reconciliation protocols for the
minimum of ranks (MPROSMR) and the sum of ranks (MPROSSR) composition
schemes in the semi-honest and the malicious models. We developed several novel
cryptographic tools in the areas of Privacy-Preserving Set Operations and Zero-
Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge. We show their value by employing these novel
cryptographic tools within our MPROS protocols. As a first main contribution, we
have designed the three protocols MR-rb, MR-sb, MR-opt (SR-rb, SR-sb, SR-opt)
based on an additively homomorphic cryptosystem for MPROSMR (MPROSSR) in
the semi-honest model. We have also constructed improved protocol variants based
on a fully homomorphic cryptosystem. As a second main contribution, we have
developed the two protocols MR-sbMM , MR-optMM (SR-sbMM , SR-optMM ) for
MPROSMR (MPROSSR) in the malicious model which provide for security against
active attackers.
In practice, as a third main contribution, we have developed the SMC-MuSe frame-
work. SMC-MuSe is a carefully designed framework for secure multi-party computa-
tion based on multisets. We have implemented different cryptographic components,
a support infrastructure for SMC, all newly-developed MPROS protocols, and two
user-friendly applications for the desktop and mobile environment. Finally, as a
fourth main contribution, we have evaluated the efficiency and analyzed the usabil-
ity of the SMC-MuSe framework. Specifically, we have measured the computation
and communication overhead of all implemented cryptographic building blocks and
MPROS protocols within the SMC-MuSe framework. With respect to usability,
we have tested the implemented Android application Prefer through a user study.
Finally, we have analyzed the applicability of our reconciliation protocols. We pre-
sented different application scenarios for MPROS and showed the usefulness for
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common Internet users by conducting a user study on privacy-preserving reconcili-
ation in the Internet. In the following, the individual contributions are summarized
in more detail.
In Chapter 3, we have introduced novel cryptographic building blocks in the research
areas of privacy-preserving set operations (Section 2.5) and zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge (Section 2.3). The proposed generalized multiset intersection operation is
used in the construction of our proposed MPROS protocols in Chapter 4. Further-
more, the chapter includes a presentation of two protocols to test the membership of
an element within a multiset and to test the inclusion relation between two multisets
in a privacy-preserving manner. Both protocols can be used to eliminate elements
in a multiset and are useful in certain applications, e. g., in a Borda Count voting
with Veto. Overall, we have generalized Kissner’s grammar [114] for multiset oper-
ations which is valid for input multisets of equal size. On the one hand, we lifted
the restriction of equal sized input multisets such that the new grammar is valid
for arbitrary input multisets. On the other hand, we extended the grammar by in-
troducing the difference operation (\) for multisets. In the area of Zero-Knowledge
Proofs of Knowledge, we have constructed novel zero-knowledge proofs for the Paillier
cryptosystem and more generic ZKPK protocols for verifiable polynomial construc-
tion and polynomial operations based on any additively homomorphic cryptosystem.
These building blocks are used in the design of our reconciliation protocols secure
against active attackers proposed in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 4, we have proposed the three different multi-party privacy-preserving
reconciliation protocols MR-rb, MR-sb, MR-opt (SR-rb, SR-sb, SR-opt) for the min-
imum of ranks and sum of ranks composition scheme which are secure in the semi-
honest model using the standard security model. Our constructions utilize an ad-
ditively homomorphic cryptosystem and are based on privacy-preserving multiset
operations. All reconciliation protocols are described for n parties and c < n collud-
ing attackers. For each reconciliation protocol, we have given a high-level overview
of the protocol, constructed a formal protocol, and provided an elaborated protocol
analysis of the correctness, security/privacy, and efficiency in terms of computation
and communication overhead. As a future research direction, one could explore
potential optimizations of our MPROS protocols. E. g., in order to eliminate the
iterative reduction steps in the multiset-based constructions, one could try to find a
way to pre-compute the threshold value t used in the multiset reduction operation.
This may lead to a considerable performance improvement of our MPROS protocols.
Based on a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, we have investigated potential
improvements of our reconciliation protocols of ordered sets. The results indicate
that we will obtain faster protocols for both composition schemes if an efficient fully
homomorphic encryption scheme exists. The existence of such a scheme is still an
ongoing research challenge. Finally, we have shown that it is possible to generalize
reconciliation protocols to arbitrary pre-ordered input sets which enables a broader
range of application scenarios.
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In Chapter 5, we have shown that it is possible to construct protocol variants
using the malicious adversary model. We have constructed the protocol variants
MR-sbMM , MR-optMM (SR-sbMM , SR-optMM ) for minimum of ranks and sum of
ranks which are secure in the malicious model using the random oracle security
model. The reconciliation protocol is given for n parties and c = n− 1 colluding at-
tackers. Our constructions apply a range of non-interactive ZKPK protocols which
are based on existing preliminary work (Section 2.3) and novel cryptographic tools
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3) in the area of Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge. We have
provided a brief description of all protocol constructions and analyzed the correct-
ness, security/privacy (formal simulation proof ), and complexity (computation and
communication overhead) of each protocol. The complexity analysis clearly shows
that the stronger security model comes at the price of efficiency with an increased
computation overhead by a factor of O(n) and a much larger communication over-
head than the semi-honest variants. Thus, depending on the application scenario
one should favor MPROS protocols secure in the semi-honest model or the malicious
model. As a future direction, one can analyze whether the non-interactive ZKPK
protocols using the random oracle security model can be converted into interactive
ZKPK protocols using the standard security model. A promising candidate is the
auxiliary string assumption by Damgard et al. [43]. Here, a globally shared random
string can be used in the efficient interactive challenge generation. This would lead
to interactive ZKPK protocols that can be proven secure in the standard security
model. A further interesting question would be whether a re-design of the proto-
cols for a varying number c < n of colluding attackers, similar to the semi-honest
constructions shown in Chapter 4, leads to a reduced amount of computation and
communication required for each party.
In Chapter 7, we have presented the SMC-MuSe framework which makes secure
multi-party computation on multisets available to application developers and end-
users. As a first step, we proposed a new practical system model which over-
comes the discrepancies between the system assumptions made in theoretical SMC
and the communication model most commonly used on the Internet today. Our
implementation includes cryptographic building blocks, a support infrastructure,
multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols, and user-friendly applica-
tions. The cryptographic building blocks consist of different additively homomor-
phic cryptosystems, privacy-preserving multiset operations, and ZKPK protocols.
The support infrastructure assists the developer in the communication and com-
putation process of each party. Most importantly, SMC-MuSe provides efficient
asynchronous communication and message serialization, SMC workers for all related
privacy-preserving computations, secure channels, and a Server and Keyserver com-
ponent for message forwarding and key generation/distribution. The core part is the
implementation of all reconciliation protocols secure in the semi-honest (Chapter 4)
and the malicious model (Chapter 5). To the best of our knowledge, SMC-MuSe
is the first practical framework that allows privacy-preserving computations against
active attackers. Regarding usability, we have developed a desktop and an An-
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droid application where both applications include a scheduling component. Here,
multiple parties can schedule meetings with each other in a privacy-preserving and
preference-maximizing way. The evaluation of our user study on the Android appli-
cation Prefer has shown that our Android application Prefer is a useful and very
interesting application for today’s smartphone users. As a future research direc-
tion, one could implement all parts of cryptographic building blocks, e. g., ZKPK
protocols, as a native C++ library. Currently, only the main arithmetic computa-
tions such as integer multiplication and exponentiation are implemented in a native
fashion. A native library for cryptographic building blocks would definitely improve
the performance of all MPROS protocols but maybe reduce the usability of the
framework for application developers.
In Chapters 6 and 8, we have evaluated the performance and usability of the SMC-
MuSe framework. We have evaluated the efficiency in terms of computation and
communication overhead of the Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem, privacy-preserving
multiset operations, MPROS protocols secure in the semi-honest and malicious
model, and MPROS on the Android phone. All solutions for MPROS in the semi-
honest and the malicious model are polynomial-time bound with respect to the
number of inputs k and the number of parties n. We have also demonstrated that
our MPROS protocols are efficient enough to be used in the mobile environment. In
Chapter 6, we have presented different reconciliation-based application scenarios in
the areas of event scheduling, e-voting, and electronic auctions. We have evaluated
the usability of these scenarios for common Internet users in a comprehensive user
study on privacy-preserving reconciliation in the Internet. Most importantly, the
evaluation results have shown that the test persons always prefer the negotiation by
secure multi-party computation in all application scenarios. Also, the test subjects
think that the minimum of ranks and sum of ranks composition schemes are good
solutions to achieve fairness in the reconciliation process. However, the users prefer
minimum of ranks over sum of ranks. Overall, the user study has shown that our
reconciliation protocols MPROSMR and MPROSSR are very useful in the presented
application scenarios for the test persons. A good research direction is to investi-
gate what fairness means for common Internet users and how fair other composition
schemes are. It is also interesting to explore further application areas besides event
scheduling, e-voting, and electronic auctions.
In summary, this thesis makes several contributions in theory and practice in the re-
search areas homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocols,
secure multi-party computation, privacy-preserving set operations, and reconciliation
protocols. We have shown that multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation proto-
cols are a very interesting use case for additively homomorphic and fully homomor-
phic cryptosystems. We have also proposed novel non-interactive ZKPK protocols,
constructed the concrete proofs for a threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem,
and implemented those ZKPK protocols within our SMC-MuSe framework. In the
area of privacy-preserving set operations, we have extended Kissner’s multiset op-
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erations and successfully applied those multiset operations in the construction of
our reconciliation protocols. In the field of SMC, we have contributed SMC-MuSe
which is an efficient and usable framework for secure multi-party computation on
multisets. We have shown the efficiency by an extensive performance analysis of
all implemented components. We have also demonstrated that SMC-MuSe is com-
petitive with existing SMC frameworks such as the SEPIA framework. We have
shown the usability of our Android application Prefer and presented a user study
on privacy-preserving reconciliation in the Internet. In the field of reconciliation
protocols, we have effectively enabled reconciliation in the multi-party setting. We
have contributed protocol constructions secure in the semi-honest and the malicious
model and illustrated different application scenarios. Our user study has shown that
reconciliation protocols are very useful in these application scenarios for common
Internet users.
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A Description of the SMC-MuSe Code
Base
In this Appendix, we provide technical information about the code base of SMC-
MuSe. We provide information about the structure of each project, the build process,
library dependencies, code repositories, and installation instructions. All projects
are located at the Itsec-GitLab1. The global package namespace of SMC-MuSe is
itsec.*.
Overall, the development team of SMC-MuSe consists of several student assistants,
diploma thesis students, and the author of this thesis. Namely, the following persons
worked on the framework: Christian Bien, Samuel Schu¨ppen, Lucas Brutschy, Sebas-
tian Szlosarczyk, Mark Schlo¨sser, and Georg Neugebauer. The work on SMC-MuSe
has also been published in [146, 149]. In the following, we discuss the contributions
of the students in more details.
The development of SMC-MuSe has been supported by two students working at our
department. Christian Bien helped in the development of the cryptographic compo-
nents and the reconciliation protocols in the semi-honest model. He mainly worked
on the user-friendly desktop application, see Section 7.6.1. Samuel Schu¨ppen pri-
marily worked on the Android application Prefer, see Section 7.6.2. He also helped
with the integration of the SEPIA framework in our test environment, see Sec-
tion 2.5.2.8. Sebastian Szlosarczyk helped in the development of a browser frontend
for our desktop application, see Section 7.6.1.
Lucas Brutschy also helped in the development of SMC-MuSe during his diploma
thesis Towards Secure Private Ordered Set Reconciliation against Active Attackers
[24]. He provided an implementation of the zero-knowledge proofs and implemented
the computation components of the reconciliation protocols in the malicious model.
Compared to [24], we implemented the serializable messages for all components of the
zero-knowledge proofs. We also implemented our reconciliation protocols in the ma-
licious model with the computation and communication components. Here, we also
measured the communication overhead of our protocols.
In order to offer a framework with efficient communication between all parties, we
1Itsec-Gitlab: https://gitlab.itsec.rwth-aachen.de.
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adapted the itsecnetback project which has been developed by Mark Schlo¨sser in
his diploma thesis A new framework for secure distributed function calls [177]. The
itsecnetback project provides efficient and secure asynchronous event-driven network
communication between two network components. The itsecnetback project can han-
dle encrypted traffic, server-side certificate verification, and message serialization.
Compared to [177], we added the feature of using Java and BouncyCastle keystores
for the secure connection (SSL) between the two components and implemented a
mutually authenticated SSLContext. We also made minor modifications to handle
secure connections established with Android phones. More details can be found in
Section 7.2.1.
In the following, we describe each project in details.
A.1 Java Project: Privacy-Preserving Applications (PPA)
Library
The PPA library is the core project of the SMC-MuSe framework, see Section 7.2.1.
It is a Java project for the Netbeans IDE [159] and the code repository is ppa-
library.git. The build process is automated with the build file build.xml created
by the Netbeans IDE using the Apache Ant technology [2]. The output is the JAR
PPA.jar. Further installation instructions can be found in the README file located
in the root folder of the project.
The project has the following library dependencies:
• MessagePack [72], msgpack-0.5.1-devel.jar : This library enables fast and small
serialization of messages.
• JBoss Netty [142], netty-3.2.4.Final.jar : This library provides efficient asyn-
chronous communication.
• MongoDB [136], mongo-2.4.jar : This library enables the use of the MongoDB
which provides efficient data storage.
• Morphia [100], morphia-0.99.jar : This library enables the mapping of Java
objects to/from MongoDB, e. g., to map MPROS objects to the MongoDB.
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Figure A.1.1: Overview of the Package Structure of the PPA library.
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• Uncommons Maths [59], uncommons-maths-1.2.1.jar : This library is used in
the PROS implementation to represent and manipulate bit string policies.
• BouncyCastle Crypto API [120], bcmail-jdk16-146.jar / bcprov-jdk16-146.jar :
We use this library to work with Bouncy Castle keystores and certificates. We
also use the Spongy Castle library [187] to be compatible with our Android
application Prefer, see Appendix A.4 for more details.
• PPA JNI Natives, libJNINative.so : This is a support library of SMC-MuSe
which is used for efficient arithmetic computations, see Appendix A.2.
• PPA-Netback, PPANetback.jar : This is a support library of SMC-MuSe which
is used for the establishment of secure channels, see Appendix A.3.
• Java Platform Standard Edition 6 / 7 [156] : The PPA library is based on the
Java platform version 6 or higher. Developers can work with the library using
the Java Development Kit (JDK) and users can run parts of the library using
the Java Runtime Environment (JRE).
The package structure of the project is shown in Figure A.1.1. Overall, the project
consists of 31,424 source lines of code. The description of the content of the packages
can be found in Chapter 7.
A.2 C++ Project: PPA JNI Natives
The PPA JNI Natives project is a support library for SMC-MuSe, see Section 7.2.1.
It is a C++ project for the Netbeans IDE and the code repository is ppa-natives.git.
The library is built with the Makefile using the GCC compiler [69]. The output is
the shared object file libJNINative.so. Further installation instructions can be found
in the README file.
The project has the following library dependencies:
• GMP library [79], gmp / gmpxx : This library enables efficient arithmetic
computations. We succesfully tested the GMP versions 5.0.2, 5.0.5, and 5.1.1.
The project consists of the following files:
• ppa c functions.h / ppa jni natives.h : Header files which define the available
methods and provide the JNI signatures.
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• ppa jni natives.cpp : The core class which provides an implementation of the
defined methods.
• Native.java : The Java class which loads the shared object and provides the
implemented methods to the PPA library.
Overall, the project consists of 292 source lines of code. The description of the usage
of the packages can be found in Chapter 7.
A.3 Java Project: PPA-Netback
The PPA-Netback project is a support library for SMC-MuSe, see Section 7.2.1. It is
a Java project for the Netbeans IDE and the code repository is ppa-netback.git. The
build process is automated with the Apache Ant build file build.xml. The output
is the JAR PPANetback.jar. Further installation instructions can be found in the
README file.
The project has the following library dependencies:
• MessagePack [72], msgpack-0.5.1-devel.jar : See Appendix A.1.
• JBoss Netty [142], netty-3.2.4.Final.jar : See Appendix A.1.
• BouncyCastle Crypto API [120], bcprov-jdk16-146.jar : See Appendix A.1.
The project consists of the following files:
• Server.java : This class implements the SSL context of the listening component
(Server).
• Client.java : This class implements the SSL context of the connecting compo-
nent (Client).
• Netback.java : This class uses the JBoss Netty framework to implement the
handling, buffering, receiving, and sending of messages in the SSL context.
It also implements methods to verify certificates while establishing an SSL
connection.
• Netfront.java / MessageHandler.java : These two interfaces have to be imple-
mented by the application developer. The frontend should contain the logic
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of the application and the message handle class should take care of message
sending, receiving, unpacking, and packing.
• MessagePackEncoder.java / MessagePackStreamDecoder.java : These classes
provide methods to pack and unpack objects serialized with MessagePack [72].
Overall, the project consists of 333 source lines of code. The description of the usage
of the project can be found in Chapter 7.
A.4 Android Project: Prefer
The Prefer library is a support library which contains the implementation of our
Android application Prefer, see Section 7.6.2. It is an Android project for the
Eclipse IDE [186] and the code repository is prefer.git. The build process is au-
tomated with the Apache Ant build file build.xml created by the Eclipse IDE.
The output is the Android application package file Prefer.apk. Further installa-
tion instructions can be found in the README file located in the root folder of the
project.
The project has the following library dependencies:
• ActionBarSherlock [196], actionbarsherlock.jar : This library is used to provide
a user-friendly action bar for all versions of Android.
• MessagePack [72], msgpack-Android.jar : See Appendix A.1.
• JBoss Netty [142], netty-3.2.4.Final.jar : See Appendix A.1.
• Spongy Castle [187], scprov-147.jar / scpkix-147.jar : The Android platform
unfortunately comes with a cut-down version of Bouncy Castle. The Spongy
Castle library solves this problem in the following way. All package names have
been moved from org.bouncycastle.* to org.spongycastle.* to avoid classloader
conflicts. We use the Spongy Castle library to employ the latest Bouncy Castle
version [120].
• PPA Library, PPA.jar : This is the core library of SMC-MuSe and we use
several components of the library, see also Chapter 7 and Appendix A.1.
• PPA JNI Natives, libJNINative.so : This is a support library of SMC-MuSe
which is used for efficient arithmetic computations, see Appendix A.2. We
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Figure A.4.1: Overview of the Package Structure of the Prefer library.
cross compile the native library to the ARM architecture of Android using the
AndroidNDK [88].
• PPA-Netback, PPANetback.jar : See Appendix A.3.
• Android platform 2.3+ [89] : The Prefer library is based on the Android
platform version 2.3 or higher. Developers can work with the library using
the Android Development Kit (Android SDK) and users can run the Android
application using a smartphone or an emulator with an Android platform.
The package structure of the project is shown in Figure A.4.1. Overall, the project
consists of 8,914 source lines of code. The description of the content of the packages
can be found in Chapter 7.
273
A Description of the SMC-MuSe Code Base
A.5 Java Project: SEPIA Integration
This project contains our integration of the SEPIA framework to test the effi-
ciency of the multiset intersection and union operation as well as the efficiency of
MR-opt using the SEPIA framework, see Sections 8.3.1 and 8.4.3 for more details.
The code repository is sepia-integration.git. The project consists of five folders. The
DocumentationLibraries folder contains all necessary dependencies and the SEPIA
documentation. The folders Intersection and Union contain the SEPIA implemen-
tation of these two operations.
The folder SepiaTests contains our integration of the SEPIA framework including
runtime measurements, automation of the test process, and scripts to test the ef-
ficiency of the multiset intersection and union operation as well as the efficiency
of MR-opt. The folder ExampleMPCSetup contains an example configuration for
the input and privacy peers which can be distributed to the test systems. Fur-
ther installation instructions can be found in the README file in the root folder
of the project. Overall, our SEPIA integration (SepiaTests folder) consists of 553
source lines of code. The description of the usage of the project can be found in
Chapter 7.
A.6 Java Web Start Project: Desktop Application
This project implements a browser frontend for our desktop application, see Sec-
tion 7.6.1. The code repository is browser-frontend.git. The project consists of two
parts. There is a homepage folder containing all necessary files to host a web page
to start our desktop application within a browser using the Java Web Start tech-
nology [158]. Second, there is a windows installer folder which contains a setup.exe
which enables the execution of the desktop application on systems running the Win-
dows operating system. Note that the Windows installer is outdated and has to be
adapted to cope with current Windows versions. Further installation instructions
can be found in the README file in the respective folders. The description of the
usage of the project can be found in Chapter 7.
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Study Survey Privatspha¨rewahrende
Aushandlungen im Internet
In this Appendix, we shortly present the relevant parts of our user study which we
evaluated in this thesis. The evaluation can be found in Section 6.5. Note that
we plan to publish a research paper about the complete user study, see Chapter 9.
In the following, we describe the evaluated parts of the original user study survey
in German. In all scenarios, the user can choose between the open negotiation,
the closed negotiation, and the negotiation by secure multi-party computation, see
Section 6.5 for more details. Figure B.1.1 shows the invitation flyer used for the
recruitment of participants.
• Figure B.1.2: This figure shows the scheduling with friends scenario. Here,
the subject should imagine to schedule a meeting with its friends for a leisure
time activity.
• Figure B.1.3: This scenario is for students and pupils. The subject should
imagine to schedule a project meeting with its classmates in the school. The
meeting should be in the afternoon.
• Figure B.1.4: This scenario is again for students and pupils. The subject should
imagine to negotiate a destination for a school excursion with its classmates in
the school. There are different destinations from which the subject can make
its choices.
• Figure B.1.5: This scenario is for employees. The subject should imagine to
schedule a conference with its colleague in the company. The meeting should
be during the working time in the next week.
• Figure B.1.6: This scenario is again for employees. The subject should imag-
ine to negotiate a destination for a company outing with its colleague in the
company. There are different destinations from which the subject can make
its choices.
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• Figures B.1.7 and B.1.8: These figures show the questions about preferences.
The subject is asked to imagine a scheduling scenario with Michael, Alice,
and Peter. The description shows an example where the two different no-
tions of fairness are explained, namely the minimum of ranks and the sum of
ranks composition scheme. Then, the subject is asked whether preferences in
scheduling application are desirable, how fair both approaches are, and which
composition scheme is preferable.
• Figure B.1.9: This figure shows the electronic auction scenario. The subject
is asked to imagine to buy an item at a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (see
Chapter 6).
B.1 Study Material
Figure B.1.1: Invitation Flyer
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Freizeit:  
Sie wollen zusammen mit vier Freunden nächste Woche eine Freizeitaktivität planen. 
Beispielsweise ins Kino, Restaurant oder Theater gehen. Nun möchten Sie mit ihren 
Freunden über das Internet aushandeln an welchem Tag Sie sich treffen. Das Treffen kann 
an jedem Abend um 20 Uhr beginnen. Sie können für jeden Termin angeben, ob Sie Zeit 
haben oder nicht. 
 
Offene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Alle ihre Freunde und der Serviceanbieter können sehen, welche Wochentage Sie 
ausgewählt haben und erhalten das Ergebnis der Terminaushandlung. D.h. alle Termine an 
denen jeder Zeit hat.  
 
Geschlossene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Der Serviceanbieter erhält von Ihnen und ihren Freunden die ausgewählten Wochentage 
zugeschickt und berechnet damit das Ergebnis, welches Ihnen mitgeteilt wird. D.h. alle 
Termine an denen jeder Zeit hat. Keiner ihrer Freunde erhält Einsicht in ihre ausgewählten 
Wochentage.  
 
Sichere-Mehr-Parteien-Berechnung:  
Keiner ihrer Freunde und auch kein Serviceanbieter erhält Einsicht in ihre ausgewählten 
Wochentage. Nur das Ergebnis wird sicher und privatsphärewahrend berechnet und allen 
bekannt gegeben. D.h. alle Termine an denen jeder Zeit hat. 
17. Ich bin bereit die Abstimmung der Terminaushandlung mit 
Freunden nach dem folgenden Verfahren durchzuführen
 
Terminaushandlung mit Freunden
Auf jeden Fall Gerne Vielleicht Ungern Auf keinen Fall
Offene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Geschlossene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Sichere-Mehr-
Parteien-
Berechnung
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Begründung 
5
6
Figure B.1.2: Scenario: Scheduling with Friends
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Schule:  
Sie müssen mit vier Mitschülern einen einstündigen Termin für ein Treffen ihrer 
Projektgruppe absprechen. Die Terminaushandlung soll über das Internet erfolgen. Der 
Termin soll an einem Nachmittag der nächsten Woche stattfinden. Sie können für jeden 
Termin angeben, ob Sie Zeit haben oder nicht. 
 
Offene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Alle ihre Mitschüler und der Serviceanbieter können sehen, welche Termine Sie ausgewählt 
haben und erhalten das Ergebnis der Terminaushandlung. D.h. alle Termine an denen jeder 
Zeit hat.  
 
Geschlossene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Der Serviceanbieter bekommt von Ihnen und ihren Mitschülern die ausgewählten Termine 
zugeschickt und berechnet damit das Ergebnis der Terminaushandlung, welches Ihnen 
mitgeteilt wird. Ihre Mitschüler erhalten keine Einsicht in ihre ausgewählten Termine.  
 
Sichere-Mehr-Parteien-Berechnung:  
Keiner ihrer Mitschüler und auch kein Serviceanbieter erhält Einsicht in ihre ausgewählten 
Termine. Nur das Ergebnis wird sicher und privatsphärewahrend berechnet und allen 
bekannt gegeben. D.h. alle Termine an denen jeder Zeit hat. 
24. Ich bin bereit die Abstimmung des Projektgruppen-Treffens nach 
dem folgenden Verfahren durchzuführen
 
Terminaushandlung im Schulumfeld
Auf jeden Fall Gerne Vielleicht Ungern Auf keinen Fall
Offene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Geschlossene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Sichere-Mehr-
Parteien-
Berechnung
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Begründung 
5
6
Figure B.1.3: Scenario: Scheduling a Project Meeting
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Schulausflug:  
Sie wollen zusammen mit ihren Mitschülern im nächsten Monat einen Schulausflug 
machen. Sie haben sich über den Tag des Ausflugs schon geeinigt. Nun möchten Sie mit 
ihren Mitschülern über das Internet noch das Ausflugsziel abstimmen. Aus folgenden 
Ausflugszielen können Sie auswählen: Wandern, Grillen, Schwimmen, Kletterpark, 
Vergnügungspark, Museumsbesuch, Theaterbesuch, Zoobesuch. Für jedes dieser Ziele 
können Sie angeben, ob es für Sie in Frage kommt oder nicht. 
 
Offene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Alle ihre Mitschüler und der Serviceanbieter können sehen, welche Ausflugsziele Sie 
ausgewählt haben und erhalten das Ergebnis der Aushandlung. D.h. alle Ausflugsziele die 
für jeden in Frage kommen.  
 
Geschlossene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Der Serviceanbieter erhält von Ihnen und ihren Mitschülern die ausgewählten Ausflugsziele 
zugeschickt und berechnet damit das Ergebnis, welches Ihnen mitgeteilt wird. D.h. alle 
Ausflugsziele die für jeden in Frage kommen. Keiner ihrer Mitschüler erhält Einsicht in 
ihre ausgewählten Ausflugsziele.  
 
Sichere-Mehr-Parteien-Berechnung:  
Keiner ihrer Mitschüler und auch kein Serviceanbieter erhält Einsicht in ihre ausgewählten 
Ausflugsziele. Nur das Ergebnis wird sicher und privatsphärewahrend berechnet und allen 
bekannt gegeben. D.h. alle Ausflugsziele die für jeden in Frage kommen. 
30. Ich bin bereit die Abstimmung der Aushandlung des Ausflugsziels 
nach dem folgenden Verfahren durchzuführen
 
Aushandlung eines Schulausflugs
Auf jeden Fall Gerne Vielleicht Ungern Auf keinen Fall
Offene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Geschlossene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Sichere-Mehr-
Parteien-
Berechnung
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Begründung 
5
6
Figure B.1.4: Scenario: Negotiate the Destination for a School Excursion
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Beruf:  
Sie müssen mit vier Arbeitskollegen einen einstündigen Termin für eine Besprechung in 
der nächsten Woche absprechen. Die Terminaushandlung soll über das Internet erfolgen. 
Der Termin soll in ihren Kernarbeitszeiten stattfinden. Sie können für jeden möglichen 
Termin in der nächsten Woche angeben, ob Sie Zeit haben oder nicht. 
 
Offene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Alle ihre Arbeitskollegen und der Serviceanbieter können sehen, welche Wochentage Sie 
ausgewählt haben und erhalten das Ergebnis der Terminaushandlung. D.h. alle Termine an 
denen jeder Zeit hat.  
 
Geschlossene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Der Serviceanbieter bekommt von Ihnen und ihren Arbeitskollegen die ausgewählten 
Termine zugeschickt und berechnet damit das Ergebnis der Terminaushandlung, welches 
Ihnen mitgeteilt wird. Ihre Arbeitskollegen erhalten keine Einsicht in ihre ausgewählten 
Termine.  
 
Sichere-Mehr-Parteien-Berechnung:  
Keiner ihrer Arbeitskollegen und auch kein Serviceanbieter erhält Einsicht in ihre 
ausgewählten Wochenstunden. Nur das Ergebnis wird sicher und privatsphärewahrend 
berechnet und allen bekannt gegeben. D.h. alle Termine an denen jeder Zeit hat. 
34. Ich bin bereit die Abstimmung des Geschäftsmeetings nach dem 
folgenden Verfahren durchzuführen
 
Terminaushandlung im Geschäftsumfeld
Auf jeden Fall Gerne Vielleicht Ungern Auf keinen Fall
Offene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Geschlossene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Sichere-Mehr-
Parteien-
Berechnung
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Begründung 
5
6
Figure B.1.5: Scenario: Scheduling a Business Meeting
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Betriebsausflug:  
Sie wollen zusammen mit ihren Arbeitskollegen im nächsten Monat einen Betriebsausflug 
machen. Sie haben sich über den Tag des Ausflugs schon geeinigt. Nun möchten Sie mit 
ihren Arbeitskollegen über das Internet noch das Ausflugsziel abstimmen. Aus folgenden 
Ausflugszielen können Sie auswählen: Wandern, Grillen, Schwimmen, Kletterpark, 
Vergnügungspark, Museumsbesuch, Theaterbesuch, Zoobesuch. Für jedes dieser Ziele 
können Sie angeben, ob es für Sie in Frage kommt oder nicht. 
 
Offene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Alle ihre Arbeitskollegen und der Serviceanbieter können sehen, welche Ausflugsziele Sie 
ausgewählt haben und erhalten das Ergebnis der Aushandlung. D.h. alle Ausflugsziele die 
für jeden in Frage kommen.  
 
Geschlossene Terminaushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Der Serviceanbieter erhält von Ihnen und ihren Arbeitskollegen die ausgewählten 
Ausflugsziele zugeschickt und berechnet damit das Ergebnis, welches Ihnen mitgeteilt wird. 
D.h. alle Ausflugsziele die für jeden in Frage kommen. Keiner ihrer Arbeitskollegen erhält 
Einsicht in ihre ausgewählten Ausflugsziele.  
 
Sichere-Mehr-Parteien-Berechnung:  
Keiner ihrer Arbeitskollegen und auch kein Serviceanbieter erhält Einsicht in ihre 
ausgewählten Ausflugsziele. Nur das Ergebnis wird sicher und privatsphärewahrend 
berechnet und allen bekannt gegeben. D.h. alle Ausflugsziele die für jeden in Frage 
kommen. 
41. Ich bin bereit die Abstimmung der Aushandlung des Ausflugsziels 
nach dem folgenden Verfahren durchzuführen
 
Aushandlung eines Betriebsausflugs
Auf jeden Fall Gerne Vielleicht Ungern Auf keinen Fall
Offene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Geschlossene 
Terminaushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Sichere-Mehr-
Parteien-
Berechnung
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Begründung 
5
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Figure B.1.6: Scenario: Negotiate the Destination for a Business Excursion
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Präferenzen:  
Im folgenden geht es darum eine Terminaushandlung mit Präferenzen zu realisieren.  
 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie könnten bei einer Terminabsprache für jeden möglichen 
Wochentag eine Präferenz angeben. Hierfür müssten Sie für jeden Wochentag einen 
Punktewert zwischen 1 und 4 vergeben (4 Punkte wenn dieser Wochentag sehr gut in Ihren 
Zeitplan passt, 1 Punkt, falls der Wochentag auch möglich ist, aber nicht so gut in ihren 
Zeitplan passt). Jeder Punktewert darf genau einmal vergeben werden.  
 
Betrachten Sie zur Verdeutlichung folgendes Beispiel: 
 
In diesem Beispiel stimmen Michael, Alice und Peter einen Termin ab. Michael würde sich 
am liebsten am Montag treffen und ungern am Donnerstag. Peter hat seine Präferenzen 
genau entgegengesetzt zu Michael gewählt. In Summe (Sum) erhält der Montag 9 Punkte, 
der Dienstag 8 Punkte, der Mittwoch 6 Punkte und der Donnerstag 7 Punkte. Der kleinste 
vergebene Wert (Min) ist für Montag 1 Punkt, für Dienstag 2 Punkte, für Mittwoch 1 
Punkt und für Donnerstag 1 Punkt. 
 
Im Folgenden betrachten wir zwei verschiedene Möglichkeiten zur Terminbestimmung, die 
die Präferenzen der Teilnehmer berücksichtigen. 
 
Möglichkeit Max Summe: 
Es wird der Termin ausgewählt, der in Summe die meisten Punkte erhält.  
D.h. der Termin, der insgesamt am beliebtesten ist.  
(Im Beispiel Montag mit 9 Punkten) 
 
Möglichkeit Max Min: 
Es wird der Termin ausgewählt, der den größten kleinsten vergebenen Wert hat.  
D.h. der Termin, der am wenigsten unbeliebt ist. 
(Im Beispiel Dienstag mit 2 Punkten) 
45. Finden Sie die Möglichkeit der Vergabe von Präferenzen im 
Kontext von Terminabsprachen wünschenswert?
 
Terminaushandlungen mit Präferenzen
Ja nmlkj
Nein nmlkj
Figure B.1.7: Composition Schemes, Part I
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46. Wie fair finden Sie die Auswahl nach der Möglichkeit Max 
Summe?
47. Wie fair finden Sie die Auswahl nach der Möglichkeit Max Min?
48. Welche der beiden Auswahlmöglichkeiten finden Sie fairer?
 
Sehr fair nmlkj Fair nmlkj Teils / Teils nmlkj Unfair nmlkj Sehr unfair nmlkj
Kurze Begründung 
Sehr fair nmlkj Fair nmlkj Teils / Teils nmlkj Unfair nmlkj Sehr unfair nmlkj
Kurze Begründung 
Max Summe nmlkj
Max Min nmlkj
Keines von beiden nmlkj
Kurze Begründung 
Figure B.1.8: Composition Schemes, Part II
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Auktionen:  
Sie würden gerne einen Artikel im Internet ersteigern. Es soll eine besondere Form von 
Auktionen genutzt werden, um den Gewinner der Auktion sowie den Preis zu bestimmen. 
Jeder Bieter hat die Möglichkeit genau ein Maximalgebot abzugeben. Die Auktion endet 
diese Woche und bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt muss jeder Bieter sein Gebot abgeben. Danach 
wird der Gewinner der Auktion sowie der Verkaufspreis bestimmt. Es gewinnt derjenige 
mit dem höchsten Gebot und zahlt lediglich den Preis des zweithöchsten Gebotes. 
 
Offene Aushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Alle Bieter und der Serviceanbieter können am Ende der Auktion sehen, welches 
Maximalgebot Sie bereit waren zu zahlen und erhalten das Ergebnis der Auktion. D.h. der 
Gewinner der Auktion sowie der zu zahlende Preis werden Ihnen mitgeteilt.  
 
Geschlossene Aushandlung über einen Serviceanbieter:  
Der Serviceanbieter bekommt von Ihnen und allen anderen Bietern die Maximalgebote 
zugeschickt und berechnet damit das Ergebnis der Auktion, welches Ihnen mitgeteilt wird. 
D.h. der Gewinner der Auktion sowie der zu zahlende Preis. Die anderen Bieter erhalten 
keine Einsicht in ihr Maximalgebot.  
 
Sichere-Mehr-Parteien-Berechnung:  
Keiner der anderen Bieter und auch kein Serviceanbieter erhält Einsicht in die 
Maximalgebote. Nur das Ergebnis wird zusammen sicher und privatsphärewahrend 
berechnet und Ihnen bekannt gegeben. D.h. der Gewinner der Auktion sowie der zu 
zahlende Preis. 
49. Ich bin bereit die Abstimmung der Internetauktion nach dem 
folgenden Verfahren durchzuführen
 
Aushandlung von Waren über das Internet
Auf jeden Fall Gerne Vielleicht Ungern Auf keinen Fall
Offene 
Aushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Geschlossene 
Aushandlung 
über einen 
Serviceanbieter
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Sichere-Mehr-
Parteien-
Berechnung
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Begründung 
5
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Figure B.1.9: Scenario: First-Price Sealed Bid-Auction
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